

Weather

Today: Thunderstorms.  
High 96, Low 74.  
Thursday: Thunderstorms.  
High 92, Low 72.

Details: B10

100TH YEAR No. 204 S DC K

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## CIA Releases Files On Past Misdeeds

*Assassination Plots, Domestic Spying Cited*

By KAREN DEYOUNG  
and WALTER PINCUS  
*Washington Post Staff Writers*

Hundreds of pages of decades-old documents declassified and released by the CIA yesterday revealed a 1970s-era agency in the throes of unaccustomed self-examination, caught between its traditional secrecy and demands that it come clean on a history of unsavory activities.

Prompted by the then-unraveling Watergate affair, and by fears that CIA involvement in that scandal would be exposed along with other illegal operations, the agency combed its files for what it called "delicate" information with "flap potential." The result was a collection of documents the CIA called the "family jewels."

Partly disclosed yesterday, the documents chronicle activities including assassination plans, illegal wiretaps and hunts for spies at political conventions. One document spoke of a plan to poison an African leader. Another revealed that the CIA had offered a Mafia boss \$150,000 to kill Cuba's Fidel Castro.

Agents set up surveillance in a ho-

### Skeletons From The Agency Closet

There was the mobster the CIA recruited to arrange a hit on Fidel Castro. There were the tests of hallucinogenic drugs on human subjects and the secret training of Washington-area police forces in surveillance, countersabotage and surreptitious entry. Then there was the agency's murky role in the Watergate scandal.

**Stories, A6**

tel opposite The Washington Post to watch for possible sources of leaked intelligence information, and senior officials juggled requests from the Nixon White House to pay off the Watergate burglars.

As he prepared the agency's testimony for congressional committees

See CIA, A7, Col. 1

A VIEW FROM WATERGATE

# The Keeper of Secrets Earned His Reputation

By BOB WOODWARD  
Washington Post Staff Writer

"Mr. Helms instructed me to restrict knowledge of the existence of the letter to an absolute minimum number of people." So said Howard J. Osborn, the CIA's director of security, in a sworn affidavit that sat for decades in the agency's secret files until it was released yesterday. The Mr. Helms in question was Richard Helms, the director of central intelligence during Watergate and a zealous guardian of his agency — "the man who kept the secrets," as his biographer, Thomas Powers, called him.



Former CIA director Richard Helms showed no desire to release potential Watergate evidence.

In this case, Osborn reported that James W. McCord Jr., the head of the Watergate burglary team and Osborn's predecessor as the CIA's chief of security, had written a letter in August 1972 to Helms. Osborn, according to his affidavit, said he "felt strongly" that it should be turned over to the FBI, which was supposedly conducting a rigorous investigation of Watergate. It was a critical moment in the Watergate probe, with Nixon seeking reelection that fall and desperate to keep the botched burglary from spoiling his chances.

McCord's letter to the CIA could have been important evidence; according to later testimony, he was seeking assistance from the CIA, where he had worked for decades, and was on the verge of blowing the whistle about Watergate, as he did months later in a famous March 21,

1973, letter to Judge John J. Sirica. But Nixon would have no preselection problem with the CIA. "Mr. Helms, after some reflection, decided he would like to have a legal opinion on the matter and summoned Mr. Lawrence Huston, general counsel of the agency, to his office and had him read the letter," Osborn recounted. Probably not to the surprise of anyone who knew Helms, after a lengthy discussion "both Mr. Helms and Mr. Huston decided that there was no such obligation and I was told to hold the letter in a secure file in my office and take no further action on it." This was the Watergate-era CIA, with Helms ever serving the president, ever mindful, as Richard M. Nixon's secret White House tapes later revealed, that the president wanted the full story of Watergate locked away in government safe-keeping. And the CIA's role in that coverage was always one of the murkiest parts of the story. As Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.), the vice chairman of the Senate Watergate committee, famously said at the time, the role of the CIA in the scandal was like "animals crashing around in the forest — you can hear them but you can't see them."

