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 Subject: CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATIONS PACKAGE

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 Pass Line: FROM THE SPECIAL ENVOY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE TO CHIEFS OF MISSION AND  
 OFFICERS HANDLING CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES  
 Subject: CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATIONS PACKAGE

1. (SBU) SUMMARY. This communications package is intended for Chiefs of Mission and staff for their use in engaging with host country counterparts and the media on climate negotiations issues in the lead-up to the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to be held in Paris in December 2015. This communications package includes three parts (background, talking points, and questions and answers) and may be shared with appropriate U.S. government employees as needed. Word document versions of the three parts of this cable, as well as other useful materials on climate change, can be found on the State Department's climate change intranet site: <https://infocentral.state.gov/climate>. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) Additional specific tailored messages for regions and posts will be sent as needed as we advance toward the Paris COP in December. (NOTE: a cable with a targeted message for countries in Africa will be sent shortly.) Questions and requests on our climate change message should be directed to S/SECC to Clare Sierawski SierawskiCS@state.gov or Franz Hochstrasser HochstrasserFJ@state.gov or to OES/EGC Kari Pederson PedersonKJ@state.gov.

3. (U) PART I: UN CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS BACKGROUND.

(SBU) We are currently negotiating an international agreement intended to guide global efforts to respond to climate change in the post-2020 era. These

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negotiations, scheduled to conclude in Paris in December of 2015, take place under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (the "UNFCCC"), a treaty signed in 1992 by the Bush Administration and ratified by almost every country in the world, including the United States ("the Parties"). We have been an active force in shaping the debate over the future climate change regime, and our international standing on climate change is stronger than it has been in many years owing to the robust actions we have been taking at home and abroad under the leadership of President Obama and Secretary Kerry.

(U) PREVIOUS MILESTONES

(SBU) UN FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (1992):

- The United States is a party.
- Its objective is to avoid dangerous man-made interference with the climate.
- It contains several principles, including that Parties should protect the climate in accordance with their "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" (so-called "CBDR/RC").
- Parties listed in "Annex I" have heightened commitments, including more detailed reporting and a non-legally binding emissions aim in relation to the year 2000, and most have obligations to provide financial assistance to non-Annex 1 countries. Annex I includes those countries that were OECD members in 1992, as well as former Soviet republics and Eastern European countries.

(U) KYOTO PROTOCOL (1997):

- The United States is not a party.
- It contains legally binding economy-wide emissions targets for Annex I Parties only.
- It covers the period from 2008-2012, although certain Parties, including the EU, Norway and Switzerland, have agreed to an amendment that goes to 2020.

(SBU) COPENHAGEN ACCORD (2009):

- It is a political instrument.
- It sets forth: a long-term goal of keeping global temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius (C) beyond pre-industrial levels; emissions commitments from both developed and developing countries; and significant transparency and finance provisions.
- It covers the period through 2020.

(U) DURBAN PLATFORM (2011):

- It lays out the mandate for the agreement currently being negotiated -- including that it will have "legal force" of some kind and that it will be "applicable to all" countries.
- The new agreement will cover the period from 2020.

(U) KEY ISSUES IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS

(SBU) Ambition: There is widespread interest in designing the Paris agreement to promote ambitious action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, in light of the 2 degrees C temperature goal. The question is how to do that in a manner that also attracts broad participation. (For example, a "top-down" approach that started with 2 degrees C and allocated emissions limits to Parties would meet the ambition test but would fail the participation test.) The current approach, under which Parties come forward with "nationally determined" targets - and do so well before Paris so that they will be exposed to the "sunshine" of public scrutiny and thus goaded to put their best foot forward - was essentially developed by the United States.

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(SBU) So-called "intended nationally determined contributions" or "INDCs" that come forward this year will not themselves be enough to keep the world on track relative to the 2 degrees C goal. But most, including us, intend the agreement to provide for regular updating of targets - our preference is every 5 years. How such update "cycles" will work to keep Parties' emissions moving in the right direction is an important issue in the negotiations.

(SBU) Differentiation, or the "firewall" between developed/developing countries: The Annex 1/non-Annex 1 division, essentially between developed and developing countries, was substantially strengthened in the Kyoto Protocol and was a major reason why the United States did not join. This Administration took office with the goal of moving beyond this "firewall" toward a regime that reflects the shifts in countries' emissions and economic profiles since 1992. We took positive steps in this direction under both the Copenhagen Accord and the Durban mandate for the current negotiation.

