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Declassification Authority: Geoffrey W. Chapman, Senior
Reviewer, A/GIS/IPS 8/6/2020

1. ~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. THE HARSH AND UNWELCOME PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON NATO EXPANSION MADE BY KOZYREV AND YELTSIN WERE APPARENTLY THE PRODUCT OF A COMBINATION OF PERSONAL, POLITICAL, AND SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS. THESE PROBABLY INCLUDE: KOZYREV'S CONTINUING SENSITIVITY TO CRITICISM THAT HE IS TOO COMPLIANT TO THE WEST; STRONG DOMESTIC OPPOSITION ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM TO EARLY NATO EXPANSION; RUSSIAN SUSPICION, FED TO SOME EXTENT BY U.S. PRESS REPORTS AND EUROPEAN COMPLAINTS, THAT THE U.S. HAS BEEN PUSHING HARDER FOR NATO EXPANSION THAN WE HAVE BEEN TELLING THE GOR IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS; A SENSE THAT U.S.-EUROPEAN DIFFERENCES ON THIS ISSUE CREATE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR RUSSIA; AND THE GROWING CONVICTION, FROM YELTSIN ON DOWN, THAT THE U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP IS HEADED FOR MORE DIFFICULT TIMES AFTER THE MID-TERM ELECTIONS. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW NEXT WEEK PROVIDES A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO CLEAR THE AIR AND PUT OUR DIALOGUE ON NATO BACK ON A WORKABLE TRACK. END SUMMARY.

WHY KOZYREV AND YELTSIN TOOK A TOUGH LINE

3. WE SUSPECT THAT THE UNWELCOME PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF KOZYREV AND YELTSIN ON NATO EXPANSION WERE TRIGGERED NOT BY ANY SPECIFIC LANGUAGE IN THE NAC COMMUNIQUE, BUT BY A COMBINATION OF PERSONAL, POLITICAL, AND SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS WHICH BOILED OVER IN BRUSSELS AND BUDAPEST. AS DEPUTY FM MAMEDOV ACKNOWLEDGED TO THE AMBASSADOR TODAY, THE U.S. WENT TO CONSIDERABLE LENGTHS IN RECENT MONTHS TO TRY TO ENSURE THAT THERE WERE NO SURPRISES AT THE NAC, AND THAT RUSSIAN INTERESTS WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. WHILE MAMEDOV ARGUED HALF-HEARTEDLY THAT THE "TIMETABLE" LANGUAGE IN THE NAC COMMUNIQUE FOR COMPLETION OF THE INITIAL

Russia



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ALLIANCE STUDY OF NEXT STEPS WAS TROUBLESOME FOR THE RUSSIANS, IT'S HARD TO SEE HOW THAT ALONE COULD HAVE PROMPTED SUCH A STIFF PUBLIC REACTION.

4. BASED UPON OUR INITIAL SOUNDINGS, WE BELIEVE A NUMBER OF COMBUSTIBLE INGREDIENTS PRODUCED THE KOZYREV OUTBURST IN BRUSSELS, WHICH THEN LED TO YELTSIN'S HARD LINE IN BUDAPEST. NONE OF THEM WAS PROBABLY SUFFICIENT IN ITSELF TO PROMPT TOUGH STATEMENTS OF THE SORT WE SAW; IT WAS THEIR COMBINATION WHICH CREATED THE PROBLEM.

-- FIRST, KOZYREV ARRIVED IN BRUSSELS ACUTELY SENSITIVE TO THE CONTINUING PERCEPTION AMONG HIS MANY DETRACTORS IN RUSSIA THAT HE IS STILL TOO COMPLIANT TO WESTERN INTERESTS. HE ALSO RETAINS A FLAIR FOR THE DRAMATIC AND A PENCHANT FOR GRANDSTANDING (AS HE DEMONSTRATED AT THE HELSINKI CSCE MEETING TWO YEARS AGO).

