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SECRET TOKYO 7141 SECTION I OF 2

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SUBJ: AS OKINAWA GOES SO GOES JAPAN SUMMARY. WITH "STRUGGLE" OVER MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY COMING UP IN 1970, JAPAN IS AT CROSS-ROADS. ANTI-US FORCES ARE MOBILIZING. KEY TO CONTINUATION OF PRODUCTIVE US-JAPAN POSTWAR RELATIONSHIP LIES IN MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF OKINAWA PROBLEM. NEGOTIATIONS THUS FAR HAVE ACHIEVED APPRECIABLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS FOR OUR SIDE. CAMEL'S BACK SHOULD NOT BE OVERLOADED. IN TUNE WITH GUAM DOCTRINE, OUR AIM IS FUNDAMENTAL COLLABORATION BETWEEN FREE WORLD'S TWO LEADING ECONOMIC POWERS TO PRESERVE PEACE IN EAST ASIA.

1. IN ANTICIPATION OF FORNMIN AICHI'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON, IT MAY BE USEFUL TO SUBMIT SOME IMPRESSIONS RE OKINAWA PROBLEM AND ITS IMPACT ON JAPAN AND US.

2. FEW OBSERVERS DOUBT THAT ON OUTCOME OF OKINAWA ISSUE ARE HINGED FATE OF OUR MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY, FUTURE COURSE OF JAPAN'S POLICY, AND ULTIMATELY PEACE IN FAR EAST. THIS MAY SOUND LIKE SWEEPING STATEMENT, BUT HISTORIC NATURE OF 1970 CROSS=ROADS IS PERHAPS BEST DRAMATIZED BY FACT THAT GOJ IS CURRENTLY CONSTRUCTING STRONG HIGH WALL AROUND DIET PREMISES IN GIRDING AGAINST UNHOLY ALLIANCE OF OPPOSITION FORCES BENT ON REVERSING DIRECTION OF JAPAN'S POLICIES SINCE WORLD WAR II.

3. POSTWAR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US AND JAPAN BEEN HIGHLY PRO. DUCTIVE FOR BOTH COUNTRIES. BUT HISTORY IS SELDOM STATIC. OUR



Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 TOKYO 07141 020640Z

ADJUSTING TO CHANGING CONDITIONS, E.G. FROM OCCUPATION TO TREATY RELATIONSHIP, HAS BEEN INEVITABLE. IT ALSO BEEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL.

4. PROBABLY GREATEST FACTOR CURRENTLY AUGURING FOR CHANGE IS JAPAN'S PHENOMENAL ECONOMIC UPSURGE. MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, IT IS SIGNALING THAT TILT RELATIONSHIP WHICH CHARACTERIZED US JAPAN POSTWAR RELATIONSHIP MUST MOVE EVEN FURTHER IN DIRECTION OF RELATIONSHIP OF SOVEREIGN EQUALS. KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER FREE WORLD'S TWO LEADING ECONOMIC POWERS WILL STAY IN STEP OR NOT. PROSPECT OF FAILURE CAUSES ONE TO SHUDDER WITH MEMORIES OF NINETEEN THIRTIES.

5. KEEPING IN STEP WITH JAPAN DOES NOT RPT NOT MEAN KOWTOWING TO JAPANESE WHIMS. IT DOES: HOWEVER, SUGGEST JAPANESE PEOPLE WILL EXPECT TO BE TREATED AS AMERICAN PEOPLE DESIRE TO BE TREATED.

6. ALWAYS SENSITIVE IS QUESTION OF FOREIGNERS IN ONE'S COUNTRY. IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE AN AMERICAN POLITICIAN RUNNING ON A PLATFORM FAVORING EXCLUSIVE MILITARY FACILITIES FOR JAPANESE ARMED FORCES ON AMERICAN SOIL. WITH EFFECT OF EXTRA-TERRITORIAL PRIVILEGES. APPEALS WHICH FORNMIN AICHI BEEN MAKING RE PROPER RESPECT FOR JAPANESE "SOVEREIGNTY" HAVE SUBSTANCE. IT IS QUITE NATURAL FOR GOU TO WISH "PRIOR CONSULTA-TION" BEFORE BECOMING EMBROILED IN WAR WITH MAINLAND CHINA.

