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VP

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

S-0603/DN-1B

TO : DR

DATE: 30 NOV 1977

FROM : VP

SUBJECT: Foreign Disclosure of SATRAN Information (U)

1. (S/NOFORN) This is to summarize for you the extent to which Satellite Reconnaissance Advance Notice (SATRAN) information can be released to the United Kingdom, Canada, other NATO countries, the Republic of Korea, and to Japan.
2. (S/NOFORN) SATRAN information is classified SECRET or lower and consists of a handbook of operating instructions, maps, map overlays, descriptions of Soviet reconnaissance satellite capabilities, satellite identifications, and tracking data. The material is designed to provide commanders or project managers with information that can be used to determine when Soviet reconnaissance satellites will be in range to pose a threat to operational security. The SATRAN program is managed by DIA and operated by ADCOM.
3. (S/NOFORN) The United Kingdom and Canada have been authorized for a number of years to receive all SATRAN information. Neither country, however, is a regular user of the program. The only recent use was by Canada, which obtained a special one time report on the coverage possibilities for an area near Pembroke, Ontario during Oct 77.
4. (S/NOFORN) Other countries in NATO have been authorized access to SATRAN information to a very limited extent and, heretofore, only on a case by case basis. USAREUR forces involved in operations and maneuvers with NATO forces have indicated that release of these data in a more general and continuous fashion is needed for their OPSEC program to be effective when operating with NATO allies. With the USAREUR needs in mind, we have decided to allow US forces to release additional SATRAN information (see enclosure) to appropriate NATO commanders when needed to effect operational security measures during exercises, maneuvers, operations, and in general defense planning. In June of this year, authority to disclose SATRAN data to Republic of Korea commanders was given to COMUSKOREA for similar reasons. We are also prepared to release SATRAN information in this fashion to the Japan Self-Defense Force.

Classified by DIA (DN)
 SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1985

Declassified Per E.O. 12958
 Defense Intelligence Agency
 28 DEC 84
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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

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5. (S/NOFORN) The information described in the enclosure is adequate to meet all essential objectives of the SATRAN program, i.e. it satisfies the requirement for knowledge of the technical capabilities of the Soviet reconnaissance satellite systems and tells the SATRAN user when each satellite will be in range to pose a threat to operational security.

SIGNED

W. D. ROBERTSON

Rear Admiral, USN

Vice Director for Production

1 Enclosure
SATRAN information, (S/NOFORN),
1 cy

* cc: VDN
VP
DN-1B
DN-1B1



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SATRAN Information Authorized for
Release to the ROK, NATO, and the Japan Self-Defense Force

1. Type of reconnaissance satellite if high-resolution photo, low-resolution photo/ELINT, second-generation ELINT, third-generation ELINT, ELINT ocean reconnaissance, radar ocean reconnaissance, or manned and manned-related system.
2. Projected time, sub-satellite ground trace, and potential collection swath width of high-resolution photo, low-resolution photo/ELINT, second-generation ELINT, or third-generation ELINT systems.
3. Projected time and sub-satellite ground trace for ELINT ocean reconnaissance, radar ocean reconnaissance, or manned and man-related systems.
4. Frequencies vulnerable to collection by ELINT satellites.
5. Camera resolution of the photo systems.

DIA (DN)
CLASSIFIED BY [unclear] AUTHORITY [unclear] DATE [unclear]
EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED IN 11 USC
1352 (a) (2) (A) AND 1352 (a) (2) (B)
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1985

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*Send to
SI-0603/DN/15*