

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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May 14, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: WILLIAM E. ODOM *W/O*

SUBJECT: Meeting with the Vice President and  
Hugh Carter on the PEADs and FEMA (U)

FEMA, NARA/NLC review(s) completed.

You asked what is to be decided at the meeting with the Vice President and Hugh Carter. Nothing, but some points about C<sup>3</sup>I vulnerability and FEMA can be made. The memo at Tab A, submitted by Hugh, is one that I drafted after the PEADs were fairly far along the review process. Hugh liked it so much that he asked if he could have it since he and his staff had done much of the work. (S)

The Presidential Emergency Action Documents (PEADs) are carried in the FOOTBALL. By signing them, the President exercises a number of emergency powers and sets in motion many things required for war mobilization and emergency economic allocations. There are two problems to be solved:

- First, update the PEADs, making sure that they are legal, have the right names, agencies, etc.
- Second, ask the larger policy question: is the system of NCA survivability and war mobilization, implicit in the PEADs, adequate for today? (S)

The first task has been completed. OMB had the lead. The second task has been launched by the tasking memo at Tab B. Because it concerns policy, the NSC took the lead. (S)

A couple of questions will arise about the tasking memo's approach and rationale. First, why did we not use a PRM format? The answer is that PRM-32 gave FPA the task of producing whatever policy review was needed. During a year of work, however, FPA could not produce either a set of policy choices or analysis for program choices. This new tasking memo allows the "ad hoc group" of NSC, OMB, OSTP, and the Military Office to oversee the process. (FPA is so poorly staffed that after two months of failed FPA drafting efforts, I had to write out their "terms of reference" for the review.) The point is, another PRM is unlikely to generate anything. At the same time, the EOP ad hoc group can get into sensitive programs (e.g. bunker locations, etc.) the way an NSC working group cannot. (S)

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The second question is about policy issues. What policy needs a change? The answer is extremely difficult to simplify, and the close-hold aspects of many programs makes it difficult to be confident about answers. After two years with the WHEP and C<sup>3</sup>I issues, I have sifted out two general problems, or inadequacies, in the present continuity of government programs: (S)

-- We have an NCA "vulnerability" problem analogous to our ICBM vulnerability. The several hard sites (the Federal Arc) near Washington are vulnerable to Soviet hard-target-kill capability. Thus the key policy/programs issue is: How can we design a new invulnerable basing mode for the President and the emergency elements of the Federal government? (S)

-- Our mobilization and economic emergency management system (as spelled out briefly in the PEADs) is neither adequate for nuclear war conditions nor adaptable to lesser contingency plans now current in Defense. There is a real danger that FEMA's Executive Order will not even include the proper authority to permit a solution to this problem. It must include a wide discretion in mobilization planning and in monitoring military manpower. (S)

Hugh Carter's interest in pressing this PEAD issue with the President was to put some heat on the NSC and the Vice President because we have traditionally put heat on him for the WHEP. (C)

#### Meeting Agenda

I recommend that you respond with the following talking points:

-- You are aware that Hugh has taken the initiative on the PEADs. You looked the revised version over (last fall), and at Odom's request, let Hugh put the results forward to the President instead of doing it yourself. (C)

-- It was clear at the PRC meetings on PRM-32 that we could not make sensible decisions on what FPA gave us. Therefore, you sent the matter back for fuller review. The tasking memo to FPA (January 26, 1979) made this a formal request. It could have gone much earlier, October 1978, but we waited, expecting to have a FEMA director at any time. Such a basic review is more important for the new agency than for FPA in its weak state. (C)

-- Today, there is nothing to decide. If we could get John Macy confirmed as FEMA director, however, that would make us more confident that the review will produce a result sufficient for policy decisions. To date there is doubt about the outcome. (C)

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-- It would be very good if OMB takes NSC views on the FEMA Executive Order, which will ensure adequate authority to deal with the mobilization, manpower, and lesser contingency planning. It is also important that the FEMA Director be brought into the NSC system by the Executive Order for coordination of his national security related programs with Defense, CIA, and others. (C)

-- Finally, the first policy issue, a new NCA/Continuity of Government basing mode is critical for maintaining deterrence, a key part of creating an endurable C<sup>3</sup>I capability. And the second issue, civil-sector mobilization support for Defense contingency plans, is critical to make our NATO reinforcement credible. (S)

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