(SBU) Now we need to ensure that the new agreement, which will apply in the 2020s and beyond, is designed to reflect evolving capabilities and circumstances, rather than a bifurcation (Annex I/non-Annex I or developed/developing) that cannot be justified on environmental, economic, legal, or political grounds. Our "nationally determined" approach is intended, in part, to provide for a continuum of effort in lieu of a categories-based approach. Nevertheless, there will be continued insistence from some developing countries that the Annex-based system be maintained. Some insist that the CBDR/RC principle noted above requires retention of that structure, but we and other developed countries, and many developing countries, strenuously disagree.

(SBU) Accountability: It will be important to design the agreement to make Parties accountable for what they agree to take on. This issue has a number of dimensions, including: that Parties are clear about their targets (by including the necessary clarifying information); that each Party's target has at least one part that is unconditional (i.e., not dependent upon what other Parties do or upon external financial support); that there are appropriate rules when it comes to accounting for targets; that Parties report on their emissions and their progress in implementing their targets; and that there be a review of Parties' implementation.

(SBU) Some Parties contend that accountability requires emissions targets to be legally binding. We and others disagree. It is not a black-and-white issue, given that there are plenty of examples in both the climate and non-climate worlds of non-compliance with legally binding targets and "compliance" with non-legally binding targets. There are also potential downsides to legally binding targets, including reducing participation and suppressing ambition. We believe we can achieve accountability effectively through strong rules for transparency in Party pledges and on reporting and review, and we are working to ensure that the agreement contains the right mix of legally binding and non-legally binding elements, i.e., one that is environmentally effective and enables the participation of key countries.

(SBU) Financial assistance to developing countries: Finance is always a contentious area in climate negotiations, with demands for very large sums and/or for "compensation" to countries experiencing climate impacts. Under U.S. leadership, donors have taken significant steps to enhance the provision of climate funding in recent years, including through working to establish a new Green Climate Fund and to ensure that developed countries meet their collective Copenhagen goal of mobilizing \$100 billion by 2020 from both public and private sources. It is likely that the financial aspect of the Paris package will be one

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of the most difficult, and managing it to an acceptable result is a major U.S. challenge.

(U) KEY PLAYERS

(SBU) China. China is a central player in the negotiations. [redacted]

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(SBU) BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China). We have different relationships with the other emerging economies of the so-called BASIC group. [redacted]

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(SBU) EU. Generally speaking, we are aligned with the EU, and we worked very constructively with them at the December 2014 meeting in Lima, [redacted]

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(SBU) Islands. Island countries, some of which are existentially threatened by climate change, [redacted]

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(SBU) Africa. Africa negotiates as a group, and while there are a variety of views among different countries, at the end of the day, they stay together, and South Africa plays the most influential role in guiding them. [redacted]

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(SBU) Latin America. Latin America is distinctive in encompassing two strikingly different groups, plus a "major economy," Brazil. The "AILAC" countries include progressive Latins, such as Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru, among others.

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(SBU) Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC). This configuration brings together the ALBA group, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and other scattered countries, such as Sudan, and Malaysia, as well as India and China. Most act in multiple groups, [redacted]

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(SBU) Umbrella Group. We caucus with the Umbrella Group, which includes Canada, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Kazakhstan, and Iceland.

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## (U) PROCESS THIS YEAR

(SBU) Preview of targets before Paris: We have now submitted our "INDC" (a reduction of 26-28 percent below 2005 levels in 2025), as have the EU, Russia, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland, and Gabon. We have been pushing others to announce ambitious and transparent targets in a timely fashion. The more strong targets are announced relatively early, the more it will create momentum toward Paris.

(U) Meetings: In addition to the formal negotiating rounds, numerous other fora will take up the issues under negotiation. These include, e.g., at least three meetings of the Major Economies Forum, a U.S.-led process involving the major emitters and others; informal meetings called by the Peruvians (the current UNFCCC Presidency) and the French in their capacity as "President" of the Paris Conference; and the annual German-hosted "Petersberg" Dialogue. France is considering potential meetings of Heads of State and/or Foreign Ministers. There will also be a number of important bilateral encounters, including between the United States and China in September.

