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(III)
IMPACT OF CUBAN-SOVIE TIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, SPRING 1980

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28, 1980

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:45 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gus Yatron (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. YATRON. The subcommittee will now come to order. Today the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee will meet in executive session on the impact of Cuban-Soviet ties in the Western Hemisphere.

Our briefings by the Defense Intelligence Agency will be divided into two sections. The session today will be confined to Soviet activity in Cuba and the use of Cuban military forces in Africa and other parts of the world.

Tomorrow, we will go into the political aspects of Cuban-Soviet influence in the hemisphere, concentrating on changes which are taking place in Central and South America.

This annual update by DIA will give the subcommittee an insight into Soviet activities in Cuba, including the presence of a Soviet combat brigade, the upgrading of military equipment and its capabilities, the extent of Communist activities in the hemisphere, and other developments in Central America, the Caribbean, and South America.

Over the years we have seen the increased level of military and economic support of Cuba by the Soviet Union. The hearings also have been a barometer for us to gage the successes or failures of Cuban foreign policy in the hemisphere.

Cuba has made some inroads, particularly in Jamaica, Grenada, and Nicaragua, although Castro has reportedly had some problems at home. The subcommittee is indicating its continuing concern by holding these hearings.

Due to the sensitive nature of the information to be given, the Defense Intelligence Agency has asked that these hearings be held in executive session. It is the Chair's intention to again request that DIA declassify as much of the testimony as possible for publication so that the public can have maximum benefit of information on this important aspect of our national security and foreign policies.

Our witnesses today are Dr. Edward M. Collins, Vice Director for Foreign Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Mr. Martin J. Scheina, analyst for Cuban Affairs, Defense Intelligence Agency.
They are accompanied by Lt. Col. Ralph Martinez-Boucher, Mr. Gary R. McClellan, Mr. David C. Yorck, Dr. Ramon da Pena, and Major John C. Crenshaw, all of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

I would like to entertain a motion from the floor that we go into executive session.

Mr. Gilman. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee now go into executive session.

Mr. Yatron. The motion has been made. Do I have a second?

Mr. Fascell. Second.

Mr. Yatron. It has been moved and seconded that we go into executive session. For the purpose of taking classified testimony, under the rule the rollcall is automatic and the clerk will now call the role.

Mr. Friedman. Mr. Yatron.

Mr. Yatron. Aye.

Mr. Friedman. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. Fascell. Aye.

Mr. Friedman. Mr. Rosenthal.

[No response.]

Mr. Friedman. Mrs. Collins.

[No response.]

Mr. Friedman. Mr. Studds.

Mr. Studds. Aye.

Mr. Friedman. Mr. Ireland.

[No response.]

Mr. Friedman. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. Gilman. Aye.

Mr. Friedman. Mr. Guyer.

[No response.]

Mr. Friedman. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Aye.

Mr. Yatron. There are five members voting "aye." A quorum being present, we are now in executive session.

Will the clerk determine that all who are present in the room have the appropriate clearance.

Dr. Collins, it is a pleasure to welcome you back. Please proceed with your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD M. COLLINS, VICE DIRECTOR FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. Collins. Mr. Chairman, honorable members of this committee, on behalf of Lieutenant General Tighe, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, I want to express my appreciation for the opportunity to have our representatives appear before you again this year.

As in recent years our presentation will be in two parts: The first will concentrate on Cuba and the Soviet presence there, and the second will concentrate on changes which are taking place in Central and South America.

In Cuba, the most significant development in the past year was the confirmation of the presence of a Soviet combat brigade. Soviet support to the Cuban military has continued at a high level over the past few years. Since 1978, deliveries of military equipment have exceeded [security deletion] and the total value of military equipment provided since 1960 now approaches [security deletion].
This upgrading of Cuba's weapons systems coupled with experience gained in Africa, higher emphasis on training, and the increased professionalism of the reserve, represents a significant improvement of Cuba's military capabilities.

In a manner similar to the support it provides to the military, the Soviet Union is keeping Cuba afloat economically. As reported last year, the Soviet Union is paying above-the-world-market prices for Cuban sugar and nickel and supplying virtually all of Cuba's petroleum at a bargain rate. Despite this assistance, Cuba's economy is quite depressed and discontent is growing.

Internationally, Havana is continuing to carry out a very active foreign policy. One of the most significant Cuban advances has been in Central America. Cuban [security deletion] assistance to the Sandinista National Liberation Front were very influential factors in helping to oust Nicaragua's President Anastasio Somoza.

Additionally, Cuba's post revolution aid to Nicaragua and Grenada has helped to strengthen Cuba's influence in these two countries. In Africa, Cuban troop presence remains at approximately 35,000. Some 20,000 of these troops are in Angola where they maintain the government in power.

Finally, Cuba is continuing its policy of aid to Third World countries primarily by supplying civilian technicians whose numbers are now approaching 13,000.

The second part of the presentation will be concerned with matters affecting other parts of Latin America. Initially we will examine the impact of recent and ongoing political and military changes in Central America and the Caribbean. Within this context we will also address the illegal movement of arms in the Central American area and the evidence of outside influence and support.

We will illustrate that Soviet influence in the hemisphere outside of Cuba is growing at a modest but steady pace and seems to parallel a diminution of U.S. presence in the area.

Political instability in the region remains a serious problem generated by chronic economic and social ills and by the activities of leftist elements. Terrorism persists as the political expression of extremists of both the left and right in many areas and while not as widespread as a few years ago, it is contributing to the instability in Central America and is making a resurgence in parts of South America.

Serious programs of military modernization are being advanced in most of the countries but especially by those whose governments are controlled by the military. Even those states which are reverting to civilian control are concerned about updating their arms inventories and to do so are turning primarily to European sources.

At this point, I would like to introduce the members of my party. Mr. Martin Scheina will give the first presentation. He will be followed tomorrow by Lt. Col. Rafael Martinez-Boucher. I am also accompanied, as the chairman has said, by Mr. Gary McClellan, Dr. Ramon da Pena and Maj. John Crenshaw today. Mr. Yorck, I believe, is not here, in his place is Mr. William Byrne.

It is my sincere hope that these presentations will be useful. We will attempt to answer the committee's questions and supply any additional information which you may desire.

You are well aware, of course, that the charters which govern our activities restrict us to the collection and evaluation of foreign intelli-
gence concerned primarily with military-related matters. Consequently, questions that you may have that are outside our areas of responsibility will have to be referred to other agencies, but we will make every effort to satisfy your requirements.

As in the past, most of the material contained in these presentations is classified and considered sensitive. Therefore, the overall classification is secret. We stand ready, however, to sanitize the transcript for publication in the open record if that is your desire.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, we will now begin with Mr. Scheina.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much, Dr. Collins. Now, Mr. Scheina.

STATEMENT OF MARTIN J. SCHEINA, ANALYST FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. SCHEINA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, good afternoon.

Today's Cuba briefing will be divided into two parts. The first portion will examine developments on the island over the past year. I will speak about the Soviet brigade including its location, size, composition, and probable missions. Additionally, we will look at the Cuban Armed Forces and Soviet deployments in Cuba. Included in the domestic section will be information on Cuba's projected nuclear powerplant, economic problems, and the impact the latter is having on discontent in Cuba.

In the international portion of the brief I will outline Cuban efforts to improve its international standing in the Third World. Cuba's military and civilian posture overseas will also be covered.

The most significant development since our briefing before your subcommittee last April was the confirmation in August 1979 of the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. As you recall from that briefing, it was mentioned [security deletion].

[Security deletion] additional intelligence [security deletion] enabled the intelligence community to more accurately determine the probable size, composition, and location of the units in question. With this information in hand, [security deletion].

The Soviet brigade has a personnel strength of approximately [security deletion]. It is divided into [security deletion] maneuver elements: [security deletion] motorized rifle [security deletion] and [security deletion] armor [security deletion]. Additionally, it has [security deletion] artillery [security deletion].

Estimated equipment totals for the brigade include [security deletion] tanks, some [security deletion] armored personnel carriers, [security deletion]. Because the Soviet brigade is [security deletion] it has the expected complement of related service and service support units.

[Security deletion.]

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt for a moment?

Mr. YATRON. Without objection.

Mr. GILMAN. When was that determination made that indicated it was [security deletion]?

Mr. SCHEINA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GILMAN. When did you make a determination that it was [security deletion]?
Mr. SCHEINA. [Security deletion.]
Mr. GILMAN. Was that before the issue blew up in the papers?
Mr. SCHEINA. [Security deletion.]
Mr. GILMAN. You had made a determination that it was not [security deletion].
Mr. SCHEINA. [Security deletion.]
Mr. GILMAN. How did the administration describe it when this issue came to the forefront?
Mr. SCHEINA. I am not sure if I really know, sir.
Mr. GILMAN. It is my impression that they described it as being [security deletion].
Mr. LAGOMARISNO. When the President made his speech, as I recall, he said that the Russians were not telling the truth about the mission, that it was a combat brigade but that we did not think it would be used as a combat brigade, or something like that. I did not follow it, frankly.
Mr. GILMAN. Do you recall how the administration felt?
Mr. SCHEINA. No, sir, unfortunately I do not.
Mr. GILMAN. Is this a combat brigade?
Mr. SCHEINA. It is a combat brigade. It is a brigade that has combat capabilities, yes, sir.
Mr. GILMAN. Is it used for that purpose?
Mr. SCHEINA. Well, sir, it is believed that that is so [security deletion]. It would be a defensive combat mission, yes, sir.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you; Mr. Chairman. I am sorry to interrupt your presentation.
Mr. SCHEINA. That is quite all right, sir.
[Security deletion.]
Mr. YATRON. Without objection.
Mr. SCHEINA. Thank you, sir. [Security deletion.]
Mr. LAGOMARISNO. Excuse me. Where is this located?
Mr. SCHEINA. [Security deletion.]
The Soviet Union has continued its high level of military support to Castro. Soviet arms to Cuba, since 1960, now total [security deletion]. Deliveries to Cuba during 1978 amounted to [security deletion]—the highest yearly total since 1962. In 1979 the total decreased to an estimated [security deletion]. However, this is still the second highest amount since the year of the missile crisis—1962.
The 1978 and 1979 figures, combined with those of the two previous years, show that on the average the monetary value of the annual deliveries has been about twice as high since the Cubans intervened in Angola.
There are several reasons for the increased deliveries. It is known that some Cuban equipment was transferred to Angola to support Cuban troops and the forces of the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA). It is probable that Moscow agreed to replace this equipment with similar or larger numbers of more modern arms.
In addition to some of the older equipment shipped from the island, Moscow sent directly to Angola and Ethiopia new vintage weapons which had not been previously identified on the island. The Cubans demonstrated a high degree of proficiency in the operation of these arms, thus probably making Moscow willing to deliver similar equipment to Cuba itself. Finally, it seems probable that Moscow has agreed
to give the Cubans some newer weapon systems in recognition of the Cuban accomplishments in Angola and Ethiopia.

In the past year Cuba has not received any weapon systems which had not been introduced in previous years. Nevertheless, follow-on deliveries of systems provided in prior years were noteworthy.

In January of this year, the Cuban Navy received its second Fоxtrot class submarine. This is based [security deletion] which will be described later in the briefing. Also, the navy received its third and fourth Turya hydrofoil torpedo boats and two more OSA II guided missile patrol boats. This brings the total of OSA’s delivered to 12.

It is possible that in the future a newer generation of craft, [security deletion] may be delivered to Cuba. The Cuban Air Force received [security deletion] additional Mig-21/Fishbeds—[security deletion]. Also, in 1979, the air force took delivery on [security deletion] AN-26/ Curl short-range transports.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Were there not also some Mig-27’s?

Mr. Scheina. Sir, that was the 1978 delivery. We had a squadron of actually Mig-23’s. The NATO term for Mig-27 and Mig-23 is identical, the Flogger. However, it is the model which determines whether it is 27 or 23, and those which we have in Cuba are 23’s, and I will be moving into that in the air force section.

Moving on to the armed forces, the Cuban Army [security deletion]. It is expected that [security deletion] should enhance the combat capabilities of the Cuban Army, [security deletion]. This is also attributed to the high importance which the Cubans place on their reserves which spend [security deletion] days a year on active duty, and the large number of reserves who have served in Africa.

The Cuban Air Force, or DAAFAR, continues to be organized into four elements: An air force element, a surface-to-air missile element, an air defense artillery force, and an air surveillance force with about 16,000 personnel. The air force has slightly over [security deletion] Mig fighter aircraft divided into [security deletion] all-weather fighter squadrons, and [security deletion] day fighter squadrons.

The most modern aircraft in the Cuban inventory is the Mig-23 Flogger—which arrived in mid-1978. We now assess the Cubans to have [security deletion] Mig-23’s which probably include [security deletion] of the F model export ground-attack variant, and [security deletion] C-model trainer. This map depicts the radius of a fully loaded Flogger F on a round trip mission. As you can see, it can reach portions of the southeastern United States, Mexico, Central America, and the western islands of the Caribbean.

Cuba now has a total of [security deletion] AN-26/Curl short-range transports. The AN-26 is DAAFAR’s primary aircraft for airborne operations. With an operating radius of [security deletion] with full payload, the [security deletion] AN-26’s have the capability to airdrop a maximum of [security deletion] troops in portions of Florida, portions of Belize, all of Jamaica, Haiti, and the Bahamas, and most of the Dominican Republic.

In the last year, surface-to-air missile protection of the island has [security deletion].

During the past several years Cuban airfields, [security deletion] have been undergoing improvements. These projects are probably being carried out [security deletion] to upgrade the revolutionary armed forces. [Security deletion.]
Improvements at Cuba’s lesser important airfields have generally been in the area of runway lengthening, resurfacing, and the addition of new aircraft parking facilities. Airfields receiving these types of improvements are at [security deletion].

In the past, Soviet pilots have been assigned to Cuba when the Cuban Air Force has had insufficient personnel to perform its mission of air defense of the island. [Security deletion.]

Since last year’s brief the Cuban Navy has received a second Foztrots diesel-powered attack submarine. Two additional Turya hydrofoil torpedo boats and two additional OSA II missile attack boats were also delivered in the past year. These deliveries are consistent with the the ongoing program to gradually update the Cuban fleet. However, because of the large number of older craft, the pace of modernization is expected to increase in the next few years.

During the past year the first Foztrots submarine was [security deletion]. The presence of the Foztrots enables the Cubans to conduct such exercises without having to depend upon visiting Soviet submarines for realistic ASF training. [Security deletion.]

Mr. SCHEINA. Concerning Soviet naval ship deployments to Cuba, this program began in 1969. By 1978, 19 had taken place averaging 2 per year. These have generally been composed of two or three major service combatants which were accompanied by a replenishment oiler. Approximately half of the deployments included one or two submarines. During recent years, ship deployments have paid port visits to Havana and Cienfuegos and conducted operational transits of the Gulf of Mexico. The average number of days the task groups spend in the Caribbean has been about 40, and the longest—91 days—took place in late 1978.

Soviet naval air deployments began in 1970 and by 1978 a total of [security deletion] had taken place. Between 1970 and 1974 there were between [security deletion] yearly. These flights increased to [security deletion] in 1977 and [security deletion] in 1978. It should be noted that during 1977 and 1978 [security deletion] of these flights used Cuba as a stopover for transit to Angola. These operations are performed by pairs of TU-95/Bear D reconnaissance aircraft which fly from the [security deletion] in U.S.S.R. to Jose Marti International Airport. Bear D flights have historically been associated with U.S., NATO and Soviet exercises, transits of U.S. ships to and from the Mediterranean, and international tensions such as the Angolan and Ethiopian wars.

During 1979, there was only one Soviet naval deployment to the Caribbean; this was carried out in August by a Kresta-II class guided-missile cruiser, a Krivak-II guided-missile frigate, and a replenishment oiler. The ships which entered the Caribbean by the Mona Passage—west of Puerto Rico—operated in the area for about a week. The task force departed the Caribbean without visiting Cuba—the first time this has happened. [Security deletion.]

Mr. SCHEINA. Since last year’s brief, there was only [security deletion] deployment of TU-95/Bear D naval aircraft to Cuba. This brings the total since 1970 to [security deletion] flights. The total for all of 1979 was only [security deletion] the lowest yearly number since 1973, and [security deletion] of these flights went on to Angola.
There have been no flights thus far during 1980. The decline in the number of flights is probably a reflection of [security deletion].

Moving on to the economy, since the revolution in 1959, Cuba has been heavily dependent on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe for trade and economic aid to underpin its underdeveloped, one-crop economy. As you may be aware, Cuba is dependent upon sugar for 85 percent of its export earnings. However, since 1975 the level of this dependency has increased rapidly. Cuba's inability to provide more for its economy from its own resources is primarily attributed to economic mismanagement and reliance on sugar for export earnings in conjunction with very low world sugar prices.

In the period from 1961 through 1975, total Soviet economic aid provided averaged $473 million annually, or about $1.3 million per day. During this period, the assistance was in the form of repayable economic credits and, to a lesser degree, subsidy payments on sugar, petroleum, and nickel that are grant aid.

By 1975 world sugar prices as well as nickel prices, the country's other major export, plummeted to levels not anticipated by Moscow. Cuban exports to the free world dropped, while sales were made to the U.S.S.R. to obtain the subsidized price. As the world price has moved lower, the level of Soviet subsidies has grown. For the period from 1976 through 1979, total aid averaged approximately [security deletion] billion annually or about [security deletion] million per day, [security deletion] the 1961 and 1975 level. During 1979 alone aid totaled more than [security deletion] billion, or almost [security deletion] million per day.

In contrast to low prices for Cuban exports, prices for oil have increased dramatically since 1974. Virtually all of Cuba's [security deletion] barrels per day of crude oil are imported from the Soviets, a heavy financial burden on Moscow.

In addition to fuel, other Soviet goods provided as aid include various items from trucks to potatoes. Such an outpouring of goods for subsidized Cuban sugar and nickel is keenly felt in the shortage-plagued U.S.S.R., where lines for foodstuffs and other goods are common. In addition, there are up to [security deletion] Soviet technicians involved in development projects in Cuba.

At this time, planning is underway for the next 5-year plan 1981-1985, which is structured to coincide with the next Soviet plan. Preliminary indications are that due to Cuba's chronic problems and faltering economy, [security deletion].

Further Soviet credits (supposedly repayable) for major industrial development projects are also expected. In addition to these aid programs, Cuba will attempt to negotiate guarantees for certain products at favorable prices under its bilateral clearing account (barter trade) with the Soviets. If only economic considerations are taken into account, Moscow might be inclined to reduce its aid support, but overriding political and strategic considerations will make this virtually impossible.

In recent months there has been an increasing number of reports of discontent in Cuba. This appears to be caused by Cuba's lagging economy. Shortages are reported to have reached such a level that a black market of almost all consumer goods is flourishing. Additionally, Cubans are displeased with the establishment of a privileged
class of top Communist party officials, high level bureaucrats, military officers, and foreign diplomats.

Many Cubans feel that a major contributing factor to economic problems is overseas military involvement. It is questionable whether the Soviets would support the Cubans to the tune of [security deletion] billion a year if the Cubans had not sent troops to Angola and Ethiopia.

The dissatisfaction has been exacerbated by the 100,000 Cuban exiles who visited the island during 1979. There is a striking difference between their apparent wealth and the poverty of the Cubans who did not leave the island. [Security deletion.]

Because of the increased dissatisfaction, the Cuban Government reports that crime is on the increase. The Government has been conducting a security crackdown, “Because anti-Communist groups have been more active.” Disgruntled Cubans have crashed into foreign embassies in efforts to gain asylum. Also, once again fleeing to Guantanamo is a popular route to escape Castroism.

In 1978 only [security deletion] Cubans jumped the fence to the U.S. Naval Base. However, last year the number climbed to [security deletion]. The forecast for the near future does not appear to be good for the Cuban people. This is because portions of the sugar and tobacco crops, Cuba’s two largest agricultural exports, are diseased. [Security deletion] this year’s tobacco crop could be virtually wiped out by disease.

During late 1979 and early 1980, the Cubans carried out a high-level governmental consolidation which is directed at reducing discontent. To crack down on the black market and reverse increased crime, Ramiro Valdes Menedez—a hardliner—was appointed as the new Minister of Interior. It appears that this program has had little impact on antigovernment activities. Nevertheless, Castro does not appear seriously threatened from within.

In previous years we have briefed the subcommittee on the agreement of the Soviet Union to provide Cuba with a nuclear powerplant. This facility, which is projected to have an 880-megawatt capacity is to be constructed in [security deletion] Cienfuegos. Construction was first expected to be begun in the late 1970’s. [Security deletion.]

Several Eastern European countries and [security deletion] are also on the waiting list, and it is believed that they will receive their plants before Cuba. For this reason it is not believed that the Cuban facility will be begun until the [security deletion], and probably will not be completed until the [security deletion]. Because the plant is being constructed by the Soviets, it is expected to comply with international atomic energy agency safeguards.

Moving on to Cuba’s international policies, Havana was the site of the sixth summit meeting of the nonaligned movement (NAM) in September 1979. Concurrently, Fidel Castro became the chairman of the movement and legitimized his position as a recognized spokesman for the Third World.

It appears that under Castro’s leadership the NAM will assume a militant stand not unlike that which it followed when Algerian President Boumedienne was its chairman. During the September meeting, Castro was able to successfully challenge efforts by more moderate states to moderate the policies of the NAM. In fact, the movement
placed Egypt on a 2-year probation for its efforts to improve relations with Israel. [Security deletion.]

Specific measures accomplished at the meeting by Cuba included the NAM's call for Puerto Rican independence, indirect endorsement of Cuban policies in Africa, and the indictment of the United States and other Western states for allegedly supporting South African apartheid.

As noted last year, Havana had been expected to scale down its activities in Africa in order to appear more moderate prior to and during the NAM meeting. In fact, Cuban activity in Africa remained at about the same level.

During late 1979 and early 1980, Havana conducted an all-out campaign to gain one of Latin America's two seats on the United Nations Security Council. Throughout the voting Cuba was unable to obtain the needed two-thirds majority vote. Because of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, Cuba lost its support, and Mexico presented itself as a compromise candidate, and won the seat.

Mr. SCHEINA. Moving to overseas involvement, the number of Cuban military personnel in sub-Saharan Africa has remained at about the same level as last year, approximately 35,000 men. President Fidel Castro retains high interest in Africa and continues to see himself as a leader of the revolutionary Third World.

Cuba continues to station about 19,000–21,000 military personnel in Angola. Their primary mission is to maintain the MPLA government of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos in power. For the Cubans, the last 2 years have been increasingly frustrating as neither the MPLA nor the combined MPLA-Cuban military operations have been able to eliminate the forces of Dr. Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Cuban disenchantment has also mounted as South Africa has successfully stepped up its air attacks against the Cuban supported insurgent forces of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), which operates out of Southern Angola. [Security deletion.]

Despite these frustrations, Castro sees continuing benefits for Cuba by staying in Angola. Because of their high visibility, the Cubans continue to gain prestige among Third World revolutionaries. They also have obtained military experience, and by supporting Moscow's objectives have acquired advanced weaponry.

Moreover, for both Moscow and Havana, continued presence in Angola has given them a base for further entry into other parts of Southern Africa. As such, they used Angola as a training area for insurgents and as an arms depot that has allowed them to rapidly resupply insurgents operating in other parts of South Africa. Finally, the Cubans maintain the MPLA government in power.

Moving to Ethiopia, Cuban presence there reached a peak of 17,000 in the spring of 1978, but after helping the Ethiopians defeat the Somali Army in the Ogaden. Cuba's forces have been slowly reduced to about 12,000. Currently the Cubans maintain about [security deletion] combat troops, [security deletion]. Other troops in Ethiopia serve primarily as advisers.

In relation to the Eritrean uprising, Cuba is in a difficult position. During the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie, Havana backed the Eri-
treans, but now in deference to President Mengistu and Soviet policy, Cuba has cut off this support. Castro has limited the activity of Cuba, mainly providing logistic support and guarding key locations.

However, because of Cuba's economic and ideological ties to radical Arab States, especially Iraq, Castro has not committed combat troops against the Eritreans. Moreover, Castro sees the Eritrean terrain as favoring the insurgents, and judges that attacks on well-fortified Eritrean positions would most likely result in an unacceptable high number of casualties.

In the case of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia the Cubans, as well as the Soviets, have provided support to back the Zimbabwe Africa People's Union (ZAPU) and [security deletion] the Zimbabwe Africa National Union (ZANU). [Security deletion.] It is believed that they will take a wait-and-see attitude for the foreseeable future.

In addition to the countries mentioned, the Cubans have approximately 1,000 personnel in 11 other African countries which are shown here. In these countries the Cubans serve primarily as advisers. They also train guerrillas for operations in neighboring countries, and serve as bodyguards.

In the Arabian Peninsula, DIA estimates that the current number of Cuban military personnel in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) is [security deletion]. The Cubans serve as advisers with the PDRY [security deletion]. There have been allegations that Cubans fought alongside South Yemen forces in the March 1979, border clash with North Yemen.

[Security deletion] it is believed that the Cubans served as advisers [security deletion]. Cuban presence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and nearby Ethiopia is a matter of concern because of their proximity to the oil-producing regions.

In addition to the large number of troops overseas, there are some 13,000 Cuban civilians as well. It should be noted that among the Cubans overseas, civilians as well as military, there are intelligence and covert operations personnel, communist organizers, etc. Over 7,000 Cuban civilians are in Angola. The Cubans worldwide appear to be concentrating on areas in which the Cuban revolution has had its most success. These are education, rural development, and public health. While the overall expertise of these advisers is not as high as those of Western technicians, they are sufficiently qualified to be of significant assistance to recipient countries.

In the past year, the most significant increases in the number of Cuban civilians overseas took place in Libya, Iraq, and Nicaragua. The latter country I will treat in detail under the Latin American section.

With regard to Iraq and Libya, there are approximately [security deletion] and [security deletion] Cuban civilians respectively performing mainly construction projects. It is likely that Havana is receiving direct payment and special loan consideration for these services.

Mr. YATRON. I was going to ask that you conclude at this point so that we are able to take a 10-minute recess. We have a vote on the floor.

[Whereupon, there was a short recess taken.]

Mr. YATRON. The subcommittee will resume its hearing. Mr. Scheina, I am sorry for the interruption.
Mr. Scheina. Thank you, sir.

Moving on to Latin America, Cuba's support for radical governments and revolutionary movements increased notably during 1979. Political, social, and economic problems in the Caribbean and Central America provided Cuba with ample opportunities which Havana has exploited. Cuban long-term investment in the Sandinistas paid handsome profits when, in July, this previously insignificant insurgent movement was able to topple the Somoza government in Nicaragua.

Cuba has nurtured the Sandinistas for nearly two decades, and as their activities gained impetus in 1978 this low profile assistance dramatically changed. [Security deletion.] It is very doubtful that the Sandinistas could have achieved victory without Cuban support.

Since July, Cuba has provided a large amount of assistance to the new government. There are presently an estimated [security deletion], Cuban military advisers working with Nicaraguan forces. Cuban civilian advisers, numbering approximately [security deletion] are working at the national and local levels. This includes about [security deletion] teachers, most of whom instruct throughout the country in primary schools and conduct literacy programs.

The remaining Cuban civilians are medical personnel, road construction workers, and technicians assisting with agriculture, economics, fishing, and construction projects.

Moving to the northern tier of Central America, Cuba cooperates with guerrilla groups in El Salvador and Guatemala and with the Communist Party in Honduras. In both El Salvador and Guatemala the dissident forces are represented by several groups. Havana's principal efforts have been to encourage the intranational factions to increase their amount of cooperation. [Security deletion.]

Moving on to the Caribbean, Cuban support to Grenada has been quite active in the past year. On March 13, 1979, Grenadan Prime Minister Sir Eric Gairy was ousted by Maurice Bishop. Bishop and members of his political party, the New Jewel movement, had had dealings with the Cubans. [Security deletion.]

Since shortly after the coup, Cuba had provided military equipment, [security deletion]. In addition, there are an estimated [security deletion] Cuban military personnel in Grenada who have been training Grenada's [security deletion] army.

On the civilian side, an estimated [security deletion] Cuban advisers have worked in Grenada since the coup, assisting the Government and working in education, agriculture, medicine, and political indoctrination. In November, Prime Minister Bishop announced that the two countries had formalized a pact under which the Cubans would provide $10 million in heavy construction equipment and supplies, plus 250 workers to build an international airport.

It should be noted that Cuban involvement in Nicaragua and Grenada, however, has caused a few of the eastern Caribbean states to be more cautious toward Cuban intentions. Examples of this are [security deletion] and to a lesser extent [security deletion].

The highest level of Cuban activity in the region is in Jamaica. Relations between the two countries have improved steadily since Prime Minister Michael Manley and Fidel Castro first met while enroute to the 1973 Nonaligned Conference in Algiers. Since then the two leaders have developed a close personal relationship, and Manley is said to be very much under the influence of Castro.
There have been reports that the Cubans carry on intelligence gatherings and other activities in Jamaica with the apparent knowledge and acquiescence of Manley. In fact, Havana’s ambassador to Kingston, Ulises Estrada, is known to have served as deputy chief of the Americas Department of the Communist Party; the organization responsible for revolutionary activities in Latin America.

Mr. Scheina. There is a large Cuban civilian personnel in Jamaica. Approximately 350 are construction laborers who are working on hospitals, microdams, sports installations, and a series of six schools. There are some 40 Cuban medical people working in Jamaican hospitals. In addition to these there are diplomatic and intelligence personnel.

Since 1975 about 1,000 Jamaicans, between 18 and 35 years, have been trained in Cuba. As of late 1979 there were 375 participating in this program.

In conclusion, I would like to show you a slide of Cuban worldwide objectives as stated in our 1976 briefing to your joint committee. We can use this as a report card to grade the degree of success the Cubans have had in carrying out their foreign policy. It appears that the Cubans have been working quite well toward achieving these goals.

Cuban presence overseas is now approaching 50,000, as Havana has people in many areas of the world. Cuban involvement overseas, whether it be civilian or military, has brought success in obtaining all of these objectives. In Africa, support for Angola and Ethiopia show that Cuba is not only a surrogate of Moscow’s foreign policy, but additionally a competent partner.

In the last year especially, Cuban influence in Latin America has grown. Havana has taken major steps in bringing Nicaragua, Grenada, and Jamaica into its sphere of influence.

In conjunction with Cuban advances overseas, the military has undergone a significant upgrading. In the last several years the Cuban Armed Forces have graduated from what was a defensive force to one, which with Soviet assistance, can deploy a large number of troops to distant conflicts on short notice. To a lesser extent the Cubans are now able to serve as an important regional military actor in the Caribbean area.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my briefing. I would be happy to entertain any questions that you and the members may have.

Additionally, I would like to say that we would like to take a few minutes for an opportunity to bring you [security deletion].

Mr. Yatron. All right. I want to thank you very much for an excellent briefing, Mr. Scheina, and I thank you, too, Dr. Collins. Do you want to do this after the questioning or do you want to do it now?

Mr. Scheina. We would have to clear the room now, so I think it would be best to do it after the questioning.

Mr. Yatron. All right. In reference to your opening statement, Dr. Collins, you said terrorism persists but not as widespread as a few years ago. However, last year’s testimony showed a significant increase in terrorism. Would you care to comment?

Mr. Collins. I think I would prefer to ask Colonel Martinez-Boucher to help me out on that.
Colonel Martinez-Boucher. The statement is valid from the point of view that terrorism persists in certain areas that we are not referring to. For example, in Colombia, terrorism is very, very serious. We have noticed a greater resurgence during the past year. Of course, we are referring to changes that have occurred from 1978 to 1979. Terrorism remains at a relatively high level, but that tempo remains pretty level. Tomorrow I will touch on that, Mr. Chairman. We will point out the areas where we have noted an increase in terrorism.

Mr. Yatron. Thank you, Colonel Martinez-Boucher.

Mr. Scheina, on page 4 you noted that there is [security deletion]. However, does the brigade have such [security deletion] capability?

Mr. Scheina. There would be the possibility of using Cuban equipment not presently belonging to the brigade.

Mr. Yatron. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Collins. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Yatron. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Yatron. Could you tell what [security deletion] the Turya hydrofoil and the OSA-II patrol boat?

Mr. Scheina. Yes, sir. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Yatron. Is there any chance of Cuba getting them?

Mr. Scheina. I think, sir, in the future it is possible. In this area it is more or less speculation on our part. We have seen some upgrading of the Cuban forces and this could be a logical progression in this modernization program.

Mr. Yatron. With the Cubans possessing over [security deletion] Mig aircraft, is it the best equipped air force in Latin America? I see the colonel shaking his head yes.

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. I would say they are probably the best equipped force in Latin America today.

Mr. Scheina. If I could add one thing to the Colonel's statement, the Cuban Air Force is primarily composed of fighter aircraft. Most of them are defensive; some with a limited offensive capability. There are other air forces which have a better or larger long-transport element than the Cubans do. But as far as defending the homeland, I would say the Cubans would be the best, yes, sir.

