Date

Dec 29, 1947

Description

Over a year after the Bikini tests, the JCS Evaluation Board produced its final report, a review of the test results and their implications for national policy. One of the board members, Admiral Ralph Ofstie, showed a draft to a colleague, who commented that “It scared the hell out of me.” Readers of the conclusions and the text of the report [PDF pages 20-49] will quickly understand why. Drawing on their understanding of the blast, fire, and radiation effects of the Able and Baker tests, the Board concluded that “If used in numbers, atomic bombs not only can nullify any nation’s military effort, but can demolish its social and economic structures and prevent their reestablishment for long periods of time. With such weapons, especially if employed in conjunction with other weapons of mass destructions, for example, pathogenic bacteria, it is quite possible to depopulate vast areas of the earth's surface, leaving only vestigial remnants of man's material works.”

The Board took it for granted that the United States had to retain its “dominance in the ability to wage atomic warfare, the loss of which might be fatal to our national life.” While it favored a peace based on international cooperation, “agreement and understanding,” until such circumstances existed, “this nation can hope only that an effective deterrent to global war will be a universal fear of the atomic bomb as the ultimate horror in war.” Therefore, in the absence of “permanent peace” the Board favored the “immediate and continuous preparation for the contingencies of atomic warfare is the part of prudence.” Thus, the idea of a permanent arms race was built into the reports’ conclusions.

The Board supported the creation of an intelligence service that could help provide warning of attack, but it also favored preventive war under some circumstances measures will be the only generally effective means of defense, and the United States must be prepared to employ them before potential enemies inflict significant damage upon us.” Even the production of fissile material by an adversary could be a cause of war. According to the Board, as commander-in-chief, the President’s duty was defense against “imminent or incipient atomic weapon attack.” Nevertheless, as long as the United States had a “democratic government,” Congress would have war making powers and was obliged to define what “imminent” or incipient” meant in practical terms: “What constitutes incipient attack it is the responsibility of the Congress to explore and define so that it may draft suitable orders to the Commander-in-Chief for utilization of our armed forces should we be under the menace of an atomic weapon attack.” In other words, Congress would authorize a preemptive or preventive war by the President.

The discussion of war-making powers was the report’s most deeply controversial feature and when the possibility of public release was under discussion, the Joint Chiefs wanted to excise those portions. The proposed excisions are evident in the version of the report published herein. Nevertheless, the entire report was so hot that senior officials in the State Department and Defense Department strongly objected to its release. The document stayed suppressed until it was declassified in 1975. [21]

Source

RG 218, Central Decimal Files, 1948-1950, box 231, CCS 476.1 (10-16-1945), Section 9, Part 2

Document published in following posting(s):

Bikini A-Bomb Tests July 1946

Jul 22, 2016

Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Proposed Release of an Extracted Version of the Final Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board on Operation Crossroads and the Related Proposed Press Release,” JCS 1691/10, 29 December 1947, Top Secret.