## (U) THE IMPORT OF A PARIS AGREEMENT

(SBU) Assuming we conclude an agreement in Paris, it will inevitably be imperfect. Still, a solid agreement would be a major accomplishment and is our singular mission for this year. If we succeed in Paris, we would for the first time have established an ambitious, durable climate regime that applies to all countries, is fair, focuses both on reducing greenhouse gas emissions and building resilience, includes strong accountability measures, and ensures ongoing financial and technical assistance to those in need. Such an agreement would send a potent signal to the markets and civil society that the leaders of the world mean business on climate change.

## 4. (U) PART II: UN CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS - TALKING POINTS

- Securing a new climate agreement in Paris is a top priority for President Obama.
  - o Reaching a new agreement in Paris would be a historic step. It would establish, for the first time, an ambitious, durable climate regime that applies to all countries, is fair, focuses both on reducing greenhouse gas emissions and building resilience, includes strong accountability measures, and ensures ongoing financial and technical assistance to those in need. Such an agreement would send a potent signal to the markets and civil society that the nations of the world are tackling climate change and that there is no going back.

- o We have to seize this opportunity. We can finally put ourselves on a path to creating a low-carbon, sustainable, global economy. If we were to miss this chance now, it would have serious consequences both for climate change and the effectiveness of the multilateral system. We have to pull together and get this done.

- o The deal is there to be done in Paris if we are smart, make compromises and work together. It will be critical that delegations come to the table this year not just to repeat their positions but to find common ground, respecting the concerns and imperatives of others.

- The President is fully committed to reaching a successful climate agreement in Paris.

- o The United States is fully engaged in the effort to deliver a strong agreement

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in Paris.

o On March 31, the United States announced a target to reduce climate pollution 26-28 percent below 2005 levels in 2025. This target is both ambitious and achievable, grounded in an intensive analysis of what can be done under existing law. It is consistent with achieving deep, economy-wide reductions of over 80 percent by 2050. It roughly doubles the pace of emission reductions for the period 2020-2025 as compared to 2005-2020.

o Last November, President Obama and President Xi Jinping of China made an historic Joint Announcement of our intended targets, with China agreeing for the first time to a peak year for its CO2 emissions of around 2030 and to an ambitious target of 20 percent clean energy in its energy mix by 2030. And both Presidents committed to working together to deliver a successful agreement in Paris.

o Under President Obama, the United States has significantly increased financial support for developing countries in their efforts to reduce emissions and increase adaptation to the impacts of climate change.

-- From 2010-2012, we joined with donor countries to meet the "Fast Start" pledge we made in Copenhagen to provide \$30 billion of climate funding. We have spearheaded a donor coordination group to drive increased finance through all available channels to meet our commitment to mobilize \$100 billion of funding from public and private sources by 2020 - in the context of meaningful mitigation and transparency by developing countries. We are well on the way to meeting that goal.

-- Late last year, the United States announced a \$3 billion pledge to the new Green Climate Fund, and worked with others to secure total pledges of over \$10 billion.

-- And we are committed to ensuring a strong, ongoing program of financial and technical assistance in the post-2020 regime.

-- The United States and other donors also supported development of the Climate Technology Center and Network (CTCN) to help developing countries identify and secure clean technology.

o On adaptation, we have responded to countries' concerns about the challenge of adapting to the impacts of climate change in several ways.

-- We have increased our adaptation assistance eight-fold since 2009, and some 80 percent of our bilateral adaptation funding goes to Least Developed Countries, Small Island Developing States, and Africa.

-- We also supported a decision to devote 50 percent of Green Climate Fund financing to adaptation on a grant equivalent basis.

-- Last year, we helped spearhead creation of the new National Adaptation Plan (NAP) Global Network to promote and support adaptation planning.

-- In September 2014, President Obama announced a new public-private partnership that provides climate science, data, tools, and training to developing countries to help them prepare for the impacts of climate change. Examples:

---- We've released high-resolution topographical data for Africa free online, providing a resolution down to 30 meters of the Earth's surface. This will allow countries to better track coming changes like sea-level rise and water shortages.

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---- We've released elevation data for Asia, which will help India predict its wheat harvest and be prepared to buy food for its people in advance if needed.

-- We have also worked cooperatively with other states in establishing the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage, and we have supported an ambitious work plan for the WIM's new Executive Committee.

-- Finally, as the largest humanitarian donor in the world, the United States will continue to respond with humanitarian aid to those in need.

- The United States is also leading on the domestic front.

