Trying to report intelligently on the Mexican military is like
trying to see in the dark - it's all shadowy outlines and no
details. The army is famously secretive, opaque, and hostile
to public scrutiny. Just ask the people who write about it.
"The army has never provided information to outsiders
on its own initiative," explains Raul Benítez Manuat,
a scholar for the Center for Research on North America at UNAM
and visiting professor at the National Defense University in
Washington who has written extensively about the Mexican armed
forces. "Its policy is to have no contact with the press
or academia."
James Smith, former correspondent in Mexico for the Los
Angeles Times, now foreign editor of the Boston Globe,
laughs when he recalls that even officials in the Secretariat
of Defense (SEDENA) press office refused to give their names
when they spoke to him. Another Mexico correspondent for a major
U.S. newspaper has equally frustrating tales to tell: "We
have never gotten any useful information out of our contacts
with the military."
The correspondent describes spending months faxing and calling
SEDENA in an effort to get Secretary of Defense Ricardo Vega
García to sit down for a personal interview. After months
of silence, General Vega suddenly agreed to meet. When he was
introduced to the reporter, Vega told him stonily: "The
only reason I am talking to you is that my President ordered
me to do so."
Remarkably, Vicente Fox's presidency appears to have had little
direct effect on the Mexican armed forces. While other aspects
of Mexican society and government became subject to fierce public
debate in the wake of the political transition, the military
remained apart, silent and unengaged.
That may be changing. The Federal Law for Information Access,
which came into effect in 2002, required the Secretariat of
Defense - along with all federal agencies - to make information
about its functions, organization and staffing voluntarily open
to the public. SEDENA is also obliged for the first time to
respond to individual citizen requests for information.
Roderic Ai Camp, professor of political science at Claremont
McKenna University in California, and the author of one of the
few authoritative studies on the Mexican armed forces, Generals
in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992), describes a "dramatic change"
in the military's attitudes toward openness. In a telephone
interview, Camp said he has used the law over 30 times to obtain
data such as the names of current military zone commanders and
a list of the members of a graduating class at the National
Defense College - information, he pointed out, that would have
been virtually impossible to get just two years ago.
"This in turn is going to have an impact to what I would
call the culture of the military," Camp said. "As
junior officers are exposed to this new openness and it is considered
the norm by the institution, they will be more willing to talk
to outsiders in the future."
U.S. declassified documents provide another rich source of
information about Mexico's armed forces; embassy, CIA and Pentagon
officials routinely gather intelligence about the military and
send it to Washington for analysis. Although American officials
face their own difficulties trying to obtain solid data about
the armed forces, their reports add significantly to the information
available in Mexico.
In this edition of Archivos Abiertos, we offer one
example of the kind of reporting found in U.S. records. The
document is an intelligence assessment of the military produced
in 1993-94 by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis
Center, called Army Country Profile-Mexico.
The Pentagon's "Army Country Profile" was a routine
annual report on militaries around the world produced with intelligence
gathered by defense attachés, embassy officers, the CIA
stations and the National Security Agency. It was designed to
keep security planners in Washington informed about the fundamental
characteristics of foreign armed forces: their mission, troops,
tactics, training, weapons, equipment, and intelligence capabilities,
among many other aspects.
The U.S. government released the secret 150-page document to
the National Security Archive with many deletions. Nevertheless,
the declassified excerpts published here contain a wealth of
information about the Mexican army impossible to obtain directly
from SEDENA, and offer an unusual glimpse inside what is still
the country's most secretive institution.
The
Enemy Within: Old Weapons, Poor Training and Corruption
The intelligence assessment also highlights U.S. concerns about
the military. Part I, "Ground Forces" - published
in April 1993 - profiles the strengths and fighting capabilities
of the army at a time when its most recent serious engagement
was still the Guerrero counterinsurgency of the 1970s. Writing
before the Chiapas uprising would permanently alter the world's
image of "stability" in Mexico, American security
planners were focused on the army's limited capacity to fight
internal unrest, and the government's failure to spend the money
necessary to modernize its armed forces.
Summary
[…] The leading problems that continue to hamper the
Mexican military are obsolete and heterogeneous equipment, lack
of logistical control and technical maintenance, over-centralization,
corruption, and inadequate training.
