Date

Jan 18, 1979

Description

Harold Saunders, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, and Thomas Pickering, the assistant secretary for oceans, international environmental, and scientific affairs, reported to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on the latest intelligence on Pakistan, among other matters. This memorandum, along with the one to Under Secretary David Newsom [Document 11] that follows, provides interesting detail on what Washington was learning about the scope of the Pakistani nuclear program. The Saunders-Pickering memorandum to Vance looks at policy options for responding to the Pakistani nuclear program, including application of the Symington Amendment (aid cut-off to countries that were illicitly enriching uranium). Their analysis spelled out the complex diplomatic problems raised by the U.S.’s new knowledge of Pakistan’s secret nuclear program.

What made policy options necessary were two findings about Pakistani efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons: One was that Pakistan was “building a facility capable of small-scale reprocessing, near the PINSTECH [Pakistan Institute for Science and Technology] research center” that would be capable of producing enough plutonium for at least one nuclear device annually. This was a reference to the “New Labs” project, among other activities. The other was that a “secret gas centrifuge program is intended to yield significant quantities of HEU.” The Pakistanis had already “succeeded in operating small numbers of centrifuge units.” Moreover, referring to Kahuta, but not naming it, the Pakistanis “have plans for 7,000 units, and have begun to construct buildings to house the facility and to acquire equipment for the plant.” It would take about 2 years of work for the plant to operate and another two years before it could produce HEU.

The discussion of the Symington Amendment, which required an aid cut-off if Pakistan was found to be receiving technology for an enrichment program after 4 August 1977 (when the amendment went into effect), indicated the problems of interpretation. Even if the technology that Pakistan was acquiring was not specifically nuclear enrichment equipment, “it is clear nevertheless that the items are being imported for use in combination in the same facility and in a way that is only consistent with the construction of gas centrifuges for enrichment.”

Cutting off aid to Pakistan raised a variety of policy problems (such as the Indian reaction), but at “present juncture, a cut-off of aid in fact risks enhancing Pakistan's sense of isolation and insecurity which are the primary motivating factors prompting their search for a nuclear deterrent.” Yet, because it would be necessary to decide on Symington in the near term, “we cannot wait and must move quickly to maximize the influence we can bring to bear by seeking the diplomatic support of others who have influence in Islamabad.” That made it necessary to consider approaches to China, the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia, Western allies, and the nuclear suppliers, all of whom were discussed in this memorandum.

What would make it difficult to discuss the Pakistani nuclear issue with many countries was “the fact that our knowledge … is derived from extremely sensitive intelligence primarily of third-country origin, which we presumably could not use publicly.” Evidently, some of the sources were British [see Document 12], based on contacts in Pakistan and elsewhere, and the French may also have provided intelligence. How much information on the secret nuclear program the U.S. could get from Pakistani diplomatic telegram traffic remains to be learned, but that source was certainly wide open owing to a backroom deal between the CIA and the Swiss producer of encoding machines.[7]

Source

RG 59, Smith records, box 13 (unlabeled file)

Document published in following posting(s):

Pakistan’s Nuclear Program Posed “Acute Dilemma” for U.S. Policy

Aug 30, 2021

NEA-Harold H. Saunders and OES - Thomas R. Pickering to the Secretary, “Pakistan's Nuclear Program: Policy and Legal Implications for the United States,” 18 January 1979, in Office of the Historian, Application of the Glenn and Symington Amendments Against Pakistan (1979), Secret