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CONTROLS

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SECTION 1 OF 3

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/\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*/

BODY

SUBJ: KYRGYZSTAN THREAT ASSESSMENT (U)

AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE NOTE

THREAT ASSESSMENT

KYRGYZSTAN (U)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE NOTE: 01-32/8102, 19 SEPTEMBER 2001 (U)

(U) SUMMARY

~~(S//NF)~~ THE TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL FOR US MILITARY INTERESTS IN THE SOUTHERN KYRGYZSTANI PROVINCES OF BATKEN AND OSH IS SIGNIFICANT, AND OFFICIAL US PRESENCE THERE IS OFF-LIMITS. THE REMAINDER OF KYRGYZSTAN IS MODERATE. THERE IS NO INFORMATION TO INDICATE A SPECIFIC THREAT TO USAF RESOURCES BY ANY TERRORIST OR EXTREMIST GROUPS. KYRGYZSTAN HAS A HIGH INCIDENCE OF VIOLENT CRIME AGAINST FOREIGNERS. THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREAT (FIS) TO US INTERESTS IS LOW. THE OVERALL INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) THREAT IN KYRGYZTAN IS ASSESSED

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AS LOW.

(U) TERRORISM

~~(S//NF)~~ THE TERRORISM THREAT TO US MILITARY INTERESTS IN THE SOUTHERN KYRGYZSTANI PROVINCES OF BATKEN AND OSH IS SIGNIFICANT, AND OFFICIAL US PRESENCE THERE IS OFF-LIMITS. THE REMAINDER OF KYRGYZSTAN IS MODERATE. THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN (IMU), WHICH HAS TIES TO USAMA BIN LADIN'S (UBL) AL-QAIDA NETWORK AND IRAN, POSES THE GREATEST THREAT IN COUNTRY AND OPERATES MAINLY IN THE BATKEN AND OSH AREAS. CAPABLE OF A WIDE RANGE OF TERRORIST OPERATIONS, THE GROUP GENERALLY FOCUSES ATTACKS AGAINST UZBEKISTANI INTERESTS, BUT HAS ALSO CONDUCTED ATTACKS IN KYRGYZSTAN. THE IMU ESPOUSES ANTI-US SENTIMENT AND HAS OPPORTUNISTICALLY TARGETED US AND OTHER FOREIGN INTERESTS IN COUNTRY. THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT IN KYRGYZSTAN IS NEUTRAL DUE THE COUNTRY'S ROUGH TERRAIN, POROUS BORDERS, AND THE LIMITED CAPABILITIES AND FUNDING OF HOST NATION SECURITY FORCES. THE THREAT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST US ASSETS IN KYRGYZSTAN IN THE EVENT OF A US MILITARY STRIKE ON AFGHANISTAN IS VERY REAL (b)(1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(c)

~~(S//NF)~~ THE IMU IS CAPABLE OF LARGE, SIMULTANEOUS, MULTIPLE CAR BOMBINGS, COORDINATED AUTOMATIC GUNFIRE ATTACKS, HOSTAGE AND BARRICADE ASSAULTS, AND KIDNAPPINGS. IMU OPERATIVES HAVE ALSO PROVEN THEMSELVES MORE CAPABLE IN THE USE OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, SMALL ARMS, AND NIGHT-VISION DEVICES (b)(1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(c). POTENTIAL IMU TERRORIST STRIKES AGAINST US INTERESTS WOULD LIKELY COME WITHOUT WARNING, JUDGING FROM THE GROUP'S STRINGENT PRE-OPERATIONAL SECURITY.

~~(S//NF)~~ IRANIAN STATE AGENTS, PRIMARILY FROM THE MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (MOIS), POSE A POTENTIAL THREAT IN THE REMAINDER OF KYRGYZSTAN. THE MOIS IS FULLY CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING AND/OR SUPPORTING A WIDE RANGE OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY, INCLUDING ASSASSINATIONS AND MASS CASUALTY BOMBINGS.