Mr. Yatron. Would you consider such strength, which is the approximate strength carried by the Nimitz class aircraft carrier, a threat to the United States?

Mr. Collins. I would say it is a very modest threat. The only real threat are the [security deletion] Mig-23's. The other aircraft are not a threat. The Mig-23's themselves in any conventional types of role would be a very modest threat. In any nuclear role, you would not expect them to be used because the other capabilities are so much greater than the Soviets have.

Mr. Yatron. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Collins. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Lagomarsino. Is there any evidence, or do you see any indication, that the Soviet combat brigade has any possible role in attempting a takeover of the Guantanamo Naval Base?

Mr. Scheina. I would say this is extremely unlikely because of the presence of the brigade in western Cuba and the location of Guantanamo, in eastern Cuba. Additionally, it had been decided that if the
Guantanamo Base were to be overrun that the Cubans have a large number of forces in eastern Cuba which I am sure would be deployed [security deletion].

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. We would certainly have advance notice if they did start to move in that brigade. It is a long way from there, as I understand.

Mr. SCHEINA. Yes, sir. Certainly, if they attempted to move the brigade we should be able to detect the movement, especially from one end of the island to the other.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I know this is not in your exact line of work but you might have run into something with regard to it; earlier today some of us met with the families of some of the Americans who are being held prisoner in Cuba, mostly for the last 2 years or less than the last 2 years. We were told that many of them had been seized in international waters, that they were not violating any law other than that alleged one, that is, trespassing.

Do you have any information on those, I mean without getting into all the details of the people, but just a general run down?

Mr. SCHEINA. We really do not have any information in that area. We feel that probably the question would be better put to the State Department than ourselves.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I was going to ask you about this. I notice that you referred in your testimony to the fence jumpers at Guantanamo. Now the number [security deletion], and I guess it is already pretty high for this year.

Mr. SCHEINA. Yes, sir.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I think that is a very significant thing, more so than it might sound to an uninitiated person, because that means they have to traverse a clear area on the Cuban side; they are shot at and it is not an easy thing to do. So that would lend pretty strong evidence that things are not very good economically.

Mr. SCHEINA. That is correct.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I am still somewhat confused about the difference between a Mig-23 and a 27.

Mr. SCHEINA. Yes, sir. The designator Mig-27 has been assigned to one model of the family, which is called the Flogger aircraft. That is the Mig-27 Flogger-D. This is an aircraft which is used by the Soviet Air Force and plays a ground attack role. The Mig-23 Flogger, which the Cubans have, is an export version. The Mig-23 family contains a number of models but the one that is not in the family is the Mig-27 Flogger-D, the domestic ground attack model.

The Cubans have the export ground attack, which is the Mig-23 Flogger-F model.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. It is a 23 and not a 27?

Mr. SCHEINA. Yes, sir. It is a 23 and its capabilities are [security deletion].

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Apparently there is some confusion about that on the military side, too, because we were in Key West and received a briefing and we were told they did have Mig-27's.

Mr. SCHEINA. I will have to talk to the people at Key West.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. It does not really make a heck of a lot of difference because as I understand it the Mig-23 that the Cubans have is a ground-attack model.

Mr. SCHEINA. That is right—it is a ground-attack aircraft.
Mr. Lagomarsino. An interesting thing—I was in Guantanamo a week ago this last weekend—was that the Marine colonel who is in charge of ground defense in Guantanamo told me in response to my question “Did you have any evidence that any of the troops that are manning that frontier brigade around Guantanamo have had African experience?” and he said [security deletion].

Mr. Scheina. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Yatron. Are you through?

Mr. Lagomarsino. Yes.

Mr. Yatron. Mr. Guyer.

Mr. Guyer. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am sorry I missed part of your testimony. I know you spent a great deal of time and research in this area.

I would have made a very poor prophet because when I first heard of Castro at the time he appeared on the Ed Sullivan program a good many years ago, he was heralded as the George Washington of Cuba.

Now, had I been a betting man, I would have bet he would not have lasted 4 or 5 years. One of the great astonishments, to me at least, is his durability.

Do you have any feeling or any particular wisdom in the area as to why he is that important to the Soviet Union? He certainly is the most costly relative that ever came to dinner. This has gone on for a good many years. Is he part of a long, long, long term program or is it because he happens to have that peculiar locale situation of proximity to us that makes him valuable?

Mr. Scheina. Sir, certainly the proximity situation makes Mr. Castro extremely valuable. Because of the proximity we feel that the Soviets believe that they can provide [security deletion] billion a year, not only because of proximity but because of the activities which the Cubans are providing overseas, the combat role which they are playing in Angola and Ethiopia.

The Soviets and the Cubans have consummated a very, what you might call, effective marriage where the Cubans are providing the troops and the Soviets are providing virtually all the equipment. Despite the investment they are making, they have been able to make strides throughout the world, quite a few in Africa and possibly we may be seeing some in Latin America in the future.

Mr. Guyer. He never seems to be a puppet ruler, though. When you see or hear Mr. Castro he always seems to be dominant. I wonder if the Soviets have given him that kind of latitude that he is not really one of their outlying provinces, that he really is almost a partner.

In fact, you have indicated that his aspirations of being the Third World leader may help explain that. Do you have any comment on that?

Mr. Collins. If I could refer, first, to your previous question, you asked if there was some long term design in this. I think I would say that there is. This goes all the way back to 1920 and Lenin’s theory of the party and a variety of things. But after the first flush of revolution in Europe wore off the Communists really decided that the road to revolution lay in what we now call the Third World. They base this on Lenin’s theories that the capitalist world depended on raw materials and what he called superprofits from the colonies.
Consequently, there has been a consistent effort to remove Western influence from the what were then colonies and the former colonies. In connection also with Lenin’s theory the party had to be largely clandestine and it had to be guided by professional revolutionaries.

If you look at how the Castro brothers got their training, they were trained in Mexico by a professional revolutionary. When they went to Cuba, the third member was a professional revolutionary and the son of a woman who had been an Argentine professional revolutionary.

Although the party has changed a lot and the executive committee of the Communist international has now been incorporated in the international section of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the objective has not changed. From their standpoint of morality, they are trying to establish just governments wherever unjust governments exist in the world. And consequently they are willing to spend a lot of money to do it.

It is very difficult for us to grasp the fact that the money does not mean that much to them if they are achieving their objectives.

Mr. Guyer. May I ask you, we have the benefit of having your testimony, experience, and deep research. How much of what you have told us actually gets to the President and to the Secretary of State? I am sure it is available, but is there credibility? Would they receive the same testimony?

Mr. Collins. I do not think we can answer that because there are really three channels of intelligence in the United States, and the Central Intelligence Agency largely supports the President and the National Security Council.

Now, we, of course, and State, provide a great deal of information and they have access to anything that we do. The State Department is supported by INR within the State Department and the Department of Defense and the JCS are supported by us.

So I would say that each of these organizations is probably receiving a little bit different interpretation of events.

Mr. Guyer. It must be most discouraging when you do your homework so well and then it seems that it does not reach either the proper sources or if it does they do not give it the attention and priority.

For example, the first report we had on the brigade was a very benign report. Nobody was a bit alarmed about it. It was very casual. It was just regarded as almost unmeaningful and yet it takes on different proportions as you hear it presented from a different viewpoint.

I would hope we have a little better success in the correlation of our information without being out of school. [Security deletion.] I am confident that we do need a better channeling of information to the proper sources.

At the decisionmaking level neither you nor us are always in that capacity, but I think this is eminently important, and I have said repeatedly that the Soviets have never abandoned their goal which took on only one new dimension. Their goal has always been No. 1, world encirclement; No. 2, internal demoralization; No. 3, nuclear
blackmail, which only came in the nuclear age. But they have never abandoned that one objective.

We do not seem to be getting the message that the people they use and work with are also going in that general direction. Would you agree with that?

Mr. SCIMEA. Yes, sir, I would agree with that 100 percent.

Mr. GUYER. Thank you.

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, we went into this before in another hearing, but one of the things that really is frustrating to me, and again I will repeat this for the benefit of my colleagues who were not in attendance at the hearings that the chairman of our full committee held with regard to the role of the CIA, and I know it has to be many, many more times frustrating to the people who have to operate within the parameters of this business, is how the stories get out to the public about how ineffective the intelligence community is, how they did not warn about what happened in Iran, how they did not warn what was going on in Nicaragua, and so on and so forth.

We find in many of these instances that, in fact, they did, that information was put in the hands of whoever received it, and it was either ignored, put on the back burner or who knows what; and in some cases, to add insult to injury, at least in one case the director of the CIA was publicly chastised for not furnishing information that he apparently had actually furnished.

Of course, the intelligence community, for two reasons, cannot really do much about it. No. 1, it is confidential information; they cannot release it. And second, they would be in the position of arguing with their commander in chief or at least someone up in the order of command. So I do not know, but I think you are right.

Mr. GUYER. I do not know of a single incident in American history or world history, for that matter, where a vital war, hot or cold, was ever won without the intelligence contribution. That can go back into the Bible, from then on until now.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Let me say that if we had had in World War II the kind of leaks that we have today, it might still be going on. If the Japanese and Germans knew we had broken their code, I think it would have been a fairly simple thing for them to develop a new one. I do not think they would have stayed with that one. It would have made it a much more costly endeavor and lasted a lot longer time.

That is something that we can and should be telling our constituents, that specific example, because that is now out in the open.

Mr. GUYER. I would not be hurt if I were not party to some of the information, or most of it, because I have a feeling that it is like trying to get out of a book club. You can get out of Russia quicker than you can quit a book club. If we had to wait on Congress to resolve these emergencies we just never would.

Let's face it, we are not expedient bodies. We would make horrible SWAT teams, I can tell you that.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. In the testimony today, and I have heard a lot of this before, not all in one place and not so well coordinated, but we were well aware at the time it was happening, not just in retrospect, about the Cuban role in the Nicaraguan revolution, were we not?

Mr. COLLINS. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lagomarsino. Was not that information furnished to the State Department?

Mr. Collins. Yes, sir.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Yet, in spite of that, some rather high officials in our Government, not to be named, said the Cuban role in the Nicaraguan revolution was minimal, or some such word like that.

Mr. Collins. I could possibly explain how that view could be held because I have heard it so much. That is, the conditions for a revolution were very, very ripe. You also had help from [security deletion]. I think it is our view, and I would certainly urge my colleagues back here to say whether they agree or not, that the Cuban arms and possibly some other help, like Cuban intelligence and that type of thing, were probably crucial to the operation. I do not know whether they would agree.

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. No question about it.

Mr. Lagomarsino. The question is, could they have done it without it?

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. No; they could not have done it without it.

Mr. Lagomarsino. That is hardly minimal.

Another thing too, I understand that one of the key things that happened in Nicaragua right before the success of the revolution was the consolidation of the three branches of the Sandinistas' movement, and I cannot remember the name of them, the three, into one unified command.

I understand also, and this is not very far away, but to switch to El Salvador, that Castro has been at least partially successful in doing the same thing there.

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. Castro was instrumental in bringing the Sandinistas together, which was essential to their victory. Castro has made very strong efforts to bring together the groups in El Salvador and he is trying to do the same thing in Guatemala. This is an indispensable process because so long as his groups are not working together they are not able to defeat the existing government.

One of the basic steps is to unify those forces, and Castro and his people have been effective. One of the conditions in providing assistance to these groups is that they come together as a group, as one unified group.

Mr. McClellan. Castro has been beating this point very hard at least since the mid-1970's, 1974, 1975 time frame, and it has proven successful.

Mr. Guyer. We have had enormous difficulty getting people on the ground in Cuba, is that true, that most of our intelligence has to come from other sources due to the fact that he runs a pretty tight ship?

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Guyer. It is very hazardous, as I understand.

Mr. Lagomarsino. I understand that we have excellent technical information as far as movement of airplanes and so on.

Mr. Scheina. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Lagomarsino. That is a good question.

Mr. Scheina. If you want I will address it.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Would you address it.

Mr. Yatron. Would you please repeat the question.
Mr. Lagomarsino. The question is, if our intelligence capability is so good how come we did not know about the Soviet combat brigade until we did?

Mr. Scheina. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Collins. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Lagomarsino. Back to the prior big flap when the Mig-23's were first discovered and/or announced. Fidel Castro himself asked our congressional delegation why the United States was so exercised about the presence of Mig-23's in Cuba when, to quote him, "You have known for 6 months that they were here before you said anything about it."

Mr. Scheina. Well, sir, we addressed this question last year too. We feel that President Castro's statement that the Mig-23's had been on the island for 6 months [security deletion].

Mr. Lagomarsino. I am not sure there is a discrepancy in the time. I gathered, from what I heard before, that the administration was advised of what you just told me and that that was some time before the public announcement was made.

Mr. McClellan. There was still a discrepancy. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Guyer. Was not one of the holdups the fact that the number of people did not change so much as the names they gave them, we were waiting for the word "brigade" to emerge?

Mr. Lagomarsino. I was talking about the airplanes.

Mr. Guyer. The number of people, though, had not varied considerably; it was what you wanted to call them. When you started calling them "brigades" then our ears kind of went up like an antenna and we started looking a little bit more closely.

Mr. Scheina. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Guyer. No more questions.

Mr. Yatron. Mr. Scheina, for what purposes other than military is the AN-26/Curl aircraft being used in Cuba, if any?

Mr. Scheina. This is a transport aircraft and it can be used for transporting civilians as well as equipment. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Yatron. What types of missiles are the [security deletion] surface-to-air missile sites equipped with?

Mr. Scheina. There has been a change in the text. Your copy says [security deletion] it was actually [security deletion] of these sites are equipped with the SA-2 missile, which is a medium to high-range altitude missile. And [security deletion] sites are equipped with the SA-3, which is a low to medium-range missile, also an older missile. It has been in the Soviet inventory for 15, maybe even more, years.

Mr. Yatron. Are the missiles first line or second line or vintage?

Mr. Scheina. They are still being used in the Soviet inventory. However, the Soviets have developed follow-on missiles with improved capabilities, but they are still quite an effective missile.

Mr. Yatron. Do you have any information which would indicate that the Soviets are planning to deploy the Backfire bomber to any of the Cuban improved air facilities?

Mr. Scheina. This is a question that has been extensively asked of my organization. We have done quite a bit of research and [security deletion]. The Cubans do have [security deletion] airfields which have sufficient runway length to satisfy the needs of the Backfire bomber, [security deletion].
Mr. YATRON. There were some newspaper reports that they were extending the runway, I believe, at Cienfuegos.

Mr. SCHEINA. [Security deletion.] And since there are already [security deletion] airfields in the country which can handle the Backfire, what is the need of extending one particular airfield for that aircraft?

Mr. YATRON. [Security deletion.]

Mr. SCHEINA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. YATRON. [Security deletion.]

Mr. SCHEINA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GUYER. Could I ask, what is the speed of the Backfire? How much takeoff strip does it have to have in footage to get off the ground?

Mr. SCHEINA. If you give me just a second, sir, I will get that for you.

Mr. GUYER. I would be surprised if you had it there.

Mr. COLLINS. The maximum sea level speed is mach [security deletion] which is around [security deletion] knots, and the maximum speed at altitude is mach [security deletion] which is [security deletion] meters or roughly [security deletion] feet.

Mr. SCHEINA. The runway length, sir, I have consulted with our Soviet airshop and they say it is somewhere in the area of about [security deletion] feet.

Mr. GUYER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. YATRON. I will have to be excused for a few moments. Mr. Lagomarsino, will you chair the meeting, please.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Does anybody on the staff want to ask any questions?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes. Don't you have any?

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Not right now. Go ahead.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Is it a possibility that the improved Cuban naval facilities could be used to service Soviet nuclear submarines?

Mr. SCHEINA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FRIEDMAN. [Security deletion.]

Mr. SCHEINA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FRIEDMAN. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FRIEDMAN. You mentioned the mismanagement of the Cuban economy. Is that a failing of individuals or of the system?

Mr. COLLINS. I think that we could say that we do not know of any socialist economy that works well. So one would think that the system is partially at fault. But probably there are failings of individuals as well. People are trying to manage enterprises that they have no real experience with.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Do you see the possibility in the near future of the Soviet Union denying Cuba's ever-increasing requests because of its own economic problems?

Mr. COLLINS. I do not see that as likely because there is evidence going back 15 years that the Soviets are dissatisfied with the Cubans' work habits, their economic performance, a variety of things; but they continue to put up the money.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. On the subject of the discontent mentioned in your testimony, how does this discontent manifest itself?

Mr. SCHEINA. It has been manifested in one very popular way, which has been graffiti. There has been quite a bit of graffiti in the Havana area. Of course, another one is the number of people trying to escape the island, in addition to the people who have jumped the fence at
Guantanamo. There have been some small boats the Cubans have tried to hijack to get out of the island.

There have been statements [security deletion] that people in Cuba are dissatisfied with the system but, of course, would not dare voice this openly. They are very circumspect about who they talk to.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Have there been any reports of any covert or overt antigovernment activities?

Mr. SCHEINA. No large scale organized activities, nothing to go beyond what I guess we could call malicious mischief.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. How about a slowdown in production, is that evident?

Mr. SCHEINA. Production has always been rather slow. Whether the speed of production has decreased even more, it is hard to say.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Is the Cuban public aware of losses and casualties that they have suffered in the overseas activities? I know we have asked it in prior years. Is it more out in the open now or is it still being shielded?

Mr. SCHEINA. Well, sir, the only way that this information becomes available to the Cubans is when it touches them at home, when a neighbor down the block did not come home from Angola or Ethiopia, or he comes back in a lame condition. The Cubans do not publicize any information regarding losses with the exception of trying to pay tribute to maybe selective individuals for political reasons.

The mass media in Cuba is controlled by the Government and they do not want to jeopardize the efforts overseas by providing fuel to the people who might take it as a reason to not want to serve overseas.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Could you give us an update on such losses and casualties since our briefing last year? Is there any indication of anything?

Mr. SCHEINA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. While we were in Guantanamo there was a report that there had been, not the level of a riot but a demonstration—I believe it was in Guantanamo City, one of the cities north of the bay—when they had brought some bodies back from Africa to bury. Are you aware of that?

Mr. SCHEINA. [Security deletion.]

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Do they generally bring the bodies back, as far as you know?

Mr. SCHEINA. [Security deletion.] We know that the Cubans do have graveyards in Angola, and a number of people have been buried overseas. In addition to that, a number of the Cubans are sent to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe where they have received rehabilitation for debilitating injuries. But that is true, some are brought home to the island.

Mr. COLLINS. Might I add that their practice is to send their casualties to hospitals in Eastern Europe rather than back to Cuba for hospitalization.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Are you familiar with the Tuesday, February 26, article by Jack Anderson entitled, “Kremlin Stirs a New Crisis in Cuba”?

Mr. SCHEINA. Yes, sir, quite familiar with that.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Could you tell us what in there is accurate and what is not?

Mr. SCHEINA. Unfortunately, I do not have a copy. If I could look at yours, I would have the opportunity, sir.
Thank you. Concerning the first point, on doubling of the Soviet brigade in Cuba, [security deletion].

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Even if that were true, the advisers have not increased lately; is that correct?

Mr. SCHEINA. [Security deletion.]

Concerning the Backfire bomber, I addressed that before, [security deletion].

With regard to Soviet fighter pilots, we have pointed out that in the past there have been Soviet pilots who came to Cuba to fill in for Cubans overseas, but [security deletion].

Concerning the Soviet denial of combat status of the brigade, I guess it depends on what one considers a combat unit. If you say the unit has not been in combat does that make it not a combat unit? Certainly, given the troops and the perceived level of expertise these troops have and the equipment they have, and certainly for their size, they would be a potent combat force.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. The Russians would be very disappointed if it was not a combat force.

Mr. SCHEINA. They would feel they were not getting their money's worth, sir.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. As a matter of fact, is it not true that they have never denied that it is a combat unit?

Mr. COLLINS. I think they did deny to the State Department that it was a combat unit. I would have to check back from last year, but I believe they said it was a training unit.

Mr. SCHEINA. [Security deletion.]

The statement that the Soviets have been sent to Cuba to release the Cubans for overseas activity [security deletion], the presence of the brigade appears to go back well before the massive Cuban involvement overseas.

Here again, I do not think the Cubans would think it a fair trade for them to have in Ethiopia and Angola alone some 33,000 combat troops to be replaced by 3,000 combat troops on the island. I think they feel a 10-for-1 exchange would not be a fair trade.

I think I have touched on the major items there.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Just to follow up, in a March 18 article by Jack Anderson he says:

Spy satellites have spotted a suspicious looking building at Punta Movidia near Cienfuegos. It closely resembles the kind of structure used in Eastern Europe for storage and maintenance of nuclear missiles. Punta Movidia is also being connected by railroad, which raises the possibility that nuclear submarines could be serviced at the huge shed.

Do you have any information on that?

Mr. SCHEINA. I would be glad to talk about that. [Security deletion.]

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Do you have any further questions?

Mr. GUYER. I have no further questions.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Fox.

Mr. Fox. Yes, sir, if I might. I wanted to ask you a general question. Given the tremendous amount of Soviet equipment that they have in Cuba and the fact that so much of it is not useful for a long-range offensive capability, it seems to far exceed their domestic needs. In addition, such equipment is not going to prevent the United States from taking action against them. So what is the logical conclusion for
the potential use of this massive amount of armament? Certainly, the transport planes and the submarines could not be used, let’s say, in Africa or some other distant foreign adventure.

Mr. Scheina. It is possible, and in fact in the conclusion of the briefing I indicated that the Cuban military role has been evolving from a strictly defensive mission to one with some offensive capabilities. As far as for areas well outside of the Caribbean, they have to rely upon either the Soviets for providing arms overseas or for transportation, or they have to rely on their own commercial airlines and merchant marine.

However, within the Caribbean region, the Cubans are developing a limited offensive force—the submarines, the Mig-23’s and the AN-26 aircraft—to build up this capability.

One, however, must view these capabilities as being quite modest at this point. [Security deletion] Cuban troops is not a massive number and the deployment of such aircraft to air drop troops to any place in the Caribbean region [security deletion].

Mr. Fox. That is why it seems a bit unusual that they would have spent such a large amount of money to develop this kind of resource base for the limited targets available and the range capability that the weapons provide.

Mr. Scheina. In support of at least the AN-26’s, it can be said the Cuban transport arm of the air force is rather aged. Before the AN-26’s were delivered, it was considered that it was a very aged arm and that maybe modernization was not in line.

Mr. Fox. If I might, I had a couple of other items I wanted to discuss. In a report from Madrid by the EFE wire service there was a story on February 8 of this year regarding an air incident near the Dominican border with Haiti between a couple of U.S. airplanes and a squadron of four Mig’s from Cuba. The report indicates that there was some air contact, not fighting but at least scrambling and chasing, evolved in the incident. I was wondering if you had any information regarding that report.

Mr. Scheina. [Security deletion.]

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. [Security deletion] every so often the Cuban Air Force will scramble their fighters. In fact, just recently they forced aircraft with U.S. registry to land in Havana. This has happened several times. [Security deletion.]

Incidents of this nature occur every so often. I think you were talking to some of the families of people that have been taken that way. Quite often these people are involved in the traffic of marihuana from Central America or from Colombia and through Florida. They do get stopped by the Cubans because they fly into the Cuban air space, as I suppose they have all the right in the world to do.

Mr. Scheina. The Cubans are quite possessive of their territorial sea or air lines. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Fox. I do not know whether you are going to get into this tomorrow, but there have been several reports about Cuban training missions located in various spots in the Caribbean. Grenada is one, which supposedly some people were sent from St. Lucia to be trained in Grenada by Cubans. Reports coming from Trinidad and Tobago indicate that Cubans have been training their citizens in Grenada and also have been trying to infiltrate the islands by using false Venezuelan passports.
Is this something you are going to touch on tomorrow or are you prepared to give us an overview of their activities in the Caribbean?

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. I think that we already touched today on the fact that there are Cubans training the Grenadan army in Grenada, that there are Cubans, I would say intelligence, working in Jamaica. Other than that we are going to be touching on the fact that we have had Nicaraguans, we have had Hondurans, we have had Salvadorans, that have been trained in Cuba. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Fox. One recent article, reporting on the airbase that Cuba is helping to build in Grenada, suggested that it might play some future strategic role for the Soviets. The suggestion is that it would be large enough to handle the Backfire or other type of long-range combat aircraft.

Do you see any validity to that kind of an argument?

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. No; I do not think it is valid at all.

Mr. Friedman. Are you saying you see no military use for that airport?

Mr. Scheina. I would like to say one thing. If the airfield is going to handle international civilian air traffic, it very likely may have a runway which is of sufficient length to handle the Backfire. We are saying [security deletion] feet, and I think if you are familiar with most of your international airfields they are [security deletion] or more.

Here one problem is that the present state of construction, we do not know what the airfield is going to have, what the capabilities are going to be. I think it probably will be quite a while before we really know what the length of that runway is going to be.

Mr. Fox. You mentioned in your presentation that one of the areas with the greatest Cuban involvement is in the island of Jamaica. Given the fact that they are in the process of beginning a campaign followed by an election, sometime later this year, is there any evidence of increased Cuban activity which might in any way be related to influencing the outcome of that election?

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. Let me answer that one. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Lagomarsino. An embarrassment? I know that gutsy newspaper there, the Gleaner, has surely pointed that out, and it has publicly named the Cuban ambassador, Mr. Estrada, as the cause of a lot of their problems.

Mr. Scheina. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Lagomarsino. Also, I see that Cuba is now criticizing the CIA for trying to destabilize the Manley government.

Mr. Scheina. That is not unusual.

Mr. Yatron. Would you gentlemen prefer that we recess until tomorrow and then we can submit some of these questions to you in writing or do you want to proceed so you can tell us some of the other information that you have available?

Mr. Collins. As you wish, Mr. Chairman. We are perfectly prepared to proceed if you wish to do so.

Mr. Yatron. I think because of the lateness of the hour we should recess today until tomorrow at 2 o’clock. The subcommittee now stands in recess, continuing in executive session.

[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 4:50 p.m., to reconvene on Thursday, March 27, 1980, at 2 p.m.]
Thursday, March 27, 1980

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gus Yatron (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. YATRON. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to order. Today the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs will continue its hearings on Soviet-Cuban relations and the impact on the Western Hemisphere.

Yesterday we heard testimony describing the Soviet activities in Cuba and the deployment of Cuban troops in Africa and other countries. Today we will concern ourselves with the political effects of Soviet-Cuban influence with emphasis on the current situations in Central and South America and the Caribbean.

Our witnesses today are Dr. Edward M. Collins, Deputy Director for Intelligence Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Lt. Col. Rafael E. Martinez-Boucher, Chief, Latin American Branch, Defense Intelligence Agency.

Gentlemen, we will reconvene the hearing at the point where we recessed yesterday. Having so voted, we are still in executive session. If the staff has determined that all of those who are present have the appropriate security clearance, we will proceed.

Mr. Collins, you may proceed, sir.

Mr. COLLINS. I believe we will hear Colonel Martinez’ presentation at this time.

Mr. YATRON. Colonel.

STATEMENT OF LT. COL. RAFAEL E. MARTINEZ-BOUCHER, CHIEF, LATIN AMERICAN BRANCH, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, the second part of our briefing will deal with political and military changes in Central America and the Caribbean during 1979. We will specifically address the impact that the Nicaraguan revolution has had on El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. We will examine the arms flow in Central America, highlighting the role that Cuba has played.
This will be followed by an analysis of the growth of Soviet and Cuban influence in the area, contrasting this development with what Latin Americans perceive as the erosion of U.S. influence in the region.

We will touch on the arms transfer and conclude with a discussion of the problem of political instability and an update on terrorism.

The year 1979 marked the 20th anniversary of the Cuban revolution and two decades of what Latin Americans consider to be a gradual but clear erosion of U.S. influence in Latin America. Many Latin Americans perceive events last year in Cuba, Nicaragua, and even tiny Grenada as further evidence of this trend which carries dangerous implications for the future.

The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua last July is perhaps the most dramatic and significant event in the region in recent years. This event not only may have marked the beginning of the first social revolution in Latin America since the Cuban revolution in 1959, but also brought Cuba back into the business of exporting revolutions in the Caribbean basin, a strategy that it had not actively pursued in Latin America since the ill-fated Bolivian adventure of Che Guevara in 1967. At that time that policy had been grudgingly abandoned in the face of what Cuba and the Soviets determined was U.S. resolve not to let "another Cuba" take place in the hemisphere. Its readoption in Nicaragua was seen by many as clearly a probing action to ascertain whether the United States still had such a commitment in the post-Vietnam era.

The Sandinistas were a small group of Castroite insurgents that had been badly mauled by the Government forces over the years. Since they had never shown much promise, Cuban aid had always been meager. Until 1974 the Sandinistas had little hope for victory. But their successful operation that year increased their prestige and apparently convinced Castro that the situation was ripe for revolution. With the assistance of [security deletion]—which had differing reasons for seeking the overthrow of the Somoza government—Cuba provided training, funds, arms, and advice to bolster the Sandinistas until they became a viable core around which other anti-Somoza forces coalesced.

Borrowing a chapter from the Spanish Civil War sympathetic leftists from neighboring countries joined the Sandinistas. Many Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrillas went to Nicaragua to fight against Somoza, believing that reciprocal aid would be furnished afterwards.

Somoza's downfall had a ripple effect in Central America. Flushed with success or inspired by the example, guerrillas in El Salvador renewed their efforts, holding to the Nicaraguan experience as a general blueprint. Cuba again indicated its willingness to cooperate; [security deletion].

Several highly motivated and financially self-sufficient Marxist insurgents were already operating in the country. Furthermore, the economic and political structure of the country was perhaps even more inequitable than that of Nicaragua.

The circumstances provide Cuba with a perfect opportunity to influence the outcome of the conflict or at least ingratiate themselves with the potential victors at little financial or political risk. Guerrilla training for Salvadoran cadres has been provided in Cuba, arms have been furnished and steps taken to enlist the cooperation of all leftist forces in El Salvador and surrounding countries to support the insurgency. [Security deletion.]
Cuba has maintained a low visibility in its support, placing enough distance between itself and the indigenous guerrillas to give it a measure of plausible denial.

Its ability to do so is increased by the relative self-sufficiency of the Salvadorans. Cuba consequently finds itself playing a support and advisory role in the case of El Salvador, different from the more prominent position it exercised in Nicaragua. The Salvadorans have made it abundantly clear that they neither seek nor will accept any leadership other than their own.

The fact that they need limited assistance from Cuba and are confident that they have a winning formula allows them to deal with the Cubans with a certain degree of equality. The war in El Salvador is largely "locally grown."

While the "armed struggle" has received the greatest amount of attention and there may now be as many as [security deletion] armed and trained guerrillas in El Salvador, their greatest achievements have not been in military engagements. The disruption of the country's economy by means of massive civil disturbances, strikes, and takeovers of farms and factories has had most damaging effect. The threat of anarchy and a total collapse of the economy is as great a danger as that posed by the growing strength of the guerrillas. [Security deletion.]

At this point, I would like to add a word about the assassination of Archbishop Romero. The death of Archbishop Oscar Romero could easily provide the spark to set off a civil war in El Salvador. Thus far, the populace has acted with shock and apprehension, and apprehension that a bloodbath is about to begin.

Numerous bombs have been set off each night and some shooting has taken place. There has not been, so far, any widespread demonstrations. Regardless of who perpetrated the crime, Romero's death can only work to the advantage of the extreme left; whether they are able to fully exploit the opportunity is still uncertain.

Unless they do so within the next few days, they may lose the opportunity to wrap themselves in the Archbishop's mantle.

The embassy in El Salvador reports that in death the Archbishop has become even more important than he was in life. [Security deletion.]

Colonel Martínez-Boucher. Returning to Central America, Guatemala comes after El Salvador [security deletion]. Many of the same political, economic, and social pressures prevalent in El Salvador also exist in Guatemala, including an oligarchy that has resisted virtually all reform efforts.

Dissidents here were also given a shot in the arm by the Nicaraguan victory. Insurgent activities have increased since then, both in frequency and intensity; however, the government forces are still very much in control. [Security deletion.]

The other likely target for serious Marxist insurgency over the longer term is Honduras, the poorest country in the region. While the potential for revolution exists the pressure for change is not nearly as strong as in El Salvador and Guatemala. [Security deletion.]

Their theory appears to be that once Honduras is surrounded by leftist governments it will be relatively easy to topple.
Although political, social, and economic problems are at the roots of the insurgency in Central America, military hardware continues to be indispensable to insurgent groups—therefore, it would be useful to examine the flow of armament in the area.

During the Nicaraguan civil war, once popular support had built up around the FSLN, arms were the single greatest need of the Sandinistas and one which the Cubans were readily willing to supply. At that time, a wide variety of weapons, including recoilless rifles, mortars, and antiaircraft guns, were flown into Nicaragua from Cuba by way of [security deletion]. The ease with which they could be introduced made it possible not only to bring in a large quantity of arms but also some heavy infantry weapons not normally associated with guerrilla warfare in Latin America.

