



OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1977–1980, VOLUME IV, NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

98. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 25, 1978

SUBJECT

Crisis Management: Priorities, Emerging Issues and Initiatives

You asked for a short review of the above three categories in my area, Crisis Management.

Basic priorities which have been met in the first two years.

1. Crisis management procedures at the strategic level. This is the area in which we have made the most progress. (An unanticipated and distressing consequence may be that we have oversold the capabilities for LUA.)
2. On the civil front, the FEMA re-organization is a major stride. The follow-through, however, is crucial and presently not ensured.²
3. PD-41 Civil Defense is a major achievement.³
4. We have generated a much changed impression and understanding of Soviet approaches to strategic force management.
5. We have created an interagency counter-terrorism incident management system which has met demands effectively thus far, and we have created new special counter-terror units in the Army.

Emerging Issues.

1. [6 lines not declassified]
2. [2 lines not declassified]
3. Mobilization inadequacies, thrown up by exercise play NIFTY NUGGET, will be an issue impacting on the organization of FEMA.⁴ Presently there is little understanding or desire in OMB to make FEMA fill the mobilization planning gap, but we will miss an extraordinary opportunity if we do not force the matter as FEMA develops.
4. Nuclear weapons security and terrorism could become a big issue. The scene in Europe is not comforting, perhaps not in the U.S. either.
5. The technology transfer and trade issue as it relates to oil, and the USSR is an on-going issue.

New Initiatives

1. *Continuity of Government.* We must launch a major review of “continuity of government.” The PRC on civil defense agreed that this should be done, and the civil defense directive, PD–41, requires the capability which at present is non-existent.⁵ This is not the easy issue it may appear to be. It relates to the C3I studies, LUA, stockpiles, mobilization, military manpower policy, and FEMA re-organization. Trying to work out the terms of reference for analysis boggles the mind. (TS)
 2. *Military doctrine.* I have spelled out the categories for pursuing this one. They are: (a) the conceptual revolution; (b) implementation in C3I by small steps; (c) flexibility in planning for military operations; (d) force structure changes by small steps. You may be inclined to emphasize the conceptual revolution first. I am inclined to leave it until last, moving in the program and operations areas first. Such a sweeping doctrinal change is impossible to explain to most audiences and unacceptable to most who understand. (TS)
 3. *Mobilization.* This one could be made an issue if you like or simply ignored for later. NIFTY NUGGET is generating a wealth of data which could be used to make it an initiative. Much can be done in this area at very little cost in defense budget outlays. Legislation and organizational changes would not be costly. (S)
 4. *A real shocker.* The quickest way to drive the defense budget down and to increase our military power is to reinstitute the draft, reducing private’s pay by 10 percent in the process. The savings would probably dwarf the “increment” Harold Brown seeks. (S)
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1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 59, Administration’s Policy: NSC: 1978. Top Secret; Sensitive.↵
2. See [footnote 4](#), [Document 72](#).↵
3. See [Document 91](#).↵
4. See [Document 94](#).↵
5. The PRC met to consider PRM–32 on civil defense on August 3. See [Document 73](#).↵