		CONFIDENTIAL			PTQ167		ELEASED IN PART 1.4(B)		
PAGE (01 N SS-00	BEIJIN	09524	01	OF 03	181028Z	BI, I	1.4(B), 1.4	$4(D), B6^{B6}$
INFO	STR-00	EAP-00 VC-00 LAB-01 NSAE-00 PRS-00 TRSE-00 SSD-00	EB-00 FRB-00 L-00 OES-01 ACE-00 T-00 PMB-00	3M () ()	INL-00 EUR-00 H-01 VCE-00 OIC-02 P-00 USIE-00 DSCC-00	AMAD-00 C-00 EXIM-01 TEDE-00 AC-01 OMB-01 SP-00 SA-00 PRM-01	DOEE-00 OIGO-00 INR-00 NEA-00 OPIC-01 IRM-00 BBG-00 DRL-02	SRPP-00 E-00 IO-00 DCP-01 PA-00 SSO-00 SNIS-00	
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REASONS: 1.5 (B/D). SUMMARY _____ 1. (C) IN A MEETING WITH POLOFFS SEPTEMBER 17, AMBASSADOR TO CHINA PREDICTED THAT CHINA WOULD SUPPORT THE U.S. IN A WAR ON TERRORISM. HE ALSO ARGUED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS SUBSTANCE TO REPORTS OF GROWING LINKS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE TALIBAN. URGED THE U.S. TO FACTOR RUSSIAN CONCERNS IN CENTRAL ASIA INTO ANY RETALIATION PLAN, AND ADVOCATED THE U.S. PURSUE DIALOGUE WITH THE TALIBAN. HEDGED POSITION ON ANY U.S. MILITARY ACTION, BUT, CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 BEIJIN 09524 01 OF 03 181028Z IN A CONDOLENCE LETTER TO THE AMBASSADOR, SAID HE URGED CAUTION IN DEALING WITH PAKISTAN, SAYING PAKISTAN'S INFLUENCE ON THE TALIBAN WAS "LIMITED." [END SUMMARY. 2. (C) POLOFFS MET SEPTEMBER 18 WITH \ GAVE POLOFFS A ONE-HOUR BRIEF ON HIS TAKE ON RECENT EVENTS. CHINA, THE WAR ON TERRORISM, AND THE TALIBAN 3. (C) SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT CHINA'S EXPRESSIONS OF REGRET OVER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, D.C. AND PENNSYLVANIA WERE SINCERE. HE PREDICTED THAT CHINA WOULD LIKELY JOIN THE UNITED STATES IN FIGHTING TERRORISM, AND THUS BACK UP ITS WORDS WITH CONCRETE ACTION. 4. (C) SAID HE HAD SEEN RECENT REPORTS IN THE U.S. PRESS ABOUT CHINA GETTING CLOSER TO THE TALIBAN. THESE REPORTS WERE NOT GROUNDLESS. CHINA HAD PURSUED ITS OWN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN. IN

(U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JON ALOISI.

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PARTICULAR, CHINA HAD A STRONG INTEREST IN CONVINCING THE CONFIDENTIAL

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5. (C) ASKED ABOUT PRESS REPORTS ABOUT CHINESE ARMS FROM
PAKISTAN NOW IN THE HANDS OF THE TALIBAN, SAID
CHINA HAD EVERY REASON TO BE CONCERNED. HE HAD SEEN SUCH
ARMS (UNSPECIFIED) HIMSELF WHEN TRAVELING IN AFGHANISTAN

RUSSIAN ROLE KEY IN CENTRAL ASIA

6. (C) URGED THE U.S. PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO RUSSIA IN FORMULATING ITS MILITARY OPTIONS. MOSCOW WAS IN LARGE PART TO BLAME FOR THE CURRENT MESS IN AFGHANISTAN, AND RUSSIA SHOULD APOLOGIZE TO THE LONG-SUFFERING AFGHAN PEOPLE FOR WHAT THE 1979 INVASION DID TO THE COUNTRY. NEVERTHELESS, RUSSIA'S ROLE IN THE REGION REMAINED PARAMOUNT. CENTRAL ASIAN STATES "STILL COULD NOT MAKE A MOVE WITHOUT RUSSIA," HE STATED.

