

NE/E:FMDickman:bw 4/17/63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

~~TOP SECRET~~

DATE April 9, 1963

SUBJECT: Working Group Meeting No. 5 - Arms Control for the Near East

- PARTICIPANTS: NEA - James P. Grant
 ACDA - Ambassador Byroade
 ACDA - William Maddox
 INR - Robert Elwood
 S/P - William Polk
 CIA - [redacted]
 NE - Robert C. Strong
 NE/E - Francois M. Dickman

FOIA (b) (3) - 50 USC 3507 - CIA

Declassified Case: NW# 57160 Date: 09-18-2023

~~COPIES FOR~~

DISTRIBUTION: Original and 4 copies to NE/E - Mr. Dickman

copies 3 4 + 5 destroyed 12/23/64

The meeting opened with the distribution of a new Action List (replacing the Work List which was discussed during the third and fourth meeting) assigning responsibility to members of the Working Group for papers to be prepared relating to the Arms Control project.

Mr. Polk said the Working Group should make an early decision on the question of organizing a small staff in view of budgetary stringencies. He believed an emissary would need a staff of 3-5 persons who could back him up, provide him with memoranda, give advice on subjects relating to arms control, surveillance techniques, the NE political situation, elements of aid, etc. and thus make the mission relatively self sufficient. The staff could then remain behind to follow-up on details after the initial approach had been made. Mr. Polk thought it should be comprised of at least one person from NEA, [redacted] and one from ACDA and perhaps the Pentagon. Mr. Grant asked of the whereabouts of Mr. Charles Cremeans, who participated in the 1956 Anderson Mission. [redacted] Mr. Cremeans had been assigned to London and thought it would be difficult to detach him from this assignment. After further discussion on where a staff might make its headquarters (Athens mentioned as the most likely possibility), Mr. Grant thought that if a staff were organized, it should not be more than three persons. If necessary the NEA man could be briefed by ACDA technicians on arms control and surveillance techniques. There appeared to be no reason to bring in the Pentagon at least in the initial stage.

EO50x1 CIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

Polk and - ISR XR DEF 18-6

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOIA (b) (3) - 50 USC 3507 - CIA

-2-

[redacted] said the forthcoming SNIE (Special National Intelligence Estimate) would cover most of the intelligence gaps mentioned in the Action List. He added that Mr. McCone had removed the SNIE from the USIB agenda and would handle it his own way in order to assure greater secrecy. [redacted] said the Agency was beginning to gather material on the extent of the French-Israel relationship in the scientific field and that a separate paper would be prepared in draft for the information of the Working Group.

On the question of Israel's and the UAR's ability to tap the foreign scientific community, Mr. Grant asked if there were any means of discouraging foreign scientists (including American) from doing any work [redacted] in either country. It was believed that the U.S. exercised a degree of control over U.S. scientists who had worked on classified projects. Mr. Grant asked that this question be added to the Action List in order to have more precise information.

EO50x6 OSD

Ambassador Byroade said ACDA would have the first draft of its paper on various arms control schemes prepared by April 18. In developing the approach, ACDA had found little difficulty on the problem [redacted]

Mr. Grant asked what the Soviet attitude might be if it looked like our approach for some kind of arms limitation might succeed. It was recalled that the Soviet Union had previously shown an interest in 1958 in a possible nuclear free area in the Near East. At the time, it was understood that the Soviets had Turkey and Iran in mind. Mr. Strong suggested that if any approach were ever made to the Soviets, it should not be in terms of nuclear free zones as this was too restrictive but in terms of pledges not to export nuclear weapons to certain areas. It was agreed to add this question to the Working List.

Mr. Grant reviewed a memorandum on administrative arrangements for the Working Group from Mr. Strong. It was agreed that briefings on the Working Group's activities to the Secretary and the White House should be oral with a memorandum of what was said placed in the file. Rather than take the responsibility for personally doing all of the oral briefing, (as suggested in the memorandum), Mr. Grant said he would be responsible to see to it that the briefings would take place. Mr. Grant noted that even Top Secret, Limit Distribution documents for the Secretary's own information receive wide circulation on the seventh floor. He recently had been called by two different persons on a status report of the Working Group's activities sent only to the Secretary in a single copy.

Turning

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

Turning to the range of our approach, and timing, Mr. Grant reiterated his general conclusion that in the first stage at least, the approach should be limited to advanced weapons which were not in the possession of either side. This restricted the approach to nuclear weapons and effective ground to ground missiles. If the right person could be found, the initial approach might be made early in June. Mr. Polk commented that for planning purposes, it would be wise at least to have a second stage (providing for no further arms escalation) and a third stage (removal of certain offensive weapons such as the TU-16) in the back of our minds.

The meeting concluded with a discussion of the credibility of our approach and what indications might be necessary to persuade Ben Gurion that Nasser would be interested in an arms limitation arrangement. Mr. Polk suggested that one way would be to encourage Nasser to write to the President indicating his interest. Our emissary could then make reference to it when he visits Ben Gurion. Mr. Strong believed this could put a weapon in the hand of Ben Gurion. While it would not embarrass Ben Gurion to come out publicly in favor of an arms limitation arrangement under U.S. sponsorship, it would embarrass Nasser. Rather than dream up devices to try to convince the bona fides of both sides, the approach should be that both sides have an interest in cooperating with the US in this program and it is to their interest to keep it secret.

~~TOP SECRET~~