Baker and many Watergate investigators came away with the sense that senior CIA officials knew more than was ever revealed, even as the agency's culture of concealment and undercover work reflexively generated the kind of response that Osborn's affidavit so accurately

3. My first involvement in this matter occurred on the 2nd or 3rd of August 1972 when an envelope addressed to Mr. Helms, then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, with no return address, and postmarked 30 July 1972 was routed to my desk from the Director's office as a routine piece of "crank mail". The envelope contained a carbon copy of a typewritten letter signed "Jim" with the name in the salutary address excised - "Dear \_\_\_\_\_". After dismissing

Among the documents released by the CIA was this Watergate affidavit from security director Howard J. Osborn.

captures. Helms wrote a revealing memoir that was published after his death in 2002, but even in that book he never seemed to have fully acknowledged what he knew about Watergate and when. Certainly at the time, he was anything but forthcoming. "The CIA had no involvement in the break-in. No involvement whatever," Helms testified to the Senate Watergate committee on Aug. 2, 1973. "The agency had nothing to do with the Watergate break-in," he added. "And I hope all the newsmen in the room hear me clearly now." But the question was, what could have Helms known?

As another 1973 document released yesterday by the CIA shows, a month or two before the Watergate burglary, E. Howard Hunt, a former CIA official and then-White House consultant called the agency's External Employment Assistance Branch to see if a "retiree" or resignee who was accomplished at picking locks could be hired, for tasks unspecified in the memo but surely deeply hinted at. The CIA of that era was the perfect Watergate enabler, as these new documents suggest in telling detail. The White House wants a lock-picker. McCord threatens to tell all. The CIA keeps mum.

effects. The drugs were screened with the use of EDP equipment, and those subjected for experimentation were tested at [redacted] being monkeys and mice. Materials [redacted] no further interest, as demonstrated by this testing, were then tested at Edgewood, using volunteer members of the Armed Forces. 2. The program was terminated last fall. The computer program remains in the machine, its final disposition not yet having been decided.

This memo outlines the program in which drug experiments were carried out on volunteers.

## Experimenting With the Mind

The CIA was eager to examine the use of dangerous pharmaceutical drugs to modify the behavior of targeted individuals, and so it asked commercial drug manufacturers to pass along samples of medicines rejected for commercial sale "because of unfavorable effects," according to an undated memorandum included in dozens of CIA documents released yesterday.



Frank Olson fell to his death after being given LSD.

CIA scientists tested some of the drugs on monkeys and mice, the memo said. Drugs that showed promise, it said, "were then tested at Edgewood, using volunteer members of the Armed Forces." This appears to be a reference to an Army laboratory north of Baltimore now called the Edgewood Chemical Biological Center. The memo doesn't discuss the reactions of those human subjects.

The three-paragraph memo reports that the late Carl Duckett, a senior CIA technologist, had said the testing program was not intended to find new techniques to be used offensively, but rather was an effort to detect if such drugs were being employed by others. Duckett "emphasizes that the program was considered as defensive, in the sense that we would be able to

recognize certain behavior if similar materials were used against Americans," it states. Duckett, the CIA's deputy director for science and technology, retired in 1977 and died in 1992.

Another document, dated May 8, 1973, mentions the existence of a 1963 account of agency scientists administering mind- or personality-altering drugs on "unwitting subjects" — that is, testing hallucinogens such as LSD on people without their knowledge. The document doesn't provide details.

One of the most notorious such cases involved Frank R. Olson, a CIA gem-warefare expert who died in a fall from a hotel window in 1953, nine days after a CIA doctor spilled Olson's after-dinner drink with LSD. In 1975, President Gerald R. Ford invited Olson's family to the White House to apologize; the government also paid the family \$750,000.

Sidney Gottlieb, the chief of the CIA's technical services division, who directed the mind-control experiments, retired from the government in 1973 and died in 1999. The released documents shed little light on those experiments.

— Thomas E. Ricks

Emergency Flashing Red Light	22
*Searchlight, Tear Gas	36
*Chemical Baton 6 1/2"	36
*Chemical Baton 12"	24
*Chemical Baton 24"	24
*Mustang 35 Pistol	6
*Searchlight with Shoulder Strap	36
*Stun Gun	3

\*NOTE: Various quantities and types of replacement chemical cartridges, loading kits, and batteries were also ordered for asterisk items.

A memo lists items lent to police to help deal with antiwar demonstrations in Washington.

## Fighting War Protesters

In the early 1970s, as Vietnam War-era protests swirled around the Washington area, local police borrowed riot equipment and received intelligence training from an unusual source: the CIA.



The CIA seemed wary of antiwar protests.

The agency, which is barred from domestic law enforcement, provided gas masks, stun guns, searchlights and protective vests. CIA specialists trained more than 20 officers — from the District, Fairfax and Arlington counties, and Alexandria — in surveillance photography, countersabotage and surreptitious entry.