As part of the Sandinista strategy small arms were handed out to any prospective anti-Somoza recruit regardless of whether there had been any previous commitment to the Sandinistas. This required a large number of weapons, far more than the Sandinistas could provide from their own resources.

Since then, the weapons traffic from Cuba coming into the region had been reduced to a steady, but important trickle. Part of the reason is that the most active insurgent groups in the area are now the Salvadorans, who have amassed a sizable war chest by means of kidnappings and bank robberies.

As a result, they can buy most of the arms they need. Part of these, they buy in-country and some they pick up through representatives abroad. Automatic—weapons, however, are harder to come by and Cuba is the suspected source of most of these. [Security deletion.]

Under the circumstances, it is not at all surprising that the largest guerrilla group in El Salvador, openly boasts that it has enough weapons to arm all of its 60,000 members and sympathizers. [Security deletion.]

In Guatemala, insurgents have had to rely on their own resources for weapons. Most of what they have has been obtained locally or from their representative abroad [security deletion].

In both El Salvador and Guatemala, the weapons are western in origin, with Israeli UZI submachineguns, German G-3 rifles, and Madsen submachineguns being some of the favorites. Unlike Nicaragua, no weapons manufactured in Communist countries have surfaced in El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras. [Security deletion.]

Colonel MARTINEZ-BOTCHER. As we conclude this review of events in Central America, let me emphasize that Cuba’s support for the Nicaraguan revolution [security deletion]. Cuba is now attempting to increase its influence in Nicaragua [security deletion].

The Cubans appear to be moving cautiously in Central America; however, they are being pulled by the impatience of local Marxist groups that have their attention focused primarily on local conditions rather than the options for U.S. global reaction which is of far greater concern to Cuba and their Soviet patrons.

[Security deletion.] and seems to be moving toward the Cuban camp has not been lost on our friends or enemies. The Marxists seem to have concluded—perhaps tentatively—that as long as an area is not considered vital by the United States, support for insurgent efforts can be given without fear of retaliation. Furthermore, there are sev-
eral other countries in Central America and the Caribbean where the conditions are at least as exploitable as they were in Nicaragua under Somoza.

Developments in the Caribbean attracted a great deal of attention during the past year. This attention is centered on the events that followed the overthrow of the Gairy government in Grenada by the New Jewel Movement—a Marxist group with Cuban connections—and in the economic and political situation in Jamaica, where Prime Minister Manley struggled to retain power with the help of Cuba and the Soviet Union.

We were concerned then, and remain concerned today, with the possibility that the new Caribbean island nations may fall prey to Cuban influence.

Grenada is such an example. You have already heard testimony describing Cuban involvement in that island. Today, Grenada may be considered to be a member of the-Soviet-Cuban camp. It, for example, voted against the General Assembly resolution condemning the Russian intervention in Afghanistan.

At the same time, the radicalization of Grenada, Cuban activities in the region, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have awakened the fears of moderate leaders in the Caribbean and given them ammunition against leftist elements. The recent electoral victories of the conservative ruling party of St. Vincent and of a conservative coalition in Saint Christopher-Nevis, may be partially attributed to these events.

In Jamaica, during 1979, Manley continued to seek economic assistance from the Soviet Union with disappointing results. Manley's 5-day official visit to Moscow in April was the major public event in Soviet-Jamaican relations since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1975, but although Manley hailed the visit as a significant breakthrough in bilateral relations, Jamaica actually gained little, and in fact may even incur losses.

As a result of the visit, a trade agreement was signed that guaranteed Soviet alumina purchases at the existing 50,000 tons annually through 1984 in exchange for Soviet goods. The Jamaican Government, however, has to purchase the alumina at ever-increasing prices as well as pay the shipping costs to the U.S.S.R.

Throughout 1979, Jamaica's economy continued to deteriorate, and the Government remained incapable of finding any solutions. Taking advantage of Manley's mismanagement of the economy and of increased public suspicions of Cuban activities in the country, Edward Seaga, leader of the opposition Jamaica Labour Party, launched a blistering attack against the Government and its relations with the Soviets and Cubans. In June 1979, he named intelligence officials at the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in a speech alleging that they were in close contact with the special branch, the intelligence arm of the Jamaica Constabulary Force. He also charged that the ruling People's National Party had established links with the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Other opposition politicians, quoted in the independent press, followed these revelations by charging that the Prime Minister and other members of his government were in close contact with Soviet and Cuban intelligence personnel and that Manley and others in his party were in collusion with various Soviet and Cuban groups to lead Jamaica further along the path toward Marxism.
As political pressure mounted and the economic problem became more intractable—Manley could not meet the IMF conditions to obtain desperately needed assistance—the Prime Minister was forced to call for elections, possibly to be held as early as October of this year.

We believe that this brief respite from leftist inroads in the Caribbean basin will be of very short duration. This area remains plagued by deep-rooted economic and social problems that seem unsolvable. Moderate forces and democratic institutions in the region will survive only if economic and security assistance is provided.

DIA is convinced that despite Cuba's domestic problems, Havana remains determined to exploit the social and economic ills of the region not only to preserve the gains it has achieved up to now, but also to pursue the goal of becoming the regional power.

We will continue to see Cuba and the indigenous Marxist groups in the Caribbean and Central America probing further. They apparently believe that they can operate in the area with a greater degree of impunity than they had in the past.

Future developments will not depend only on Cuban and Soviet initiative and internal problems, but also on U.S. responses and the Latins' perception of such responses.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to move now to South America and the growth of Soviet influence in that area.

Mr. YATRO. Without objection.

Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUTCHER. The United States has traditionally enjoyed a position of great influence throughout Latin America. However, in recent years there has been a gradual, but significant, erosion of that influence which has been manifested in several ways. The Soviets have attempted to exploit this situation.

More and more Latin American countries are developing policies and taking positions that are often at variance with ours—the Sandinistas' victory in Nicaragua is seen by some Latins as a victory of communism over U.S. interests; the Argentines' and Brazilians' nuclear programs thwart U.S. efforts to minimize nuclear proliferation; and Mexico increasingly challenges U.S. initiatives.

Related to the foregoing and a reflection of this process is the growing influence of the Andean Pact and the increased tendency, especially among the larger countries, to pursue new foreign policy initiatives that are not compatible with our own interests.

Latin Americans see the lessening of U.S. military ties with their countries as a sign of lack of U.S. interest in the area. The great majority of Latin governments continue to be controlled by their armed forces. The military's dissatisfaction with any given set of arms policies influences governmental perceptions and decisions that may have little or no relation to military issues.

The Soviets have attempted, with limited success, to exploit these perceptions and have been very forthcoming with their offers of arms. The U.S.S.R. has also used diplomacy, trade, and technical assistance to further its interests. Their approach has been flexible and has been aimed at several countries, disregarding the political coloration of the government in power. Hydroelectric development projects in such conservative countries as Argentina and Brazil are two good examples of this.
In the area of diplomacy, Moscow has expanded the number of diplomatic ties in the region from 7 in 1969 to 17 at the present time. Within the last 6 months, they have established diplomatic relations with Nicaragua and Grenada.

Soviet trade, both in arms and in commercial goods, has grown at a relatively rapid pace. Since 1970, trade with the region has increased over sixfold. Commerce has been an easy tool, since the Soviets have been willing to import much more from Latin America than it has sold in the area. An excellent example of this situation is Argentina.

Ten years ago, trade between the two countries amounted to only $40 million. By 1978, trade between the two countries amounted to $486 million and the Soviet Union had become Argentina’s largest trading partner. Although this trade declined 20 percent last year, the U.S.S.R. was still Argentina’s second largest trade partner.

Since 1977, Argentina has accumulated a trade surplus with the U.S.S.R. amounting to $1 billion. Where this type of relationship is not feasible, as with weapon sales to Peru, the Soviets have sought expanded trade by granting low prices and liberal credit.

Soviet technical assistance, though still small, also is increasing. During the 1970’s, Latin America accounted for only [security deletion] percent of the total economic aid extended by the U.S.S.R. to less developed countries. While small, this represented a [security deletion] percent increase over the pre-1968 figures. Almost all aid has been associated with high-visibility projects, such as irrigation and port development in Peru, a tin smelter in Bolivia, and hydroelectric development in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.

Outside of Cuba, Soviet influence in Peru is by far the most pronounced in all of Latin America. Prior to 1968, the Soviet presence was nonexistent, but that year the United States suspended military sales to Peru and the Peruvians turned first to Western Europe, and then to the Soviet Union for military hardware. Moscow’s massive offerings of military equipment not readily available elsewhere, at extremely generous terms, drew a positive response from the Peruvians and set the stage for the arrival of Soviet advisers and the training of Peruvian military personnel in the Soviet Union.

A quick comparison of the Soviet military role in Peru with that of the United States in [security deletion] is very revealing. There are almost as many Soviet advisers in Peru [security deletion] as there are American military personnel [security deletion]. Soviet military sales to Peru in [security deletion] exceeded U.S. sales to all of Latin America that year [security deletion]. This was true [security deletion] and 1980 may prove to be the same.

Although Soviet aid to Cuba and Peru is very significant, military assistance to the rest of Latin America is still virtually nonexistent. Soviet inroads in other countries, however, can be expected, as Latin American countries continue their quest for arms.

Accelerated modernization programs fueled by continued territorial disputes and sustained by military governments, provided the dynamics behind the arms acquisition programs in the region.

Expenditure for arms, although not significant by world standards, increased in the region in 1979 in comparison to previous years. This is if we disregard the aberration of 1978 when one country, [security deletion].
Guyana and Grenada were the other two countries in the region that contracted or received military hardware from Communist countries in 1979. [Security deletion.]

Non-U.S. free world military assistance to Latin America for 1979 totaled [security deletion] in deliveries and [security deletion] in new contracts. The top supplier in 1979 was France with deliveries of [security deletion] and contracts for [security deletion]. France was followed by Israel, Italy, and the United Kingdom. In a new development, Brazil became the fifth most important supplier with [security deletion] in deliveries and [security deletion] in contracts.

The [security deletion] in Latin American contracts for free world material in 1979 were a little over [security deletion] the value of contracts for 1978 and the [security deletion]. The leading contractor for military assistance during 1979 was Chile, with agreements worth [security deletion]. This was Chile's biggest contract year ever, and exceeded Argentina's 1979 purchase which totaled [security deletion]. The third largest purchaser in 1979 was one of Latin America's poorest countries—Bolivia [security deletion].

We shall now project a series of viewgraphs that list the major items of equipment purchased from the free world by Peru, Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, and Paraguay.

Peru's [security deletion] agreement with the U.S.S.R. is primarily for the purchase of [security deletion]. Her free world purchases include [security deletion].

Chile's primary purchases for 1979 consisted of [security deletion]. Chile also purchased [security deletion]. In addition, she purchased over [security deletion].

Argentina continued to acquire most of her equipment in France. During the year, Argentina contracted [security deletion]. The Italians were [security deletion] Argentina's second most important supplier and contracted to sell [security deletion].

Bolivia's primary purchase during 1979 was [security deletion].

Paraguay's big purchase for 1979 was for nine Brazilian-built MB-326 jet attack trainers for which they paid $40 million. Argentina was her second largest supplier and provided [security deletion]. The aircraft purchase from Brazil represented the Paraguayan Air Force's entry into the jet age. Although of Italian design, they are built, actually assembled, in Brazil under license from the Aeromacci Co.

From here, Mr. Chairman, I would like to move on to the problem of political instability in the area. It is obvious from what we have already testified that the past year has not seen much improvement in the political stability of Latin America. In relative terms, South America has fared somewhat better than the rest of Latin America. Strong military governments in that region offer a partial explanation.

Nevertheless, the past year witnessed severe political turbulence to include a coup in Bolivia and the first nonconstitutional change of government in Surinam since its independence in 1975. These developments were balanced by the assumption of power in Ecuador of a civilian government and the continued efforts of the Peruvian Government to transfer power to civilians in 1980.

Brazil also continued to pursue the democratization process despite labor unrest and political opposition to President Figueiredo's polit-
ical reform programs. Even in Argentina, there seems to be some interest in returning political power to civilians.

It would be a mistake, however, if these actions were interpreted to mean that the military has decided to return to the barracks. To the contrary, the military will likely remain the ultimate political arbiter in most of these countries. Their reasons for doing so will vary widely, ranging from purest nationalism to ill-disguised self-interest.

Attention today is focused on two countries—Bolivia and Peru. Bolivia has long been noted for frequent and abrupt changes in government. Since 1978, when the Banzer government decided to allow the civilians to return to government, the country has been ruled by five presidents—three gained power through coups d'etat and two by way of congressional appointments. Lydia Guiler, the present interim President, heads a government that is not expected to last until June, when the nation is scheduled to hold its third presidential election in less than 2 years.

Economic problems, personalism, institutional and self-interest and real or imagined fear of communism, give form to Bolivian politics. These elements are not expected to change now or in the near future, and political instability will remain a serious problem until a strong man emerges from one of the contending institutional factions. The political prognosis for Bolivia is dismal.

We are slightly more optimistic where Peru's Government is concerned. We believe that the Peruvian military leadership remains committed to the return of the country to civilian rule provided an acceptable candidate wins. Elections are now scheduled for May 18 and the installation of the new government for July 28.

Finally, we must address Surinam.

After 5 years of independence and democracy, the Republic of Surinam experienced its first nonconstitutional change of government. The February 1980 coup was foreshadowed by more than the Arron government. The immediate catalyst of the coup was the trial of the NCO union leaders who were found guilty of rebellion.

The NCO's had no trouble in assuming power. One of their first acts was to create a national military council to provide the basis for a new government. A new cabinet has since been appointed.

Now I would like to talk a little bit about terrorism.

One factor which continues to impact on the political stability in many Latin American States is terrorism. While terrorism does not of itself threaten the viability of any Latin American country except for El Salvador, its presence serves to reveal a level of considerable frustration for elements of the population. Or, it may indicate that a particular country has been targeted by extremist elements who do not expect to have an opportunity for ascendancy in the political arena.

One favorite terrorist tactic has been the seizure and occupation of embassies. Beginning this year in January with the tragic takeover and burning of the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala (which resulted in 39 deaths), there has been an alarming trend of embassy takeovers in Latin America. In El Salvador both the Spanish and Panamanian Embassies were seized, and in Mexico a peasant group occupied the Belgian and Danish Embassies for 6 days.
Militant Panamanian students briefly seized the Salvadoran Embassy in Panama, and currently, of course, the Dominican Embassy in Bogota, Colombia, continues to be held. If the terrorists occupying the Dominican Republic Embassy achieve their goals, we can expect to see the continued use of this new tactic in the future.

Guatemala has seen a pronounced increase in terrorism in recent years. Extreme leftist elements, which had been fairly quiescent since the late 1960's, resurfaced in 1976. While their insurgency was concentrated in the rural areas they also increased the tempo of terrorist acts in the cities—the 1979 assassination of the Guatemalan Army Chief of Staff being an example.

The victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua has further encouraged the Guatemalan insurgent groups, and terrorists acts have increased since the summer of 1979. Although the insurgents do not yet present a significant threat to the Guatemalan Government, the possibility exists that increased terrorism will result in overly repressive countermeasures, which in turn will alienate a much larger segment of the populace.

In South America some of the major insurgent groups of the recent past, such as the Uruguayan Tupamaros and the Argentine ERP (People's Revolutionary Army), have been virtually eliminated; other groups, such as the Argentine Montoneros have held on.

Despite the loss of most of its capabilities in late 1976 and early 1977, the Montoneros have retained the ability of making and planting highly sophisticated bombs. During 1979, they conducted a series of bombings that were reminiscent of their heydays. The Montoneros do not constitute a serious threat at the present time but they can expect to continue to be a security problem for the Argentine Government.

In Chile, the long-banned MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left) an important supporter of the late President Salvador Allende, is [security deletion].

The Chilean press has credited the MIR with 47 bombings in 1978 and 80 in 1979. So far, the MIR's bombings have been directed at the destruction of property rather than at people and as a result there have been few casualties.

Terrorism, just like political instability, is merely a symptom of the deep-rooted political, economic, and social problems of Latin America. It would be naive to expect that the conflicts that plague the region will disappear in the near future or that our enemies will not exploit them—it would be well to face the fact that the problems are chronic and that future changes will most likely work to our disadvantage.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my presentation.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much, Colonel, for an excellent briefing.

To your knowledge, is there any evidence that the Romero assassination was committed by paid assassins?

Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER. The indications we have is that it was a very professional job, a [security deletion]. The terrorists are good but they are not that good. So, I think that we could make the assessment that it was done by a professional.

Mr. YATRON. Do you have any idea where the professional could have come from?
Colonel Martínez-Boucher. We have no indications of whether he was a rightist or a leftist. Both the left and the right could very easily obtain a professional.

Mr. Yatron. Are the guerrillas from neighboring countries participating in the El Salvadoran insurgency as they did in Nicaragua?

Colonel Martínez-Boucher. At the present time we have some indications that some [security deletion]. This is the only indication that there are some in the country.

However, there is no doubt in our minds that [security deletion] facilitating the movement of weapons from Honduras into El Salvador. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Yatron. Would you comment on the possible flow of arms from Honduras to El Salvador and the need to provide [security deletion].

Colonel Martínez-Boucher. There is no question in my mind that there is a need to improve the training of the Honduran Army in trying to regain some control. I should not say “regain some control,” but be able to control the border area a little bit better because right now, as I mentioned in the briefing, there is great facility moving arms through that frontier.

Mr. Yatron. Do the insurgents in Guatemala have a war chest to purchase arms as their counterparts did in El Salvador?

Colonel Martínez-Boucher. No; they do not. Is that correct?

Mr. McClellan. Basically.

Colonel Martínez-Boucher. As far as I know, they do not have war chests that the Salvadorans have.

Mr. Yatron. [Security deletion.]

Colonel Martínez-Boucher. We do not know really.

Mr. Yatron. If I understand your testimony, is the U.S. hesitancy to supply security assistance to El Salvador and Guatemala interpreted by the Cubans and the Soviets as an unwillingness to defend our areas of traditional influence?

Colonel Martínez-Boucher. I would not specify El Salvador and Guatemala. I think that the perception is more general and is not necessarily tied up with whether or not we provide military assistance. It might be related to other U.S. policies that Latin Americans do not care for that create a situation [security deletion].

Mr. Yatron. Are the dissidents in Honduras expecting to receive similar assistance from El Salvadoran and Guatemalan insurgents in return for the alleged support that they are now providing?

Colonel Martínez-Boucher. We believe that insurgency in Central America is not restricted by national boundaries. We believe that the insurgent movement is well coordinated by the Cubans, and that it includes elements in all the countries. [Security deletion.] We know that the Cubans provide technical assistance, they provide training and they are the driving organizational force behind the entire insurgency movement in the area.

Having said that, I would go back to my presentation and indicate that it does not always work the way the Cubans want. In the case of El Salvador, the Salvadorans tend to be somewhat more independent. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Yatron. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With regard to the arms trafficking in Central America, have you at any time found any relationship between arms trafficking and narcotics trafficking? We have
received some reports that some of the narcotics traffickers have been utilizing the funds for trafficking in weapons. Do you have any information with regard to that?

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. I have no evidence of that. But I would like to refer this question to either Mr. Da Pena or Mr. McClellan to see if they have any information concerning that.

Mr. McClellan. My background, or my information, would indicate not. I have seen no connection between drug trafficking and the terrorist or insurgent activities in these areas at all.

Mr. Gilman. Have you received any information regarding drug trafficking in El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras?

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. We have not, sir, because it is not within our charter to deal with drugs. Once in a while, of course, it might crop up in one of our reports, but normally we do not deal with drugs.

Mr. McClellan. I recognize that you do not deal with it. What we are trying to find out is if there is any relationship between the trafficking in arms and the trafficking in narcotics.

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. We have no evidence of that, sir.

Mr. McClellan. Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, the middle and central American area, sir, is not noted for its drug growing or trafficking. Mexico and Colombia are the biggest areas.

Mr. Gilman. [Security deletion.]

Mr. McClellan. Yes.

Mr. Gilman. This is also the case in Panama, where a lot of the arms trafficking takes place.

Have you been able to pinpoint a source of financing for the insurgents for the arms trafficking? Where are they getting the funds?

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. In the case of El Salvador, they have acquired most of their funds through kidnappings and through bank robberies. A kidnaping might net them several million dollars. So they have the money.

Mr. McClellan. It has been very lucrative for the Salvadoran terrorists.

Mr. Gilman. What about the other countries?

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. In the other countries they are trying to follow the same blueprint. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Gilman. What is the source of their armaments? Where are they purchasing them?

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. Well, in many of these countries you will find that the guerrillas are armed, not with standard military equipment but with hunting equipment, they have rifles and handguns. It was not until last week, for example, that El Salvador, which has been experiencing this tremendous insurgency problem, decided to impose restrictions on the possession of arms.

There is another factor also. El Salvador is a country that is violence prone. You can say everyone has a gun in his house. Local acquisition of weapons is very easy.

They do purchase weapons from the outside. I remember last year, for example, when the Sandinistas were fighting Somoza that some of the weapons were purchased in the United States [security deletion]. So there is a multitude of sources that they use.

The financing is their own because, and I think we have mentioned this several times, [security deletion].
Mr. GILMAN. Have there been any Cuban weapons earmarked in any of these countries? Have you been able to find any Cuban source for any of the weapons in El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras?

Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER. [Security deletion.]

What I am saying is, the Cubans do not want to leave their trademark behind. For example, there must be thousands of U.S. weapons in Cuba that were left there from 20 years ago. They can get those weapons and provide them to the guerrillas and they can be just as effective, or they can get them through other sources. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GILMAN. [Security deletion.]

Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GILMAN. [Security deletion.]

Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER. I do not know.

Mr. GILMAN. [Security deletion.]

Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER. Not that I know of, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. [Security deletion.]

Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GILMAN. [Security deletion.]

Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER. I do not know.

Mr. DA PENA. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. GILMAN. [Security deletion.]

Mr. DA PENA. No.

Mr. GILMAN. [Security deletion.]

Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER. Yes, sir; there has been a significant amount of training. There have been Salvadorans, Hondurans, Nicaraguans, of course, Guatemalans, trained in Cuba.

Mr. GILMAN. What is the extent of any Soviet presence in Central America?

Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER. There are Soviet diplomats in Costa Rica and Nicaragua.

Mr. GILMAN. What about El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala?

Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER. Not to my knowledge. I believe not.

Mr. GILMAN. Is there any East German presence?

Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER. No.

Mr. GILMAN. I would like to reserve an opportunity for further questioning, Mr. Chairman, and relinquish the balance of my time.

Mr. YATRON. Colonel, and Dr. Collins, we would like to recess for about 10 or 15 minutes. We have a vote.

[Whereupon, there was a short recess taken.]

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, gentlemen, for waiting. We will reconvene our briefing and hearing at this time. I would like to call on our colleague, Mr. Lagomarsino, who has some questions.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There were some press reports yesterday that appear to quote Ambassador White in El Salvador, as mentioning anti-Castro Cubans having some role to play, perhaps, in the assassination of Archbishop Romero. Are you aware of any such report or fact of that nature?

Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER. No; I am not.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. From what you said earlier, I gather we have absolutely no information as to who carried out the assassination.
Colonel Martinez-Boucher. That is true.

Mr. Lagomarsino. On page 3 of your statement you say, "The first priority of the Cubans and the Sandinistas was to consolidate FSLN control over Nicaragua." Do I take it from that that you are saying that the Cubans are involved in the actual plan, or whatever you want to call it here, in Nicaragua itself?

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. Of course, the Cubans were the driving force, if we could call it that, behind the Sandinistas. Once the Sandinistas defeated the Nicaraguan national guard they had to consolidate their position in the country. Of course, the Cubans have played a very important role in that regard as well.

You might remember from yesterday's testimony that they have provided not only technical assistance in the field of education and agriculture and road construction but they have been very much involved in training the military, the Sandinista army.

[Security deletion.]

Mr. Lagomarsino. You say on page 5, that arms have been furnished and steps taken to enlist the cooperation of all leftist forces in El Salvador and surrounding countries to support the insurgency.

[Security deletion.]

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. That is an affirmative, sir.

Mr. Lagomarsino. I was going to ask you about the U.S. arms that found their way into Nicaragua [security deletion] but you already discussed that.

Now, with regard to your statement on page 13, you repeat essentially the same thing in several other places as well, you say the Marxists seem to have concluded, perhaps tentatively, that as long as areas not considered vital by the United States, support for insurgent efforts can be given without fear of retaliation. Is that an intuitive feeling on your part, on the part of the Agency, or do you have actual information that things like that have been said?

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. It is based on what has actually occurred in Central America. [Security deletion.] They took advantage of it and they exploited the situation to the fullest.

Mr. Lagomarsino. You mentioned the vote of Grenada against our position on the Afghanistan invasion. Can you speculate or do you have any actual information as to why Nicaragua abstained on that particular vote?

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. Anything I would say would be speculation. I guess that I could say that they did not support the Soviet position fully, because they were in the process, and are still in the process, of trying to get U.S. aid. Surely if they had voted in support of the Soviets, I have no doubt in my mind that many people in Congress would not have taken that very lightly.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Then, on page 18, it goes back to the question I was asking a little earlier about perceptions and so on. You say, "Future developments will not depend only on Cuban and Soviet initiative and internal problems, but on U.S. responses and the Latins' perceptions of such responses."

We discussed, a moment ago, the perception of the Cubans as to what we have done and not done and how that may well have affected what they did in that area.
What is the perception of other countries in the area?
Colonel Martinez-Boucher. I can be almost precise. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Lagomarsino. [Security deletion.]
Colonel Martinez-Boucher. [Security deletion.]
Mr. Lagomarsino. [Security deletion.]
Colonel Martinez-Boucher. No, we have no evidence of that. At best we could say that [security deletion.]
Mr. Lagomarsino. [Security deletion.]
Colonel Martinez-Boucher. [Security deletion.]
Mr. Lagomarsino. [Security deletion.]
Colonel Martinez-Boucher. We have received some indications to that effect, yes.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Recently?
Colonel Martinez-Boucher. Within the last month.
Mr. Lagomarsino. [Security deletion.]
Colonel Martinez-Boucher. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Lagomarsino. [Security deletion.]
Colonel Martinez-Boucher. [Security deletion.]
Mr. McClellan. [Security deletion.]
Mr. Lagomarsino. [Security deletion.]
Mr. McClellan. No.
Mr. Lagomarsino. [Security deletion.]

Well, we could go on a long time, Mr. Chairman, but perhaps we better stop here.

Mr. Yatron. Thank you. I would like to ask a few questions and then we will adjourn and go into our private session.

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. All right.

Mr. Yatron. Is there any evidence of a military confrontation in Jamaica to strengthen Manley's regime before he has to hold elections?
Colonel Martinez-Boucher. We do not anticipate that that will occur. The armed forces in Jamaica have not been co-opted as such by Manley. We suspect there is going to be a great deal of turbulence in the country because the economic situation is so serious, and also we believe that Manley would do all he can to stay in power.

Mr. Yatron. Referring to the testimony on Jamaica, and the claims of the opposition leader, Edward Seaga, is it truth or is it rhetoric? In your statement, on page 16 I believe, you quoted Mr. Seaga.
Colonel Martinez-Boucher. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Yatron. Would you care to comment on why Prime Minister Manley would enter into the Soviet alumina deal, which is not really heavily in favor of Jamaica, when that country is in such bad economic condition?

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. It does not make any sense to us either, but it is something that I suppose goes back to the Jamaicans saying, "Well, I have gained some concession from the Soviets." The price of alumina is going up, and he (Manley) established that there would be a fixed price. He agreed to pay for the shipment and we know that the cost of the shipment is going to go up, so I do not see any advantage that they could have gained from it.

Mr. Yatron. Is the Peruvian Government pleased with the quality and maintenance of the Soviet equipment that they have been buying?
Colonel Martinez-Boucher. The Peruvians are basically happy with their equipment. They are somewhat [security deletion]. However, recent reports tend to indicate that the Soviets have agreed to provide them with [security deletion]. I would say that perhaps in the future there would be greater satisfaction on the part of the Peruvians in that area.

Mr. Yatron. [Security deletion.]

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Yatron. On the same concept, can you tell us of the high cost of maintenance of French Mirages and other foreign equipment maintenance costs as compared to our equipment?

Colonel Martinez-Boucher. I am afraid I cannot answer that question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Yatron. We would like to submit some additional questions to you for written responses. I am going to request that we adjourn the meeting for the day. We want to thank you gentlemen for giving us the benefit of your expertise. We have another rollcall to respond to and we will come back and talk to you briefly at that time in the private session.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the meeting was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]
IMPACT OF CUBAN-SOVIEII TIES IN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE, SPRING 1980

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 16, 1980

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2 p.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House
Office Building, Hon. Gus Yatron (chairman of the subcommittee)
residing.

Mr. YATRON. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to order.
The Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs will continue its hear-
ings on Soviet-Cuban Ties in the Western Hemisphere.

We previously heard testimony from the Defense Intelligence
Agency describing Soviet activities in Cuba, the deployment of Cuban
troops in Africa and other countries, and the political effects of Soviet-
Cuban influence on the current situation in Central and South America
and the Caribbean.

Today the Central Intelligence Agency will provide insight on the
unrest in Cuba and the extent of overt and covert activities of Cuban
and Soviet intelligence forces in the hemisphere.

Our witnesses today are Mr. Robin Kent, Mr. Randolph Pherson,
and Mr. Russell Swanson, all analysts from the Office of Political
Analysis, National Foreign Assessment Center of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency.

Also, we have Mr. Robert J. English, chief of the U.S.S.R.—East
European Division, Office of Political Affairs, and Mr. Craig Schop-
meyer, analyst of the Office of Strategic Research with the National
Foreign Assessment Center of the CIA.

Due to the sensitive nature of the information to be given, the
Central Intelligence Agency has requested these hearings to be held
in executive session. It is the Chair's intention to again request that
the CIA declassify as much of the testimony as possible for publica-
tion so that the public can have maximum benefit of information on
this most important aspect of our national security and foreign
policies.

I would like to entertain a motion from the floor that we go into
executive session.

Mr. Lagomarsino. I so move, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. YATRON. It has been moved and seconded that we go into execu-
tive session for the purpose of taking classified testimony. Under the
rule the rocall is automatic and the clerk will now call the roll.

Mr. Friedman. Mr. Yatron.

Mr. YATRON. Aye.
Mr. FRIEDMAN, Mr. Fascell.
Mr. FASCCELL. Aye.
Mr. FRIEDMAN, Mr. Rosenthal.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Aye.
Mr. FRIEDMAN, Mrs. Collins.
[No response.]
Mr. FRIEDMAN, Mr. Studds.
[No response.]
Mr. FRIEDMAN, Mr. Ireland.
[No response.]
Mr. FRIEDMAN, Mr. Gilman.
Mr. GILMAN. Aye.
Mr. FRIEDMAN, Mr. Guyer.
[No response.]
Mr. FRIEDMAN, Mr. Lagomarsino.
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Aye.
Mr. YATRON. There are five members voting "aye." A quorum being present, we are now in executive session.

In the interest of time, I will also entertain a motion from the floor that we continue in executive session tomorrow, when we will have witnesses from the State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. FASCCELL. So moved.
Mr. YATRON. It has been moved and seconded that we continue in executive session tomorrow for the purpose of taking classified testimony. Under the rule, the rollcall is automatic and the clerk will now call the roll.

Mr. FRIEDMAN, Mr. Yatron.
Mr. YATRON. Aye.
Mr. FRIEDMAN, Mr. Fascell.
Mr. FASCCELL. Aye.
Mr. FRIEDMAN, Mr. Rosenthal.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Aye.
Mr. FRIEDMAN, Mrs. Collins.
[No response.]
Mr. FRIEDMAN, Mr. Studds.
[No response.]
Mr. FRIEDMAN, Mr. Ireland.
[No response.]
Mr. FRIEDMAN, Mr. Gilman.
Mr. GILMAN. Aye.
Mr. FRIEDMAN, Mr. Guyer.
[No response.]
Mr. FRIEDMAN, Mr. Lagomarsino.
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Aye.
Mr. YATRON. There are five members voting "aye." A quorum being present, we will remain in executive session tomorrow.

Will the clerk determine that all those who are present in the room have the appropriate clearance.

Gentleman, it is a pleasure to welcome you. Please proceed with your opening statement.

Mr. FASCCELL. Mr. Chairman, let me identify and corroborate Mr. Jerry Desantiana, State Department, on my staff.
Mr. YATRON. We welcome Mr. Desantiana. Gentlemen, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF ROBIN KENT, ANALYST, OFFICE OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS, NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. KENT. Mr. Chairman, if it meets with your approval, the approach we would like to follow today is for myself to give a brief overview of Cuba's motivations and general tactics in the region, and then Mr. Pherson will talk more specifically about what the Cubans are involved in Central America.