-- SECOND, HOSTILITY TO EARLY NATO EXPANSION IS ALMOST UNIVERSALLY FELT ACROSS THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SPECTRUM HERE. DURING AN UNSETTLED PERIOD AT HOME, WITH THE DUST STILL SETTLING ON THE RECENT CABINET RESHUFFLE AND CHECHNYA A SOURCE OF REAL WORRY, THE TEMPTATION TO STRIKE A POPULAR, NATIONALIST CHORD ON FOREIGN POLICY WAS UNDOUBTEDLY STRONG.

-- THIRD, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO TRY TO EXPLAIN THE RUSSIAN REACTION SOLELY IN DOMESTIC TERMS. BOTH KOZYREV AND YELTSIN (WITH WHOM THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS REPORTEDLY IN CLOSE CONTACT BEFORE HE DELIVERED HIS STATEMENT IN BRUSSELS) HAVE WEIGHED WHAT WE HAVE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED TO THEM IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS ABOUT OUR CAREFUL APPROACH TO NATO EXPANSION AGAINST WHAT THEY SEE IN U.S. PRESS BACKGROUNDEERS AND AMERICAN OP-ED PAGES. THE NET RESULT HAS BEEN TO FEED THE SUSPICION (HOWEVER MISGUIDED) OF MANY IN THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP THAT WE ARE QUIETLY PUSHING THE ALLIES TO MOVE FASTER ON EXPANSION THAN WE HAVE BEEN SUGGESTING TO THE GOR.

(YELTSIN WAS QUOTED BY RUSSIAN PRESS IN BUDAPEST AS GROUSING THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON, WHILE SAYING THE RIGHT THINGS IN PUBLIC, HAS PRIVATELY BEEN LOBBYING TO EXCLUDE MOSCOW FROM ANY FUTURE NATO MEMBERSHIP.)

-- FOURTH, KOZYREV MAY HAVE PERCEIVED THAT DIFFERENCES WITH SOME OF OUR ALLIES OVER THE PACE OF EXPANSION OFFERED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR RUSSIA TO SLOW THE PROCESS. MAMEDOV, FOR EXAMPLE, CITED REPORTS HE HAD HEARD OF GERMAN COMPLAINTS THAT

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THE U.S. HAD "PUSHED TOO HARD" IN BRUSSELS FOR INCLUSION OF "TIMETABLE" LANGUAGE IN THE NAC COMMUNIQUE.

-- FINALLY, IT HAS BECOME CONVENTIONAL WISDOM IN MOSCOW AFTER OUR MID-TERM ELECTIONS THAT, AS YELTSIN HIMSELF PUT IT PUBLICLY ON HIS DEPARTURE FOR BUDAPEST, "IT WILL BECOME MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO DO BUSINESS WITH THE AMERICANS." WHILE WE HAVE EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY THAT THERE IS A BIPARTISAN COMMITMENT TO A STRONG U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP (AND WARNED AGAINST THE DANGERS OF CREATING SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECIES), THERE IS AN UNMISTAKEABLE RUSSIAN TENDENCY NOW TO ASSUME THAT



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GREATER FRICTION BETWEEN US IS LIKELY -- WHICH UNFORTUNATELY INTERSECTS WITH THE CONTINUATION OF A MORE ASSERTIVE RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY. (IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT KOZYREV AND YELTSIN THOUGHT THEY WERE SENDING A SIGNAL TO THE NEW U.S. CONGRESS ABOUT THE POTENTIAL DANGERS OF DISREGARDING RUSSIAN INTERESTS ON SUCH ISSUES; THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED TO MAMEDOV TODAY THAT THEIR PERFORMANCE RISKS PRECISELY THE KIND OF REACTION THAT THEY SHOULD SEEK TO AVOID.)