- o Since President Obama took office, the United States has taken historic steps to sharply reduce its emissions, especially through the President's Climate Action Plan, putting us on track to meet our 2020 goal of reducing emissions in the range of 17 percent below 2005 levels in 2020. We have:

- More than tripled electricity generation from wind, and increased solar energy generation by more than twenty fold;

- Established the toughest fuel economy standards in U.S. history for cars and trucks, which will double average fuel efficiency from 27 to 54 miles per gallon by 2025;

- Proposed groundbreaking regulations to cut carbon pollution by 30 percent from U.S. power plants, which account for a third of U.S. emissions;

- Set energy conservation standards for 29 categories of appliances and equipment, with more on the way;

- Invested in renewable energy technologies, including by making \$4 billion in loan guarantees for innovative renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies; and

- Developed a strategy to reduce methane emissions from a variety of sectors, including a goal to cut methane emissions from the oil and gas sector 40-45 percent from 2012 levels by 2025.

- o Under President Obama's leadership, the United States has also intensified focus on bolstering our domestic resilience to climate change. In the last two years alone, we have:

- Released the third U.S. National Climate Assessment, the most comprehensive source of scientific information about climate change impacts across all U.S. regions and critical sectors of the economy;

- Launched an online Climate Resilience Toolkit to provide scientific tools, information, and expertise to help communities manage climate-related risks and opportunities and improve their resilience to extreme events; and

- Established a Climate Data Initiative to leverage open data across the Federal government to spur innovation and private-sector entrepreneurship as it relates to adaptation. Partners include Google, Intel, Amazon, HP, Coca-Cola, IBM, Walmart, Microsoft, the World Bank, and the Rockefeller Foundation, among many others.

- The final agreement in Paris needs to include key features.


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- o First, the outcome needs to be ambitious. The core objective of the 1992 Framework Convention is to avoid dangerous climate change, so we need to reduce emissions as effectively as possible. The first step is for countries to come forward with strong, timely targets (known as "INDCs" - Intended Nationally Determined Contributions). And the agreement also needs to include solid accountability measures so everyone can see how countries are doing in implementing their targets.
- o Second, we need to elevate the importance of adaptation. Countries need to do sound adaptation planning and to implement those plans in order to build resilience to the impacts of climate change.
- o Third, the agreement needs to be fair to all and relevant to a dynamic and evolving world. What we expect from countries should be differentiated to capture their varying circumstances and capabilities. But an agreement for the 2020s and beyond cannot be bifurcated on the basis of fixed 1992 categories or equivalents, such as developed versus developing countries.



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- o Fourth, the outcome needs to ensure strong, ongoing financial assistance, especially aimed at adaptation for the most vulnerable, like small islands and African states, consistent with the robust measures taken in recent years.

- That's broadly how we see things, but we would like to hear your views.

- o To sum up on our side - the United States under President Obama is fully engaged both domestically and internationally. He is totally committed to reaching an effective Paris deal that launches a major climate effort for the decades to come.

- o I'd like to hear from you today about your views and concerns.

5. (U) PART III: UN CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS - QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

WHAT THE UNITED STATES IS DOING

What is the United States doing to achieve success in the Paris climate negotiation?

The United States is leading internationally and domestically. Internationally, we announced our ambitious post-2020 target at the end of March [technically, "INDC" or "Intended Nationally Determined Contribution"]; we pledged \$3B to the new Green Climate Fund as part of a \$10B initial capitalization late last year; President Obama and President Xi of China joined in an historic announcement of our respective post-2020 targets in November, providing a boost of momentum to the negotiations; and we are in full diplomatic swing working with countries around

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the world to get the Paris agreement done.

At home, the United States has taken historic steps to sharply reduce its emissions, including through the President's Climate Action Plan, putting us on track to meet our 2020 goal of reducing emissions in the range of 17 percent below 2005 levels in 2020. Since President Obama took office, we have more than tripled electricity generation from wind, increased solar energy generation by a factor of ten, established the toughest fuel economy standards in U.S. history for cars and trucks, and proposed groundbreaking regulations to cut carbon pollution by 30 percent from U.S. power plants. We have also intensified our focus on bolstering domestic resilience to the impacts of climate change, including through release of the third U.S. National Climate Assessment.

Is the United States going to achieve its 2020 target of a 17 percent reduction?

With strong policy actions across all sectors, we are on track to achieve our target.