Then Mr. English will speak on Soviet activities in the region, and finally Mr. Swanson will speak on the Cuban economy.

Mr. YATRON. Without objection.

Mr. KENT. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, Cuba's aggressive behavior in foreign affairs is caused by Fidel Castro's firm commitment to revolution as an ideology. In his view, the ills of the world are caused by imperialism and capitalism. He firmly believes that revolution is the only solution to these ills and he sees his role as being the revolutionary leader of the Third World against the forces of imperialism.

This outlook puts him in direct conflict with Western states, particularly the United States. Castro uses a wide variety of tactics to achieve his objectives. He uses cultural contacts, commercial contacts, [security deletion]. He uses normal diplomatic interaction; he uses foreign economic assistance programs; he also uses support for guerrilla organizations, military advisers to friendly governments. He can use any or all of these in some combination.

Cuba has experienced a number of successes in Central America and the Caribbean in the past year, and Grenada and Nicaragua are the prime examples of this. Cuban influence in Grenada has rapidly increased since the coup there in March 1979. The most recent example of that is the large airport project that the Cubans are heavily engaged in constructing.

Nicaragua is a far more important victory for the Cubans and that is evidenced by the large number of Cuban advisers and teachers that are in that country, and the heavy investment that Cuba has devoted to assisting that country.

However, Cuba has also experienced some problems in the region and elsewhere. For example, Jamaican Prime Minister Manley is a close friend of Cuba but is experiencing political troubles in his own country [security deletion].

Another setback that the Cubans have experienced in recent months is the loss of the election for the U.N. Security Council seat. The second one would be the impact of Afghanistan on Castro's efforts to assume an important role as leader of the nonaligned movement. Cuba, as you are well aware, also, is experiencing severe economic problems at the present time, and the most recent problem that Castro is now experiencing is the refugee situation in the Peruvian Embassy.

I would now like to turn it to Randy to talk on the Central American situation.
STATEMENT OF RANDOLPH PHERSON, ANALYST, OFFICE OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS, NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. Pherson. Just briefly, I would like to go over what the situation is, what the Cuban objectives are, and what they have accomplished in Central America.

As Robin has indicated, Latin America and Central America, in particular, is a prime objective of Cuban foreign policy. They think they can make the most revolutionary gains there. It is an area ripe for revolution.

[Security deletion] is also very much interested in making sure that a revolution in these countries succeeds.

[Security deletion] they have already progressed with a revolution in Nicaragua.

[Security deletion.]

To look specifically at some of these countries and what has been accomplished and what is hoped for, I would like to start with Nicaragua and then go to the three northern tier countries, with just a couple of sentences. Basically, the perspective is that Cuba sees itself as the arsenal, the training center, the adviser and the catalyst for revolution in these areas, and it is building on the Nicaraguan experience where it now is the dominant foreign influence.

[Security deletion.]

On the civilian side, it has more advisers in Nicaragua than any other country in the world, with one exception, and that is Angola. It has 1,200 teachers in Nicaragua, over 300 medics, over 200 construction workers, also advisers working on [security deletion] agriculture, fisheries. It is also training 1,200 secondary students in Cuba. It has brought them to the Isle of Youth, formerly the Isle of Pines. It has plans for another 600 to come when another school is built. It has consolidated, or is hoping to consolidate, the revolution there, and it is focusing primarily on the internal situation in Nicaragua.

In El Salvador it thinks it has the best prospects. Looking from the Cuban perspective, I think El Salvador would probably be the next one to fall. [Security deletion.] In Guatemala, the military is stronger [security deletion] it probably ranks, in Cuba's perception, as the number two target behind El Salvador. [Security deletion.]

Honduras still has a long way to go. You have a very strong polarization of the right and the left in that country.

[Security deletion.]

That concludes my remarks, and I will turn it over to Mr. English.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. ENGLISH, CHIEF OF U.S.S.R.—EAST EUROPEAN DIVISION, OFFICE OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS, NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. English. Traditionally, the Soviet Union has been less active in Latin America than in any other place in the Third World in terms of general activities, economic aids and credits, and just general presence. Within Latin America they have been the least active, except for Cuba, in the Caribbean and Central America.
What they have done, of course, is supported “liberation movements” in their propaganda outlets. They have encouraged local Communist parties to join broad political fronts wherever they thought favorable conditions existed for such an arrangement, but they have not made a serious investment of time or energy on their own.

This is largely because it was generally recognized by the Soviets that the Western Hemisphere was within the U.S. sphere of influence and the likelihood of gaining any significant positive results in Latin America, the Caribbean, Central America were remote, particularly when the risk of confrontation with the United States was a very strong possibility.

Events in 1979, the coup in Grenada, the revolution in Nicaragua, unrest in El Salvador, may have changed Soviet perceptions. I think we see signs that these events have colored Soviet thinking and that they now estimate that perhaps there is something to be gained by making some additional investments. I think they are impressed by the advances that Cuba has made in the area, which of course ultimately is financed by the Soviets, and I think, in view of the state of United States-Soviet relations, that they feel they have less to risk by being a little bit more assertive in this part of the world.

Nevertheless, their activity still is quite limited by any kind of measurement, particularly when you measure it against other areas in the less developed world. Soviet economic assistance to Latin America, for example, is at the bottom of the list, compared to other regions of the less developed world.

Nevertheless, it is on its way up and there has been a great deal of contact between Soviet officials and officials of this region compared to past decades. For example, a high level delegation from Nicaragua has just recently completed a visit to the Soviet Union. The delegation included the Nicaraguan defense minister, the planning minister, the fishing minister, and a host of others.

We do not know precisely what sorts of agreements were concluded but it is reasonable to believe that Moscow did give some assurances of following through and giving additional support directly to the new Government in Nicaragua.

We do know that Aeroflot is supposed to begin transiting and using Managua in mid-1980. We do know that there is a fishing agreement, and we also know that this same delegation went to East Germany as well as the Soviet Union.

From past experience we know that East Germans act as a surrogate for the Soviet Union in the Third World, although the Cubans, of course, are more active in this sort of activity in the Western Hemisphere. The East Germans have already established a diplomatic presence in Nicaragua, as has the Soviet Union, and we would expect to get reports fairly soon that the East Germans are training the Nicaraguans in such things as police control and public administration.

The actual military training probably will be left up to the Cubans but, of course, it will all be supported and financed by the Soviet Union.

In Jamaica the Soviets have had a diplomatic presence, I believe, since 1975 and it was upgraded to ambassadorial level in 1978. They have a relatively good relationship with Prime Minister Manley. [Security deletion.]
We do know that there is a KGB presence in Jamaica [security deletion].

I would have to say that Jamaica and Nicaragua are the cornerstones of increased Soviet activity and interest in the Caribbean. There has not been much else really, small things such as the Mexican defense minister visiting the Soviet Union last September, [security deletion].

In Grenada, as far as we can tell, the coup occurred there from local circumstances. The Soviets had nothing to do with it, or the Cubans either as far as I know. The Soviets have not done much to try and capitalize on that. They do not have a diplomatic presence there. They will probably try but they do not appear to be terribly anxious.

All of this costs a great deal of money and Cuba is a very heavy subsidy for the Soviet Union. I am fairly certain that they would not like another economic weight similar to the magnitude that Cuba puts on the Soviet Union.

I think the Soviets, for the near term in any case, are delighted with the course of events which have taken place during 1979. I think they are hopeful that these events will gain more momentum. I think that they look upon this as a justification of the way the world is going—the world revolution, as they like to refer to it. I believe that they are hopeful that they probably will not have to do a lot themselves to contribute to it. However, each time that there is some kind of a limited success, as in Nicaragua, I think at that point they will weigh in and make it clear that they are prepared to keep whatever group, as long as they have some kind of leftist credentials, in power.

That recent visit that I mentioned of the Nicaraguan Government delegation was hosted by two high level Soviet party officials, Kirilenko and Ponomarev. Ponomarev is also on the secretariat, as is Kirilenko, but Ponomarev's job on the secretariat is in charge of the nonruling Communist parties. He is the kind of official that would host a visit by the Italian Communist Party.

What I am saying is that the Soviets are treating the Nicaraguan administration as if they were already part of the Marxist community. Nevertheless, they also recognize that there are constraints on their ability to expand their influence in this part of the world, not the least of which is the United States. Relations with the United States will always maintain a certain amount of precedence in the Soviet view, and there are limits to what they will do in this part of the world to advance the revolutionary momentum.

Another constraint is the fact that there is a lot of instability in this region and the Soviets are uncomfortable with instability. They like things very ordered and well run.

The fact that Manley, for example, is facing very stiff opposition in the election that is coming up, the fact that there are coups and countercoups with great regularity in this part of the world, makes them, in their final judgment, hesitate to put too much investment in some of these new regimes that might sprout out. But, in the case of Nicaragua, since it has been successful, they feel that they owe it to the image that they want to maintain throughout the world, in terms of supporting the revolutionary movement, of giving them as much assistance as they possibly can now, preferably through the Cubans, preferably through the East Germans, but directly if necessary, as long as a relatively stable government is in place.
We might stop here now and hear about the economics of the region from Mr. Swanson.

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Swanson.

STATEMENT OF RUSSELL SWANSON, ANALYST, OFFICE OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS, NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. SWANSON. Mr. Chairman, at the same time that Cuba is pursuing an increasingly aggressive foreign policy in the Caribbean Basin and in Central America, and is touting its development policy as a model for the Third World, Cuba is facing perhaps its most serious socio-economic challenges since the consolidation of the revolution in the early 1960's.

The economy is generally stagnant. The agricultural sector, which is the backbone of the economy, has been hit by a series of natural disasters. The all important sugar sector has been struck by sugar cane rust, which has affected about 25 percent of the crop. As a result, production this year is likely to drop about 1 million tons below that of last year, that is from 8 million tons to 7 million tons.

The tobacco industry, which is Cuba's fourth largest export revenue source, has been decimated by blue mold. As a result, the Cuban cigar industry has been closed down totally and Cuba has been forced to import tobacco for domestic consumption.

The fishing sector, which has been one of the few economic successes of the Cuban revolution, experienced a 25 percent drop in output last year because of reduced access to traditional fishing waters, primarily because of the increased adoption and enforcement of the 200 mile economic zone by many countries.

Other agriculture, which is primarily in the hands of the private sector, continues to suffer from a lack of price incentives and availability of credits and other agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, etcetera.

Industrial production is seriously constrained by limitations on raw materials and intermediate goods, most of which have to be imported.

The expansion of industry itself is impaired by a lack of domestic investment as well as a lack of foreign investment. These restrictions primarily reflect an ideologically-based economic development policy which restrict private foreign investment and private domestic investment, and by import capacity constraints due to a lack of foreign exchange.

[Security deletion.]

The implications of the economic stagnation and deteriorating economic situation, are two-fold. Domestically they could result in the existence of overt unemployment for the first time since the early days of the Castro takeover; the Cuban labor force is now growing at about 3 percent per annum, while the economy itself is growing very little, if at all.

This is likely to lead, we believe, to growing popular discontent, the manifestation of which we now see in the fact that 10,000 Cubans recently sought asylum at the Peruvian Embassy in Havana in a period of 48 hours when the opportunity presented itself. We believe that there are many more than the 10,000, perhaps several hundred thousand who would like to leave, if they had the opportunity.
Internationally, because of the serious lack of hard currency earnings and restricted import capacity from the West, we are likely to see the Cubans driven, more deeply into the Soviet camp in terms of economic dependence.

As Mr. English said, the Cubans are now obtaining approximately $3 billion a year in Soviet grants and subsidies and economic development aid and there is every indication that that is likely to increase over the years.

At the same time, however, this could have adverse implications for their bilateral relations with Moscow in that it comes at a time when the Soviet Union is beginning to experience serious economic difficulties of their own, particularly in the area of petroleum.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Swanson. Are there any other comments?

Mr. KENT. I think that concludes our prepared remarks.

Mr. YATRON. We thank you all very much for participating.

I would like to ask Mr. English, could you provide us with information on any Latin American countries that are being used as a staging area for intelligence activities in the United States?

Mr. ENGLISH. In the United States?

Mr. YATRON. Yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. No, sir, I am not acquainted with any evidence that would corroborate that statement. They obviously have a presence in Mexico and it is conceivable that they could be operating against Americans who are traveling in Mexico, but I cannot recall any incident that occurred that would verify that.

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Pherson, would you care to comment on the upcoming elections in Honduras?

Mr. PH R ESON. Can you comment on that?

Mr. KENT. No.

Mr. YATRON. Maybe you could provide something for the record on that at another time.

Mr. KENT. Generally, our area of expertise here is on the Cuban side of the question.

Mr. YATRON. I believe one of you made a statement earlier regarding the activity in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Would you care to comment on whether you believe the Cuban-Soviet objective in Central America now aimed at El Salvador, and in the longer run at Honduras and Guatemala, is this really being targeted for Mexico?

Mr. KENT. Maybe we can both speak on that. Bob, you might want to speak from the Soviet point.

[Security deletion.] Mexico is the only country that did not break diplomatic relations with Cuba when the embargo and the sanctions and the period of isolation were imposed on Cuba by the OAS. Cuba remembers this and frequently refers to it in their propaganda or news statements.

[Security deletion.]

Mr. PHerson. Just to add a point, building on that fact, the relationship is, as Mr. English noted, the Mexican defense minister did go to the Soviet Union and East Germany and he also stopped off in Cuba.

1 The material referred to is of a sensitive nature and will remain on file in the subcommittee office.
for talks. [Security deletion] one possibility is that they worked out an arrangement where President Lopez Portillo will be going to Cuba on a state visit in July.

[Security deletion.]

Mr. Yatron. That causes a great cooperation between countries.

Mr. Pherson. Well, that is because of the relationship that now exists.

Mr. Yatron. Can you tell me how many DGI agents are stationed in the Western Hemisphere? Could you give us a breakdown?

Mr. Kent. I do not have those figures at the top of my head. We could probably go back and do some research and perhaps submit a response.

Mr. Yatron. That would be fine. Also, if you could tell us how many KGB agents are stationed in the Western Hemisphere?[1]

Mr. Kent. Do we have that at all?

Mr. English. Suspect KGB agents is probably the way it will come out.

Mr. Yatron. We would like to know what the focal point of their activities are in the hemisphere and if you could describe any overt or covert activities.

Are there any links to major terrorist groups such as those from Germany, Italy, and Japan?

Mr. Kent. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Yatron. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. Gilman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

There have been some reports that there has been some talk of the development of another canal through Nicaragua. Has there been any information about Cuban interest or Soviet interest in the construction of such a canal?

Mr. Kent. I have seen nothing from the Cuban viewpoint that indicates that they have an interest or an involvement in such an enterprise.

Mr. English. Nor from the Soviet point of view.

Mr. Gilman. [Security deletion.] Is there any direct involvement by the Costa Rican officials or Panamanian officials in any of the changes of government in Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras?

Mr. Pherson. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Kent.

Mr. Kent. In Nicaragua?

Mr. Gilman. In Nicaragua or in any of the other countries.

Mr. Kent. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Gilman. Do either the Cubans or the Soviets have a presence in Costa Rica?

Mr. Kent. The Cubans have a consulate, don't they?

Mr. Swanson. Yes.

Mr. English. The Soviets do, but it is not very active. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Gilman. What about in Panama?

Mr. English. No diplomatic relations in Panama.

Mr. Gilman. How about the Cubans?

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1 Due to the sensitive nature of the response supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency, it will remain on file in the subcommittee office.
Mr. Kent. The Cubans are quite active in Panama. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Yatron. Excuse me. Could you just yield. I would like to ask a question. When we were in Costa Rica, I thought that President Carazo said that he threw them out of the country. Is that correct?

Mr. Swanson. There were a couple of Soviet diplomats, that were declared persona non grata last summer because of their alleged involvement in labor unrest in Costa Rica, but they did not sever diplomatic ties.

Mr. Gilman. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Swanson. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Gilman. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Swanson. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Gilman. Is there extensive trade of that nature?

Mr. Swanson. There is a growing trade. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Gilman. What products principally do they deal in?

Mr. Swanson. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Gilman. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Swanson. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Gilman. Are we selling them any military equipment?

Mr. Swanson. No. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Gilman. You mentioned that East Germany had some presence in Nicaragua. How substantial is that?

Mr. English. I mentioned that. It is relatively new. Diplomatic relations have only been established, I believe, in the past 6 to 8 months. I do not know the numbers that are there now. They are probably still coming in, just as the Soviet diplomatic mission is still filling out. The Soviet Ambassador, incidentally, that had been appointed was the Ambassador to Ecuador. He is just simply being transferred.

The East Germans will probably continue to come in. Their foreign minister went to Nicaragua last September, early on, to demonstrate a certain amount of support for the revolution. I cannot estimate right now, though, how many are there or how many are going to come. I would expect not only East Germany but some of the other East European states will probably follow suit.

Mr. Gilman. Does East Germany have a presence in any of the other Central American countries?

Mr. English. For many years they had very little diplomatic representation throughout the world because of the divided Germanys, but more recently since the United States recognized East Germany, this has expanded somewhat. They now have a diplomatic presence in about 15 Latin American countries.

Mr. Gilman. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Pherson. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Gilman. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Pherson. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Gilman. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Pherson. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Gilman. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Pherson. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Gilman. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Pherson. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Gilman. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Pherson. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Gilman. Have we traced any arms shipments from Cuba into Salvador?
Mr. PHERSON. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GILMAN. Have we identified any of the arms in Salvador as being Cuban arms?

Mr. PHERSON. [Security deletion.]

Mr. KENT. [Security deletion.]

Mr. PHERSON. [Security deletion.]

Mr. SWANSON. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GILMAN. Yes.

Mr. KENT. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GILMAN. No PLO presence in Central America?

Mr. KENT. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GILMAN. Is there a PLO office in Nicaragua at the present time?

Mr. KENT. I am not sure of that. There might be. We can check on that for you.

[Security deletion.]

[The following statement was submitted for the record:]

At the present time, the PLO does not have an office in Nicaragua.

Mr. GILMAN. [Security deletion.]

Mr. KENT. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GILMAN. We have been able to pinpoint that?

Mr. PHERSON. [Security deletion.]

Mr. KENT. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GILMAN. I have just one last question. Have you been able to tie in any of the gun trafficking to the narcotics trafficking in Central America?

Mr. KENT. With the Cubans?

Mr. GILMAN. With any of the groups in Central America.

Mr. KENT. That is a question that is really outside of our area of expertise.

Mr. PHERSON. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GILMAN. [Security deletion.]

Mr. PHERSON. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GILMAN. [Security deletion.]

Mr. PHERSON. [Security deletion.]

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Gilman. We have a vote on the floor, so I would like to request a 10 minute recess.

[Whereupon, there was a recess taken.]

Mr. YATRON. We can resume the hearing and when Mr. Lagomarsino comes back then I will acknowledge him at that time.

I am interested in a number of electronic intelligence collecting trawlers that are operating in the Atlantic and the Caribbean. Do you have any data on this type of information?

Mr. SCHOPMEYER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. YATRON. Do you have any data or any number of the fishing boats or scientific mapping ships, such as the ones operating out of Argentina in the Antarctic?

Mr. SCHOPMEYER. No, I do not.

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Lagomarsino, are you ready to ask some questions?

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Yes.

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Lagomarsino.

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1 Mr. Schopmeyer is an analyst, Office of Strategic Research, National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency.
Mr. Lagomarsino. Does the agency have a reading on what Prime Minister Manley is likely to do in Jamaica? Let me ask the question a little differently.

Some people are concerned that Manley might well try to take over by less than legitimate means should he lose the election that he has scheduled, or perhaps not even hold the election. Do we get any kind of reading like that at all?

Mr. Kent. [Security deletion.]

I think the best way to answer your question is to direct it to our Jamaican analyst and see if we can get a response over to you that is probably a lot more authoritative than anything I could say.

[Security deletion.]

Mr. Lagomarsino. You do not think that they would respond if Manley, as the head of the Government, asked them to come in and help put down insurrection or however you might describe it?

Mr. Kent. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Lagomarsino. With regard to that, we have said that we would not stand for a Cuban invasion, but I do not think anything has been said that would cover exactly that kind of a situation.

Mr. Kent. [Security deletion] but again, I will direct that question to our analyst.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Prior to the recess we had a briefing by DIA on much the same grounds that you have been going over earlier. One of the things they told us [security deletion].

Mr. Pfeiffer. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Lagomarsino. What they said, as I recall, was that [security deletion].

Mr. Pfeiffer. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Lagomarsino. Are you the proper people to ask about the capacity of the South American navies to counteract any kind of a Soviet or Cuban naval power in the Southern Atlantic or Pacific?

Mr. Schopmeyer. No.

Mr. Lagomarsino. OK. That takes care of that. Could you comment on whether or not there is any Soviet or has been any Soviet presence in the area other than Cuba?

Mr. Kent. Soviet naval presence?

Mr. Lagomarsino. Yes.

Mr. Schopmeyer. Soviet naval activity in the Caribbean and the South Atlantic has been minimal since late last summer. They had a task group that was in the Caribbean briefly in August but left after an unusually short tour. They did not stop at any ports on that particular deployment.

Mr. Lagomarsino. They did not go into the South American portion?

Mr. Schopmeyer. No.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Mr. Gilman asked you about Soviet presence in Costa Rica. What is the size of the Embassy there? I guess you were talking about the diplomats who have been expelled. What is the size of the Russian Embassy?

Mr. English. We were chatting about this during the recess. I gather that there is a rumor that there are as many as 150 Soviets there, which seems to me to be way out of line. Our latest information indicates that there are 24 Soviets in the Russian Embassy in Costa Rica and that includes administrative personnel.
The Soviets are relatively solid in Jamaica and their presence there is somewhat larger than in Costa Rica.

Mr. Lagomarsino. How about in Nicaragua?

Mr. English. Nicaragua is just being established. The ambassador is arriving from Ecuador, although he may be there by now. It is still fleshing out, and I suspect it will be fairly large, but I do not know what it is yet. The East Germans are established there as well. Again, they are filling it out.

Mr. Lagomarsino. You were talking about East German presence in Nicaragua. We had a report earlier that the East Germans were helping the Nicaraguans establish their labor union policies. Is that correct?

Mr. English. That seems in character with the sort of activity they do in the Third World.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Could you give us a reading of what the organized labor situation is in Nicaragua right now?

Mr. English. I cannot. Maybe one of these gentlemen can.

Mr. Pierson. The Cubans are also providing some assistance to labor. Nicaraguan labor leaders are training some in Cuba, and the best we could say is that they are trying to set up a structure which would parallel the Cuban model.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Is there evidence that they are trying to force out other unions? I understand they have their own Sandinista labor union and there have been, in the past, I guess, labor unions from their standpoint, on the left and on the right, and that they have put a lot of pressure on the CAUS, which I guess is a left labor union.

Do you have any evidence that they have harassed the AFL-CIO affiliated union of the CAUS?

Mr. Pierson. I cannot speak authoritatively on that.

Mr. Kent. I think that would be better for us to check with our people back at the building and see what we can find for you on that.

Mr. Yatron. What is the nature of the activities of the Cuban DGI agents in Jamaica?

Mr. Kent. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Yatron. Isn't the present Cuban Ambassador a former Deputy Chief of the Americas Department of the Community Party, which is the organization responsible for revolutionary activities in Latin America?

Mr. Kent. Yes, sir. We were talking about this during the break also. He did hold that position. He still essentially is a key official from that department, and that department is directed by Manuel Pineiro, who was a key official in the direction of the Cuban revolutionary offensive in Latin America during the 1960's. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Yatron. Could you tell us how many KGB agents are in Jamaica and the nature of their activities.

Mr. English. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Yatron. Can you tell us what they are doing and the nature of those activities?

Mr. English. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Yatron. Has the People's National Party established links with the Soviet and Cuban Communist Parties?

Mr. English. You mean formal links of some kind?

Mr. Kent. Well, there are frequent visits between the two countries by officials, Cuban party officials, who may also coincidentally hold
Government positions, and equally PNP members come to Cuba. Whether those are best described as party links, which has a very specific meaning in Communist terms, it is not clear.

I think it is more diffuse than that. It tends to be a bilateral relationship that sort of cuts across those kinds of definitions.

Mr. YATRON. Are there any indications that Cuban or Soviet intelligence agents are anticipating a role in the upcoming elections?

Mr. KENT. [Security deletion.]

Mr. YATRON. I understand that violence has been reported throughout Kingston because of the campaigning of Michael Manley and Edward Seaga.

Are Cuban and Soviet agents in any way inciting political activities or political violence?

Mr. KENT. [Security deletion.]

Mr. YATRON. In your judgment, is the Cuban presence in Jamaica a political asset or liability to Manley?

Mr. KENT. That is an interesting question. The opposition party is certainly playing up the Cuban involvement and trying to use it to its own advantage. [Security deletion.]

Mr. YATRON. Are the Jamaican people aware of the magnitude of the Cuban presence?

Mr. KENT. Probably, they are. As I understand it, the Jamaican media played up to a considerable and accurate degree the nature of the Cuban intelligence connections with PNP officials.

Mr. YATRON. There was a recent report on March 25 that the Jamaican People's National Party has set up an economic intelligence unit to receive and investigate reports of sabotage and adverse propaganda. Are there any Cubans involved in the operations of this unit?

Mr. KENT. I do not know. I think we should probably check that.

Mr. YATRON. We will submit some other questions and request that you provide the subcommittee with written responses for the record.

Mr. KENT. OK.

Mr. YATRON. We want to thank you gentlemen for appearing here today.

The subcommittee will recess in executive session until tomorrow at 2 p.m.

[Whereupon, the meeting of the subcommittee was adjourned at 3:45 p.m., to reconvene on Thursday, April 17, 1980, at 2 p.m.]
Mr. YATRON. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to order. Today, the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs will continue, in executive session, its hearings on Soviet-Cuban ties in the Western Hemisphere.

To round out the picture previously drawn by witnesses from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency, we have witnesses today from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the State Department.

I want to welcome our witnesses, Mr. Edward J. O'Malley, Inspector-Deputy Assistant Director of the Intelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Mr. Myles Frechette, Country Director for Cuban Affairs of the Department of State.

Mr. Frechette is accompanied by Mr. John D. Blacken, Country Director for Central America, and Mr. Robert W. Warne, Country Director for the Caribbean, both of the State Department.

Due to the sensitive nature of the information to be presented, the FBI and the State Department have requested these hearings be held in executive session.

It is the Chair's intention to again request that they declassify as much of the testimony as possible for publication so that the public can have maximum benefit of information on this most important aspect of our national security and foreign policies.

Mr. O'Malley, if you would like to summarize your statement, we can then proceed with questions.

[Testimony given by Mr. O'Malley was not declassified by request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.]

Mr. YATRON. We want to thank you very much, Mr. O'Malley, Mr. Nolan, and Mr. Brandon, for appearing here and giving us the benefit of your views.

Mr. O'MALLEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. YATRON. There could be some other written questions submitted by other members of the subcommittee who were not able to be here today. If that is the case, we would appreciate your written responses.

Mr. O'MALLEY. Surely.
Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much. Now we will have Mr. Frechette, Mr. Warne, and Mr. Blacken.

Mr. Frechette, we welcome you. If you would summarize your statement, we can then follow with questions.

STATEMENT OF MYLES R. R. FRECHETTE, COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Frechette. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome this opportunity to review with you the impact of Cuban-Soviet ties on the Western Hemisphere. When my predecessor, Wayne Smith, testified before this subcommittee in April 1978, he concluded, (1) that while Cuba's hands were not altogether clean in the hemisphere, its clandestine activities within neighboring states had declined markedly since the 1960's, (2) that both Cuba and the Soviet Union seemed content to play a waiting game in the hemisphere, but, (3) that we could not be complacent about Cuba's future role because, should significant opportunities present themselves, Cuba could move back toward a more aggressive posture.

Since that testimony 2 years ago there have been several noteworthy developments, some favorable to U.S. interests, others unfavorable. I would like to review these briefly before responding to any questions you might have.

With me are Robert Warne, the Director of Caribbean Affairs, and John Blacken, the Director of Central American Affairs. They are both prepared to answer any questions you might have on developments in specific countries in these regions.

Two years ago our major concern with respect to Cuba was the presence of Cuban expeditionary forces in Angola and Ethiopia. That concern has not diminished; Cuba still has about 20,000 troops in Angola and 12 to 15,000 in Ethiopia. To this have been added two concerns closer to home: growing Cuban willingness to become involved in the Caribbean and Central America, and Cuba's increasingly close relationship with the Soviet Union.

After several years with Cuban preoccupation with Africa we are seeing a resurgence of interest in Latin America. The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and the New Jewel Movement coup in Grenada have brought into power in the Caribbean basin two new governments favorably disposed toward Cuba.

It is doubtful that the Cubans anticipated the speed with which these changes took place. But they moved quickly to extend assistance to maintain their influence.

Cuba has also grown increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance. The Soviet economic subsidy to Cuba has doubled over the past 2 years to more than $3 billion in 1979. The Soviet Union has also been helping upgrade the Cuban Armed Forces by delivering modern military equipment to Cuba.

Given the experience of the 1962 missile crisis we monitor arms deliveries to Cuba closely to insure that they represent no threat to the United States.

At the same time, the Cuban economy has experienced severe setbacks, calling more sharply into question Cuba's viability as a development model for the rest of the Third World, and stimulating increased emigration from Cuba. The thousands of Cubans who have crowded
into the Peruvian Embassy in Havana in a desperate attempt to leave
the island provide a graphic illustration of popular discontent with
the dismal failure of the Cuban economy.

Cuba's drive for Third World leadership and bid for a seat on the
U.N. Security Council have been sidetracked by the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan.

While there has been some limited progress in our bilateral rela-
tions, Cuba's aggressive foreign policy has prevented any significant
progress toward normalization. This does not mean that our policy
of seeking to open constructive lines of communication was mistaken.
On the contrary, we continue to believe that there is no possibility
of resolving our differences unless we are at least willing to talk.
Our dialog has cost us little and yielded some significant benefits.

The Cubans and the Soviets remain ready to exploit targets of
opportunity in the hemisphere. They see any erosion of U.S. influence
as a net gain for themselves. So far, however, they have avoided
taking too many risks, probably out of fear of provoking a strong
U.S. reaction.

Our most effective response to this challenge would be to increase
our own efforts of assistance. Most countries in the region badly need
economic and technical assistance of one form or another. We have
the capability to meet at least some of their needs. Cuba, by contrast,
has very little to give.

It is worthwhile to keep in mind that even those states which are
friendliest to Cuba—Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Guyana—have care-
fully kept the door open to the West. They may admire certain aspects
of the Cuban model, but pragmatism and nationalism dictate against
replicating it.

Our policies are designed to address critical short-range economic
problems in the region. We are encouraging greater cooperation and
interdependence among the island-states of the Caribbean.

In Central America we recognize that change is inevitable where
traditional patterns are in many respects unjust and unsuitable. We
are adapting our policies and using our many links to these societies
to help the process of change already underway to be less violent and
take more democratic forms than they would otherwise.

In addition, we have made clear to all parties that we take our
security interests in the Caribbean most seriously. The President has
already announced concrete steps in this regard, including increased
surveillance of Cuba, expanded military maneuvers in the region,
and the establishment of a full-time Caribbean joint task force head-
quartered in Key West.

Cuba has shown it can move quickly to take advantage of targets
of opportunity. Nevertheless, the United States has the resources
and the determination to meet the challenge.

The poignant picture of thousands of Cubans jammed shoulder to
shoulder inside the Peruvian Embassy in a desperate attempt to flee
their homeland is a vivid reminder that the future does not belong
to Castro's Cuba.

That concludes my summary statement, Mr. Chairman. The state-
ment that I submitted to you is entirely unclassified and can be quoted
in toto.

[Mr. Frechette's prepared statement follows:]
Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity to review with you the impact of Cuban-Soviet ties on the Western Hemisphere. When my predecessor, Wayne Smith, testified before this subcommittee in April 1978, he concluded 1) that while Cuba’s hands were not altogether clean in the hemisphere, its clandestine activities within neighboring states had declined markedly since the 1960s, 2) that both Cuba and the Soviet Union seemed content to play a waiting game in the hemisphere, but 3) that we could not be complacent about Cuba’s future role, because, should significant opportunities present themselves, Cuba could move back toward a more aggressive posture.