7. HAVING SERVED IN MIDEAST, I AM IMPRESSED THAT SIGNIFICANT ALBEIT PRECARIOUS PUBLIC SUPPORT EXISTS FOR US BASES IN JAPAN. RECENT YOMIURI POLL SHOWED 32 PERCENT OF JAPANESE PEOPLE SUPPORT CONTINUATION OF MST AFTER 1970 (24 PERCENT OPPOSE AND 44 PERCENT UNDECIDED).IN MOST MIDEAST COUNTRIES, PLAGUED WITH VARIOUS FORMS OF ULTRA-NATIONALISM, VOTE WOULD BE ABOUT 99 PERCENT TO OUST FOREIGN BASES.

8. IT STRIKES ME THAT AMONG OTHER THINGS AT STAKE IN CRITICAL YEAR AHEAD IS WHETHER JAPAN IS GOING TO BE ABLE TO BEHAVE IN FUTURE AS SOPHISTICATED AND RESPONSIBLE POWER (ALTHOUGH EVEN NATION LIKE FRANCE OUSTED OUR BASES) OR WHETHER MORE PRIMITIVE AND EMOTIONAL FORCES OF JAPANESE NATIONALISM AS FOSTERED BY JSP. COMMUNISTS AND ULTRA-NATIONALISTS, ARE TO PREVAIL.

9. ALL OF WHICH IS TO SAY THAT JAPAN'S INTERNAL POLITICS IS AT CROSS-ROADS AND IT IS OF PRIORITY INTEREST TO US TO SEE CONTINU-

DECLASSIFIED Authority <u>MND</u> 969000



Department of State TELEGRAM

SEFRET

PAGE 03 TOKYO 07141 0206402

ATION OF WELL ORIENTED GOJ SUCH AS HAS CHARACTERIZED POSTWAR JAPAN. IF RADICAL FORCES LIKE JSP WERE TO GAIN ASCENDENCY, OUR MILITARY FACILITIES WOULD BE DOOMED AND PROSPECTS FOR JAPAN-US COLLABORATION IN PRESERVING PEACE IN FAR EAST WOULD BE BLEAK.

10. WHICH WAY JAPAN WILL: GO DEPENDS, AS SENATOR MANSFIELD HAS OBSERVED, ON HANDLING OF OKINAWA/ISSUE. PRIMIN SATO'S LDP AND LIKEMINDED ELEMENTS ARE COUNTING ON SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF PROBLEM TO PAVE WAY FOR VICTORY IN DIET ELECTION WHICH MUST BE HELD BY JANUARY 1971 AND LIKELY TO BE HELD EARLIER. ANTI-US FORCES ARE COUNTING ON OKINAWA ISSUE AS FLAG TO WHIP UP PATRIOTIC EMOTIONS TO SCORE VICTORIES EITHER IN STREET OR IN DIET ELECTIONS. EVEN PARTIAL VICTORIES FOR THESE UNFRIENDLY FORCES WOULD INEVITABLY DRIVE GOU. INTO MORE NATIONALISTIC STANCE.

11. BUT WE ALSO HAVE PROBLEMS AND REQUIREMENTS. PRIOR TO ACQUIR. ING WHAT ONE OF THEM DESCRIBED AS "BIGGER PICTURE." SEVERAL RECENT CONGRESSIONAL VISITORS SUGGESTED THAT SINCE WE ARE THERE WE SIMPLY STAY IN OKINAWA. TO CONTINUE OUR COMPLETE JURISDICTION WOULD. OF COURSE. BE IDEAL. UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES. HOW-EVER. TO ATTEMPT TO DO SO WOULD ONLY ASSURE REVERSAL OF JAPAN'S POST-WAR POLICIES AND WOULD TRANSFORM OUR POSITION IN OKINAWA TO ONE OF OCCUPATION FORCES OPERATING IN AN INCREASINGLY HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT.

12. RE LATTER POINT, IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT ALL CANDIDATES FOR OKINAWA CHIEF EXECUTIVE LAST NOVEMBER RAN ON PLATFORM OF REVERSION. VICTOR WAS YARA WHO CAMPAIGNED FOR "IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL" REVERSION. IT DOUBTFUL USG COULD OR WOULD WISH TO OPERATE BASES BY USE OF BAYONET, PARTICULARLY SINCE DIFFERENCE IN CAPABILITY AVAILABLE TO US VIA AGREED SETTLEMENT IS SO SMALL. GP=3:

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