The CIA-local nexus was included in hundreds of pages of documents released yesterday by the agency that detailed a quarter-century of CIA history. The records said the agency recruited officers primarily to protect CIA facilities from attack by protesters. "A conscious decision was made . . . to utilize the services of local police to repel invaders in case of riot or dissension," a top CIA official wrote in May 1973.

But the documents make it clear that the intelligence agency also wanted to keep tabs on the mammoth antiwar demonstrations in Washington from

1969 through 1971. The D.C. police department, for example, was given a communications system "to monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations," the records said. The CIA also extended to basic law enforcement. Police officials in Montgomery County told The Post in 1973 that they received CIA surveillance training to combat street crime. The agency also gave Arlington and Alexandria a substance it had developed to detect whether someone had recently handled metallic objects, such as firearms.

Local police officials said yesterday that the CIA connection was too old for them to provide additional details. "We don't have any records," said Arlington police spokesman John Liale. "We have no way to determine if we did receive any equipment or what we did with it."

Although the National Security Act of 1947, which established the CIA, says the agency has no state police or law enforcement powers, legal experts said it's unclear whether the CIA aid was illegal because the agency was only assisting local police. — Jerry Markon

4. This Agency was aware that Roselli intended to expose his participation in the plot should we not intervene on his behalf. The DCI decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Roselli or someone on his behalf furnishing Jack Anderson details of the incident. Attached hereto are two of Anderson's articles dealing with Roselli. Anderson is also Editor of the Washington Bureau of the Washington Post, Sunday supplemental "Parade."

This memo discusses mobster John Roselli's threat to expose the CIA plot to kill Castro.

## Trying to Kill Fidel Castro

It was certainly a marriage of convenience. After Fidel Castro led a revolution that toppled a friendly government in 1959, the CIA was desperate to eliminate him. So the agency sought out a partner equally worried about Castro — the Mafia, which had lucrative investments in Cuban casinos. The plot, described in detail in CIA documents released yesterday, involved six poison pills, a bungled wiretapping and CIA operatives working with two mob bosses on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted list.



Roselli testified. His body was found in a barrel.

The CIA's efforts to assassinate Castro were documented by the Church Committee in 1975, based on the testimony of the key players, but the documents show that the agency's actions in the early 1960s still have the capacity to shock. The CIA plan was known to only a few top officials, including then-CIA Director Allen Dulles, Robert A. Maheu, a former FBI agent, was asked by senior officials to contact Johnny Roselli, a high-ranking mob-

who had connections in Havana. Flipping through Parade magazine, Maheu later discovered to his shock that "Sam" and "Joe" were actually Momo Salvatore Giancana, the successor to Al Capone as head of the Chicago mob, and Santo Trafficante Jr., the head of the mob's Cuban operations.

Maheu told the CIA's security office, but the plan went forward, according to a summary written by the agency's director, Howard J. Osborn. Giancana suggested slipping something into Castro's drink or food, and the CIA provided "six pills of high lethal content," according to the summary. But an initial assassin got cold feet, and the project was canceled before a second man could act.

The project was nearly exposed when Maheu was arrested for arranging the wiretapping of the room of comedian Dan Rowan, who Giancana suspected was having an affair with the mobster's girlfriend. When the wiretap technician was captured, he implicated



This 1962 CIA paper was 14 years premature in predicting the demise of Chinese Premier Mao Zedong.

## Keeping an Eye on Communism

When a young analyst of Soviet affairs named Melvin A. Goodman started work at the CIA in 1966, he was ushered into a room to read special collections of reports on the Soviet Union and China. His bosses "thought this was the best work the CIA had produced at the time," Goodman said yesterday of the documents, which dated to the early 1950s.



Verifying details on Joseph Stalin's death was hard.

Yesterday, many of those Cold War-era papers were suddenly available to the public on the CIA's own Web site, at [www.foia.cia.gov/cpe.asp](http://www.foia.cia.gov/cpe.asp). But what impressed Goodman 40 years ago looks more mundane today, because the agency's analysts had little hard information about the major communist powers in the two decades up to 1972.

The 11,000 pages released yesterday appeared to contain no startling revelations and a number of goofs. For example, in a 1962 paper called "The Decline of Mao Tse-Tung," agency analysts predicted the

Most of the reports were produced by the CIA's Special Research Staff (SRS), long defunct. It was largely staffed by academic specialists whose findings were frequently at odds with judgments by senior CIA officials and policymakers. For example, several papers accurately described the 1960's Sino-Soviet split when senior CIA officials were telling others that the countries' tensions were insignificant.