Since that testimony two years ago, there have been several noteworthy developments, some favorable to US interests, others unfavorable. I would like to review these briefly before responding to any questions you might have. With me are Robert Warne, the Director of Caribbean Affairs, and John Blacken, the Director of Central American Affairs. They are prepared to answer any questions you might have on developments in specific countries in these regions.
Two years ago our major concern with respect to Cuba was the presence of Cuban expeditionary forces in Angola and Ethiopia. That concern has not diminished; Cuba still has about 20,000 troops in Angola and 12-15,000 in Ethiopia. To this have been added two concerns closer to home: growing Cuban willingness to become involved in the Caribbean and Central America, and Cuba's increasingly close relationship with the Soviet Union. The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and the New Jewel Movement coup in Grenada have brought into power in the Caribbean basin two new governments favorably disposed toward Cuba. It is doubtful that the Cubans anticipated the speed with which these changes took place. But there are signs that Cuba has been reassessing the prospects for revolutionary change elsewhere in the hemisphere and that, after several years of Cuban preoccupation with Africa, we are seeing a resurgence of interest in Latin America.

Cuba has also grown increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance; there has been no significant divergence of interests between the two.

At the same time, the Cuban economy has experienced severe setbacks, calling more sharply into question Cuba's viability as a development model for the rest of the Third World and stimulating increased emigration from Cuba to the West. Cuba's drive for Third World leadership and bid for a seat on the UN Security Council have been sidetracked by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While there has been some limited progress in our bilateral relations, Cuba's
aggressive foreign policy has prevented any significant progress toward normalization.

**Involvement in the Caribbean and Central America**

Since the failure of its attempts to export revolution in the 1960s, Cuba has followed a two-pronged approach toward Latin America. It has shifted emphasis to strengthening its relations with non-rightist governments, attempting to push them leftward, while still maintaining ties to leftist revolutionaries in those countries with governments it considers to be reactionary. During the 1970s, Cuba's approach has been cautious, flexible, and sophisticated. The Cubans now demonstrate a capacity to tailor their activities to local political realities and to make allowances for national and regional differences. This approach has paid some dividends for Cuba in the Caribbean basin, where many states have entered a difficult period of economic and political transition.

In Nicaragua, the Cubans had long maintained ties with the Sandinista movement, but until the FSLN offensive of last year, had generally limited their support to training, asylum, and money. During 1979, however, as the Sandinistas' prospects for success brightened, Cuba stepped up its support by clandestinely sending arms. Despite this support, the Sandinista movement was and is basically an indigenous movement with historical roots in Nicaragua. While Cuban support was important to the FSLN, it was but one element in the equation which produced Somoza's downfall.
Since the Sandinista victory, Cuba has moved quickly to assist the new Nicaraguan government, building on existing ties to key Sandinista leaders. The total Cuban presence in Nicaragua is now at least 2,000, and includes:

---about 200 military and security advisers;
---at least 1,200 teachers, who began arriving in late October 1979; and
---several hundred medical specialists, construction personnel, and advisers on agrarian reform, the media, labor, and cultural instruments.

In addition, some 600 Nicaraguan students are studying at a Cuban secondary school at the Isle of Pines.

In Grenada, the Cubans may well have had foreknowledge of the coup that brought Maurice Bishop and the New Jewel Movement to power, but there is no evidence they engineered it. After the coup, however, the Cubans moved quickly to offer assistance, which the Bishop government has been all too eager to accept. Cuba has provided arms and sent military advisors (most of whom have since departed) to train the new Grenadian army. It has also sent a few civilian technicians. Recently 250 Cuban construction workers began arriving to build a new airport, for which Cuba will provide much of the material. Havana may well have in mind making Grenada a showcase of Cuban-aided development in the region, but it is doubtful the Cubans have the wherewithal to succeed alone in this effort.

Elsewhere in the region, the Cubans probably see El
Salvador as the most promising target for further revolutionary gains. They have counseled the Salvadoran leftists to seek unity before provoking a direct confrontation with the junta. It appears, however, that the leftists have not followed this advice. Cuba's principal contribution so far has been training and advice.

Cuba also maintains ties to leftists in Guatemala and Honduras, but apparently believes the prospects for radical change there are less promising.

Cuba still has good relations with the two countries which until last year were its closest friends in the Caribbean basin, Jamaica and Guyana. Since 1975, Cuba has provided Jamaica with assistance in improving Kingston's water supply, constructing housing and schools, and modernizing agricultural and fisheries techniques. Cuba has sent doctors and other medical personnel to staff Jamaican hospitals and has trained several hundred Jamaican youths in Cuba to become construction workers. There are also reports that Cuba is providing training to some Jamaican security officials.

Cuban assistance to Guyana has been of a similar nature, although smaller in scale. However, Cuba's relations with the Burnham government are complicated by its desire to main-
tain influence with the major opposition to Burnham, Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party. In late 1979, Cuba and Guyana terminated their fisheries agreement, reportedly because the Guyanese believed Cuba had failed to live up to its end of the agreement.

In the Eastern Caribbean, Cuba has balanced low-key encouragement of legitimate leftist groups with open cooperation with established governments. There is little doubt that the political climate offers opportunities Havana may be able to exploit to increase its influence at the expense of the U.S. However, Cuba's official presence in the Eastern Caribbean (excluding Grenada) is still limited to several Prensa Latina and Cubana airline representatives.

The Soviets have also increased their involvement in this hemisphere, expanding their trade, technical assistance, and diplomatic presence. The Soviets have been particularly interested in South America, although they have recently added embassies in Nicaragua and Grenada. Both Jamaica and Nicaragua have expressed interest in receiving Soviet economic and technical assistance. So far, the Soviets have provided little, although there is a possibility the recent Nicaraguan mission to Moscow may change this.

The Soviet-Cuban Relationship

Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union has several
facets. Havana depends on Moscow for about two-thirds of its total trade. Soviet economic support to Cuba exceeded $3 billion in 1979, a two-fold increase from two years ago. The bulk of this assistance consists of subsidies on sugar, petroleum, and nickel. As President Castro explained in an unusually candid speech to the National People's Assembly on December 27, 1979, the price paid by the Soviets for Cuban sugar is on a sliding scale. In 1979 they bought Cuban sugar at the equivalent of 44 cents, as compared to the world market price of about 10 cents. Similarly, the Soviets sell Cuba petroleum at about half the market price. Since Cuba exports three to four million tons of sugar to the Soviet Union each year and receives nearly all its petroleum from the Soviets, these price differentials are crucial to the Cuban economy. The need to maintain this enormous subsidy, without which Cuba would be forced to reduce sharply its already austere standard of living, remains a constant concern to the Castro regime.

For the past several years, the Soviet Union has been helping upgrade the Cuban armed forces by delivering modern military equipment to Cuba. Unlike other Soviet military clients, Cuba pays nothing for this equipment. This armed forces modernization program strikes a tender nerve in the U.S., even though most of the types of equipment Cuba has received so far were provided earlier to other Soviet clients. Given the experience of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, we monitor arms deliveries to Cuba closely to ensure that they
represent no threat to the United States.

Several developments have aroused particular interest. In 1978, the Soviets delivered MiG-23s, more sophisticated aircraft than Cuba had previously received. Since certain versions of the MiG-23 are configured to carry nuclear weapons, we carefully studied the aircrafts' characteristics and raised the transfer directly with the Soviets before concluding that they did not constitute an offensive threat to the U.S.

Similarly, we have been monitoring for some time the construction of a new naval facility at Cienfuegos consisting of deep-water piers and naval support-type buildings. We have no evidence the Soviets are involved in the construction or will be ultimately operating the facility. So far, it has been used by the conventional, non-nuclear submarines delivered by the Soviets to Cuba. It would not be surprising, however, for Soviet naval vessels to make a port call at the new facility during future deployments to the Caribbean.

Another facet of the Soviet-Cuban relationship is the presence in Cuba of a Soviet combat brigade. The unit, which consists of 2,600-3,000 men, may have been in Cuba for some time, but we were unable to confirm its presence until last fall. Here again we were confronted with something which, while not a security threat to the U.S., was a cause of serious concern.

More recently, the costs to Cuba of its dependence on the Soviet Union have come into sharper focus. Castro had hoped to use Cuba's three-year term as president of the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) to project himself as leader of the Third World. Havana spent lavishly in playing host to the September 1979 NAM summit. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan not only ended Cuba's bid for a seat on the UN Security Council, but also has undermined Cuba's ability to exert influence within the Non-Aligned Movement. Cuba's was placed in such an uncomfortable position by the intervention that when Cuba's Ambassador to the UN finally spoke out on the subject, he was careful to couch his support for the Soviets not as a defense of the invasion but as an attack on the United States and "imperialism."

**Deepening Economic Problems in Cuba**

Cuba's deepening economic problems have shown the Cuban people and the world that the Cuban economic model, which resembles some aspects of the Soviet model, offers few solutions to the problems of underdevelopment. The Soviet economic subsidy to Cuba exceeds U.S. assistance to all of Latin America, while Cuba's population is less than one-twentieth of Latin America's. Despite this huge subsidy, the Cuban standard of living, as mentioned before, is austere and deteriorating.

Massive infusions of Soviet aid have kept the economy afloat, but just barely. Sugar cane rust has hurt the 1979-80 sugar crop. The tobacco industry has been severely damaged by blue mold. Castro admitted in his December 27 speech that the Soviets delivered only 28% of the lumber they had agreed to supply to Cuba in 1979. This has brought construc-
tion to a standstill, exacerbating the already extremely tight housing situation. Virtually all basic consumer necessities are strictly rationed, and rations for some items were cut back in 1979. The thousands of Cubans who have crowded into the Peruvian Embassy in Havana in a desperate attempt to leave the island provide a graphic illustration of popular discontent with the dismal failure of the Cuban economy.

In light of Cuba's current economic difficulties, the Castro government will probably go to great lengths to maintain Soviet assistance at least at the present level. Beyond this, the Cubans are beginning to introduce material incentives in an attempt to increase labor productivity and are continuing to seek increased trade with the West. The Castro regime's prospects for earning hard currency to finance purchases from the West are extremely limited, however. This is one reason the Cubans continue to be interested in improving relations with the United States. They see a lifting of the trade embargo as one means of easing their economic squeeze. It also explains their interest in more tourism from the United States, even at the risk of increased domestic discontent arising from greater exposure to the West.

Still, Cuba has proven unwilling to sacrifice its aggressive foreign policy to improve relations with us. It wants better relations, but apparently not at the cost of abandoning its position at the forefront of those seeking revolutionary change.
U.S.-Cuban Relations

Over the past three years, we have taken a number of steps to open constructive lines of communication between Cuba and the U.S. We negotiated the opening of Interests Sections in Washington and Havana and have lifted the ban on U.S. travel to Cuba, granted visas to selected Cuban citizens to visit the U.S., and permitted the resumption of charter flights between the two countries. We have also signed fishing rights and provisional maritime boundary agreements and held two rounds of Coast Guard talks, in Havana and Washington.

The Cubans, for their part, have taken some encouraging steps, particularly in the human rights field. But this has not been matched by any change in Cuba's foreign policy. As a result, we have emphasized to the Cubans that there can be no significant progress toward normalization until we see convincing evidence of a Cuban turnaround in Africa, including troop reductions. At the same time, we have also taken steps to protect our security interests closer to home.

This does not mean that our policy of seeking to open constructive lines of communication was mistaken. On the contrary, we continue to believe that there is no possibility of resolving our differences unless we are at least willing to talk.

Our dialogue with Cuba has cost us little and has yielded some significant benefits. For example, the Cubans are cooperating with us in search and rescue operations and drug traffic interdiction in the heavily traveled waters between Cuba
and Florida. We have had greater success in securing the release of American small craft and their crews that stray into Cuban waters. (Between November 1979 and March 1980, 46 American citizens inadvertently entered Cuban territory without authorization. 32 were released fairly promptly after questioning; 14 were arrested.) Our consular officers at the U.S. Interests Section are able to provide assistance to Americans in Cuban jails. This has become increasingly important, because there are now more than forty Americans in Cuban jails. The Cuban government has permitted all single-source Americans and dual nationals to depart Cuba with all members of their households, even those of Cuban citizenship. The Cubans have also released most American political prisoners. Indeed, one of the members of this subcommittee, Congressman Ben Gilman, contributed a great deal of time and effort toward securing the release of four American political prisoners last fall.

The Cuban Government has taken other unilateral steps which probably would have been impossible before we opened lines of communication to Cuba. In late 1979, President Castro announced that he would release almost all Cuban political prisoners and allow them to leave the island with their families. So far about 3,900 political prisoners have been released. And, for the first time since the early 1960s, the Castro government now allows Cuban-Americans to return to the island for family visits. Tens of thousands of Americans of Cuban extraction have benefitted from these steps.
Meeting the Challenge

The past two years have shown that the Cubans and the Soviets remain ready to exploit targets of opportunity in this hemisphere. They see any erosion of U.S. influence as a net gain for themselves. So far, however, they have avoided taking too many risks, probably out of fear of provoking a strong U.S. reaction. The Soviets have traditionally focussed their attention on South America. The Cubans, however, see the Caribbean basin as an area ripe with opportunities for extending their influence. They are becoming more active in the region now that their African involvement has leveled off.

Former Assistant Secretary Viron Vaky discussed at length before this subcommittee on September 11, 1979, the factors that make many countries in the Caribbean basin vulnerable to Cuban influence. More recently, this was discussed by Deputy Assistant Secretary John Bushnell in his March 25, 1980, testimony before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Committee on Appropriations.

Cuba's success in exploiting any emerging opportunities will depend in large measure on our response and that of others in the hemisphere. Our most effective response to Cuba's attempts to extend its influence in the Caribbean basin would be to increase our own efforts of assistance. Most countries in the region badly need economic and technical assistance of one form or another. We have the capability to meet at least some of their needs. Cuba, by contrast,
has very little to give. It is worthwhile to keep in mind that even those states which are friendliest to Cuba—Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Guyana—have carefully kept the door open to the West. They may admire certain aspects of the Cuban model, but pragmatism and nationalism dictate against replicating it.

Our policies are designed to address critical short-range economic problems in the region. We are encouraging greater cooperation and interdependence among the island-states of the Caribbean. In Central America, we recognize that change is inevitable where traditional patterns are in many respects both unjust and unsuitable. We are adapting our policies and using our many links to these societies to help the processes of change already underway take less violent and more democratic forms than they would otherwise.

In addition, we have made clear to all parties that we take our security interests in the Caribbean basin most seriously. The President has already announced concrete steps in this regard, including increased surveillance of Cuba, expanded military maneuvers in the region, and the establishment of a full-time Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters at Key West.

Cuba has shown it can move quickly to take advantage of targets of opportunity. Nevertheless, the United States has the resources and the determination to meet the challenge. The poignant picture of thousands of Cubans jammed shoulder-to-shoulder inside the Peruvian Embassy in a desperate attempt to flee their homeland is a vivid reminder that the future does not belong to Castro's Cuba.
Mr. Yatron. Without objection we will have it included in the record. Thank you very much, Mr. Frechette, for an excellent statement.

On the subject of security interest which you mention on page 14, would you consider the cooperation of all Latin American governments necessary for protecting our security interests in the hemisphere from Soviet and Cuban influence?

Mr. Frechette. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that the cooperation of all of them is necessary, but certainly the cooperation of a number of them would be useful. As you know, one of the problems we have had in recent years in dealing with the Cuban threat in the hemisphere, and the Soviet threat, is that frankly many Latin American governments are simply not excited or as excited as we are about the threat.

It is very difficult to pursue any kind of a hemispheric policy when most of the countries in the hemisphere really are not that concerned.

Mr. Yatron. Mr. Blacken, would you comment on the upcoming election in Honduras?

STATEMENT OF JOHN D. BLACKEN, COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL AMERICA, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Blacken. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Honduran Government is going through a process of returning to civilian rule. It has been a military government for 8 years. These elections are a step in that process. They are to elect a constituent assembly which in turn will draft a constitution.

We hope that they will defer any election of a president until a subsequent step, although it is entirely possible that this group could decide that it will also indirectly elect a president. That is a question mark.

There is one other thing. There are two parties which will be permitted to participate in those elections. The Christian Democrats have been excluded.

Mr. Yatron. Which are the two parties?

Mr. Blacken. The Liberal Party and the National Party.

Mr. Yatron. Mr. Warne, could you give us an election update for the Caribbean area?

STATEMENT OF ROBERT W. WARNE, COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Warne. I will be delighted to, Mr. Chairman. There are two elections immediately on the horizon concerning the Caribbean. One is an unspecified date in Jamaica where the current government, the Manley government of the People's National Party, has called for an election sometime this year, possibly as early as July or August. The date has not yet been set.

They are currently working with the Electoral Commission to prepare themselves for that election. The date should be announced in the foreseeable future.

The other election is the election in Antigua, a small dependency at the present time of the United Kingdom. Antigua has scheduled an election for April 24. We anticipate, from all signs, that this will be a democratic election and will go forward with the parties competing for their shares of the parliamentary seats.

It is quite possible after the election that Antigua will make some
decision regarding its independence from the United Kingdom. That remains to be seen.

"Those are the two elections immediately on the horizon.

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Frechet, do you see any signs of a resurgence of Cuban interest in Latin America, despite its own problems at home?

Mr. FRECHETTE. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. As I pointed out in my statement, there is no question that within the last 2 years the Cubans have perceived the situation in Latin America in general, but in the Caribbean and Central America in particular, as going their way; in other words, economic, social and political problems in those areas indicate that they have some sort of role to play.

This is a matter of great concern to us because we have noted that after many years of having abandoned, in effect, fooling around in this area, they are now trying to exploit opportunities, but without taking too many risks.

Mr. YATRON. Could you give us some examples of Cuba tailoring its activities to local political realities?

Mr. FRECHETTE. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. In Peru and Venezuela the Cubans are extremely effective in maintaining links with all the political parties, other than those of the extreme right with which they will have nothing to do. They have good contacts in the press and in influential sectors in the society.

I was stationed in Venezuela until August of last year and I can tell you, from personal experience, that the Cuban Embassy down there was extremely capable and well connected. They were able to make Cuba's message reach throughout the elites of Venezuela.

Mr. YATRON. Does anybody else want to comment on that?

Mr. BLACKEN. Just another example of the same thing. During the contest last fall in the U.N. for the Security Council seat between Colombia and Cuba, the Cubans sought to use the Colombian press and certain sympathetic groups in Colombia to undermine the Colombian Government's determination to pursue that candidacy.

Mr. YATRON. How many military advisers are stationed in Nicaragua, both Cuban and Soviet, if any?

Mr. FRECHETTE. Mr. Chairman, there are several hundred, but about 200, I believe, is the figure that I have.

Mr. BLACKEN. Two hundred military.

Mr. FRECHETTE. Two hundred military, certainly. Now, there are several hundred civilians acting in the fields of agriculture, labor, security, and education. We have at least 1,200 teachers in Nicaragua, at least 1,200. There may be more, but I think that is a safe figure.

Mr. BLACKEN. The global figure is about 2,000 total.

Mr. FRECHETTE. All in all, yes.

Mr. YATRON. Do you have any evidence of Cuban foreknowledge of the coup in Grenada?

Mr. FRECHETTE. We believe that the coup leaders in Grenada did notify the Cubans that they were going to do it. That is the extent of it. They got the message through somehow. Perhaps Mr. Warne would like to get into more detail on that.

Mr. WARNE. We have no specific knowledge that the Cubans were actively involved in the preparations for the New Jewel Movement coup on March 13, 1979. There were some indications that perhaps they were aware of these plans.

There was no evidence that they were actively involved beforehand in actually organizing and arming these elements.
Mr. YATRÔN. What types of arms and how many Cuban military advisers were sent to Grenada after the coup?

Mr. WARNE. The Cubans responded very rapidly to the coup, and to the efforts of the New Jewel Movement to welcome them in. Immediately after the coup they sent in a number of military trainers to help organize a para-military force. [Security deletion.] We believe that they have helped in the training of about 1,500 to 2,000 paramilitary forces that now exist in Grenada. Many of these trainers, we believe, have now left, although probably a small cadre still remains in Grenada.

The Cubans have continued to have a very active involvement in Grenada, but primarily on the economic and social side at this present time. They have now entered into an agreement to build a new jet port with the Grenadan Government. This jet port will entail about $10 million of aid in kind of the Cubans, as well as several hundred technicians. The Cubans are providing cement, for example, and technical expertise, as well as actual construction workers to assist in the building of the jet port.

They also have a number of doctors, educators, and others working in Grenada at this time. They also have a very active embassy. They now have an ambassador resident in Grenada who is adopting quite a high silhouette; for example, he took quite an active role in the recent March 13 celebration of the so-called revolution of the Grenadan Government.

Mr. YATRÔN. On page 4, would you explain why you think it is doubtful that the Cubans have the wherewithal to succeed in making Grenada a showcase of Cuban-aided development?

Mr. FRETCHETTE. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. It is very simple. They do not have any money to make available for projects. The most they can do is to provide manpower and some equipment or goods. In the case of Grenada and the airport, they do produce cement in Cuba, so they are making available cement.

The one thing that Cuba has to bring to bear to its aid programs around the world is manpower. Cuba does have disguised underemployment and unemployment. For the next 10 years at least, Mr. Chairman, Cuba will have an excess of working-age male population.

So, in a certain sense, it suits Cuba to have people abroad. Cuba at the present time, as you know, has about 35,000 troops in Africa, and it has perhaps another 15,000 civilian personnel around the world. Some of these are actually reimbursed for their services. For instance, construction battalions in Iraq and in Libya are reimbursed in hard currency by those countries. Some of the civilian advisers in Angola are also reimbursed in hard currency to Cuba.

So there are some advantages to the Cubans in terms of unemployment in having their people abroad. But again, I return, the one thing Cuba does not have is money to make available to help in the Caribbean. That is where we believe we have the edge.

We have, No. 1, a higher level of technical expertise to offer, and we have money, the one thing the Cubans really lack.

I might add that the Soviets also do not make money available generally for aid programs. The last thing the Soviets will commit is money.

Mr. YATRÔN. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSDNO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Could you tell us how many Nicaraguan students are now studying in Cuba?
Mr. Frechet. There are 600, to the best of our knowledge.
Mr. Lagomarsino. Where did I see 1,200?
Mr. Frechet. It is 1,200 teachers, we believe, Cuban teachers in Nicaragua.
Mr. Lagomarsino. No; I think it was the other way around, too, that the original contingent was 600 on the Isle of Youth, and I heard there was another 600.
Mr. Frechet. I am not familiar with those figures, sir.
Mr. Lagomarsino. You said earlier that you thought one of the reasons the Cubans were becoming active again in this area is because they perceive they can do so with little risk. I am paraphrasing, but essentially that is what you said, as I understand it. Is that correct?
Mr. Frechet. No, sir. What I said was that they perceive economic, social, and political conditions in the area as being ripe for exploitation, and I said that they would be active wherever they perceived that the risk is not too great.
They fear the United States, and they will not push us too far. For example, in the case of Nicaragua, they were able to get much of their arms and other assistance in using [security deletion]. The fact that [security deletion] themselves on their own had decided to give assistance to the Sandinistas, provided an excellent cover for Cuban efforts.
Now, I might say, those governments [security deletion] were aware that they were being used as a front for Cuba. I do not mean to suggest that the Cubans hoodwinked them in any way. But the fact that other countries in the area were giving help to the Sandinistas provided, if you will, an excellent cover for the Cuban activity.
The United States could not object too hard to the assistance of the Cubans when in fact [security deletion] were doing the same thing.
Mr. Lagomarsino. Did not the State Department, at least for a while, maintain that Panama was not shipping arms to Nicaragua?
Mr. Frechet. I took over this job in August 1979, Mr. Lagomarsino. I do not know. Do you know, John?
Mr. Blacken. I do not know.
Mr. Lagomarsino. During the debate on the Panama Canal implementing legislation, as I recall, the State Department's position was that there was not very good evidence that arms were being shipped from Panama, or at least with the knowledge of the Panamanian Government.
Mr. Frechet. It is possible at one point in time not to know something and then to know it a month later for sure.
Mr. Lagomarsino. And also it is a convenience sometimes not to know when you have legislation pending that you want passed. I understand that very well.
With regard to Jamaica, how many Cubans are present in Jamaica, do you know that?
Mr. Warne. Mr. Lagomarsino, we do not have an exact figure as to the number of Cubans but it is a very large group of Cubans, mainly Cubans who are working in technical assistance, agricultural, educational, and health activities. We would estimate that there are several hundred Cuban technicians and others that are present there. They also have a very active embassy. Their ambassador, Mr. Estrada, has a very high silhouette and is very politically active and has been very active with the militants of the People's National Party in promoting party activities.
Mr. Lagomarsino. Are there any Cubans involved in the military or security aspects of Jamaica?

Mr. Warn. Mr. Lagomarsino, we believe that there probably are; yes. There probably are intelligence agents involved with Jamaican authorities in various activities.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Some people speculate that, No. 1, perhaps Manley will not actually go through with an election if it appears that he could be defeated, and No. 2, I have even heard some speculation that perhaps he might try to take over the country and impose a one-party, if you will, dictatorship.

Mr. Warn. That is a possibility, but I do not believe that it is the greatest possibility. Mr. Manley is a dedicated democrat, I believe, who would like to carry through elections.

However, there are elements in his party who have authoritarian views and he is being pushed several ways. As you know, in February he announced that he would call early elections sometime this year, as soon as the Electoral Commission could prepare the electoral list and other requirements to go ahead with elections. It is our belief that probably that is Mr. Manley’s intent, to hold elections, although there is a possibility that with social unrest, with deterioration in the economy, which is certainly occurring at this time, that that situation could change and he might turn to another direction, although we are certainly counseling him and other elements there that the democratic solution is the best one.

Mr. Lagomarsino. I understand that President Carter in his Caribbean speech, whenever that was, said he would not permit Cuban invasions.

Mr. Warn. That was April 9.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Of this year?

Mr. Warn. Which speech are you speaking of, the October 1 one?

Mr. Lagomarsino. I think I am talking about the October 1 one where he said, among other things, that we would resist and oppose any Cuban invasion. Was that not part of it?

Mr. Freichette. No, that was Soviet, the use of Cuba for any Soviet adventures in the hemisphere.

Mr. Lagomarsino. How do we tell if it is for the Soviets or Cuba?

Mr. Freichette. Obviously, sir, we would oppose the Cubans also, but I believe in that speech he made specific reference to the Soviets. I would like to, if I may, make one clarification. There is not too much evidence that the Jamaican Armed Forces are that closely tied with the Cubans, but I believe there is more evidence that the security services have close ties with the Cubans. Is that not correct?

Mr. Warn. There are two security forces in Jamaica. You first have the Jamaican defense force, which is essentially their military arm, and then you have the Jamaican constabulary, which is the police-
related activities. To the best knowledge we have, both are relatively professional and independent and nonpolitical. Certainly, the defense force is professional and nonpolitical.

Also, there are other security elements in the Jamaican Government. There are linkages, we believe, between the security element and the Cubans. How active and the extent of that involvement are a matter of speculation.

Mr. Lagomarsino. I take it from what you said, and from my recollection of the President's speech, that if the Cubans invaded Haiti, which would seem to be the most likely because they have the most antipathy for Haiti from what Mr. Castro said, or Jamaica or any other country, that we would assist that country in resisting that invasion.

Mr. Frechette. Not only we, but any invasion by Cuba of a neighboring country would bring into play the Rio Treaty, the Inter-American system and the OAS.

Mr. Lagomarsino. I do not have too much faith in that. I hope we would not wait until we had all of the signatories.

Mr. Frechette. Certainly not. I just wanted to indicate that there are treaty obligations which give us certain rights and abilities to do certain things.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Let's imagine a scenario where Mr. Manley or some leader in the region, although I think that he would be the most likely at this point, if anything ever happened, invited the Cubans in as an occupying force, if you will. What would be our reaction to that?

Mr. Frechette. That would pose a very difficult problem.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Very tough!

Mr. Frechette. Very difficult indeed.

Mr. Warne. That is a hypothetical question, Mr. Lagomarsino, and it is awfully difficult for us to predict ahead. I can assure you that you have to be very concerned over that situation and we would act appropriately.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Do you have any evidence of the Cubans giving military training to the people from El Salvador, Guatemala or Honduras in Cuba at the present time?

Mr. Frechette. They have done that over a number of years, Mr. Lagomarsino. Their links with leftist groups in Central America and in other parts of Latin America go back many, many years.

As I pointed out in my statement, despite the fact that during the 1970's they tended to concentrate more on legitimate relationships with governments, they continue to maintain their links with leftist groups. And the kind of links they maintained were occasionally giving them some money, occasionally asylum, occasionally some training.

Mr. Lagomarsino. That is continuing as far as you know?

Mr. Frechette. Yes, sir.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Do we have any evidence that the Cubans are involved in the training of any guerrillas or terrorist groups in other countries?

Mr. Frechette. The Cubans provide training to people from many countries, Mr. Lagomarsino. They do that in Cuba; they do it in other countries; and they do it in the country from which those people come. They do it, for instance, in Africa.
Mr. Lagomarsino. How about in Central America? Do you have any evidence of that?
Mr. Frechette. I am sorry.
Mr. Lagomarsino. The Cuban training of terrorists in any country in Central America.
Mr. Frechette. In recent years of terrorists per se, no, sir. Now, of revolutionaries, that is something else.
Mr. Lagomarsino. OK, revolutionaries.
Mr. Frechette. There is a distinction in the sense that I do not believe the Cubans are interested in the Japanese Red Army type of activity. They are, however, interested in wars of national liberation and they are prepared to give training to people for that.
You must understand that in past years they have given some training, for instance, to the PLO which has later carried out terrorist activities. But our best information is that the Cubans themselves do not believe that terrorist activities per se is the way to go.
Mr. Lagomarsino. Is there any evidence that Cubans are involved in any training of revolutionaries in Nicaragua, El Salvador, or Guatemala?
Mr. Frechette. In Nicaragua?
Mr. Lagomarsino. Yes.
Mr. Frechette. Not that I know of, but maybe Mr. Blacken knows.
Mr. Blacken. They have advisers in Nicaragua. We have no hard indications, but I think we believe that there are some advisers also with the guerrillas in El Salvador. In Guatemala, I do not know.
Mr. Lagomarsino. DIA told us 3 weeks ago, 4 weeks ago, that they have evidence that [security deletion]. The CIA said they believe that that is probably true. Do you have any information on that?
Mr. Frechette. Not specifically, no, sir.
Mr. Blacken. Our information indicates that the largest amount of guerrilla training takes place in El Salvador itself, although there are some outside. It could be there is some in Nicaragua, and we believe there is some in Cuba.
Mr. Lagomarsino. Thank you.
Mr. Yatron. What details do you have on setting up a conduit to transfer arms to Salvadoran guerrillas through Honduras?
Mr. Frechette. We have some evidence, sir, that the Cubans have been working with [security deletion] to establish some conduits, but I think that I should warn that we have very little evidence to substantiate that arms have actually flowed through those conduits. But we do know [security deletion] they have been trying to set such a thing up.
I should point out that for the moment, to the best of my knowledge, no Communist weapons have been found in El Salvador. They did turn up, Communist-origin weapons, in Nicaragua but so far none have shown up, that we know of, in El Salvador.
Mr. Yatron. Do you perceive a cooling of relations with Guyana?
Mr. Frechette. Yes, sir, there is a cooling of relations, at least to some extent manifested by the ending of the fishing agreement.
As you know, Guyana does pose a problem for the Cubans because they want to maintain contacts with Mr. Cheddi Jagan's party. They consider themselves closer ideologically with Mr. Jagan and his party than they do with Mr. Burnham. They have never, to my knowledge,
really convinced themselves that Mr. Burnham is a genuine revolutionary.

They believe that Mr. Burnham came to power in part because we helped him.

Mr. YATRON. Are we doing anything to take advantage of the situation?

Mr. FRELCHETTE. Mr. Blacken was in Guyana. My guess is that that is a little hard to do, but perhaps he would like to address that.

Mr. BLACKEN. Mr. Warne also can correct me on this, but basically in 1976 our relations with Guyana were strained and very low. I think since 1977, the end of that period, they have improved considerably. We are providing economic assistance to Guyana now in a greater degree than we were before. I think the relationship has improved significantly over the past 4 years.

Mr. WARNE. I would agree with that. I think our relationship has improved with the Guyanese Government, although we are maintaining our flexibility. We perceive the Government as still an authoritarian instrument. They have postponed elections and have not set a definite date for when they might hold elections. We certainly would encourage a democratic process there.

As a result, we are working with the Burnham government, providing financial assistance, and cooperation in other areas, particularly in the information area, but we do remind them of human rights violations as well as our desire to see the electoral process go forward.

Mr. YATRON. In the eastern Caribbean, excluding Grenada, where you have stated that there is a limited Cuban official presence, do you view the Prensa Latina and the Cubana Airline representatives as important tools of Cuban policy, or are they just conduits for information?

Mr. FRELCHETTE. Certainly the Prensa Latina people are very active in winning over people to the Cuban point of view. After all, that is one of their major roles, not only dispensing news but also propaganda.

In my experience, the Cubana reps are more often exactly what they say they are—airline people—but they also on occasion have carried out intelligence missions. It is very difficult to tell. A man does not have to be a professional intelligence officer to carry out intelligence missions.

Mr. YATRON. On the Soviet-Cuban relationship, do you see the Soviets continuing their support at the same level as in the past or will it be reduced?

