cc (ym)s

9000

THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

February 4, 1977

SECRET

DOS REVIEWED 06-Mar-2007: DECLASSIFIED IN FULL.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Cyrus Vance CV

1. Human Rights: We have good evidence that your Administration's speaking out on human rights has caused both the South Korean and Indonesian governments to improve their human rights practices. The Korean government has informed our Embassy that it is not carrying out the death sentence recently imposed on a theological student; has relaxed press censorship; and has not arrested or punished two opposition leaders for statements critical of the Park government. Intelligence reports indicate that Indonesian President Suharto recently said his government must rapidly resolve the problem of political detainees in order to remain closely allied with the U.S. Suharto reportedly made this decision after having read your Inaugural address.

2. <u>Rhodesia</u>: Today Ian Smith made a public defense of his rejection of the British proposals and a request for U.S. understanding. He asked that an <u>American mission</u> come to examine the situation in his country. Smith said he would not seek support in delaying majority rule, but wanted American help in achieving a settlement which would not bring Russian-dominated terrorists into power.

> SECRET GDS

SECRET

-2-

900 d

Assessing his meetings in London, Andy Young concludes that the British seem genuinely perplexed as to what to do now that Smith has rejected their proposals. The British seem ready to conclude that they have carried the ball about as far as they can and are looking to us to develop new proposals as well as press the initiative forward with Smith and Vorster. They have asked Andy to stop in London at the end of his African trip.

Kaunda replied to your letter of January 26 expressing his appreciation for our commitment to work for a settlement in southern Africa. Kaunda blames the British for letting the present negotiations fail and Smith for being at the root of the problem. Kaunda believes it worth the effort to try to reconvene Geneva, if this attempt fails.

He suggests that Smith be forced from power and a caretaker government under new leadership put in place. He defends his defense of the armed struggle and warns that SWAPO will carry on the fight in Namibia if a settlement is not reached. Kaunda told us to admit that "the hour for peaceful action has essentially passed and, what you are involved in is a salvaging operation which requires a realistic and firm action in handling those who obstruct peaceful change."

Warnke Nomination: 3. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has scheduled Paul Warnke for next Tuesday morning. There are several requests by outside groups and individuals to testify against Paul and the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee expects the hearing to go on for some time. Stennis will probably not request that his Armed Services Committee also hold hearings although several members of that committee will participate in the hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee. Cranston's hard work and many editorials favorable to Paul have helped to improve the atmosphere in which the hearings will be held.

SECRET

No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/02 : NLC-128-12-5-13-7

-3-

SECRET

The Advisory Board on Ambassadorial Appointments: 4. The first day of the Advisory Board went very well. The members are proceeding in a slow and careful way. The group will be convening tomorrow morning. By the end of this afternoon they had reached a firm decision on only one post -- Yugoslavia. In this case they found that three of the five proposed candidates were qualified and that the other two, while also qualified, were not proved of This up to the unusual demands which will face our next Ambassador in Belgrade. The Board will convene again on February 16 and February 26-27. Dean Rusk, Reubin Askew, Maurice Ferre, and others have all told me that they believe that they have made a very good start.

5. Protest to the Soviets: I called in Dobrynin this afternoon and protested the expulsion of George Krimsky of the AP bureau in Moscow and the detention of Alexander Ginzburg. I also asked Dobrynin to withdraw Yevgenig Karpov of the Soviet UN Mission who has been indicted on espionage charges in New Jersey. Dobrynin said that he doubted that his government would reverse itself on either the Krimsky or Ginzburg cases since both men had violated Soviet laws and had to bear the consequences of this. I told Dobrynin that if there was not a change in the Soviet attitudes in these two instances, we would have to speak out publicly to condemn Soviet behavior, and that if I had not received a reversal in the Krimsky case within 24 hours, we would retaliate. Dobrynin said that he understood what the problem was in the Karpov case and that he would take action in the matter, which I assume means that Karpov will be removed.

Dobrynin also delivered to me a letter to you from Brezhnev in response to your letter of January 26. I am forwarding Brezhnev's letter herewith.

All the Department is saying tonight in response to press queries on the Krimsky and Ginzburg cases is: Secretary Vance discussed these matters this afternoon with Ambassador Dobrynin. The Secretary will have nothing more to say on these subjects today.

6. KFIRs: We called Dinitz tonight to tell him of our decision not to authorize the KFIR sale to Ecuador but to increase security support assistance for Israel next year to \$1.785 billion. Dinitz took the news well and was especially satisfied with the aid decision.

SECRET

-4-

ok-but

nights

I favor

SECRET

We will speak to Humphrey, Case, and Javits tomorrow on the matter to tell them of your decision and inform them of Dinitz's reaction.

Alan Boyd: Brock Adams and I have asked Alan 7. Boyd to be the US negotiator in the difficult bilateral Competition airline talks that are coming up with the British. Brock and I believe that Alan is the best person in the country to do this job. Alan is willing to take not Pre-Shared it on subject, of course, to your approval. refained

U.S. Treaty Making Process: I am enclosing 8. a paper prepared in the Department on the procedures for concluding treaties.

SECRET

No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/02 : NLC-128-12-5-13-7