Date

Sep 16, 1977

Description

In the spring of 1977 (See FRUS Document 9), President Carter asked Secretary of Defense Brown about several key issues: “1) procedures for the conduct of a limited nuclear war, (2) the survivability of our command and control under nuclear attack, and (3) the concept of “limited nuclear options” (LNOs). Those questions prompted a lengthy report that provided important context for decision-making. Brown’s report included a detailed look back at key developments during the 1960s and 1970s, including the important Foster Panel report, the National Security Study Memorandum 169 report, and Richard Nixon’s National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242. All were responses to the problem of catastrophically huge SIOP attack options involving “several thousand nuclear weapons” (the smallest, by 1969, involved over 1,700 weapons). According to Brown, even though top U.S. officials “believed our strategic forces and plans adequate to deter a major nuclear attack on the US, they were uncertain that the threat of large-scale nuclear retaliation provided the best deterrent to lesser attacks or threats to the US and its allies.” Also concerning was the “changing strategic balance [that] appeared to erode US allies’ confidence in the strength and credibility of the US nuclear deterrent.” Those concerns led to the new approach embodied in NSDM 242 and proposals for Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs), Select Attack Options (SAOs) and Regional Nuclear Options (RNO) that would supposedly be more credible and could be used to control escalation and “limit damage” to prevent an all-out nuclear war.

Providing some detail on the state of play in producing LNOs, Brown recommended implementing NSDM 242 and continuing “current doctrine” for the use (“employment”) of nuclear weapons. The purpose of those options was “to strengthen deterrence across a broader range of possible conflicts by providing a series of preplanned, measured and discrete nuclear response options more applicable to situations where the deterrence threat of the large-scale options in the SIOP would be inappropriate or incredible.” Details on the LNOs and RNOs that top commanders had prepared are completely excised.

With his report, Brown included memoranda on “procedures for conducting nuclear war,” command and control survivability, and by JCS Chair George Brown on “nuclear weapons employment policy.” The command-and-control study found that “the potential for survivability of the US command and control system today is better than it was in 1970, with recent assessments concluding that it contributes significantly to a credible deterrence.” That was most optimistic compared to information that Odom and Brzezinski would receive in 1978 (See Documents 4 and 9).

Source

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy (FRUS Document 36)

Document published in following posting(s):

New State Department History Details Nuclear Targeting and Continuity of Government, 1977-1980

Apr 17, 2024

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, “Secretary Brown’s Response to Questions on Our Nuclear War Procedures and Doctrine,” n.d. [circa 16 September 1977], with attachments, Top Secret, excised copy