Mr. FRELCHETTE. You mean to Cuba, sir?

Mr. YATRON. As in the past, yes.

Mr. FRELCHETTE. No, we see this as probably increasing, Mr. Chairman. From the early 1960's until about 1975, Soviet assistance in economic terms was about $1 million per day. From about 1975 to 1978 that went up to close to $4 million a day. In 1979 it was $8 million a day, close to $3 billion for the whole year.

Now, that is quite aside from military assistance, which is given to Cuba free. It is grant aid, and since 1960 the Cubans have received almost $2 billion worth of Soviet arms free.

Mr. YATRON. That [security deletion] million a day is a figure that was given to us before by the Defense Intelligence and also the CIA.

Mr. FRELCHETTE. I think we are all agreed on that, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lagomarsino. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Yatron. Yes.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Does that count the money that is paid directly to Cuba for its maintenance of its troops in other countries?

Mr. Frechette. No, sir.

Mr. Lagomarsino. That is in addition?

Mr. Frechette. That is in addition. That does not come from the Soviet Union. I am sorry. I misunderstood your question. The Angolans pay, or the Libyans pay, or the Iraqis pay, for Cuban civilians who give their assistance.

But in many countries their groups, whatever they may be doing—medical technicians, teachers, military advisers, palace guards, security advisers—are there for free.

The Cubans are tremendously flexible in their foreign aid program. They will work out any kind of a deal that can be worked. If the country will provide, for instance, food and lodging, they will take it. It can be worked out. They are extremely flexible. There is no foreign aid program. There are no strictures. There are no legislative amendments. There is no congress. The Cubans can do whatever they want to virtually overnight.

I did not imply any criticism, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Fidel is like the big bear. He sleeps wherever he wants to.

Mr. Frechette. That is right.

Mr. Yatron. You cite the failure of the Soviets to deliver the full amount of lumber agreed to, which has created additional housing problems. Is there any indication of less support of the Cuban economy or is there another reason?

Mr. Frechette. Mr. Chairman, we think that it was caused by the same kind of problem that the Cubans have—that these centrally directed economies really do not work and that the Soviets, just like the Cubans, miss their production goals.

There was a speech made on December 27 by Fidel Castro, which I have mentioned in my statement in which he goes on at some length—and I must say very amusingly—to point out that in the Socialist group within which Cuba now finds itself you pretty much take what your partners give you. It is a division of labor.

As he points out, the fact is they need sheets, and mattresses and that sort of thing, but since all their friends have to give them is TV sets, they take TV sets.

Then he suggested that 10,000 Cubans might go to Siberia to cut the lumber that Cuba needs. And, in fact, there are indications that the Cubans are putting together such a lumber-cutting brigade.

Mr. Yatron. Since we are helping to prop up the Cuban economy with increased tourism, has any thought been given to halting these trips?

Mr. Frechette. No, sir; one of the steps that was taken at the beginning of the process toward normalization was to allow tourism of Americans. Among other things, as you know, the Supreme Court has held that we cannot restrict or withhold passports for travel to certain countries. We felt that it was useful for Americans to go and see Cuba firsthand. Freedom to travel is one of the freedoms which we endorse in general. Freedom of communication. We endorse that as a general policy of the United States.
Now, as a result of the steps toward normalization, Fidel Castro in 1978 said that Cuban-Americans could return to Cuba to visit their relatives. This is the first time since 1962 that this had been possible. We estimate that 120,000 Cuban exiles have been to Cuba since that began. They have left in Cuba probably $110 million in foreign exchange of a help to Cuba.

We feel that that is useful for two reasons; one, humanitarian, with the idea that these poor people who have been separated for 20 years from their relatives can see them again, and two, we believe that their presence in Cuba has an unsettling effect. It is the best propaganda there is. It is not directed. It is spontaneous. It is natural.

Mr. YATRON. You state on page 11, "Our policies are designed to address critical short-range economic problems threatening several countries." What are the long-term policies that address the same issues?

Mr. WARNE. Mr. Chairman, perhaps I should turn first to the Caribbean and I will let Mr. Blacken pick up on Central America.

Our long-range policies, I would say, are four- or fivefold. First and foremost, we are promoting development in the long-term, both political, social, and economic, and that means that our desire is to reinforce the constitutional democratic traditions that exist in the Caribbean, to strengthen the democratic process and to hopefully move these countries toward a continuation of the Westminster parliamentary system or other form of democratic institution.

Second, and as important, is identification of the basic human needs in these islands to help them diversify their agriculture economies, to help them develop an industrial base and technical capability so that they can sustain development.

They have been impacted very severely by the increased oil prices. Many of them are not going to realize real rates of growth this year. They suffer from acute levels of high unemployment and in the long-term the only way that these problems can be solved is through increasing their productivity and the capability of using their resources.

Third, we would like to see a diversification of these economies. We see at the present time that many of the economies are unable to get away from monoculture or one or two exports of commodities. They need to develop their own internal agriculture. They need to diversify their exports and they need to go into areas where they can export and earn foreign exchange. This will reduce their dependency on external aid.

Fourth, we would like to see them develop regionally in a cooperative framework through the Caricom, the Eastern Caribbean Common Market, through the activities of the multilateral lending agencies, particularly the Caribbean Development Bank.

We are providing help in this area through a multilateral framework which we helped initiate, the Caribbean Group for Development in Economic Cooperation, in which we have brought together some 31 countries and 15 international institutions to raise financing to assist in project development and immediate balance-of-payments needs to help these countries develop.

The hallmark of that program is regional cooperation in a multilateral framework.

Our ultimate goal, of course, is to have close relationships with these countries through sound development programs in the full
extent of the word—political, economic, and social. We believe we are accomplishing that, with the support of the Congress. We have substantially increased our financial assistance to the Caribbean but much more needs to be done. We have just started the process.

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Blacken.

Mr. BLACKEN. Much of what Mr. Warne has said is also applicable to Central America. There is one crucial difference, and that is that many of the political structures—the socioeconomic structures of Central America—date back for a long time. Until recently they had not changed. We had oligarchies in charge linked to the military, and basically a status quo has remained.

In the past, we have been identified with the status quo. It has become very clear that it cannot be maintained much longer.

Central America is in a transition period, and it is a difficult and in some ways a dangerous period for us, because basically there are changes going on, changes that are very difficult to control and influence, yet we feel it is in our interest to try to contain it in the sense of helping change and reforms—the basic necessary economic and social reforms—take place to allow people of the area to participate more fully in their own governments, in the election of their governments, and in their economy.

We are engaged in this certainly in El Salvador right now. In fact, [security deletion] I think until last October, [security deletion] as far as the Cuban position toward El Salvador was concerned, it was one of waiting and watching what they considered a favorable thing.

In October the junta took over and it has announced in the last 2 months significant agrarian reforms and banking reforms in order to get land to the people who have been farming it. I think the Cubans and the extreme left in El Salvador are extremely worried about this. They no longer are waiting. They are now trying to disrupt these reform programs, and they are making a very strong effort to disrupt this, both internally and through groups that they influence outside. They are trying to discredit the junta with liberal and other groups in the United States as well to undermine this policy that we have of supporting the change and supporting the junta.

So we are in a difficult and sensitive period in Central America.

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSIINO. I just have one question. I certainly support the idea of supporting the junta in El Salvador. I think it is the only way there is to go.

Let me make a comment and then I will ask a question. It appears to me that it is one thing to support reforms that somebody else carries out; it is another thing for us to insist on a particular reform. Did we do that in El Salvador?

Mr. BLACKEN. Not insist on a particular reform. There were times when the junta, different elements of the junta, had hesitations. When they have asked us I think we have said that this is very advisable, that it is necessary to go ahead with the reform.

Mr. LAGOMARSIINO. Did we say, "Unless you go ahead we will chop you off?"

Mr. BLACKEN. No; I do not think we have said that.

There is one thing: On the matter of human rights we have made it very clear that our support—particularly we have a small military
program with trucks and communications equipment—and we have made it very clear that this kind of support would continue only as long as they are able to control violence and certainly restrict any violence that might be coming from the government.

Basically, they are fighting a war against the left. So it is a very difficult thing to say who is doing what to whom, but that reducing violence is a clear part of our policy.

Mr. YATRON. Is there any drug traffic flowing through Cuban waters? You say in your testimony that they are cooperating in search and rescue operations in drug traffic interception. Is there any activity at all?

Mr. FRECHETTE. Through those waters?

Mr. YATRON. In Cuba.

Mr. FRECHETTE. Yes, sir. Cuba sits right astride the traffic routes from South America coming north. The small boats go through the Yucatan Straits and the Windward Passage, so Cuba sits right astride this and has been helpful to us, has given us some cooperation in narcotics interdiction.

As a matter of fact, the U.S. Coast Guard basically stakes out those two passages and sits there on patrol. In addition, the Drug Enforcement Administration has carried out an operation [security deletion] to help track some of these airborne drug traffickers into the Florida area. It was a tremendously successful operation. This was last October. I understand they have another one planned coming up soon.

Mr. YATRON. In which eastern Caribbean countries has Cuba balanced low-key encouragement of legitimate leftist groups with open cooperation of established governments?

Mr. WARNE. It is hard to identify a specific country, Mr. Chairman, where that specific description would fit. The Cubans are active throughout the region. I think that their policy is one of trying to come out of the isolation that they have in the Caribbean at the present time to extend a more active role throughout the region.

I think they are tailoring their response to the needs of each country.

Maybe the best way I can answer that is just by illustration of activities in one or two countries to give you some idea. St. Lucia, for example, which is a newly independent, mini-state, had a recent election in July and had a more progressive government come forward, at least in some senses of the word.

In that case I believe the Cubans offered assistance to the government. The government has not been particularly responsive, at least that is to the best of our information, [security deletion]. They continue to have dialogue with the St. Lucian officials at every opportunity. They certainly want to cultivate them, but they do not have an overt effort in the sense of a major aid program or military training.

They have offered, for example, programs in home construction. But to the best of my knowledge, those offers have not been accepted.

They would exploit the opportunity, should it exist, that if that government wanted to turn toward a more cooperative approach, more involvement in the military area, I think the Cubans would be responsive. But at this time the St. Lucian Government has decided not to do that.
Barbados might be another example where you have a stable democratically elected government that is doing very well economically. The Cubans really have had a minimal involvement, but they do have a Communist or strong militant left wing group, and we believe the Cubans have been active in financing that group, perhaps helping them establish a newspaper and some campaign activities, but a limited involvement.

Those two illustrations, I think, would point out the types of ways the Cubans are trying to respond to opportunities, both among those who are sympathetic in the political spectrum and also with established governments.

Mr. YATRON. Are these governments aware of Cuba's encouragement of these particular leftist groups?

Mr. WARNE. Often I believe they are, yes, but not necessarily of clandestine activities where there might be payments of funds to a militant leader who might be running for office. I am not sure that they are aware of that. I do not believe they are, but they are generally aware of Cuban activities. In some cases we have exchanged views on these activities.

Mr. YATRON. How much indoctrination do the Jamaicans training to be construction workers receive in Cuba?

Mr. WARNE. I am not sure. Indeed there is indoctrination. Indoctrination is exposure to a very carefully tailored situation to try to persuade them of the benefits of the Cuban society.

Frankly, Mr. Chairman, I think the bloom has come off of the Cuban model. I think the events that recently have occurred of economic hardships, have demonstrated throughout the Caribbean to many of the people who are broadminded that the Cuban model has some major shortcomings and indeed is not necessarily the best model to follow in all elements of economic activity.

Mr. FRECHETTE. Perhaps I should note, Mr. Chairman, that in Cuba there is a sizeable population of Jamaican origin. These people are not always English-speaking, but a lot of them are. So it is not difficult for the Cubans, although they are not English-speaking, to make contact with those Jamaicans who go over there for training.

Mr. YATRON. Would you care to comment further on the significance of Ulisas Estrada counseling Manley on his campaign strategy?

Mr. WARNE. I was struck, Mr. Chairman, by Mr. Estrada's very high silhouette in Kingston. It continues to be very high. In fact, he spoke out publicly in criticism of the independent press slanderous comments which he thought were directed against him and others. I think it has been damaging and counter-productive in my own view.

He obviously is not an astute diplomat. He has been involved in political activities. He probably has damaged the Cuban cause and indeed has set himself up to be criticized by the opposition party for interfering in domestic politics. Indeed, the independent press has also made these comments.

I find it very surprising and rather inept.

Mr. YATRON. I understand at one time he was a very high official in charge of revolution in the hemisphere.

Mr. WARNE. That is correct. It is my understanding that he is involved in political action.
Mr. YATRON. On page 12 you mention that Cuba has released most American political prisoners. I was under the impression that the four Americans released last fall were the only remaining political prisoners that were left there.

Mr. FRECHETTE. No, sir. There are two who also have Cuban citizenship. The Cubans take the position that anybody who has dual nationality, that is, Cuban and something else, is only a Cuban. So we have those two people whom we consider American citizens but who are considered by the Cubans as Cuban citizens. Therefore, they will not talk to us about them; they will not give us access to them. This is a problem that we have in Cuba.

In addition, we probably have at least nine, and possibly more, persons of American citizenship who are considered Cubans by the Cubans. They are there on common criminal charges, either under detention or are serving sentences.

Mr. YATRON. I have one final question. You state on page 13 that Cuba has become more active in the Caribbean basin now that the African situation has stabilized. Should Cuba experience instability in Africa, could that attract their attention away from the Caribbean basin?

Mr. FRECHETTE. It is possible, of course, Mr. Chairman.

To some extent the Cuban situation in Africa is now slowed down tremendously. The Cuban troops in Angola are no longer engaged in front-line operations. They are basically sitting in garrisons guarding the major cities, basically keeping the MPLA in power.

It is not the Cubans who are fighting the UNITA forces of Jonas Savimbi, it is Angolans.

In Ethiopia, the Cubans do have a brigade stationed in the Ogaden, but they are no longer fighting the Somalis. They are not involved in the fighting directly against the Eritreans. Let's not forget that at one time the Cubans supported the Eritreans. They are not involved in that now. They have been very careful.

What they do do is allow Ethiopian forces to fight by, shall we say, performing rear line activities, garrison duty, that sort of thing.

So in Africa basically I will not use the words "bogged down" but things have quieted down tremendously. In the Caribbean they see opportunities to exploit, and we have seen this increasing willingness to become involved. It is possible that if things heated up in Africa that might slow down the Cubans in the Caribbean, but it is not automatically true that if it heats up in Africa it will slow down in the Caribbean. There is not that direct cause and effect relationship, no, sir.

Mr. WARNE. I would agree with that, Mr. Chairman. I really do not see the Cubans tapering off their activities in the Caribbean. There are too many volatile, opportunistic situations existing there, and I think as long as those opportunities exist, I think they will continue to try and exploit those opportunities as they come along.

They want to get out of their isolation in the region.

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Lagomarsino, do you have any more questions?

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. No, thank you.

Mr. YATRON. I want to thank you, Mr. Frechette, Mr. Warne, and Mr. Blacken. You have been excellent witnesses. We appreciate you coming before the committee, and should any of the members who were
not here today have any questions that they would like to submit in writing, we will send them to you. We would appreciate your written responses.

Mr. Frechette. Thank you very much.

Mr. YaTrobe. Thank you very much for coming here today. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the meeting of the subcommittee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]
The subcommittee met at 2 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gus Yatron (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. YATRON. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will now come to order.

Today the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs will conclude a series of hearings on Soviet-Cuban relations and their impact on the Western Hemisphere.

The unrest and instability in Central America and the Caribbean has placed a greater concern on the role of Soviet-Cuban influence in the hemisphere than in previous years. In the four previous hearings we have heard testimony from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, all of which took place in executive session.

It is the subcommittee's desire to provide the public with a well-rounded presentation of Soviet-Cuban influence. Toward that end, today's witnesses are well versed on Soviet-Cuban relations and will represent the academic community's contribution to the hearings.

The witnesses today include Prof. Luis Aguilar of Georgetown University and Prof. William M. LeoGrande of American University.

Gentlemen, we are pleased to have you here today. If you will summarize your statements, your prepared remarks will appear in their entirety in the record. We can then proceed with questions.

Professor Aguilar, would you like to begin, sir?

STATEMENT OF LUIS E. AGUILAR, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am very grateful for the opportunity to be here. I have to apologize because there was a communications gap and I sent my testimony too late to be as good as I wanted it to be. So, instead of summarizing I would like, with your permission, to indicate what is for me the most essential part of the present problem.

The historical background of these Soviet-Cuban relations, I am almost sure we all know, began by a series of contacts in 1960. Then, from 1962 it reached its highest moment in terms of military danger
with the missile crisis. But from the very beginning—and that is the point I am going to stress—we have to know the difference between Soviet interests and Castro's, or Cuba's interests.

The Soviets seem to be much more concerned with strategic values—I am referring mainly to the Caribbean—while Castro's policies seem to be more interested in expanding Castro's influence and prestige in the entire Western Hemisphere. From 1962 to 1968, without too much Soviet support, Havana embarked into a continental campaign of revolutionary efforts.

By 1968, the guerrilla campaign that Havana had promoted in Latin America, had resulted in failure. Simultaneously, the economic situation in Cuba was in such poor condition that Castro was forced to begin what has been called the Sovietization of Cuba; that is, Soviet pressure on the Cuban Government increased as Cuba's economic dependence on Russian aid mounted.

In 1968, Mr. Castro had to applaud the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia; almost broke relationship with China, and tried to follow the pattern of what is known as the institutionalization of the revolution. After the failure of the 10 million ton sugar crop in 1970, Cuba became almost totally dependent on Soviet assistance.

The price that Cuba had to pay for this economic aid which has been growing all these years, became evident in 1975 when Castro sent troops to Angola, and to Ethiopia, providing the Soviet Union with troops or human elements that could do in Africa and in the Western Hemisphere what the Soviets could not do directly.

So, we have two basic trends which slowly, because of Cuba's economic disaster, became one. By the middle of the 1970's Cuba was in no condition to pursue an independent policy and had to follow Russian directions. The Soviets are aiming basically at weakening the American position and strengthening their military position. Only when it is convenient to those objectives they back Castro's attempts to expand Cuba's influence.

Castro is always trying to maintain the good image of "the Cuban model". He has sent advisers, technicians to Jamaica, to Grenada, to Dominica, help to the Sandinistas. As I have said those aims could coincide at times with those of the Soviet Union, but we could be confronted with a deep crisis in Cuba. I think that this is a moment where there is a possibility, a strong possibility that Soviet interests and Castro's interests are not coinciding. I think there is, again, a possibility that the mass exodus of Cubans from the island, that Castro's confession of economic problems—of almost disaster magnitude—in Cuba, that the irresponsibility shown in sinking two boats in the Bahamas, two patrol boats, could be a proof that Mr. Castro is losing his control over events, and by alarming neighbor countries he has endangered his position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. He is perhaps becoming more of a burden than an asset.

The Soviets could be considering a change in Cuba's high command—and I said that in a program which Professor LeoGrande and myself shared some days ago—it is conceivable that there is a power struggle inside Cuba, because the Soviet Union could be searching and looking for a more dependable, more efficient, more reliable type of leader that would follow a pragmatic Socialist way and not the egoistical revolutionary, if you want romantic, tendencies of Mr. Castro.
I would say that this crisis is unfolding now and the United States, and the nations of the Western Hemisphere, should be ready to try to use that crisis, to restore Cuba to a democratic system or at least to slow down Soviet influence in the Caribbean.

[Mr. Aguilar’s prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LUIS E. AGUILAR, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

The impact and the perspective of Soviet-Cuban relations can be better perceived through a brief historical glance at their evolution in the last two decades.

A little more than twenty years ago, respective Soviet and American spheres of national interest, where no hostile regimes would be tolerated, were clearly defined. When a “leftist” government in Guatemala flirted with the Soviets in 1954, American intervention provoked its collapse. Two years later, Russian tanks crushed Hungary’s attempt to break Soviet ties. Mutual respect for those spheres of influence seemed so well established that when in 1960 Fidel Castro began transforming Cuba into a socialist state, an alarmed Cuban Communist party urged caution while the Soviet Union, which was testing American response in Berlin, prudently refrained from any military commitment. Apparently the Kremlin could not believe a socialist regime would survive ninety miles from the United States. In 1961 the expected American blow was delivered. Lacking, among other things, organization and deprived of military support, the Bay of Pigs invasion became a classical example of a perfect failure. As a result, Castro’s international prestige soared, U.S. image was shattered, and an emboldened Soviet Union installed missiles in Cuba. Kennedy’s firm stand forced the removal of the missiles, but at the price of guaranteeing that no anti-Castro action was to be taken or permitted.

Thus, the U.S. tolerated a dangerous tilting of international balance: the Soviet’s sphere remained intact, the Americans have been deeply penetrated. An amazing situation followed. Under the tacit protection of U.S. power, Castro mounted a formidable anti-U.S. campaign posing as a heroic David (an image which conveniently forgets that David Castro was shielded by an agreement between Soviet and American Goliaths). Castro promoted guerrillas in the Continent, exhorted all Latin-Americans to break Yanqui imperialism, and maintained relentless ambitious anti-American propaganda.

American reaction to this barrage was, in general, as extraordinary as the situation itself. No positive action was taken to face Cuba’s challenge. On the contrary, scores of journalists exulted the “positive” aspects of the Cuban Revolution; academicians strove to be invited by a regime which had suppressed academic freedom; liberal senators embraced Castro and assured the American public of Fidel’s friendly intentions; and Washington kept an “open” attitude toward Havana. The usual answer to any criticism of this policy was a bland “But what can little Cuba do against the most powerful nation in the world?”

Helped by increased economic and military Soviet support, Castro built the most impressive military machine of all Latin America and escalated his campaign into global proportions. By 1970, the failure of the guerrilla campaign in the continent, and increasing economic problems in Cuba had forced Castro to yield more and more to Soviet pressure. The enormous amount of Soviet economic assistance had to be repaid in the international arena. Extremist by nature, Castro became more anti-Israel than the Palestinians, and more anti-American than the Soviets.

Thousands of Cuban troops were sent to Angola and Ethiopia to save or aid faltering socialist regimes, and Cuban subversive and secret organizations were put under Soviet control.

In the Western Hemisphere, Soviet pragmatism appears to have overcome Castro’s initial “revolutionarism”. Cuban-Soviet activities had been largely concentrated on the Caribbean area. Cuban presence and influence expanded in Guyana and Jamaica, Castro’s ‘advisers’ sponsored a successful coup in Grenada, stirred trouble in Dominica, and are allegedly training St. Lucia’s troops for a possible takeover in that island. Sandinista victory has opened a new base of operations for the Cuban-Soviet alliance. More than two thousand Cuban “volunteers” are in Nicaragua, and Cuban oriented groups are increasingly active in El Salvador, where a civil war now appears almost inevitable. Even democratic Costa Rica had been forced to take action against Cuban “agents”.


And as current chairman of the nonaligned nations, Castro is trying hard to inject good doses of anti-Americanism into that organization. All things considered, little Cuba has done exceptionally well.

Cuban-Soviet relations are today facing a deep crisis. The mismanagement of Cuba's economy, and Castro reluctance to follow the Soviet suggestion of "institutionalization" of the revolution, had created a mass exodus of Cubans, and an international situation which is quite negative for the propaganda of the Cuban "model" in the Caribbean. Careful plans of slow penetration of the area had been jeopardized by those events and by Castro's apparent eagerness to use military force, as demonstrated by the recent incident of sinking to Bahamian boats.

Inside Cuba, the economic situation and the demoralization of the population seemed to have reached new depths. Simultaneously, Soviet price to keep the island economy from collapsing had increased. It is quite possible that according to Soviet perspective, Castro has become more of a burden than an asset. If that is the case, the reshuffling of the high political and military positions in the Cuban government, Castro's desperate attempts to create an international incident in the Caribbean, and new repressive methods apply in Cuba, could be the signs of a dangerous internal struggle for power. We should keep in mind that Afghanistan has once more demonstrated that failure is a dangerous word in the Soviet dictionary. There are forces inside Cuba which the Kremlin consider more reliable and efficient than Fidel Castro. The United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere, should be ready to take positive measures if a dramatic struggle in Cuba opens the door for a pushing back of Soviet influence and a reestablishing of the balance of power which existed twenty years ago. At any rate, the present situation, with its formidable propaganda possibilities should be exploited to the maximum.

Mr. Yatron. Thank you very much for a very concise statement, Professor Aguilar.

Professor LeoGrande, would you like to proceed?

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM M. LEOGRANDE, PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Mr. LeoGrande. Let me begin by thanking you, Mr. Chairman and the subcommittee for giving me the opportunity to speak to you this afternoon on a subject which has been and will no doubt continue to be one of great importance for U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere.

Cuba has consistently pursued three foreign policy objectives since the revolution in 1959: First and foremost, the survival of the revolutionary government in the face of hostility from the United States and from most of the rest of the hemisphere. Second, the economic development of the Cuban economy, and third, "proletarian internationalism," that is, support for leftist governments and political movements abroad.

Cuba's suspension from the inter-American system and its resulting diplomatic and economic isolation in the hemisphere threatened all three of these objectives. At the same time, Cuba's alignment with the Soviet Union in the early 1960's provided a counterbalance to the hostilities that Cuba faced in the Americas. Soviet military assistance gave Cuba the arms it needed to defend itself against the possibility of a direct intervention by the United States and also against the paramilitary attacks launched by the Cuban exile community—attacks launched primarily from the United States but also from the territories of other nations in the hemisphere.

Soviet economic assistance made it possible for the Cuban economy to survive the economic embargo placed on Cuba by the United States,
and also the economic sanctions adopted by the Organization of American States in 1963.

Cuba's principal objective in the Western Hemisphere is the same today as it was nearly two decades ago—to break out of the diplomatic and economic isolation imposed upon it in the early 1960's. While the objective has not changed, Cuba's strategy for attaining this objective has evolved to fit changing international circumstances.

During the 1960's, Cuba faced nearly unanimous opposition in the hemisphere and sought to break its isolation by promoting revolutionary movements to overthrow those Latin American governments which were hostile to it. This militant strategy reached its zenith in the late 1960's when Cuba started to "export" revolution throughout the hemisphere, offering material support indiscriminately to virtually every existing guerrilla group no matter how small. The period of "exporting" revolution climaxed in 1967 when Che Guevara was killed in Bolivia while trying to create a guerrilla base for continental revolution.

It should be noted that Cuba's policy during this period was not undertaken in cooperation with the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the Soviets opposed the Cuban strategy as unrealistic and, moreover, detrimental to the larger Soviet goal of fostering peaceful coexistence with the United States. While this policy difference between Cuba and the Soviet Union created strains in bilateral relations between those two countries, the Soviets were not able to restrain the Cubans in an area which Cuba regarded as essential to its basic national interests.

The failure of the strategy of exporting revolution, combined with changing international conditions, have led Cuba to revise its approach to hemispheric relations. That revision occurred in the early 1970's.

Latin America's guerrillas had proven to be no match for the counterinsurgency forces created under the Alliance for Progress. By the early 1970's, however, the solid front of hemispheric hostility toward Cuba had begun to crack. Chile, Argentina, and Peru all abandoned the Organization of American States sanctions, and most of the rest of Latin America was moving toward a normalization of relations. In an effort to reinforce these developments, Cuba adopted a conciliatory policy toward its neighbors, establishing normal state-to-state relations with any government that was willing to do so. Inevitably, this new diplomatic strategy for breaking Cuba's isolation required a sharp reduction in aid to guerrilla movements in the hemisphere. Since 1972, Cuba has provided very little material assistance to such organizations.

Cuba's current policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean is basically the same policy as adopted in the early 1970's. Cuba's bilateral relations with its neighbors—apart from relations with the United States which really have to be considered separately—can be divided, I think, into three major categories:

One: Countries with which Cuba has normal relations, ranging from reasonably warm relations with countries such as Mexico, to merely proper relations with countries such as Argentina.

Two: Countries with which Cuba has no formal relations, so that the bilateral relationship is still one of open hostility—countries such as Chile, Uruguay, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras.
Three: Countries with which Cuba has close and friendly relations, in particular Nicaragua, Guyana, Jamaica, and Grenada.

In the case of those countries with which Cuba has normal relations, Cuban policy is to continue pursuing the sort of conciliatory diplomatic strategy it has pursued over the last decade. At the moment, however, this situation is extremely volatile. The incident at the Peruvian Embassy and the flood of refugees that we have seen since that incident has put considerable strain on Cuba’s relations with the Andean Pact nations, particularly Venezuela and Peru. It is unclear at this time whether bilateral relations with those two countries are going to be able to survive the current crisis.

In the case of those countries whose relationship with Cuba is still one of overt hostility, Cuban policy has changed somewhat in the last 18 months. Prior to the Nicaraguan revolution, the Cubans did not believe that there were any significant prospects for revolution in the hemisphere. This belief was a legacy of the failure of attempts to “export” revolution in the late 1960s and was one of the reasons behind the reduction of aid to guerrillas in the 1970s.

The Nicaraguan insurrection, however, convinced the Cubans that at least in Central America the prospects for revolution were better than they had believed. Consequently, Cuba has begun to provide limited military assistance to revolutionary movements in that area. They provided assistance to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and are currently providing some assistance to the left in El Salvador.

However, all indications are that the amount of aid being provided is quite small. Cuba has maintained a low profile in aiding these movements, essentially for two reasons. First, the Cubans do not wish to undermine the overall conciliatory approach which they have taken toward the rest of the hemisphere; and second, they do not wish to provoke an intervention by the United States in Central America. While Cuba will probably continue to aid revolutionary movements in Central America, it is unlikely to escalate that aid substantially and there is virtually no chance that the Cubans will intervene directly anywhere in the Western Hemisphere.

The newest dimension of Cuban policy concerns those nations with which Cuba has developed close and friendly relations. The warm relations which Cuba now has with Nicaragua, Guyana, Jamaica, and Grenada are based upon a degree of ideological affinity between Cuba and these countries. That is, each of these nations is attempting to pursue some sort of socialist path of development and therefore feels a certain kinship with Cuba, even though none of them has adopted Cuba’s Marxist-Leninist model of socialism. Cuba has sought to build upon this ideological kinship by offering to all of these states programs of economic assistance in the fields of health, education, and construction. While Cuba has sent a few military advisers to at least some of these countries, the military dimension of Cuban assistance programs is clearly overshadowed by its economic dimension.

It seems to me there are two major observations that emerge from this survey of Cuba’s current policy. First, that the military component is very small compared to the diplomatic and economic initiatives which have been taken over the past few years. Second, that the role of the Soviet Union in determining Cuba’s hemispheric policy is smaller still. For the Soviet Union, Latin America is a geopolitically marginal area. For Cuba, it is not. Thus Cuban policy in this part of
the world responds first and foremost to Cuban national interests. This is as true today as it was in the 1960's.

What sort of challenge does Cuban policy pose in the Western Hemisphere for the United States? Since Cuba's major initiatives have been diplomatic and economic rather than military, the challenge to the United States is likewise diplomatic and economic rather than military. There is no doubt that Cuba seeks to reduce the hemispheric influence of the United States, but I believe if we meet a political challenge with a military response, we will only make Cuba's task easier.

Such policies as expanding our military presence in the Caribbean or providing military assistance to repressive regimes in Central America do not enhance American prestige, they undermine it. They detract from the impressive diplomatic gains we have made in Latin America through our human rights policy and the conclusion of the Panama Canal treaties. They revive in Latin America fears of U.S. interventionism—fears which are today more potent than fears of Cuban subversion.

The best policy for the United States is one which combines a commitment to social and economic development with a respect for the right of each nation to choose its own social and political system. Specifically, we must avoid allowing our preoccupation with Cuba to distort our policies toward other nations. Many Latin Americans would like to maintain cordial relations with both Cuba and the United States. When the United States threatens reprisals against a nation that creates friendly relations with Cuba, as Secretary Kissinger did in the case of Jamaica, we insult the national pride of our neighbors, demolish our own prestige, and leave the diplomatic field open to the Cubans.

Let me conclude with a recommendation which, given the current situation, will no doubt be a bit surprising and perhaps politically unpopular. I believe it is in the best interest of the United States to once again begin the process of trying to reach a normal state of relations with Cuba—not as a favor to the Cubans, but because such a policy is in the best interests of the United States. It is in the best interest of the United States for a whole variety of reasons which, if members of the subcommittee would like, we can go into in the question period.

Thank you very much.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Professor LeoGrande for a very interesting statement.

You emphasize that Cuba is interested in economic development of the island and has adopted a conciliatory policy toward its neighbors. In that light, would you care to comment on last Saturday's attack by Cuban Air Force airplanes on the Bahamian patrol boat?

Mr. LeoGrande. I believe that the attack was probably an error. I do not believe that a military attack on a Bahamian naval vessel was authorized by senior Cuban officials. Whether the Cuban forces actually made a mistake and thought it was a pirate vessel, or whether the action was taken at the initiative of lower-level military officials, I am not in a position to know.

