Date

Oct 27, 1965

Description

Under Secretary George W. Ball signed off on a fervent expression of his apprehensions about the direction of West German policy should the West fail to establish an MLF leading Bonn to feel “rejection and discrimination.” Ball saw three bad possibilities: a national nuclear program, a French-German nuclear deal, or “the real danger, a German political adventure.” By the last, he meant a revival of German nationalism, which could lead to a reunification deal with Moscow. That would be “catastrophic for us” by causing a “major shift” in the balance of power, the demoralization of the West, and a “new and greater struggle.”

Source

RG 59, Executive Secretariat Briefing Books, 1958-1976, box 10, Book # 115, The Case for An American Lead to Establish a Collective Nuclear System, 1965

Document published in following posting(s):

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the German Nuclear Question Part II, 1965-1969

Mar 21, 2018

“The Danger from a Psychotic Germany,” Appendix to “The Case for a Strong American Lead to Establish a Collective Nuclear System That Would Help the Western World from Repeating an Old Mistake,” attached to George W. Ball to Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Mr. Bundy, 27 October 1965