U.S. CENTRAL ASIAN POLICY NOT OBJECTIVE

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INFO	LOG-00 CIAE-00 DS-00 VC-00 LAB-01 NSAE-00 PRS-00 TRSE-00 SSD-00 SAS-00	NP-00 COME-00 EAP-00 FRB-00 L-00 OES-01 ACE-00 T-00 PMB-00 /018W	AID-00 CTME-00 EB-00 H-01 VCE-00 OIC-02 P-00 USIE-00 DSCC-00	AIT-03 INL-00 EUR-00 TEDE-00 AC-01 OMB-01 SP-00 SA-00 PRM-01	AMAD-00 C-00 EXIM-01 INR-00 NEA-00 OPIC-01 IRM-00 EPAE-00 DRL-02	ACQ-00 DOEE-00 E-00 IO-00 DCP-01 PA-00 SSO-00 SNIS-00 G-00	CEA-01 SRPP-00 FBIE-00 ITC-01 NRRC-00 PM-00 STR-00 NISC-00 NFAT-00

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P 180735Z SEP 01 FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2007-01989 Doc No. C17542682 Date: 07/10/2014 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0869 INFO AMEMBASSY AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY SEOUL AMEMBASSY TOKYO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY CANBERRA MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE AIT TAIPEI 8394 NSC WASHDC SECDEF WASHDC USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI JICPAC HONOLULU HI CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 BEIJIN 09524 02 OF 03 181029Z AMCONSUL SHANGHAI AMCONSUL SHENYANG AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU AMCONSUL HONG KONG ZEN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 BEIJING 009524 E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/11 TAGS: PREL, PARM, ETRD, PHUM, RS, CH, SUBJECT: TFUS01: AMBASSADOR: ON THE TALIBAN, CHINA'S ROLE IN FIGHTING TERRORISM 7. (C) CRITICIZED U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA, STATING IT WAS NOT OBJECTIVE. HE URGED THAT THE U.S. REVISIT ITS POLICY TOWARDS UZBEKISTAN, SAYING THAT THE KARIMOV REGIME, IN ADDITION TO INFRINGING ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ALSO PREVENTED HIS PEOPLE FROM LIVING A "NORMAL LIFE." REFUGEES CONTINUED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. U.S. SHOULD ENGAGE TALIBAN; BE WARY OF PAKISTAN _______ 8. (C) IF THE U.S. WAS WILLING TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH KARIMOV, WHY NOT ENGAGE THE TALIBAN AS WELL, ASKED. DIALOGUE WITH THE TALIBAN WAS ALL THE MORE

8. (C) IF THE U.S. WAS WILLING TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH KARIMOV, WHY NOT ENGAGE THE TALIBAN AS WELL, ASKED. DIALOGUE WITH THE TALIBAN WAS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT, GIVEN THAT THE TALIBAN WERE GENERALLY HONEST IN NEGOTIATIONS. THE TALIBAN DID NOT SUPPORT TERRORISM, AND 99 PERCENT OF THE AFGHAN POPULATION DID NOT KNOW WHO OSAMA BIN LADEN WAS, HE ARGUED. THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, WAS DUPLICITOUS AND COULD NOT BE TRUSTED.

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MOREOVER, ISLAMABAD'S INFLUENCE ON THE TALIBAN WAS LIMITED.	
AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM	
9. (C) SAID THE NOT RECEIVED ANY INSTRUCTIONS	
ON POSITION IN THE EVENT OF MILITARY ACTION	
IN THE REGION.	
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CONDOLENCE LETTER	
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11. (U)	D0
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P 180735Z SEP 01 FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0870

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

AIT TAIPEI 8395

NSC WASHDC

SECDEF WASHDC

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

JICPAC HONOLULU HI

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AMCONSUL SHANGHAI AMCONSUL SHENYANG

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AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU AMCONSUL HONG KONG ZEN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU	
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 BEIJING 009524	
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/11 TAGS: PREL, PARM, ETRD, PHUM, RS, CH, SUBJECT: TFUS01: AMBASSADOR: ON THE TALIBAN, CHINA'S ROLE IN FIGHTING TERRORISM	В1
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COMMENT	

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