

4 SEP 1965

6-368/ST

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEFMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Satellite Reconnaissance Advance Notice (SATRAN) (U)

1. (S) In the summer of 1964, soon after intelligence analysts revealed that the Soviets were conducting satellite photographic reconnaissance of the U.S. and other areas of the world that are of strategic interest to them, some of the US Commands requested information on the areas under surveillance by the Soviets. CINCLANT, CINCSOUTH, and CINCSAC, in particular, stated that they needed to know the areas being photographed by the Soviets, and needed to know this in "real time," particularly in times of crises, i.e., as soon after the photography occurred as possible in order to take defensive action as deemed necessary. This defensive action could be dispersal of forces, increased alert posture, or acceptance of the fact that their force posture had been detected and was known.
2. (S) Discussions were held with NSA leading to a rough determination of the additional resources necessary to provide this "real time" intelligence, and although a final cost was not ascertained, the increase necessary in personnel and facilities at overseas installations indicated the capital outlay at several million dollars, in addition to increased operating costs. The J-3 and J-5, JCS, were asked to comment on the real time requirements. They were not enthusiastic, both in terms of the value of the real time data, and in consideration of the increased resources required to meet the requirement. They did, however, suggest further study by DIA to provide useful information to the US Commands.
3. (S) Inasmuch as the above system at best would provide only after-the-fact information of surveillance of U.S. forces by Soviet spacecraft, and much of the information that could be determined by the Soviets, such as deployment practices and policy, are practically useless once they have been compromised, DIAST investigated other means that could be used to counter Soviet satellite reconnaissance.
4. (S) It was decided that prior warning of possible reconnaissance would be much more beneficial than after-the-fact information. This prior warning would enable the commanders to take positive defensive action; e.g., CINCSAC could move airplanes to an airfield not subject to surveillance; CINCLANT could avoid being in the area under reconnaissance, or if that is not possible, slow down the speed of ships to avoid leaving wakes and

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thereby revealing direction of travel; and the Army stated that in certain EW-CW tests they would suspend the tests during periods of possible reconnaissance. Additionally, learning to cope with the COSMOS system in peacetime would be valuable practice in periods of increased tension or hostilities. (The time that any particular area on earth is subject to Soviet reconnaissance is less than five minutes per satellite and at the present the Soviets are launching an average of one satellite each three and one-half weeks.)

5. (S) Accordingly, arrangements were made with FTD and NORAD to implement a system to advise commanders in advance of possible Soviet satellite reconnaissance. This system has been called SATRAM (Satellite Reconnaissance Advance Notice). FTD prepared and distributed a short instruction manual telling how to plot the ephemeris data and determine resolution and swath width. NORAD sends out to the consumers the necessary ephemeris data on each Soviet reconnaissance launch. The SATRAM system went into effect on 3 August 1963 when COSMOS 77 was launched. The system provides data on the swath width and resolution of the reconnaissance system; and the time and geographic location of the COSMOS satellite.

6. (S) The response from the commanders has far exceeded expectations. Instructions were sent initially to thirty-three consumers on 6 July 1963 and since then requests have been received for forty-nine additional manuals, primarily for NORAD and Army organizations, although the Navy Fleet Reconnaissance Squadron One (VR-1) and U.S. Forces, Korea, have asked to be included.

7. (S) In contrast to the millions of dollars that would have been required for increased resources for the "real time" system, SATRAM has cost a minimum amount. FTD published the instruction booklet out of existing resources and NORAD is providing the ephemeris to the consumers by dispatching one additional teletype for each Soviet reconnaissance satellite that is launched.

SIGNED

JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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