The Army is capable of maintaining public order, but this capability
depends on how widespread civil unrest becomes. The military
would not be able to control a broad-based antigovernment movement,
but such an uprising is unlikely to happen in the near future.
Mexican authorities are extremely sensitive to its military
associating with any foreign armed forces. Relations between
US and Mexican military officers are correct, but formal. Under
the current Secretary of National Defense, General Antonio Riviello
Bazan, more lines of communication have been established and
opportunities for exchange between the two militaries have broadened.
However, relations will probably continue to expand at a slow
pace because of historical antecedents, contentious bilateral
immigration, and drug enforcement-related issues.
Mission and Doctrine of the Armed Forces
A Mexican military defense against an equal-size military force
with modern weapons is not possible. Under the protection of
the United States (US), and with weaker militaries to the south,
Mexico has historically enjoyed the benefits of a de facto military
alliance without obligations. As a result, the Mexican Armed
Forces have organized and equipped primarily for internal defense.
The mission of the armed forces includes the security and support
of the administration, control against civil unrest, and suppression
of drug trafficking.
Mexico continues to remain remarkably free of immediate security
concerns from within or beyond its borders. The lack of short-term
threats is particularly unique given Mexico's proximity to the
sustained instability in Central America and its own significant
economic difficulties. However, domestic instability could increase
dramatically if the economy fails to improve despite the government's
current civic and military modernization efforts. […]
Armed Forces Capability
Although disciplined, the armed forces of Mexico are undertrained
and antiquated. Modernization and reorganization programs are
currently underway to alleviate these deficiencies, but progress
will be slow because the Mexican Government has traditionally
kept its armed forces organizationally divided, rendering them
too weak to pose a political challenge. […]
The organization, equipment, and training of the army are well
suited for conducting counterinsurgency operations. The Mexican
Army is capable of suppressing a regional insurgency, as demonstrated
by its successful counterinsurgency campaign in Guerrero State
in 1974. […] Only a massive, nationwide insurrection would
challenge the army's ability to maintain order.
Weapons Sophistication
Although Mexico is economically well developed by Third World
standards, it retains much outdated and heterogeneous military
equipment. Commanders from all services frequently complain
of spare-parts shortages, under-qualified maintenance technicians,
and lack of quality equipment.
Based on the poor condition of current Mexican weapons and
equipment, it can be concluded that competent employment of
any newly acquired sophisticated equipment would be highly unlikely
- the Mexican military does not have a budget of sufficient
size or adequate training and logistical support structures
required. Although improving, this problem is not expected to
be remedied in the near future.
Recent Operational Experience
The most significant military activity in recent years has
taken place in the counterdrug arena. The army was called upon
to suppress election-related civil unrest in Michoacan State
in April 1990. Elements of the Airborne Brigade have provided
security for some major law enforcement actions, including the
arrest of a corrupt union leader and a major drugtrafficking
kingpin. […]
Although the Mexican military has shown an ability to conduct
successful counterdrug operations, the efforts have not been
enough to significantly restrict or stop the transshipment of
drugs through Mexico. [Large section deleted.]
Disposition
Over the past 12 years, the Mexican Secretariats of National
Defense and the Navy have significantly increased military capability,
particularly in southeastern Mexico. The buildup is part of
an overall military expansion and modernization program and
is also in response to perceived security threats along the
borders with Guatemala and Belize. The threats include Guatemalan
insurgent activity, Guatemalan army incursions, trafficking
in arms and drugs, and threats to oil producing facilities.
The armed forces have nearly doubled the number of combat units
and aircraft assigned to southeastern Mexico while reorganizing
commands, constructing new facilities and adding new capabilities
such as a radar system and special operations units.
Specialized Training
Officers and soldiers of units with specialized missions receive
appropriate training. The Group of 100 (the army's principal
antiterrorist unit) and the GAFE (Special Forces Airmobile Group)
train for their special operations. The personnel of the Airborne
Brigade receive a grueling 11-week jump school. Units selected
for Task Force Marte undergo a month of intensive training for
counterdrugs before deploying.
There is no military intelligence branch; consequently, individuals
from other branches attend intelligence training. There is no
military intelligence school in Mexico, so officers often train
in foreign schools. […]
Corruption
Corruption exists in the army - as in all branches of the Mexican
Armed Forces - and it affects all ranks. Corruption is most
notable with units participating in counterdrug operations,
because drug traffickers are often able to entice some military
personnel to cooperate in return for various forms of compensation.