What is the United States target for the post-2020 period? Is it enough? Will it put us on a path to limit temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius? What about 1.5 degrees Celsius?

The United States has set a target of reducing our greenhouse gas emissions to 26-28 percent below 2005 levels in 2025, and will make best efforts to reduce emissions by 28 percent. Our target roughly doubles the annual pace of our carbon emission reductions during the five years from 2020 to 2025 as compared to the period from 2005 to 2020. It also puts us on a pathway consistent with achieving deep reductions of 80 percent or more by 2050, the level commonly expected from advanced economies in order to hold expected warming to below 2 degrees Celsius.

Whom did the United States consult on its target and what is it based on?

The United States undertook an extensive, rigorous interagency process to identify and assess potential emission reductions that are both achievable and cost effective. This process examined options to reduce emissions of all greenhouse gases in every economic sector through existing executive authorities and voluntary programs. Our agencies have had wide-ranging discussions with stakeholders from the public, private and non-profit sector, including formal and informal consultations with Congress.

Can the United States deliver on its target?

Yes. This target is grounded in assessments of the potential to reduce emissions under existing laws that have already been passed by Congress. The policies and regulations implemented under this Administration will continue to have substantial and growing benefits even in later years. For example, vehicle efficiency standards now cover model years up through 2025.

What happens if Congress or the courts block the power plant (or other) regulations the United States is relying on?

Although legal actions are common, EPA's regulatory actions have been repeatedly upheld by the courts and they have been able to deliver consistently robust results. For example, EPA regulations since 1980 have withstood repeated legal challenges to successfully drive down another pollutant, sulfur dioxide, emissions by more than 80 percent.

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The rulemaking process is the way our executive branch implements the requirements placed on it by Congress through existing laws. The rules we issue are federally enforceable.

[IF ASKED] After a rule is finalized, Congress may, within 60 days, vote to overturn a rule under the Congressional Review Act (CRA). Any such action is subject to Presidential veto; veto can only be overridden with 2/3 majority vote in both houses of Congress. No EPA or DOE rules have ever been overturned with this procedure.

NB: Overturning rules using the CRA is extremely rare. In the history of the Congressional Review Act, only one rule has ever been overturned on a CRA vote (the Clinton-era OSHA ergonomic standards).

What happens if the next President decides to roll back the regulations President Obama has put in place? Without the support of Congress, how can we have any confidence that the United States will deliver on its target?

Our 2025 target is grounded in assessments of the potential to reduce emissions under existing laws that have already been passed by Congress. Our regulatory actions are the means by which the Executive Branch carries out its role to implement laws passed by Congress. Regulatory actions taken under the authority of existing laws follow a careful process and are very difficult to undo. For example, under the Clean Air Act, the United States is obligated to reduce emissions of carbon pollution. Once a regulation like the Clean Power Plan is finalized, it can only be rescinded through another rulemaking process. Any new rulemaking process must meet rigorous requirements, including providing notice via a proposal, taking public comment, and issuing a reasoned and reasonable decision that is responsive to the comments.

#### THE NEGOTIATIONS

Why is this year's meeting in Paris so important?

The Paris meeting presents an opportunity to take an historic step in combatting climate change. We have the chance to establish, for the first time, an ambitious, durable climate regime that applies to all countries, is fair to everyone, focuses both on reducing greenhouse gas emissions and building resilience against the impacts of climate change, includes strong accountability measures, and ensures ongoing financial and technical assistance to those in need. If we do this, it will send a powerful signal to the markets and civil society that nations have finally joined together to tackle climate change and that there is no going back.

What are the important issues heading into Paris?

There are at least five key issues:

First, ambition. We need a serious show of ambition in the lead up to Paris. Countries, especially the major economies, need to come forward with emission reductions targets that show we are making the cuts needed to keep us on the right track.

Second, accountability. We need to design an agreement that makes Parties accountable for their emission targets. Although the targets are nationally determined, they should be clear, at their core be unconditional, and be subject to certain basic agreed rules, as well as to regular reporting and review.

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Third, adaptation. We need to respond to the call by many countries to elevate the issue of adaptation to climate change. That is, the agreement must not only effectively tackle the causes of climate change, but it must address its effects. The agreement should prioritize adaptation action.