The Cubans would have literally nothing to gain by provoking a military confrontation with the Bahamas.
Mr. YATRON. It is my understanding that it had proper markings.
Mr. LEOGRANDE. That is what we read in the press reports. I have no way of knowing any different.

Mr. YATRON. I note that 2,000 refugees a day are arriving from Cuba. Would that indicate that the economic development in the island in the past 20 years has been a success or a failure?

Mr. LEOGRANDE. To talk about the success or failure of economic development we would have to begin by talking about what its goals were. But, trying to be more responsive to your question, there is no doubt that at the moment the Cuban economy is facing a severe crisis. The economy is in a recession, partly for reasons which are beyond the control of Cuban authorities; partly as a result of failures of their economic planning system. It is a confluence of factors which have put the economy in a very sorry state at the moment.

There is no question that economic difficulties have been a catalyst for the wave of refugees that we have seen over the last few weeks.

Mr. YATRON. Would you consider Cuba's foreign policy a success?

Mr. LEOGRANDE. I think from the Cuban point of view it certainly has been a success, overall. The one area in which they have not had much success as of yet is normalizing relations within the Western Hemisphere. They have had much more success in their relations with the Soviet Union, which they have managed very successfully from their point of view. They have had great success in their attempts to improve their prestige in the Third World and to reach an influential position in the nonaligned movement. They have had great success in their policy of trying to promote the development of revolutionary movements and friendly governments in Africa.

In all of those areas, Cuban foreign policy has been very successful.

Mr. YATRON. How would the United States benefit from normalization of relations with Cuba?

Mr. LEOGRANDE. I think we benefit from normalization in a number of ways. Some of them are relatively small, some are not so small.

There is a certain amount of economic trade to be done between the United States and Cuba. Most importantly, from the point of view of the United States, Cuba could become a major supplier of nickel. Nickel, of course, is a scarce mineral and Cuba would be our natural trading partner for that.

Another advantage which sometimes gets overlooked or treated as a minor advantage—I think is not so minor—is the humanitarian dimension of normalizing relations. During the period 1978–79, the Cuban community in the United States entered into negotiations with the Cuban Government and was able to gain a variety of concessions from the Government with regard to the release of political prisoners, allowing for the reunification of families and allowing exiles to visit the island. These are humanitarian gains, and I think they are important ones.

There are further gains to be made in those areas. We are in fact seeing some of them right now. It would be much easier for us to arrange some sort of orderly evacuation of refugees from Cuba if we had normal relations. Moreover, we would be facing a much less difficult and sensitive situation with regard to the nearly 400 Cubans who are now in the U.S. interests section in Havana, if we had normal relations.
Because we do not have normal relations, the United States, by international law, really does not have the right to give those people political asylum, so, we face a very, very difficult situation with regard to them.

Concerning more significant advantages for the United States, the Cubans over the past few years have become a very influential force in the Third World. They are the chair of the nonaligned movement and will be until the next Nonaligned Summit Conference. They have many friends in the Third World and in Africa in particular. It is not in the best interest of the United States to have a policy of hostility toward a nation which has become so influential in, and is such a spokesman for the Third World.

I think that our interests with regard to that whole area of the globe would be better served if we had a normal diplomatic relationship with the Cubans.

Mr. Yatron. Thank you very much, Professor LeoGrande.

Professor Aguilar, you state that the Soviet's tremendous amounts of assistance to Cuba are paid back through the international arena. Would this apply to the Western Hemisphere?

Mr. Aguilar. Not for the moment, no. As I said, the Soviet interests seem to be concentrated in the Caribbean. I only agree with my colleague on one point, and that is that the Soviets consider Latin America as a peripheral zone of interest—with one exception, the Caribbean. There is oil in Venezuela, oil in Mexico, the Panama Canal, and Cuba. So, the Soviets do give a lot of importance to the Caribbean.

Now, in that area, if you will allow me to expand that answer because I have to, to make it clear.

Mr. Yatron. Without objection.

Mr. Aguilar. The picture that I have received from my colleague, LeoGrande, is of a small peaceful nation being attacked by almost everybody, trying to improve the lot of its people and full of cordiality toward other nations.

Let's comment in passing, that he used a term which Castro has always rejected because it is a capitalistic term "to export revolution." One does not export or import revolution, that is a business terminology.

But, let me point out this fact to the committee, the three first invasions that Cuba launched against nations in the Caribbean were launched much before any aggression against the Castro revolution had taken place. There were two attempts to invade the Dominican Republic; one expedition sent to Panama, and one to Nicaragua in the year 1959. At that time relations with the United States were cordial and no one had attacked Cuba. It was the initial proclamation of Castro himself that he was going to help revolution everywhere.

So, there you find a nation that from the very beginning is trying to intervene in the affairs of other nations. As a matter of fact, early in 1959 they insulted the President of Costa Rica when he visited Havana, in spite of President Figueres military aid to Castro, sent when he was still fighting in the mountains. When the President was talking, defending a policy of moderation, they took away the microphone and insulted him.

Afterwards, Cuba attacked Venezuela. And then, when these nations reacted, Castro's propaganda would offer the picture of "Poor little Cuba, being surrounded by hostility."
The second part of Professor LeoGrande's testimony maintains that in an effort to break the diplomatic isolation imposed on Cuba, Castro began to export guerrillas to other countries. I do not really understand how you can break isolated diplomatic relations by sending guerrillas. If you send guerrillas, you alienate the governments and sometimes the people of those nations. This is one of the reasons why there were so many military coups in the 1960's in Latin America. Unfortunately, the answer of many nations to Castro's challenge was to give full power to their armed forces.

The third is that Professor LeoGrande seems to touch lightly the economic dependence of Cuba to the Soviet Union. Now, according to even pro-Castro economists, Cuba depends today more heavily on Soviet aid than she ever did on the United States. The entire effort of the revolution was to create an independent Cuba, and now they depend more on the Soviet Union than ever on the United States. That is why I wrote that Cuba had passed “from the Platt amendment to the Plattoff amendment.”

Actually, you cannot dismiss that basic fact. Cuba cannot be presented as a sovereign government capable of making independent decisions. Quite the contrary, the reality of Cuba's economic dependence on the Soviet Union has produced political dependence. And the extent of Cuba's economic disaster can be measured by the regime's recognition that many of the most important economic goals of the revolution have not been achieved. The tobacco crop has almost entirely collapsed. The sugar crop is about 30 to 35 percent below the quota. The workers lack enthusiasm. Cuba needs austerity and sacrifices and more economic aid. That economic aid comes from the Soviet Union, and from the Soviet Union come also all the political pressures which that economic aid entitles them to exert.

Finally—not finally but two more points—he says that Cuba is giving only small aid to the nations in the Caribbean. Sure it is a small aid. But what do you have to send to Grenada or to Dominica? Those are small nations and little aid carries great weight. We must keep in mind that this aid sometimes appears rather strange. I have noticed some measures of criticism in Grenada or in Dominica because the Cubans are building an international airport. How is that airport going to help the poor people in Grenada? The answer is, “tourism.” But, tourism has to come from the “imperialist” United States. And also, an international airport could have at any moment a military value. So, it is rather curious that in this case this small economic aid is given not to agrarian reform, not to expand the economy, but to build an international airport. It is a small help, but it's possibilities make it a symbolic one.

The last point—and this is going to be, I promise, the last point—has to do with the advantage that the United States is going to receive from reestablishing relations with Cuba. In that sense it is always forgotten that Mr. Castro himself more than four times has blocked any open or friendly attitude coming from Washington. This is not only a problem of Washington saying, “Well, now, we want to receive Cuba back among us, and then Castro will accept it as a turbulent boy coming back to the fold.”

No; Mr. Castro many times has said he does not want diplomatic relations. He wants economic aid—economic aid because he is in economic need. What the United States has to ask itself is, how much
economic aid should be given to a regime that has consistently pro-
claimed total hostility toward the United States and everything the
United States represents.

Mr. YATRON. Until this time we have heard only that Castro may
have had some foreknowledge of the coup in Grenada. However, you
state that Castro's advisers sponsored the coup. On what do you base
this claim, Doctor?

Mr. AGUILAR. Well, this direct knowledge comes only from inter-
views and reading some articles. In this kind of situation open and
direct evidence is difficult to find. For example, I believe we can all
agree that the government of President Arbenz was toppled in Guatemala
with the direct intervention of the CIA. Now, on what do we base that? On nothing more than testimonies, declarations, or
accusations.

I have interviewed certain people and there have been certain decla-
rances and certain applause, a certain relationship that gives me the
conviction that they had a direct involvement in that coup.

Mr. YATRON. Can you identify some of the forces inside Cuba which
the Kremlin considers more reliable than Castro?

Mr. AGUILAR. The answer must be very speculative. I would say that
the danger for Mr. Castro comes from people like his brother Raoul,
and more clearly—from the members of a new generation. There is
a generation gap growing in Cuba. I would look at the young officers
and technicians that have been educated in the Soviet Union, Romania,
and Bulgaria, and who are now 35, or 40, and who find no political
opening for them. There are several groups of technicians that are
discontent, frustrated because the Politburo or the elite in power
in Cuba has not changed in 21 years. After 21 years, no new names
have appeared in the elite that rules Cuba.

So, there is a generation pushing there that has been trained in so-
cialist countries and could provide a more efficient and more, let me
say, traditional socialist direction.

Mr. YATRON. Congressman Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LeOGRANDE, I, like Professor Aguilar could not find much to
agree with you on today. But, I would like to ask you specifically about
the prestige that Cuba has in the Third World.

Is your analysis of the prestige Cuba has based on the present cir-
cumstance, or as it was, say, prior to Cuba's loss of the Security Coun-
cil seat? That one thing alone would indicate to me that Cuba does
not have the kind of prestige that you seem to say it does.

Mr. LeOGRANDE. There were two events in the last few months which
have certainly done damage to Cuba's overall prestige in the Third
World. The first was complaints among some of the nonaligned countries
as to how the Cubans handled the arrangements for the Sixth Summit
of Nonaligned Nations, which was held last year in Havana.

The second was the position that the Cubans took on the United
Nations General Assembly vote concerning the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. Without actually endorsing the invasion the Cubans
nevertheless voted against the resolution condemning the Soviet
intervention.

Cuba's loss of prestige due to those events was reflected in the fact
that it ultimately lost the Security Council seat. But we should not let
those two setbacks lead us to the conclusion that Cuban prestige in
the Third World is low; that would be a mistaken conclusion. Cuba is still chairman of the nonaligned movement, and these two events have not destroyed the good will that Cuba built up very carefully over the previous decade.

Mr. Lagomarsino. I wonder what the reading would be on Cuba's prestige today with the thousands of people leaving Cuba and with certainly the perception that if they were allowed to do so, probably millions would leave.

Mr. Leogrande. Well, we will have to wait and see how the rest of the Third World reacts. Let me add, though, that I do not think millions would leave. The Cuban Government has adopted the policy that anyone who wants to leave, can leave. We have not seen the end of it yet, so we do not know how many people ultimately will become refugees. But I believe the estimate from the State Department that about a quarter of a million may leave are probably correct.

Mr. Lagomarsino. With regard to that, I would be, if I were living in Cuba and I wanted to leave, I would be very, very careful about telling anybody. A year ago when some of us were in Cuba, we went to a church and talked to two couples, a younger couple and an older couple. The older, the man, was an architect. Just that morning, several hours before that, we had been told by the Cuban Interior Department that anybody who wanted to leave, could leave, and he added in sort of an aside, if they met the conditions.

The architect said that he had applied to leave 14 years before and never heard anything back. The younger man was a draftsman and told us he had applied to leave. I think it was about 10 years go. The next day he was not a draftsman any more; he was a weed hoer. He lost his house. His wife could not get a job and he had never heard anything.

So, I would suspect that a lot of people in Cuba will not even apply to leave until they see which way the wind is blowing because they might want to leave, but they sure would not want to go into a labor battalion or in a labor camp. So, I do not think very many people are yet ready to take Castro's word for that.

Why do you think the Cubans are leaving?

Mr. Leogrande. I think a variety of factors feed into it. No doubt, the catalyst for this exodus has been the economic problems Cuba has had over the last year. In addition, there has been some difficulty arising from the visits to Cuba by people in the Cuban exile community in the United States and other Latin American countries, 110,000 of whom went back to Cuba to visit last year. Many of them brought consumer goods as presents for their families, and that created a rather sharp contrast between the standard of living in Cuba, which of course is still a very poor country, and the United States. That had the effect of aggravating discontent over the state of the Cuban economy.

Another factor has been the recent crackdown by the Ministry of the Interior on the black market. The black market has been growing over the past year, and the crackdown put black marketeers into a difficult situation very suddenly. Therefore, their activities had been more or less tolerated; now they are not being tolerated.

In short, there are a whole variety of factors contributing to the exodus we are seeing.
Mr. Lagomarsino. On page 5 you refer to the amounts of Cuban aid to the Central American countries as quite small. What do you consider small? What are you talking about?

Mr. Leogrande. Let me use Nicaragua as an example. In the case of Nicaragua, the material assistance Cuba provided was no more than a few crates, or a couple of small plane loads of arms.

The principal assistance that Cuba rendered to the Nicaraguan revolutionaries was putting them in touch with international arms merchants so that they could acquire arms on the international market, and also helping the various factions of the Nicaraguan left mediate their disputes so that they could present a united front against the Somoza regime.

Cuba will continue, I am sure, to provide that kind of assistance to revolutionary movements in Central America.

But I do not believe that the Cubans are going to become as involved in promoting revolution abroad as they were in the late 1960's, when they saw it as a means of overthrowing governments hostile to them and creating governments that would be friendly. In those years, that was their principal strategy for breaking their isolation in the hemisphere.

I have no doubt that their principal strategy for breaking their isolation now is to try to create normal state-to-state relations with as many governments as they can.

Mr. Lagomarsino. I can put you in touch with some governments in the area that do not exactly agree with what you have just said.

Mr. Leogrande. As I outlined in my testimony, there are unquestionably some governments in the hemisphere with which Cuba's relations are no better today than they were in 1965.

Mr. Lagomarsino. You also say on page 6 that Cuba has a kinship with Nicaragua, Guyana, Jamaica, and Grenada, even though none of them has adopted Cuba's Marxist-Leninist model of change.

How would you define Cuba's Marxist-Leninist model of change?

Mr. Leogrande. A very rapid socialization of the economy that leaves very little of it in private hands; and the creation of a one-party political system in which that one party is a vanguard party organized along Marxist-Leninist lines; and so on and so forth.

Mr. Lagomarsino. You do not think any of these other countries have done that?

Mr. Leogrande. No; I do not.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Not even Grenada?

Mr. Leogrande. No, not as yet.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Do you think that if Mr. Manley had his way he would like to go more in the direction of Cuba?

Mr. Leogrande. I am not an expert on Jamaican politics, but Mr. Manley's political and economic position is so difficult at the moment that I suspect that he is more concerned with the very shortrun than he is with such longrun questions as that.

Mr. Lagomarsino. You criticized Secretary Kissinger in the case of a Jamaica statement. I would respond to that by pointing out that I think our Government was insulted by some of the statements made by some of our present-day representatives—Mr. Andrew Young and Mr. Sam Brown, who as I recall, after visiting Jamaica made the statement, or at least were reported as having made the statement that they
preferred Mr. Manley's economic system to our own. I think that does more damage than anything Mr. Kissinger might have said about something that was true. But, that is just my own opinion.

Professor Aguilar, on the last page of your statement, the last sentence, as a matter of fact, you say that, "At any rate, the present situation, with its formidable propaganda possibilities should be exploited to the maximum."

Can you tell us what you would suggest as to how we might exploit this possibility, or the situation?

Mr. Aguilar. Well, I think that for many people coming out of Cuba, it is sort of unbelievable that while Cuba is always promoting its system as a model, for all of Latin America, no propaganda counteracts this false image. They cannot understand why there are no radio programs coming from the United States, telling the Cuban people, for example, how many troops are in Angola; what is the real result of the sugar crop; why the failure of tobacco. That is a powerful weapon to be used against the regime. It is not a matter of telling any lies, but of asking valid questions and telling the truth. Why are Cuban troops in Ethiopia? How many Cuban soldiers have died in Angola? And then gives names and facts.

Second, a true picture of Cuba should be offered to the Latin American countries. Mr. Castro was very eager to avoid the Cuban refugees from arriving in any Latin American country. He wanted them to come to Miami to New York, or to Alaska, or to the North Pole because he cannot afford to have these Cubans arriving in San Juan, Costa Rica, or Venezuela with poor clothes, proclaiming the harsh reality of Cuba.

Again, one of the motives, one of the essential motives to leave Cuba, one of the most noble reasons to leave Cuba is the decision to be free; to be able to speak, to talk, to say, "I do not agree with this" or "I do not like this."

Among the many Cubans who reached San Jose, Costa Rica, there was a young mechanic who simply began to shout, "Soy libre, soy libre." He did not say, "I do not have shoes or a coat," or a cigar, or coffee. He just said, "I am free."

Now, those photos in San Jose destroy the image of the Cuban model as has been presented so efficiently in all of Latin America. I think that the United States should cooperate with the Andean Pact, with the Andean nations and try to reach a relocalization of Cubans in Latin America, providing means to spread in the continent their declarations and reports to send students to Latin America, show the Cuban youth escaping from Cuba. Four of those who have come out of Cuba are writers. One of them was, at least for a while, a famous writer in Cuba. I would interview this man and publicize what he has to say to all of Latin American media.

Mr. Lagomarsino. I agree, I think that makes a lot of sense. I would suggest that perhaps one reason Mr. Castro is allowing as many refugees to come here, as distinguished from other countries in the area is because, as far as I know, we are the only country in the Western Hemisphere who has laid down an absolute pledge that we would not invade or allow the invasion of Cuba.

Mr. Aguilar. Perhaps. I think he is more concerned with the other impact.
Mr. Lagomarsino. I think you are right. I think the presence of refugee Cubans in other countries would have a tremendous impact and adverse reaction.

Mr. Aguilar. To give you an example, in Peru today, the leaders of the Communist Party have been questioned several times; “What do you think is happening in Cuba?” According to all reports, the Communist leaders have refused to answer. For the first time in Peru, the left, the Communist Party, is on the defensive saying, “Well, we do not have anything to say. We have to wait and see. Let’s wait for more information to answer this question.”

Mr. Lagomarsino. Let me ask Mr. LeoGrande another question, too. You said if we had relations, proper diplomatic relations with Cuba, that the present situation of the people in the American Interests Section would not have occurred. How do you distinguish that from Peru? They definitely had proper diplomatic relations.

Mr. LeoGrande. I did not say it would not have occurred, but rather that it would be a lot easier to resolve. The difficulty with the situation we have now is that, because we do not have normal diplomatic relations, the United States cannot grant political asylum to those people.

Since we cannot, we are stuck with them in our Interests Section, and we have no easy way of resolving it.

The Cubans are now saying that in order to enter into negotiations on how to resolve that problem and how to resolve the problem of the flow of refugees, the Cuban Government wants to discuss all the bilateral issues between Cuba and the United States.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Yatron. Professor LeoGrande, in your view, the people who are seeking to leave Cuba, would you consider them economic refugees or political refugees?

Mr. LeoGrande. There are some of each, but I think they are primarily economic refugees. The large number of people who are seeking to leave now have been motivated by the decline in the economy.

These people were almost certainly disaffected or discontent with Cuba before the economic problems became severe. But there have been so many refugees who talk about economic deprivation and the desire to improve their economic situation, that I think it is primarily an economic motivation.

Mr. Yatron. Would you care to comment on that, Professor Aguilar?

Mr. Aguilar. I would point out that in a totalitarian state, it is very difficult to separate the economy from the political issues. It is always sort of amusing to see that when there was a good sugar crop in Cuba, the Government never said, “The economy is fine.” They said, “The Socialist system has obtained a victory in the sugar battle.”

If the sugar crop was poor, then they blame a hurricane or isolate the episode as an economic factor. Economic victories are political victories, economic failures are only economic. In Cuba, dissatisfaction with economic conditions could become a political issue. If you dare to proclaim in a group, “The situation here is terrible,” then you become an enemy of the regime. You are criticizing the regime. The economic reason has immediately evolved into a political issue and a political crime.
Let us mention, for example, the case of one of the recently arrived Cuban writers, who, because he complained of the repression of homosexuals—not even economic conditions—was sent for 2 years to a rehabilitation farm. I do not know how successful that rehabilitation farm would be in Socialist Cuba, but the fact is he was sent for 2 years to a sort of prison. So, could we say this was a sexual cause? No in a totalitarian state, this is a political crime. Consequently, his complaint resulted in harsh punishment.

So, these people say, "Yes, we have no food, no clothes, no nothing," that is economic dissatisfaction, but if you make a public protest, you are in trouble and you are facing a political sentence.

Mr. YATRON. Professor LeoGrande?

Mr. LEOGRANDE. If we use the current policy definition of a political refugee, then a political refugee is someone who faces or would face political persecution and is therefore given asylum. Most of the Cubans who are coming here now are not people who face persecution; they were not political dissidents or political activists.

That, of course, is one of the primary difficulties we face in our refugee policy because, given the character of the Cuban refugees, it is very difficult to draw a line between them and the Haitian refugees, or refugees from Mexico, or from any number of other countries.

Mr. YATRON. How about the mob violence against the people who are seeking to enter the United States?

Mr. LEOGRANDE. I do not know what to make of that, to be honest with you. I know Wayne Smith, and have great respect for him. In his opinion, the violence at the Interests Section was intentionally staged by the Government. The Cuban Government denies that it was intentionally staged and says that it was simply spontaneous.

To be honest with you, I do not know. The film reports show that there were Cuban police on the scene and that they certainly were trying to break up the riot; but whether the Government originally provoked it, I do not know.

I will say this, however: Many of the demonstrations, that have been going on around Havana and much of the harassment of people who are seeking to leave has not been organized by the Government. It is in fact spontaneous. One of the indications of this is that the Government has been trying for the past week to get its most fervent supporters at the local level to stop these acts of violence against the people who want to leave.

Mr. AGUILAR. May I add a note to that? When Mr. Castro, said in a speech, "Let the scum of this nation get out of here," he was given a sort of signal to his partisans; he was saying that these people should be or could be insulted, or humiliated by anyone because the leader, the maximum leader, had already expressed his opinion on these people. As soon as he ordered the Committees of the Defense of the Resolution, "Stop the demonstration," the demonstration stopped. I tend to believe that these "automatic" actions and reactions are not quite spontaneous.

Mr. YATRON. Professor LeoGrande, you state on page 2 that Cuba's second foreign policy objective is the economic development of the island, and third is the support of leftist governments.

If this is true, why has Cuba forsaken trade opportunities with the West in favor of its African venture?
Mr. LeoGrande. There is no question that the principal cost of Cuba's policy toward Africa was to halt the normalization of relations with the United States and to slow the process creating wider economic relations not only with the United States but with other Western countries.

I think the reason that they chose to follow the policy they did in Africa, and thereby foresake the possibility of those economic gains, was that they felt they had more to gain in international influence and prestige by their activity in Africa than they had to gain economically by normalizing relations with the United States.

In a sense, what it came down to was this: Were they willing to give up what proved to be a very, very successful policy in Africa for a few hundred million dollars worth of trade with the United States? The answer was, no.

This was a situation where two of Cuba's principal foreign policy objectives were in conflict to some extent and they had to give one a higher priority.

Mr. Yatron. You also state on page 7 that U.S. foreign policy should respect the right of each nation to choose its own social and political system. Would you consider a Cuban-supported revolution as an expression of the right to self-determination?

Mr. LeoGrande. It depends entirely upon whether the Cuban support is the determining factor, or whether it is really a peripheral issue. The Nicaraguan case is a good example. The Cuban support for the Sandinistas was truly of marginal consequences in the outcome of that insurrection. I believe that insurrection did in fact reflect a process of self-determination by the Nicaraguan people.

Mr. Yatron. Would you anticipate the continuation of Cuba's aggressive foreign policy despite the stagnation of Cuba's economy?

Mr. LeoGrande. I think the Cubans will continue to pursue the same sort of policy that they have been pursuing in Africa. In Latin America I think they will continue to pursue a policy very similar to the one they are now pursuing—that is, the sort of three-tiered policy of modest support for revolutionary movements; economic assistance for governments that they regard as friendly, and an attempt to maintain proper state-to-state relations with those governments that are willing to maintain them.

Mr. Yatron. Thank you.

Professor Aguilar, what changes, if any, would you suggest in American policy toward Cuba in the event of an internal power struggle?

Mr. Aguilar. Wow. That depends on how, between whom. If it is a power struggle between Fidel Castro's forces and the more pro-Soviet forces, I would say do not do anything; abstain because this is a power struggle that will weaken the regime anyway.

Now, if it is a case like that of Hungary in 1956, I would say, then you should intervene because that is the expression of the Cuban people, and you should try to help a popular rebellion against a dictatorial regime—even in a small way, as Cuba did with Nicaragua.

Mr. Yatron. You note Castro's successes in Central America and in the Caribbean. I would like to know, what impact has the refugee situation and the attack of a Bahamian patrol boat had on these successes?
Mr. AouilAR. Well, I think the picture of Cuba—I always hesitate when I say Cuba because I prefer to refer to it as “Castro’s revolution”—I think the image of Cuba has suffered somehow. I was a little bit puzzled by this idea of a great success in Angola. A great success for whom? What benefits has Angola brought to the Cuban people? Perhaps a great success for the Socialist world, but not for Cuba or for Castro.

But to speak of closer areas, there has been a growing opposition in Jamaica against this pro-Cuban policy. There have been criticisms in Guyana because of the affairs of Afghanistan. I would say that because those events and the evidence of Cuba’s economic failure, Castro’s image has suffered, no doubt—I have no doubt about it—a series of setbacks that have even cooled off people in Jamaica, Grenada, or Dominica.

Mr. YATRON. In your opinion, what is the top priority of Cuban foreign policy?

Mr. AouilAR. In that area?

Mr. YATRON. Yes.

Mr. AouilAR. Well, to weaken the prestige—if there is any left, sorry to say—of the United States in that area. To increase Cuba’s image as a friendly nation, a nation which is only sending advisers. To promote radical governments, anti-American regimes which would later follow a Soviet pattern. Also, to gain allies in the area, either through governments or through creating enough pressure on certain governments as to follow a sort of friendly attitude toward Cuba.

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Professor, with regard to the statement that Mr. LeoGrande made about Nicaragua, Guyana, Jamaica, and Grenada not adopting or following Cuba’s Marxist-Leninist model of change, do you have any comments you would like to make about that?

Mr. AouilAR. Well, I think that they all have learned a lesson. I could present that lesson in more scientific terms, but let me use a sort of common language. The sobering lesson that Cuba has provided for these nations in the Caribbean is that it is illusory to think that establishing a socialist regime you gain immediate access to Soviet aid. They have learned that the Soviet Union and the Kremlin is not ruled by Socialist boy scouts who give aid to anybody who proclaims himself a Socialist.

They have seen what happened to Guyana. Guyana sent an economic delegation—I think it was 2 years ago, 3 years ago, maybe less than that—to Moscow. After 4 days the Soviets, couching their words in Marxist terminology, told them, “The road to Socialism is long and arduous, you have to work for it.” Consequently they are now less inclined to move rapidly toward an official proclamation of Socialism.

Mr. Castro himself has learned this lesson. We should remember, that when he visited Chile in 1971, he advised Allende, “Slow down and do not take Chile out of the American zone of economic influence.” The people in Grenada, or in Dominica, or in Jamaica know this and are less willing to move toward an open break with the United States by proclaiming a Socialist regime.

As a matter of fact recently, I asked a top representative of Dominica, “How can you talk about your goals of reaching a Socialist regime while at the same time you want and need American tourism?
Isn’t that a contradiction? Do you expect that tourists from American imperialism are going to be a source of economic power for a regime which would be essentially anti-American?” He answered, “Well, that is a dilemma that we will face in the future.” It was a very cautious answer. Caution seems to be the present policy of those regimes.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Mr. LeoGrande, if we were to follow your suggestion, or your recommendation that we normalize relations with Cuba, do you feel it should be done without conditions?

Mr. LeoGrande. We need to open the process of negotiation. There are a variety of bilateral issues between the two countries, issues upon which the United States wants Cuba to make concessions and vice versa. I think we need to sit down with them and begin to negotiate those issues.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Well, as I understand it, it has been made clear to Mr. Castro time and again that there are several conditions that we feel are necessary. For example, that he pull his troops out of Africa; that he stop exporting revolution in Central and South America; that he somehow account for the properties of Americans that were expropriated in Cuba.

As far as I understand it, he has just said “no” to all these conditions.

Mr. LeoGrande. Unless I am mistaken, the United States has not made the compensation issue a precondition for negotiations. The United States has said, though, that a sizable withdrawal of Cuban military forces from Africa is a precondition for resuming the normalization process.

If we maintain that as a precondition, there will be no normalization of relations.

Mr. Lagomarsino. So, you do not think we should make that a condition?

Mr. LeoGrande. I do not. I do not think there should be any precondition on either side.

Mr. Lagomarsino. So, we treat people in Africa as second-class citizens insofar as revolutionary activities from the outside?

Mr. LeoGrande. No, I do not see how that follows.

Mr. Lagomarsino. The people in Angola would probably disagree with you, some of them.

Mr. LeoGrande. What I am saying is this: The process of normalization ought to be begun with no preconditions on either side. We ought to sit down with Cuba, put the issues on the table and try and work through them.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Shifting hemispheres, would you say the same thing about Vietnam?

Mr. LeoGrande. Yes; and the same thing about Angola as well. Although I do not see that we have many differences with Angola except for the fact that the Cubans are there.

Mr. Lagomarsino. I have no further questions.

Mr. Yatron. Thank you. Gentlemen, we have a vote on the floor of the House. I would like to respectfully request we take a recess for about 10 minutes at which time we will resume the hearing.

[Whereupon, a short recess was taken.]

Mr. Yatron. The subcommittee will resume its hearing.

Professor LeoGrande do you see any advantage or disadvantage to U.S. foreign policy as a result of President Carter not having responded more harshly to the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba?
Mr. LeoGrande. No; in fact, that whole incident came out as badly as it did because the administration overreacted in the first place. At the time U.S. reconnaissance satellites saw a large-scale military maneuver being conducted by Soviet troops and reported that to the White House. The White House then jumped to the conclusion that this maneuver was being carried out by a Soviet brigade, implying that these were regular Soviet combat troops apart from the military advisory group that the Soviet Union has in Cuba. The administration also jumped to the conclusion that this must be some sort of a new military initiative on the part of the Soviet Union in Cuba. Upon retrospect, it turned out that the intelligence we had could not sustain either of those conclusions. The intelligence community could not rule out the possibility, the strong possibility, that these Soviet troops had been in Cuba ever since the missile crisis. It could not rule out the possibility that these troops were part of an advisory mission, coming together to conduct maneuvers as part of the training process.

As a result, what was characterized as an "unacceptable" situation suddenly became acceptable and the United States looked very bad. If the administration had not initially overreacted by jumping to conclusions about the character of those military personnel, the whole incident could have been avoided.

In short, it was a minor thing which was blown out of proportion; we looked bad for blowing it out of proportion and then not having an adequate response.

Mr. Yatron. With Castro the head of the nonaligned movement, what would be your expectation in terms of where Castro is planning to lead the movement in western hemispheric affairs?

Mr. LeoGrande. In western hemispheric affairs the role of the nonaligned movement is likely to be fairly restricted; most western hemispheric countries are not members of the nonaligned movement. But there is no doubt that the Cubans would like to see the nonaligned movement move to the left. In particular, that means to adopt a political position which sees the movement as an ally of the Soviet Union. In the economic realm the Cubans would like the nonaligned movement to reach a consensus that its economic interests lie more with the Socialist camp than with Western countries.

Let me say, though, that I think the Cubans are not going to have a great deal of success in accomplishing these objectives. The final declaration which came out of the sixth summit that was held in Havana last September represents the consensus within the nonaligned movement. The Cubans argued for positions in that document which were considerably more radical than the final document that was actually produced. The result was that the Cubans realized the movement's consensus would only allow so much in the way of change toward a more radical position.

Cuba's attitude as a leader of the movement since then has reflected their acceptance of the fact that they have to live with the existing consensus, even though it is not as radical as they would like.

Mr. Yatron. Do you foresee Soviet assistance bringing Cuba out of its economic stagnation, or will the situation continue to deteriorate?

Mr. LeoGrande. The Soviet Union is committed at this point to providing whatever economic assistance the Cuban economy requires. Whether it will require more or less in the intermediate run is very difficult to predict. The natural conditions which have caused the cur-
rent recession, that is to say, the loss of the tobacco crop and the partial loss of the sugar crop should be rectified in a year or two. The Cubans are trying to remedy the managerial difficulties they have had over the last 5 or 6 years, or even longer, but whether they will have any success in that is difficult to predict.

