Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 1 of 27 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER Plaintiff No 17-163 V OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE Defendant DECLARATION OF EDWARD GISTARO DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE Pursuant to 28 U S C 1746 I Edward Gistaro declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct 1 I am the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration I assumed this position in March 2016 Previously I served as the Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration starting in June 2014 Prior to my appointment as Assistant Deputy Director I served within the Intelligence Community 1C in several management and analytical positions since 1989 2 Under a written delegation of authority by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 1 3 c of Executive Order 13526 I hold original ciassr carion authority at the TOP SECRET level I am authorized therefore to conduct classi cation reviews and to make original classification and declassification decisions for intelligence information up to and including the TOP SECRET level Case Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 2 of 27 3 Through the exercise of my official duties I have become familiar with this civil action and the underlying FOIA request I make the following statements based upon my personal knowledge and information made available to me in my of cial capacity 4 I submit this declaration in support of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment in this proceeding The purpose of this declaration is to explain and justify to the extent possible on the public record the actions taken by the ODNI in reSponse to plaintiffs request for information under the FOIA 5 U S C 552 I BACKGROUND INFORNIATION ON THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 5 Congress created the position of the Director of National Intelligence DNI in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 Pub L No 108-458 1 101 a and 1097 18 Stat 3638 3643-63 3698 99 2004 IRTPA amending Sections 102 through 104 of Title 1 of the National Security Act of 1947 Subject to the authority direction and control of the President the DN I serves as both the head of the US Intelligence Community 1C and as the principal adviser to the President and the National Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security 50 U S C 3023 b l 2 6 The responsibilities and authorities of the DNI are set forth in the National Security Act of 194 as amended These responsibilities include ensuring that national intelligence is provided to the President heads of the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders the Senate and House of Representatives and committees thereof 50 U S C 3024 a 1 The is charged with establishing the objectives of determining the requirements and priorities for and managing and directing the tasking collection analysis production and dissemination of national intelligence by elements of the 1C 50 U S C 3024 D l A i and Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 3 of 27 7 In addition the National Security Act of 1947 as amended provides that the DN1 shall protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure 50 U S C 3024 i Consistent with this responsibility the DNI establishes and implements guidelines for the IC for the classi cation of information under applicable law Executive Orders or other Presidential Directives and for access to and dissemination of intelligence 50 U S C 3024 i 2 A B 8 Finally the National Security Act of 1947 as amended created the Of ce of the Director of National Intelligence ODNI The function of the ODNI is to assist the DN1 in carrying out his duties and responsibilities under the Act and other applicable provisions of law and to carry out such other duties as may be prescribed by the President or by law II THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL JANUARY 5 2017 REPORT RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT U S 9 On December 6 2016 the President of the United States Barack Obarna hereinafter the President instructed the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper hereinafter Clapper to prepare an intelligence report addressing the motivation and scope of Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election 10 DNI Clapper assigned the task of preparing the report to the National Intelligence Council NIC The 1C is a key ODNI component responsible for leading analysis across the IC to inform immediate and long term policy deliberations In my of eial capacity as DDNUII I oversee the activities and operations conducted by the NIC Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 4 of 27 I I National Intelligence Officers NIOs working within the NIC serve as the principal subject matter experts to both the DNI and to national security decision makers on all aspects of analysis related to their regional and functional roles 12 Production of the report was led by the National Intelligence Of cer for Russia and Eurasia NIOfRussia and the National Intelligence Of cer for Cyber Issues The NIOJ Russia is a seasoned intelligence of cer with 20 years of experience within the and extensive academic and intelligence background in Russia including Russian intelligence activities capabilities and methods The is an intelligence of cer with 15 years of experience in cyber analysis and operations within the IC He has also served as a Classi cation Advisory Of cer in his previous roles Both the NIOIRussia and the NIOnyber are qualified competent experts with respect to identifying information that standing alone or working in concert with other information including unclassified information could jeopardize US intelligence sources methods activities and national security if released to the public 13 The IOIRussia and IOICyber were supervised by the Vice Chair of the NIC an experienced intelligence officer with 30 years of service within the IC and 14 years of experience with declassi cation The Vice Chair is also a quali ed competent expert with respect to identifying information that standing alone or working in concert with other information including unclassi ed information could jeopardize US intelligence sources methods activities and national security if released to the public 14 The Vice Chair NIOJ'Russia and were