Fourth, finance. We need to be pragmatic about the level and kinds of financial support for developing countries. Demands for massive sums and for "compensation" are simply not feasible, and we have made real progress with the establishment of the Green Climate Fund and in ensuring that developed countries meet their collective 2009 Copenhagen goal of mobilizing \$100 billion by 2020 from both public and private sources.

Finally, differentiation. We need an agreement that both properly takes account of the different circumstances and capabilities of different countries but also works in the world of the 2020s and beyond. This means we cannot build the post-2020s regime on the basis of the antiquated divisions between countries created by the 1992 Convention ("Annex 1" or developed countries, "Non-Annex 1" for developing), but instead must differentiate in a manner that captures and reflects the real world, i.e. the shifts in countries' emissions and economic trends that have occurred and will continue to occur.

Are countries submitting ambitious targets in a timely way? Are you concerned that "INDCs" aren't coming in strong enough or in a timely enough manner?

There is no question that ambitious and timely targets are an essential component to getting a successful agreement in Paris, and we are doing well on that score. The United States, Europe and China account for more than half of global emissions, and all have announced strong targets. While China hasn't made its formal submission yet, the targets it announced in the U.S.-China Joint Announcement of our presidents in November were very solid. Mexico also put forward a very impressive target at the end of March, and a number of other countries [e.g., Norway, Switzerland, Russia, and Gabon] were "early movers." We expect to see a very substantial set of targets coming in as the year progresses.

What impact will the U.S.-China Joint Announcement have on the negotiations? Will a U.S.-China alliance assure the success of Paris?

While the U.S.-China Joint Announcement cannot ensure the success of Paris, it has clearly given momentum to the negotiations and set a precedent for what is possible in bridging differences. The joint announcement sent a powerful signal that the world's two largest economies and carbon emitters are serious about addressing climate change, and willing to work through differences to reach common ground.

Does the United States support a legally binding agreement?

The mandate for the negotiations, adopted in Durban in 2011, makes clear that the Paris agreement is to have some kind of legal force. That said, it leaves the Parties with flexibility regarding the form of the agreement and the legal nature of its provisions.

The legal form of the agreement is under discussion now, though the negotiations are still more focused on the substance of the agreement than on the form.

If the targets aren't legally binding, isn't this whole thing just a weak "pledge and review" exercise? Won't that be a failure?

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The success of the agreement does not hinge on whether or not the targets will be legally binding. What matters is whether the agreement will promote environmental ambition, be designed to enable global participation, and ensure accountability with respect to implementation of the targets.

Will the Paris agreement put us on track to meet the 2 degree Celsius goal? If there is a mitigation "gap," what does the United States think we should do about it?

The 2 degrees Celsius limit is our agreed goal, but we should not evaluate Paris on the basis of a single snapshot taken in December 2015. Holding global temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius is going to require the transformation of the global economy from a high-carbon to a low-carbon energy base. We can't fully accomplish that transformation in 2015, but we can make a critical start.

What we need to see from Paris with regard to two degrees is: (i) initial targets that are as ambitious as possible - especially by the largest-emitting countries; (ii) the progressive ramping up of ambition on regular cycles, preferably every 5 years; and (iii) endorsement of the imperative of long-term decarbonization.

Why does the United States oppose the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities"?

We don't. Differentiation is essential and the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" can be fully addressed in a manner consistent with the interests of all and the objective of containing climate change. The principle is, for example, embodied in the "nationally determined" structure of mitigation targets, which we support, and which is a self-differentiated structure that protects everyone's real interests, including the imperatives of growth, development and the eradication of poverty.

What we do not accept is bifurcation based on rigid categories of countries that were established in 1992 and never change, no matter how much the material conditions of countries change. It makes no sense for the form and content of a new agreement for the 2020s and beyond to be set based on antiquated categories.

Don't the developed countries have a historic responsibility for causing climate change?

Of course we recognize our historic role in the production of greenhouse gas emissions, but you need to be careful here - the concept of "historic responsibility" is often invoked to suggest that responsibility for taking climate action rests almost entirely with the so-called "Annex 1" (developed) countries as defined in 1992. We don't find that logic either justified or conducive to solving the problem.

Industrialized countries certainly emitted early, in the context of creating the technologies that modernized and are still modernizing the world. But history didn't stop in 1992, it is created every day. Consider: the world is now emitting almost as much every decade as all the cumulative emissions that occurred before 1970; developing countries now account for over 60 percent of current global emissions; and cumulative emissions from developing countries will surpass those of developed countries by 2020. Moreover, while emissions before the late 20th century were produced without either knowledge about the risk of global warming or the availability of effective alternatives to fossil fuels, those facts have now changed dramatically - we now know the consequences and more and more have

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alternatives to fossil fuels.