(U) IMU LEADER b6, b7c IS STRONGLY ANTI-AMERICAN AND VIEWS US POLICY AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE AS A MAJOR PROP TO HIS PRIMARY TARGET, THE GOVERNMENT OF UZBEKISTAN. FOLLOWING THE STATE DEPARTMENTS DESIGNATION OF THE IMU AS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION IN SEP 00, b6, b7c DECLARED HIS GROUP A PART OF A JIHAD AGAINST US AND RUSSIAN INTERESTS AND HAS USED THIS JIHAD PREMISE TO RECRUIT NEW MEMBERS. THE GROUP HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO EXPLOIT US TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY BY KIDNAPPING OR PLANNING TO KIDNAP US HIKERS IN BATKEN AND OSH PROVINCES RESPECTIVELY.

~~(S//NF)~~ THE IMU ALSO HAS TARGETED KYRGYZSTANI INTERESTS.

~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(c)

(b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(c)

HOWEVER, NO INTELLIGENCE CURRENTLY INDICATES IRAN INTENDS TO ATTACK US PERSONNEL OR INTERESTS IN KYRGYZSTAN.

~~(S//NF)~~ THE MOST ACTIVE ORGANIZATION IN KYRGYZSTAN RELATED TO THE IMU HAS BEEN THE HIZB AL-TAHRIR ALTERNATELY, HEZBUT TAKHRIR, WHICH DISSEMINATES PROPAGANDA ADVOCATING THE NON-VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS REPLACEMENT BY AN ISLAMIC STATE. HIZB MEMBERS SYMPATHIZE WITH IMU ACTIONS BUT HAVE NOT APPEARED TO TAKE PART IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN THE PAST.

~~(S//NF)~~ ETHNIC TURKIC MUSLIM RESIDENTS OF WESTERN CHINA, KNOWN AS UIGHURS, ARE ALSO ACTIVE IN KYRGYZSTAN, MAINLY IN THE EASTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY, ALONG THE CHINESE BORDER. THEY HAVE PROVEN CAPABLE OF ASSAULTS, INCLUDING ATTACKS AGAINST CHINESE AT BISHKEK'S DOSTUK HOTEL IN MAY 2000. UIGHURS DO NOT THREATEN US INTERESTS IN THE REGION. HOWEVER, THEY HAVE PARTICIPATED AS INSURGENT FIGHTERS FOR THE IMU.

~~(S//NF)~~ THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT FOR ALL OF KYRGYZSTAN IS NEUTRAL DUE TO THE COUNTRY'S POROUS BORDERS, ROUGH TERRAIN,

(b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(d)

THE COUNTRY'S MOUNTAINOUS SOUTHERN BORDERS ARE ALSO DIFFICULT TO DEFEND, AND THEY PRESENT A SERIOUS IMPEDIMENT TO TRACKING TERRORIST GROUPS. IMU LEADERS, UBL AND HIS AFFILIATES, AND IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE ASSETS ARE WELL AWARE OF THESE FACTORS.

(b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(d)

\*\*\*\*\* BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 \*\*\*\*\*

(b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(d)

(U) POTENTIAL THREAT IN EVENT OF US ATTACK IN AFGHANISTAN

~~(S//NF)~~ IN MID-SEP 01, [REDACTED] BELIEVED THE IMU WAS CAPABLE OF ATTACKING US INTERESTS IN COUNTRY IN RESPONSE TO A US ACTION AGAINST UBL OR THE TALIBAN IN AFGHANISTAN.

(b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(c)

[REDACTED] HAD NO SPECIFIC THREAT INFORMATION, BUT BELIEVES THE POTENTIAL WAS VERY REAL. AT LEAST 40 IMU MEMBERS LIVE AND OPERATE UNDER COVER IN KYRGYZSTAN. MOST WERE IN THE SOUTH, BUT AT LEAST ONE SMALL CELL WAS IN THE BISHKEK.

(b1),  
E.O. 13526  
Sec. 1.4(c)

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] ASSESSES THE POTENTIAL THREAT AS TWO-FOLD: (A) POSSIBLE PREPLANNED OPERATIONS AGAINST US TARGETS AS PART OF A LARGER SERIES OF ATTACKS, OR (B) POSSIBLE SPONTANEOUS IMU RETALIATION IN

RESPONSE TO A US STRIKE IN AFGHANISTAN. AT LEAST TWO IMU MEMBERS ARE BELIEVED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH AN AL-QAIDA MEMBER IN PESHAWAR, PAKISTAN. LINKS BETWEEN THE IMU AND AL-QAIDA HAVE BEEN WELL REPORTED, AND THE THREAT AGAINST US INTERESTS IS CREDIBLE. AS OF MID-SEP 01,

BELIEVED THAT TWO AFGHANS IN BISHKEK WERE PROBABLY IN CONTACT WITH AL-QAIDA, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO CURRENT INDICATION THAT THEY ARE PLANNING HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST US OR OTHER TARGETS.