Mr. Yatron. On page 7, you state that we must not let our preoccupation with Cuba distort our policies toward other countries. Would you care to comment on the claim that many of our policies toward other countries are a result of Cuba's preoccupation with refueling revolution?

Mr. LeoGrande. Let me return to the Nicaraguan example. Before Somoza left Nicaragua, the policy of the United States was to try to create some sort of moderate post-Somoza government which would prevent the Sandinistas from coming to power. The reason was not so much that the Cubans were involved supporting the left, but rather that the United States simply felt that a Sandinista government would not be in our best interests.

The involvement of the Cubans in Nicaragua and in the hemisphere generally has become in some ways almost an obsession on the part of the United States—an obsession which makes it very difficult for us to weigh what is in our best interest bilaterally with particular countries. The Nicaraguan case is in some ways an exception after Somoza left. I think that the policy the administration has pursued with regard to Nicaragua since Somoza left has been a good one. Even though the aid package has yet to be finalized, nevertheless, I think the administration has had good intent. The result is that we have been able to maintain cordial relations with Nicaragua now for almost a year after Somoza left power. If we go back to 1959, a year after Batista had left and the revolutionary government had come to power in Cuba, United States relations with Cuba were absolutely horrible. So, I think that we have done a good job since Somoza left in Nicaragua.

The Angola case is another interesting one. The United States has literally no bilateral disputes or hostilities with Angola other than the fact that there are Cuban troops there. The result is that we are not interested in normalizing relations with Angola, even though the Angolans are not only interested but anxious to improve relations with the United States and with the West generally. They would like to avoid falling into economic dependency on the Soviet Union. But because Cubans are in Angola, we are unwilling to make any overture to that country. The result is that we condemn them to realign themselves economically with the Socialist camp because they have no other alternative.

Mr. Yatron. Professor Aguilar, would you like to comment on the assertion that Cuba has adopted a conciliatory diplomatic approach toward most of the nations in the hemisphere?

Mr. Aguilar. If that policy is compared with what Cuba was doing in the 1960's and early 1970's, I would agree with that. Cuba is no longer proclaiming, "We are going to transform the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the continent," which meant, we are going to revolutionize the whole continent; all governments that are not revolutionaries are our enemies. That was Cuba's official position in the 1960's.

If you compare that policy with Castro's attitude in 1971 when he visited Peru and hailed Col. Velasco Alvarado as a "revolutionary leader"; and it was quite a surprise to see Mr. Castro shaking the hand
of an ex-gorilla—not guerrilla, gorilla—who had recently defeated Castro oriented guerrillas, that was quite a change. Part of it, I would say, was a result of Soviet influence. The Soviets are much more pragmatic. As Professor LeoGrande has said, the Soviet Union never really approved or openly backed the guerrillas. Those students and priests going to the mountains to fight, for nebulous causes and with undefined programs, were not considered reliable by the Soviets.

After the 1970's Cuba became more orthodox, following more closely the Soviet pragmatic approach. A flexible conciliatory policy toward Latin America was initiated. Remember that when in the 1960's a very numerous Soviet commission was visiting Colombia to sign a commercial treaty, the Colombian Government arrested all Communist leaders in the nation. At that time Mr. Castro expressed his anger and complained that the Soviet Union was sacrificing the Colombian Communist Party to mere economic interests. But since then, the situation has changed. Castro can no longer criticize the Soviets. In that perspective, yes, I agree.

Mr. YATRON. Do you think it is likely that Cuba will increase its assistance to revolutionaries in Central America?

Mr. AGUILAR. Well, I would like to agree again with my colleague. I do not think that the United States should consider that the concept of revolution was invented in Cuba, or that the economic and social problems of Central America and the Caribbean are a result of Havana's conspiracy, or the Soviet Union's. Those problems are there and can be expected. And, unless the United States pays full attention to the region before it explodes, before the usual, "What do we do" after Guatemala becomes revolutionary, the danger will increase. You should be paying attention to what is happening in Guatemala now, to the poor economic conditions; to the lack of social justice; to the repressive government they have, and do something about it now. Or, slowly, a revolutionary situation will grow. And then the Cubans surely will come to profit from the situation because that is their métier, as the French say, their Socialist duty.

I would say that this should be the U.S. policy, not to wait until the situation gets hopeless. Try to help the democratic or the social changes before the Cubans can exploit the situation.

Mr. YATRON. Do you anticipate that either Grenada, Nicaragua, Guyana, or Jamaica will eventually adopt the Cuban Marxist-Leninist model of development.

Mr. AGUILAR. Well, Mr. Chairman. I have a book published on Marxism in Latin America. Before I began doing research, I had a sort of clear idea what was a Marxist-Socialist government. When I finished the book, I found myself very confused because today socialism has acquired an undefined connotation. Mozambique is a Socialist nation. Grenada is perhaps moving toward socialism. Cuba is Socialist, but China is also Socialist. And the Chinese are saying that the Soviets are imperialists or traitors to socialism. I do not know how to answer that question. I would say that if the question is put in this sense, are these governments going to move toward one party system, toward state control of the economic resources, toward elimination of opposition, then my answer would be on the affirmative. Yes, that seems to be the trend. I hope that it does not happen, but at least many powerful elements in those nations are moving toward those goals.
Mr. YATRON. In your view, do Latin Americans have a greater fear of U.S. interventionism, or Cuban subversionism?

Mr. AGUILAR. That depends on what part of Latin America we are talking about. I am sure that the Argentinians have no fear of Cuban intervention, or Brazil, or Chile. The closer you get to Cuba, the higher the risk and the fear of some kind of Cuban intervention.

In terms of American intervention, or let me say U.S. intervention, frankly, I do not think that there is any nation in the world today that is afraid of American intervention.

Mr. YATRON. Professor LeoGrande, on page 6, you cite the fact that Cuba's foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere is overshadowed by their economic initiatives, and the role of the Soviet Union is very small. In the same light, would you say Cuba’s policies are the exact opposite of this in Africa, with military initiatives overshadowing economics, and the desires of the Soviet Union being the major factor?

Mr. LeoGRANDE. You have to distinguish among specific countries. Certainly, in Angola and in Ethiopia, the military dimension of Cuban involvement is the principal dimension.

In the large number of other countries to which Cuba provides assistance programs of various sorts, economic assistance tends to be predominant.

With regard to whose interests are advanced by such programs, in both Angola and in Ethiopia you have a convergence of interest, a partnership between Cuba and the Soviet Union. The Cubans could not be there without Soviet military assistance, and the Soviets could not be there without the Cubans being willing to cooperate with them.

The convergence of their interests makes it possible for them to build such a partnership.

Mr. YATRON. On what do you base your statement that Latin America fears U.S. interventionism more than Cuban subversion?

Mr. LeoGRANDE. Let me begin by qualifying my comment, restricting it to most Latin American countries. If we are talking about Central America, it would not apply.

But the wave of Cuban revolutionism in the late 1960's was a failure. The governments of the hemisphere proved quite capable of containing the guerrilla movements which the Cubans supported—to the point that the Cubans moved away from that policy. I think most governments in the hemisphere have ceased to fear the kind of exporting of revolution which Cuba engaged in during the 1960's.

With regard to the United States, I think that no action the United States has taken in the post-war period did more damage to our prestige and relations in Latin America than the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic. At the time, the Organization of American States was convinced by our Government to endorse the intervention, but in retrospect, there is no doubt that it harmed our relations rather than helping them.

I believe there is now considerable fear in Latin America that the United States may react to political instability in Central America with some response similar to the Dominican intervention. That would necessarily bring forth from virtually every government in the hemisphere condemnation of U.S. interventionism.

We must understand—as I am sure you do—that the issue of U.S. interventionism in the hemisphere has a very, very long history.
It is one of the most sensitive issues in our relations with the hemisphere, perhaps second only to economic issues.

Mr. YATRON. Do you have anything you want to add to this, Professor Aguilar?

Mr. AGUILAR. No; except perhaps just a footnote. I cannot visualize the military Government of Chile, to give one example, condemning American intervention in Central America to avoid a leftist government from reaching power. I tend to believe that not many military regimes would condemn the United States for that kind of intervention. Also, condemnations could be real and passionate or only rhetorical. The United States could receive a lot of "rhetorical" criticism.

Mr. YATRON. Gentlemen, I have no further questions. Some of the other subcommittee members may have some questions to submit to you in writing. If this would be the case, we would appreciate your written responses.

Mr. LEOGRANDE. Certainly.

Mr. YATRON. I want to thank you both very much for giving us the benefit of your expertise. It has been a very interesting hearing.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
APPENDIX 1

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED IN WRITING BY SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN GUS YATRON TO DR. EDWARD M. COLLINS, VICE DIRECTOR FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ACTION IN ANGOLA

Mr. YATRON. Although you stated you had no reports of casualties, a report appeared March 29, 1980 in the Washington Star. It referred to action in Angola stating:

"As proof of their growing strength, Savimbi's forces have just turned back a Cuban offensive aimed at opening the Benguela railroad, and Castro's censorship hides the heavy casualties from the Cuban people."

Would you care to comment?

Mr. COLLINS. [Security deletion.]

DOMESTIC DISCONTENT IN CUBA

Mr. YATRON. Would you comment on the effect of the security crackdown on domestic discontent in Cuba?

Mr. COLLINS. [Security deletion.]

BLACK MARKET AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN CUBA

Mr. YATRON. In your opinion, why has the high level government consolidation had little impact on the black market and criminal activity?

Mr. COLLINS. [Security deletion.]

CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA

Mr. YATRON. With Castro as chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, do you anticipate that the Cuban military activities in Africa will continue a moderate appearance?

Dr. Collins. Castro has stated on numerous occasions that Cuban military activities in Africa are on the side of the "progressive forces" and against neo-colonial forces. [Security deletion.]

CUBAN PRESENCE IN YEMEN

Mr. YATRON. Do you believe Cuban presence in Yemen is a possible first step toward active Soviet presence?

Mr. Collins. As you know, the Soviets began regular naval deployments to the Indian Ocean in 1988 and since that time have made port calls in Aden. Today, the Soviet make frequent use of both naval and air facilities in South Yemen. The importance of these facilities has grown considerably since the loss of access to facilities in Somalia in 1977. [Security deletion.]

CUBAN INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Mr. YATRON. Cuba has reportedly encouraged guerrilla forces in Central America to unite in the same fashion as in Nicaragua. Have they had any success? Are they promoting this type of unity in the Caribbean?

Mr. COLLINS. [Security deletion.]

CUBAN ACTIVITY IN THE GRENADA COUP

Mr. YATRON. What evidence, if any, is there of Cuban activity in the Grenada coup, other than the New Jewel movement having "dealings" with the Cubans?

Mr. COLLINS. [Security deletion.]
CUBAN MILITARY-ADVISERS IN AFRICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Mr. YATRON. You refer to Cuba as an important regional military actor in the Caribbean area. Do you see the possibility of transferring their role in Africa back to this hemisphere in the near future?

Mr. COLLINS. Cuba has the ability to simultaneously provide large numbers of military advisers and combat troops in both Africa and the Caribbean. The degree to which the Cubans become militarily active in the Caribbean depends to a large degree on what they perceive the U.S. reaction would be to Havana's involvement.

MODERNIZATION OF CUBAN EQUIPMENT

Mr. YATRON. On the subject of modernizing their equipment, have the Cubans obtained additional ground assault helicopter gunships since last year?

Mr. COLLINS. [Security deletion.]

SOVIET ARMS FLOWS

Mr. YATRON. Is there any evidence of Soviet arms flowing from Cuba to Central America and the Caribbean?

Mr. COLLINS. [Security deletion.]

SUBMARINES IN CUBA

Mr. YATRON. Last year, you said one submarine would be a "quite minor threat". Now that Cuba has two Foxtrot subs, does that upgrade them to a "minor threat"?

Mr. COLLINS. It is difficult to quantify just what level of threat one, two, or more submarines pose. Certainly by increasing the number of submarines the threat increases. By receiving additional submarines the Cubans can have more patrols or exercises. However, given the fact that these ships are relatively new to the Cubans, there is a question as to how quickly they can fully master the operation of this weapon system.

CUBAN INFLUENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN

Mr. YATRON. You state on page 17 that the respite from leftist inroads into the Caribbean is only temporary, and Havana is determined to exploit the social and economic ills of the region. Do you anticipate Castro will use similar methods in the Caribbean as he has in Central America?

Mr. COLLINS. Castro will do anything that he has to do to increase Cuban influence in the Caribbean. There is no rigid blueprint for success. In some countries, the Cubans will attempt to unify all militant opposition and to undermine government control when possible. In other areas, the Cubans will attempt to improve state-to-state relations, which has been the general practice thus far in the Caribbean. Beyond these generalized concepts, however, there will be no structured pattern. Cuban participation in Nicaragua and El Salvador has differed, and further inroads into the Caribbean will also undoubtedly vary.

SOVIET ARMS

Mr. YATRON. Would you comment on why the Soviets sell arms to military governments which are diametrically opposed to communism and frequently repress communist organization or political parties?

Mr. COLLINS. Thus, far, the Soviets have not sold arms to military governments in Latin America which are diametrically opposed to communism. The Soviets initially sold arms to Peru when the military government was led by Gen. Juan Velasco, who was sympathetic to the left, including the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP). [Security deletion.] Since August 1975, however, the government has been controlled by more moderate military officers who have been less sympathetic to the leftists. The Soviets, nevertheless, have continued to sell arms [security deletion].

SOVIET EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN PERU

Mr. YATRON. Are you able to tell us how close the cooperation is between the Soviet Embassy personnel and Soviet military advisers stationed in Peru?

Mr. COLLINS. [Security deletion.]
Mr. YATRON. How receptive has the Peruvian Government been to the reality that with Soviet equipment comes Soviet advisers?

Mr. COLLINS. The Peruvian Government knows the Soviet advisers are needed to instruct in the use of and provide maintenance for equipment, especially for the more complex weapons systems [security deletion]. It would appear, therefore, that the military government is willing to accept Soviet advisers in order to obtain the equipment it wants. It could be considered a marriage of convenience. The Soviets have long wanted to expand their influence in South America and have now gained a toehold in Peru. The Peruvian military government wants and has obtained military hardware.

Mr. YATRON. What type of financial terms do the Soviets offer for their non-military projects, such as the tin smelter in Bolivia, the hydro-electric projects in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, and the irrigation and port development projects in Peru?

Mr. COLLINS. Soviet economic aid to Latin America has been in the form of lines of trade credits tied to purchases of Soviet equipment. The primary countries involved have been Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay. The development projects involved have largely been highly visible in a political sense and are in the public sector. As outlined below, the credits provided have been primarily for hydro-electric construction except in the case of the Bolivian tin project. These credits are of a commercial nature in that they are to be repaid and are tied to purchases of Soviet equipment needed to complete the various projects.

Soviet willingness to extend these trade credits is partially motivated by the extremely unfavorable balance of trade that exists with Latin America. Liberal credit extensions encourage these countries to import a modicum of Soviet products that would not be desired on their technical merits. Consequently, these credits are liberal in that they are extended for a period of 12 years at 2½ to 3 percent interest. The credit repayment helps to offset significant Soviet imports of agricultural products and tin. It also enables the Soviets to place technical advisers in the host country, but the number has always been small in relation to other world regions.

The greatest part of Soviet economic credits to Latin America have been for hydro-electric power development projects. [Security deletion.]

Mr. YATRON. I have concerns about the stability of the government in Bolivia. Would you comment further on that aspect and the March 13 report of a plot there to destroy airplanes, military combat and transport trucks, and an ammunition dump? Is there any Cuban connection that has been ascertained?

Mr. COLLINS. There are many good reasons for concern about the stability of the Bolivian Government. The administration headed by Mrs. Gueller has managed to remain in office for nearly five months. [security deletion]. The domestic political situation is quite unstable, and the economic scene is dismal. Bolivia is fighting an inflationary spiral and has a huge U.S. $3 billion foreign debt. Since previous regimes were reluctant to impose economic restrictions on the populace, the current government has been forced to implement an economic austerity program to insure that Bolivia continues to receive the International monetary assistance on which it depends. The continuing civil unrest is a result of this stringent program. [security deletion.]

Mr. YATRON. Would you consider it sabre rattling that Peru has purchased 16 additional Soviet fighter bombers with firepower equal to the French Mirages of neighboring countries?

Mr. COLLINS. [Security deletion.]

Mr. YATRON. What are your expectations in Guyana, where elections have been postponed twice, while a new “socialist” Constitution is written?
Mr. Collins. The new Constitution bill was approved by the President of Guyana on February 20, 1980. It will remain in abeyance until Parliament is dissolved. The National Assembly is expected to be dissolved by October 26, 1980, and the Constitution will be promulgated within seven days of the dissolution. The bill provides for the current Prime Minister, Forbes Burnham, to assume the office of Executive President "as if he had been elected" and to remain in that office "until the person elected President in the next following presidential election" takes over. Elections are called for within three months of the dissolution of the existing Parliament.

The new Constitution created a presidential republic and vastly expands the President's powers at the expense of the Prime Minister and the National Assembly. The President is head of government as well as state. The Prime Minister becomes an adviser to the President. [Security deletion.]

For the past years, Burnham has been losing support, even in his own party. The economic crisis, bringing with it a sharp decline in living standards and public services, and the apprehension aroused by Burnham's success in obtaining authority to change the Constitution [security deletion] has intensified political opposition.

GRENADA'S ARMED COUP

Mr. Yatron. Would you comment on the significance of the pledge of unity reported March 14 in which leaders of Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Grenada, that would place the United States policy under increased strain?

Mr. Collins. On March 13, 1980, Grenada celebrated the first anniversary of the armed coup which brought the New Jewel Movement to power. The only Caribbean leader to accept the invitation of Prime Minister Bishop to attend the ceremonies was Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica. The Nicaraguan leader, Daniel Ortega, also attended. Reportedly, the three underlined the need for the Caribbean and the Americas to unite to fight imperialism—the common enemy—and to try to solve such problems as high unemployment and poverty.

This type of rhetoric replete with anti-U.S. euphemisms is frequently trotted out by leftist leaders for public consumption. What is of particular interest here, however, is the fact that no Caribbean leader other than Prime Minister Manley attended the celebrations. One could infer that most other Caribbean governments were not wholly in tune with the new, pro-Cuban revolutionary regime in Grenada and wanted to keep their distance. Such statements from these leaders are both predictable and unexceptional and are not likely to impose new strains on U.S. Caribbean policy.

CUBAN PLOT

Mr. Yatron. As I read your testimony, are you stating the Cuban plot has shifted to develop popular complaints into revolutionary situations? Isn't it your thought also, that Cuba is supplying seed money and training, rather than a large number of people?

Mr. Collins. There is no one Cuban strategy for expanding its influence. A variety of methods are used, depending on local conditions in the target country. The exploitation of popular complaints has been a very important method used in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, with varying degrees of success. Between 1967 and 1978, Cuba generally used other means to advance its regional interest, but Nicaragua presented it with a propitious set of conditions that Cuba felt warranted the readoption of this approach. This does not mean that Havana has limited itself to this one approach or even that this is the preferred method. It does indicate, however, that Cuba is flexible in pursuit of its goals, and fostering revolutions is one of the techniques that has worked under certain conditions. [Security deletion.]

CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO NICARAGUA

Mr. Yatron. In Jamaica, you mention the Cuban Ambassador Is a former deputy chief of the Department of the Americas of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba. Isn't the Cuban Ambassador to Nicaragua, Julian Lopez, also a former section chief of the same Department of the Americas?

Mr. Collins. [Security deletion.]
CUBAN TRAINING OF JAMAICAN AND NICARAGUAN YOUTHS

Mr. YATRON. How many Jamaican youths are training in Cuba and have returned to form a so-called Trojan Horse to spread Cuban influence, rather than use their vocational training? How many Nicaraguan youths are undergoing similar training in Cuba, if you know? Are you aware of the number of KGB agents assigned to Jamaica?

Mr. COLLINS. As of September 1979, a total of [security deletion] Jamaican “Brigadistas” were known to have received training in Cuba with another [security deletion] currently undergoing training for a total of [security deletion].

LIBYAN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO CARIBBEAN ISLANDS

Mr. YATRON. Would you comment on Libyan financial assistance to several Caribbean islands? What is the extent of such funds and what is the significance?

Mr. COLLINS. [Security deletion.]

According to Jamaican newspaper reports, the Libyan Government had agreed to lend Jamaica U.S. $50 million for three years at an interest rate of 13 percent, repayable in one lump sum of U.S. $75 million at the end of the period. Up to this date, however, Jamaica has received no money from Libya, and there is some belief that the loan may have been contingent upon Jamaica reaching an understanding with the IMF. This is unlikely at this time. [Security deletion.]

During a press conference on January 17, 1980 after returning from the Middle East, Prime Minister Maurice Bishop stated that Grenada will receive U.S. $10 million, primarily for the airport construction project, as a result of his visits to Algeria, Libya, and Syria. It is thought that Libya pledged U.S. $4 million of the total amount. No other information about these loans has yet been publicized [security deletion].

DISPUTE OVER BEAGLE CHANNEL

Mr. YATRON. Is the Argentine-Chile dispute over the Beagle Channel close to solution or is there a chance of a military confrontation?

Mr. COLLINS. [Security deletion.]
APPENDIX 2

Questions Submitted in Writing by Subcommittee Chairman Gus Yatron to Robin Kent, Randolph Pherson, Robert English and Russell Swanson and Responses Thereto

Question. How many KGB personnel are there in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean and Central America, and especially in Jamaica?
Answer. [Security deletion.]

Question. What is the size of the Russian Embassy in Costa Rica? Were some Soviets expelled from Costa Rica recently? When? Why?
Answer. As of September 1979 there were 9 Soviet diplomats and 15 administrative employees at the Russian embassy in Costa Rica.
The 1st and 2nd secretaries were declared personae non gratae in August 1979. The secretaries were accused of being involved in the Limon strike.
Relations have cooled. President of Costa Rica believes Soviets are again involved in labor strife, but there have been no more expulsions since August 1979.

Question. I read a report which states that the Soviet embassy in Managua has a staff of one hundred personnel. Why does such a small country have such a large diplomatic staff from the Soviet Union?
Answer. Soviet Ambassador German Shlyapnikov arrived in Managua 16 April 1980. As of 16 April 1980 the Soviet embassy staff level was about 40 personnel. The staff is still working out of the Intercontinental Hotel. There is no confirmation that the number of personnel may grow to nearly 100.

(1) The East Germans have diplomatic relations with 18 Latin American countries to include: Argentina, established June 25, 1973; Bolivia, established September 18, 1973; Brazil, established October 22, 1973; Colombia, established March 23, 1973; Costa Rica, established January 9, 1973 (Ambassador resident in Mexico); Cuba, established January 12, 1963; Ecuador, established July 23, 1973; Grenada, established October 9, 1979; Guyana, established April 17, 1973; Jamaica, established March 21, 1977; Mexico, established June 5, 1973; Nicaragua, established July 20, 1979; Panama, established January 28, 1974 (Ambassador resident in Mexico); Peru, established December 28, 1972; Suriname, established August 3, 1978; Uruguay, established December 24, 1972; Venezuela, established July 24, 1973; St. Lucia, established March 15, 1979.

(2) The following is a breakdown of individuals associated with the East German Embassies according to our files: Argentina: 4 diplomatic representatives, 5 commercial representatives, 1 press representative, 16 administrative/support, total Buenos Aires—26.

Bolivia: 1 diplomatic representative, 3 commercial representatives, 1 administrative, total La Paz—5 (Also Ambassador to Peru, resides in Lima).

Brazil: 5 diplomatic representatives, 4 commercial representatives, 1 support, total Brasilia—10, 8 trade mission representatives (Rio de Janeiro); 21 trade mission representatives (Sao Paulo); 9 representatives from mixed trading companies (Sao Paulo).

Colombia: 4 diplomatic representatives, 4 commercial representatives, 9 administrative/support, total Bogota—17.

Costa Rica: 1 diplomatic representative (also ambassador to Mexico resides in Mexico).

Cuba: 12 diplomatic representatives, 1 military attache, 3 commercial representatives, 2 press representatives, total Havana—18.

Ecuador: 3 diplomatic representatives, 2 commercial representatives, total Quito—5.

Guyana: 1 diplomatic representative (also ambassador to Cuba and Jamaica resides in Cuba), 2 commercial representatives, total Georgetown—3.

Jamaica: 1 diplomatic representative (also ambassador to Cuba and Guyana resides in Cuba).

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Mexico: 8 diplomatic representatives, 1 military attache, 17 commercial representatives, 1 press representative, 6 administrative/support, total Mexico City—33.

Nicaragua: 1 diplomatic representative (no further information).

Panama: 1 diplomatic representative (also ambassador to Mexico and Costa Rica; resides Mexico City).

Peru: 5 diplomatic representatives, 1 military attache, 3 commercial representatives, 2 administrative/support, 3 Carl Zeiss Co. in Lima, total Lima—14.

Uruguay: 3 diplomatic representatives, 2 commercial representatives, total Montevideo—5.

Venezuela: 5 diplomatic representatives, 2 commercial representatives, 4 administrative/support, total Caracas—11.

Grenada and St. Lucia have not yet exchanged representatives. No further information on Nicaragua and Suriname is available.

(3) The East Germans have confirmed publically that they would provide "basic and advanced" training for Nicaraguan trade union officials in the GDR. (This type of aid has been extended by the East German Labor Federation—FDGB—to trade union organizations of other Latin American countries.) A FDGB official presented a "solidarity consignment" worth M1 million ($300,000) to the Nicaraguan Government during his visit to the country in late September 1979.

A Nicaraguan delegation visited the GDR March 27-April 2, 1980. A series of General Cooperation Agreements were signed to include a trade agreement covering long-term bilateral trade and providing for the formation of a mixed commission to develop bilateral economic relations.

(4) Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia have all agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. At present there is no evidence to indicate that these countries have established resident embassies in Managua.
APPENDIX 3

REPRINT OF APRIL 1, 1980 ASSOCIATED PRESS ARTICLE IN THE RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH

[From the Richmond Times-Dispatch April 1, 1980]

NAVY TO SEND HYDROFOOLS TO DUTY IN CARIBBEAN

NORFOLK (AP)—The Navy said yesterday it plans to station its fast hydrofoil missile patrol boats in Key West, Fla., in a further show of U.S. strength in the Caribbean.

The first of the ships to be placed in service, the USS Pegasus, will be transferred from its home port to Key West Aug. 1. Others will join the Pegasus after they are built.

The action is based on a Navy decision to increase the use of Navy facilities at Key West. This, officials say, is in keeping with continued interests in the waters around Cuba.

It also is a part of President Carter's response to the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba. The response included the establishment of a joint military task force in Key West.

The Pegasus, built by Boeing in Seattle, is capable of speeds of 55 miles per hour and has a range of 600 to 1,200 miles. It is 132 feet long, carries a crew of 21 and is armed with eight Harpoon anti-ship missiles.

The vessel completed its first operational assignment recently with other Atlantic Fleet ships and earned high marks, officials said.

Initial the fleet of hydrofoils was designed for high-speed missile attacks against enemy surface ships in close-in waters. The Mediterranean or Baltic Sea were considered the probable assignment areas.

But in the past few months the Navy began considering the advantages of such a vessel in the areas surrounding the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Station in Cuba, as well as in northeast Caribbean ports.

The vessels are descendants of the World War II PT boat, and the Navy believes there is a need to increase their numbers.

The skipper of the Pegasus, Lt. Cmdr. James W. Orvis, said in an interview recently that the Pegasus performed better than even some skeptics had thought. For that reason, it may have rewritten the orders to the Caribbean.

Two other Pegasus-class hydrofoils will join the group in the summer of 1981 and the remainder over the following three years.

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APPENDIX 4

REPRINT OF MAY 13, 1980 WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE BY ERNESTO BETANCOURT ENTITLED "BEHIND THE CUBAN TRAGEDY"

For weeks now we have been exposed to the tragic spectacle of thousands of Cubans desperately trying to flee the island. The human aspect of this tragedy has been aggravated by Carter's hesitation as well as by Castro's frantic maneuvering and viciousness.

Little can be added to the human side of the story. Faces and events speak more eloquently than words. But there is a meaning behind these events that could confront the United States with an opportunity that transcends the boundaries of Cuba and the refugee issue.

Underneath the braging and the orchestrated mass demonstrations, Castro is running scared. The Soviets may move to free themselves from the discredit he is heaping upon the socialist model among Third World leaders. They may be concerned with a Caribbean Afghanistan. Furthermore, these events show that Castro has lost touch with Cuban public opinion.

The action that unleashed this situation was Castro's decision to allow visits by exiled Cubans, instead of treating them contemptuously as "worms," Castro's press called those who had fled the island "members of the community in exile." His main concern was to earn desperately needed foreign exchange. Overconfident, as all beneficiaries of absolute power are, Castro could hardly expect that move to bring so many headaches upon his regime.

The 100,000 Cubans who visited the island in 1979 had an eye-opening impact on those who had stayed behind. The contrast in life styles awakened memories among the old, who could remember. It also opened new vistas to the young, who supposedly were thoroughly indoctrinated by the regime. The impact was not limited to the appeal of abundant food, clothing and electronic gadgets, but went to the deeper issue of freedom. There is a stronger appeal in being able to speak, to travel and to live and work where you want. And, most important, people want to be free of fear.

To say this does not belittle the importance of material conditions. These mass visits coincided with a disastrous situation in the Cuban economy: the collapse of the tobacco crop forced the closing of cigar and cigarette factories, idling 27,000 workers. The sugar crop this year is also a failure. Consumer goods shortages are appalling. The so-called Soviet assistance does not seem to alleviate these hardships.

In the presence of an increasingly educated population, it is easy to understand the judgment of those who want to leave. Cuba under Castro is unable to offer the good life or the pursuit to happiness. Charisma is no longer enough to keep the population's support for the regime.

In a speech last December, Castro made a pessimistic review of the economic situation. Earlier, his brother, Raul, minister of defense, had blamed the revolutionary leadership—meaning Fidel—for the economic mess. Castro took over direct supervision of the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Culture and Health—a strange approach to improve the management of the economy. More likely he was trying to prevent a Soviet move to replace him or to regain control of the police and military from pro-Soviet elements.

In January 1980, Celia Sanchez, Castro's Sierra Maestra secretary and lifelong companion, died. This provoked speculation in diplomatic circles in Havana that she was killed in a shootout between Fidel and Raul. Since Raul is known to be the Soviets' preferred Castro, it is not too farfetched to infer that Soviet pressure is a cause of tension among the core leadership in Havana.

Pressure for what? We can only speculate. The Soviet Union cannot be too happy with Castro's failure to use his position as chairman of the non-aligned

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movement to ease its embarrassment over Afghanistan. In fact, Castro couldn't even attend President Tito's funeral. At a time when the Soviets see opportunities in the Caribbean, Central America, Africa and the Middle East to capitalize on a favorable military balance of forces, Castro's clumsy handling of the Peruvian Embassy incident has introduced an unnecessary and most damaging distraction. What has happened undermines of rationalizations used by the Soviet Union to justify its expansionism in the Third World.

Rather than Cuba's being seen as a model for the wave of the future, questions are being raised in Mozambique, Jamaica, Guyana, Costa Rica, Peru and other quarters about the workability of the Cuban experiment. No wonder Castro wants all the refugees to come to the United States instead of going to Latin America. There they could help destroy the myth of his success in building a new, happier society.

The use of goon squads at the U.S. Embassy against those wishing to leave and the announcement on May 1 of the creation of a militia seem to reflect Castro's distrust of the Cuban armed forces. It is not that they may be unwilling to act against the people; that point has not yet been reached (although it may come, as it did in Hungary in 1956). Probably Castro needs a force less influenced by the Soviets to protect himself from a fate similar to that of Hafizullah Amin in Afghanistan.

In the event of disintegration of the Castro regime, what should our position be? We must be prepared to face the eventuality of a Soviet move to replace Castro in order to keep Cuba within the communist camp. Even if severe repression is required, the Soviet military leaders are unlikely to accept quietly the loss of such a crucial strategic position. Following usual Soviet practice, Castro's adventurism could be blamed for the regime's failure.

Under such circumstances, could the Soviets rely on the Cuban armed forces in Cuba, Ethiopia and Angola? That is doubtful. Once events are unleashed, the hatred of the Cubans for the Soviets will make the regime highly unstable. As in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, Soviet forces may have to used. That is the moment for which we had better start preparing contingency plans and, one hopes, under a more determined leadership than we have shown recently.

Granted, this is a very hypothetical interpretation of the meaning of the Cuban exodus. But we should not ignore it. Guilt over Vietnam, Chile and Watergate has made many lose sight of the strong appeal of a free society. It is that kind of attitude that leads people to think that communism is irreversible, but not even Brezhnev believes that. If he did, the Brezhnev doctrine would not have been necessary.

The writer, now a development consultant here, was Fidel Castro's Washington representative during the Cuban revolution.