Analysts who wrote these reports relied mainly on the same public clues that journalists and scholars read: Which order did the senior Soviet leaders enter the Hall of Colossus at the opening of the Party Congress? What terminology did Pravda use to describe a rising figure?

"The West was completely dependent on the Soviet radio and press for all news on this development," a 1953 report on Premier Joseph Stalin's death said bluntly. "It is impossible therefore to determine whether Stalin had been dead for some time, whether

# Files From '70s Released In Effort to Show Openness



Director James R. Schlesinger in 1973 asked agency employees for negative information about the CIA.



William E. Colby angered many agency veterans by giving the "family jewels" files to Congress.



BY MANUEL BALCE CENEA — ASSOCIATED PRESS

National Security Archive Executive Director Thomas Blanton, standing; Deputy Director Malcolm Byrne, left; and senior fellow and CIA expert John Prados, second from left, work with researchers and analysts on documents released by the CIA. The agency released hundreds of pages of internal reports yesterday.

CIA. From A1

investigating Watergate in May 1973, William E. Colby, then a senior CIA official, struggled with how much to reveal, according to one memo. What investigators wanted to know, one colleague warned after reviewing Colby's draft, was: "Did the CIA cooperate wittingly in [illegal] activities. . . . Or did it only respond supinely to higher authority even though it had some reason for suspecting illegal conduct?"

The colleague advised against a "minimal factual response" in favor of "candor." Colby, who became CIA director in September 1973, later turned the entire "family jewels" file over to Congress, an act some agency veterans still consider a betrayal.

Current CIA Director Michael V. Hayden said yesterday that the papers include "reminders of some things the CIA should not have done." He told agency staff members that the internal reforms and increased oversight after the Watergate disclosures gave the CIA "a far stronger place in our democratic system."

Hayden became CIA director last summer in the midst of new allegations that the intelligence community crossed legal lines by torturing terrorism suspects at secret prisons and by conducting warrantless surveillance involving Americans. His decision to release the "family jewels," responding to a 1992 Freedom of Information Act request, was meant to convince critics that the agency embraces openness when possible.

Some documents resonate with recent intelligence controversies. Several dealt with the agency's domestic spying on anti-Vietnam War groups during the Johnson and Nixon years. One described an operation, begun under President Richard M. Nixon in late 1972, to track telephone calls between people stateside and overseas, and foreign calls routed through the United States.

The documents provided few new details of CIA operations, most of which were revealed long ago, either by Congress or the media. Rather than being a comprehensive accounting of a quarter-century of agency history, they were a haphazard collection of internal memos, communications with Congress and press clippings. Many contained deletions, and a number of pages were blank.

Most revealing were the memos written in response to a May 1973 appeal by then-Director James R. Schlesinger to "report to me immediately on any activities now going on, or that have gone on in the past, which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency."

The responses, sent by division heads, low-level bureaucrats and retired operatives, included lengthy

A one-paragraph memo recounts planning for a "project involving the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, then premier of the Republic of Congo. According to [name deleted], poison was to have been the vehicle . . ." A Belgian commission later attributed Lumumba's 1961 death to local rivals who had imprisoned him.

In 1972, Colby offered a carefully worded disclaimer in response to a letter from Lloyd Shearer of Parade magazine, who asked about direct CIA involvement in assassinations. "I can say, under oath if need be, that the CIA has never carried out a political assassination, nor has it induced, employed or suggested one which occurred."

In October 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson requested an interagency survey of possible foreign connections to U.S. groups opposed to the Vietnam War and worldwide student movements with communist links. Then-Director Richard M. Helms tasked the agency to do it, and the main input came from "sensitive intercepts" produced by the National Security Agency, according to another memo.

Agency officials became nervous years later because CIA reports on this issue included material on the homegrown radical group Students for a Democratic Society, known as SDS. Under its charter, the CIA is not allowed to conduct domestic intelligence-gathering.

The memos also recount more mundane concerns. After Nixon's May 1970 speech defending an incursion into Cambodia during the Vietnam War, the White House received thousands of letters, and directed that the CIA fund replies. The agency's costs totaled \$33,655 for printing and postage for replies sent out to Nixon supporters. Negative letters were handed to the State Department for reply.