The message is simple - we have an unmistakable responsibility to act and we are acting, but all countries share a common responsibility to combat climate change and we all need to pull together.

Are the developed countries on track to meet your 2009 pledge in Copenhagen of \$100B by 2020? Where are you now? Why can't you show a year-by-year pathway?

We are well on our way to collectively mobilizing \$100 billion per year by 2020, the goal we set in Copenhagen in 2009, in the context of meaningful mitigation and transparency by developing countries. According to various third-party estimates, as well as the finance body of the UN climate convention itself, annual public flows from developed to developing countries are in the range of \$35-40 billion. And this doesn't include the private finance mobilized by these flows, which also counts toward the \$100 billion goal. So we're making good progress toward our collective \$100 billion goal. We have already said we would provide clear information on our progress toward the goal, but are not prepared to add new year-by-year goals; that wasn't part of the pledge we made in 2009, and we are not prepared to change that now.

Why is a collective multi-year pledge of \$10B to the Green Climate Fund such a big deal? It's just a small part of your \$100B/year pledge. You're not even 1/10th of the way there, are you?

This question is based on a common confusion, so let me try to straighten it out. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a new institution that we hope will become the preeminent channel for climate finance. But even if it does, it will still be only one channel, and right now it is brand new and has just gone through its initial capitalization of \$10B - a great start.

By contrast, the \$100B pledge is based on the mobilization of climate finance from all sources, public and private, and includes all channels, including the World Bank and other regional development banks; national development banks such as our OPIC; export credit agencies; bilateral assistance; and private sector investment triggered in some fashion by public funds or policy. There was never a pledge for a "\$100B Green Climate Fund."

In terms of where we stand on the \$100B, authoritative third-party estimates, including from the World Bank, put annual public flows from developed to developing countries in the range of \$35 billion. And this doesn't include the private finance mobilized by these flows, which also counts toward the \$100 billion goal.

What is the United States itself doing to provide financial assistance to poor countries?

The United States is using every available lever to mobilize climate finance for developing countries. Between FY2010-14, U.S. public climate finance amounted to \$12.8 billion, with assistance for adaptation increasing eightfold since 2009. In FY2014 alone, the United States provided nearly \$2.7 billion dollars in public finance, and increased the share of adaptation finance as a percentage of our overall public finance. These numbers do not include the private finance mobilized by this money. Last year we:

- Pledged \$3 billion to the Green Climate Fund - half of which will be for adaptation (on a grant-equivalent basis), and a further half for least developed

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countries (LDCs), small island developing states, and African states;

- Mandated U.S. federal agencies to mainstream climate resilience into all international development assistance;
- Launched a National Adaptation Planning (NAP) Global Network to galvanize bilateral assistance to support national adaptation planning processes in vulnerable countries; and
- President Obama announced a new public-private partnership that provides climate science, data, tools, and training to developing countries to help them prepare for the impacts of climate change. Examples:
  - o We've released free, online, high-resolution topographical data for Africa, providing a resolution down to 30 meters of the Earth's surface. This will allow countries to better track coming changes like sea-level rise and water shortages.
  - o We've released elevation data for Asia, which can help countries in that region better predict things like wheat harvests and be prepared to buy food for its people in advance if needed.
- In addition, as the largest humanitarian donor in the world, the United States will continue to respond with humanitarian aid to those in need.

If climate change is as big a problem as you say it is, why won't the United States support a plan to lower the intellectual property barriers that make it impossible for developing countries to get the clean technology they need for low-carbon development?

We have never seen intellectual property protection as a barrier to the transfer of low-carbon technology. Just the opposite. Intellectual property rights (IPR) provide critical incentives for innovation that will drive the development of climate change mitigation and adaptation technologies, promote research and development and economic growth, create jobs, and incentivize the commercialization of critical green goods and services, including in developing and least-developed countries. Without IPR protection, many of the technologies on which we rely today would not have been developed. And we need tomorrow's technologies to adequately address the climate-related challenges that we are facing and will face. Without protection of IPR, we will not have them. It is that simple.

How is the United States working to ensure that vulnerable countries aren't devastated by climate change?