// bad maneuver later it'll backfire

5. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THESE VARIOUS ANXIETIES WAS WHAT WE HEARD IN BRUSSELS AND BUDAPEST. WE ARE NOT CERTAIN HOW PREMEDITATED KOZYREV'S OUTBURST WAS, OR WHAT EXACTLY TRANSPIRED BETWEEN HIM AND YELTSIN ON THE TELEPHONE BEFORE HIS BRUSSELS STATEMENT (OR WHO SPUN UP WHOM). WHATEVER SECOND THOUGHTS KOZYREV MAY HAVE ABOUT HIS PERFORMANCE, IT IS CLEAR THAT RUSSIAN REACTION HERE, BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, HAS BEEN OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE STANCE THAT HE AND THE PRESIDENT TOOK.

WHERE TO GO FROM HERE

6. WE DOUBT THAT SENIOR RUSSIAN OFFICIALS KNOW AT THIS POINT EXACTLY WHAT KINDS OF "CLARIFICATIONS" THEY NEED FROM US AND OUR ALLIES ON THE PROCESS OF NATO EXPANSION. PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS ASSISTANT DMITRIY RYURIKOV WAS VAGUE ON THIS ISSUE WITH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW LAST FRIDAY; MAMEDOV WAS EQUALLY ELUSIVE TODAY.

7. WE BELIEVE THAT YELTSIN AND KOZYREV ARE AWARE THAT THEY CANNOT STOP THE PROCESS OF NATO EXPANSION. ULTIMATELY WE BELIEVE THE RUSSIANS WILL SEEK OUR ASSURANCES THAT: (1) NO ACTUAL DECISIONS ON EXPANSION WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE JUNE 1996 (NOT COINCIDENTALLY, THE SCHEDULED DATE FOR RUSSIA'S NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS); AND (2) NO FORMAL ENTRY OF NEW MEMBERS INTO THE ALLIANCE WILL TAKE PLACE UNTIL THE END OF THE CENTURY. WITHOUT TRYING TO JUSTIFY RUSSIA'S HEAVYHANDED TACTICS, THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE FURTHER WE CAN GO IN PORTRAYING OUR PRESENT APPROACH AS REALISTIC AND WITHIN (OR CLOSE TO) THESE PARAMETERS, THE BETTER ABLE WE'LL BE TO REASSURE YELTSIN AND RECONSTRUCT A REASONABLE DIALOGUE..

8. IN THE MEANTIME, THE GOR WILL BE LOOKING, AT A MINIMUM, FOR EVEN GREATER TRANSPARENCY IN OUR PLANNING; FOR HIGH-LEVEL REITERATION THAT ALL REASONABLE RUSSIAN CONCERNS WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND THAT THE DOOR TO EVENTUAL MEMBERSHIP IS NOT BARRED TO ANYONE; AND FOR A COMMITMENT THAT THE IPP DOCUMENT AND RUSSIA-NATO PAPER ARE ONLY A FIRST STEP TOWARD A DEEPER (AND PERHAPS MORE FORMAL) UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO.

9. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT -- AND IN PARTICULAR HIS MEETING WITH YELTSIN -- PROVIDES A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO PUT OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE RUSSIANS ON NATO BACK ON A WORKABLE TRACK. WE WILL BE FOLLOWING UP SEPARATELY WITH OUR THOUGHTS ON

HOW BEST TO APPROACH THIS ISSUE IN THE RUN-UP TO THE VISIT. WE WOULD URGE IN THE MEANTIME THAT WE RESTRAIN OUR PERFECTLY UNDERSTANDABLE URGE TO RESPOND IN KIND PUBLICLY TO THE GOR. THAT WILL ONLY FEED THE ALREADY POPULAR TENDENCY HERE TO DIG IN RUSSIA'S HEELS, AND ENCOURAGE A CYCLE OF RESPONSES AND COUNTER-RESPONSES THAT CLEARLY WILL NOT SERVE OUR INTERESTS OR PROMOTE OUR OBJECTIVES.
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