(b1),  
F.O. 13526,  
Sec. 1.4(c)

(U) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREAT  
~~(S//NF)~~ THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREAT FROM THE KYRGYZ INTELLIGENCE SERVICES TO ANY US PRESENCE IN KYRGYZSTAN IS LOW.

(b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(c)

~~(S//NF)~~

(b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(d)

~~(S//NF)~~

(b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(c)

AS DOES THE PRESENCE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS IN SOUTHERN KYRGYSTAN.

(b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(c)

THE MNB POSSESSES THE ABILITY TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY AGAINST HIGH PRIORITY TARGETS.

~~(S//NF)~~ THE MNB HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN KYRGYZSTAN AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, TERRORISM, AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) PROLIFERATION. THEY SHARE, WITH THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS (MVD) RESPONSIBILITY FOR NARCOTICS, ORGANIZED CRIME, GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION, AND ISLAMIC EXTREMISM BASED IN SOUTHERN KYRGYZSTAN. THE MNB RECENTLY CREATED A UNIFORMED BORDER CONTROL DIVISION WHICH SHARED BORDER SECURITY WITH A SIMILAR DIVISION WITHIN THE KYRGYZ MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD).

~~(S//NF)~~

(b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(c), (g)

[REDACTED] (b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(c)

~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED] (b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(c)

(U) THIRD COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE THREATS:

~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED] (b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(c)

~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED] (b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(c)

\*\*\*\*\* BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 \*\*\*\*\*/

(b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(c)

(U) INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO)

~~(S//NF)~~ THE OVERALL IO THREAT IN KYRGYZTAN IS ASSESSED AS LOW

[REDACTED] (b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(c)

(b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4 (c), (g)

~~(S//NF)~~

(b1), E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4(c)

(U) CRIME

(U) KYRGYZSTAN HAS A HIGH INCIDENCE OF VIOLENT CRIME AGAINST FOREIGNERS. THE US EMBASSY IN BISHKEK RECOMMENDS AGAINST THE USE OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION OR WALKING AFTER DARK. TRAVELERS SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS IN OR NEAR HOTELS, BARS, PARKS, AND ALL PLACES THAT ATTRACT EXPATRIATES. STREET CRIME AGAINST US CITIZENS IS RISING. AUTO THEFT, MUGGINGS, AND PICKPOCKETING ARE COMMON IN CROWDED PLACES SUCH AS MARKETS AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION.

(U) HARASSMENT AND EXTORTION BY PEOPLE POSING AS POLICE OFFICERS ARE COMMON. GENUINE POLICEMEN MUST SHOW IDENTIFICATION UPON DEMAND. TRAVELERS SHOULD NOT VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO ANY REQUESTS TO THOSE WHO DO NOT SHOW OFFICIAL IDENTIFICATION.

(U) REFERENCES

(U) THIS PRODUCT IS A SYNTHESIS OF THE MOST CURRENT, COLLATERAL TERRORIST THREAT INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM THE MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, INCLUDING DIA, USCENTCOM, US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AFOSI REGION 2, AFOSI DETACHMENTS AND OTHER US AGENCIES.

(U) AFOSI POINT OF CONTACT: QUESTIONS OR INQUIRIES REGARDING THIS THREAT ASSESSMENT MAY BE ADDRESSED TO HQ AFOSI/XOQA AT DSN STU III

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(U) AFOSI CI NOTES AND THREAT ASSESSMENTS ARE AVAILABLE ON INTELINK-SCI AND SIPRNET VIA THE AFOSI HOME PAGES AT WWW.AFOSI.IC.GOV

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REASON: 1.5(B), (C), (D)

DECLASSIFY ON: X1 AND X6

DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

PLEASE SEND YOUR FEEDBACK, COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS TO

          b6, b7c           AT HQ AFOSI/XOQA

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SOURCES: FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES

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