The United States has increased its adaptation assistance to vulnerable countries eight-fold since 2009. Some 80 percent of our bilateral support has gone to the poorest and most vulnerable countries - least developed countries (LDCs), small islands developing states, and African states. We are helping these countries reduce climate risks in key areas, including infrastructure, agriculture, and health and water services. We do this in part by helping develop capacity to use the best science and analysis for decision making, and promoting the good governance necessary to carry out these decisions.

As part of this effort, the United States is investing in the Famine Early Warning Systems Network to identify potential threats to food security, and provide monthly food security updates, regular food security outlooks and alerts, and response planning efforts.

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In addition, in September 2014, President Obama announced a new public-private partnership that provides climate science, data, tools, and training to developing countries to help them prepare for the impacts of climate change. The United States also created the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) Global Network last year to galvanize support to help vulnerable countries develop and implement their NAP processes.

Why does the United States oppose creating a fund to compensate poor countries for the loss and damage they suffer from the climate change that industrialized countries cause?

The United States has worked hard on the "loss and damage" issue over the last year and a half, including supporting the establishment of the "Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage," or "WIM," at the Warsaw COP. We also supported an ambitious work plan for the Executive Committee of the WIM at the Lima COP last December. This year, we are working intensively with partners from the islands and other vulnerable countries to find a cooperative, effective approach for Paris. And, of course, the United States is the largest humanitarian donor in the world, and will be there when disaster strikes, no matter the cause.

We are also committed to helping vulnerable countries develop in a climate resilient way so that they can avert and reduce loss and damage in the first place, and the United States, under President Obama's guidance, has established itself as a leader in this regard.

IF PRESSED: We do not support a "compensation" fund because we don't think it appropriate or feasible to suggest that unknown, unlimited liability should be imposed on certain countries.

#### POOR COUNTRIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE

Why should poor countries put so much emphasis on climate change when their first priority should be to develop, grow, provide energy for their people, and eradicate poverty?

The reality is that poor countries cannot grow and develop in a sustainable manner unless they adopt a low-carbon and resilient approach. Climate change simply poses too great a threat, whether to food production, water supply, or exposure to extreme weather events. And the poor are unfortunately most at risk from these and other climate impacts.

But it is also true that addressing climate change can be done in an affordable manner. First, the new agreement under discussion would be fully differentiated, calling on countries to make their own decisions about steps to take in a manner that fits their own national circumstances and level of development. Second, the amount of support for countries in their efforts to adapt and develop along a cleaner path is rising with the new Green Climate Fund, support programs for Low Emission Development Strategies (LEDS), such as the U.S. Enhancing Capacity for LEDS program and LEDS Global Partnership, and other support channels. Third, the costs for cleaner energy are dropping dramatically, making a non-fossil fuel path much more viable.

How can you oppose the use of coal by poor countries when it is the only affordable way for them to grow, develop, provide access to energy and eradicate poverty?

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U.S. policy is that public resources should not be used to finance commercially competitive technology in middle-income countries that are capable of attracting private sector investment. Such coal plants would "lock in" high carbon emissions for many decades to come, and make it harder to take on the already challenging issue of reducing carbon pollution. An exception is made for the poorest countries.

Of course coal plants can be part of a country's energy mix; what we're saying is that we shouldn't subsidize the building of such plants with U.S. government funds. Our policy does not limit private sector financing of coal plants. But scarce donor country financing for energy development should support clean energy solutions.

CONGRESS

Is the United States trying to avoid Senate approval on a potential Paris agreement?

No. The Administration has made clear that any international agreement brought into force for the United States will be done so consistent with the constitutional requirements. The Administration will also continue to consult with the Congress regarding the negotiations.

Will the agreement the United States is pushing for require Senate approval?

Negotiations are ongoing. At this stage, we cannot say whether the Paris conference will result in an agreement that requires Senate approval. The appropriate domestic form of the Paris outcome will depend upon several factors, including its specific provisions.

Does the Republican Congress undermine your ability to get an effective agreement?

The Administration is focused on bringing home an agreement that is in the best interests of the United States. In sum, we are seeking an agreement that is ambitious in light of the climate challenge; that reflects nationally determined mitigation efforts in line with national circumstances and capabilities; that provides for accountability with respect to such efforts; that takes account of evolving emissions and economic trends; and that promotes adaptation by parties to climate impacts.

6. (U) Minimize considered.

Signature: Kerry

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