Command and Control
Command and control suffers from over centralization and a
rigid command structure. Even the most minute decisions, such
as requisitions for spare parts or approval of officer leave
forms, must be signed at the national level. This slows routine
decision-making to a crawl, although the Secretary will bypass
the chain of command and communicate directly with zone commanders
on important issues. Most of the Mexican Army is dispersed as
garrison units controlled by military zone headquarters, with
no tactical organization above battalion level. This zonal system
does provide flexibility, as units can be transferred from one
zone to another with little disruption. Efforts to professionalize
the officer corps, coupled with operational experience in the
drug war, are gradually improving the army's command and control
capability.
Intelligence
The army's intelligence capabilities are marginal and geared
mainly to collecting on domestic political groups and, more
recently, on drug trafficking activity. Resources devoted to
non-domestic targets are limited to surveillance of various
foreign embassies and diplomats, particularly the United States
and Cuba. The Secretariat of Government, responsible for internal
security, runs the General Directorate of Investigations and
National Security (DGISN), probably Mexico's most efficient
intelligence organization. The DGISN is well organized and uses
its limited resources efficiently in collecting routine, short-term
intelligence. [Deleted]
The army's system of intelligence collection and analysis is
rudimentary. Military zone commanders utilize an information
platoon to collect intelligence in their area. Partidas (groups
of information platoons) stationed in isolated areas and the
rural defense corps also collect information. Raw intelligence
is passed directly to the S-2 (intelligence) section of the
National Defense Staff in Mexico City for analysis. [Deleted]
The Presidential Command Staff has its own S-2 section and
provides independent analysis exclusively for the president.
The unit is primarily concerned with providing security for
the president, but also reports on other areas of concern to
the president.
Part II of the Army Country Profile-Mexico, written
in August 1994, analyzes Mexican intelligence and security services,
according to the document's preface and table of contents. Although
only handful of pages have been declassified and released to
the National Security Archive, they contain information about
U.S. intelligence operations in Mexico, the capabilities of
Mexican intelligence agencies, and Washington's evaluation of
the effects of the Zapatista uprising on the country's prospects
for stability.
The declassification of Part II of this report is evidence
that even sensitive information about the Mexican military can
be made public and discussed openly without harming Mexico's
national security or the future of the armed forces. Perhaps
the report could even serve as a model for the Secretariat of
Defense - and provoke a re-evaluation of SEDENA's internal policy
toward the right of Mexican citizens to information about their
armed forces.
Counterintelligence
The Mexican environment is relatively favorable for the conduct
of intelligence operations by the US Armed Forces. Bribery and
other forms of corruption are widespread throughout Mexico,
giving foreign intelligence services numerous opportunities
to recruit sources. The ability of Mexican intelligence services
to counter HUMINT [human intelligence gathering] operations
is probably only moderate. Mexican intelligence has very little
experience in combating foreign espionage operations, primarily
because most of the espionage occurring inside Mexico is directed
against the US; the Mexican Government has limited concern with
such operations. [Deleted]
Outlook
For the foreseeable future the Mexican intelligence and security
establishment will face serious problems caused by corruption
and inadequate funding. Effective law enforcement in Mexico
faces major obstacles because of the pervasive influence of
drug traffickers who have corrupted large numbers of police
and intelligence personnel. Corruption is a less serious problem
within the Mexican Armed Forces where greater discipline prevails.
Within the PJF and the state police services, corruption is
widespread and has led to large-scale dismissals [….]
The January 1994 outbreak of an organized insurgency in Chiapas
has presented Mexico's intelligence and security services with
a serious challenge. A significant percentage of Mexican military
and police forces have been diverted to Chiapas to contain the
violence. Until a peace settlement is reached, this reallocation
of intelligence assets is likely to remain in effect. The main
consequence of this situation is a weakening of the Mexican
effort against drug trafficking. At present it appears that
the EZLN, the guerrilla group behind the insurgency, does not
have enough resources or adherents to spread its activities
to other Mexican states. If this proves true, and the government
is able to reach an agreement with the EZLN, the rebellion in
Chiapas will not have long-term repercussions for the stability
of Mexico. On the other hand, if the EZLN and the government
are unable to come to terms, there is a chance that unrest could
spread to other parts of Mexico, which would threaten the overall
stability of the country. […]