supported by a team of experienced intelligence officers from the Central Intelligence Agency CIA the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI and the National Security Agency NSA who assembled the report using intelligence available to the IC as of December 29 2016 Case Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 5 of 27 15 The report produced by the NIC was entitled Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections and included sensitive national security information collected under the control of and provided by the CIA the FBI and the NSA The intelligence provided by the CIA FBI and NSA falls within the scope of one or more of the following types of information a Signal Intelligence Sources Some of the information contained in the report consists of intelligence obtained from signal intelligence SIGINT collected by the NSA The NSA produces SIGINT by collecting processing and analyzing foreign electromagnetic signals to obtain intelligence information necessary to US national defense national security and conduct of foreign affairs The provided to the NIC by the NSA for inclusion in the report qualifies as intelligence activities sources or and was previously classified by SA as either SECRET or TOP SECRET pursuant to Executive Order E0 13526 Release of the classified SIGIN contained in the report to the public or to foreign authorities could be reasonably expected to cause serious or exceptionally grave danger to national security b Human Intelligence HUMINT Sources Some of the information contained in the report consists of intelligence gathered by clandestine human sources These individuals are often uniquely situated to report on speci c subjects and to provide critical information that cannot be otherwise obtained The IC takes extreme albeit reasonable and necessary measures to ensure that human sources are not compromised because their exposure would subject them to capture imprisonment torture and death Such exposure would also impair the Us ability to recruit similarly situated individuals in the future The HUMINT provided to the NIC by the CIA for inclusion in the report Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 6 of 27 quali es as or otherwise reveals intelligence activities and sources with respect to Executive Order E0 13526 and was previously classified by CIA as either SECRET or TOP SECRET Release of the classi ed HUMINT contained in the report to the public or to foreign authorities could be reasonably expected to expose human intelligence sources to serious or exceptionally grave danger and would present an equally serious or exceptionally grave danger to national security c Intelligence Methods The report also contains details that would disclose intelligence methods Intelligence methods are the techniques procedures tradecrafts and means by which the 1C accomplishes its mission By their very nature intelligence methods are revealing of intelligence sources and vice versa Accordingly knowledge that a particular method is being employed can be used by foreign intelligence to pinpoint the availability and identity of a particular source or group of sources Such knowledge would also allow foreign intelligence to impair or capture human assets counter U S intelligence efforts and otherwise provide entities hostile to the United States with a threatening and possibly decisive advantage over US national interests and security The intelligence provided to the NIC by the NSA CIA and the FBI for inclusion in the report quali es as or otherwise reveals intelligence activities and methods with respect to Executive Order E0 13526 and was previously classi ed by NSA CIA or FBI as either SECRET or TOP SECRET Release of information in the report revealing classi ed intelligence methods to the public or to foreign authorities could be reasonably expected to cause serious or exceptionally grave danger to national security 1 Intelligence Activities Intelligence activities are the operations that are conducted by the on a day to-day basis to protect and preserve US national security Activities Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 7 of 27 rely on intelligence sources embody intelligence methods and reflect U S intelligence interests objectives and capabilities Knowledge of US intelligence activities provides foreign governments with information that can assist them in detecting tracking and exposing US intelligence sources and methods as well as impairing the overall intelligence strategy The intelligence provided to the NIC by the NSA the CIA and the FBI for inclusion in the report illustrates intelligence andfor foreign activities within the scepe of Executive Order E0 13526 andi'or and was previously classified by NSA CIA or the FBI as either SECRET or TOP SECRET Release of the information in the report revealing intelligence activities to the public or to foreign authorities could be reasonably expected to cause serious or exceptionally grave danger to national security The information falling within one or more of these four categories that was included in the text of the report was originally classi ed as SECRET or TOP SECRET as determined by the providing agency and at present retains this classi cation 16 The report was completed on January 5 2017 and was classi ed by the NIOi'Cyber as TOP SECRET This derivative classi cation determination reflected the fact that some of the content of the report was classi ed by the providing agencies as TOP SECRET Because the report contained information classi ed by other intelligence agencies holding original classi cation authority as TOP SECRET the report as a whole was properly classi ed as TOP SECRET in accordance with ODNI's classi cation guidelines 17 After reviewing the report I believe that the classi ed report was properly marked as TOP SECRET in accordance with E0 13526 l 6 and that the report remains properly classi ed as TOP SECRET I make this determination both as a rati cation of the NIO Cyber's Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 8 of 27 derivative classi cation determination as described in paragraph 16 and as an independent derivative classification determination based on my own experience knowledge of the contents of the report and my understanding that the sensitive intelligence gathered produced and provided to ODNI by other intelligence agencies 1 falls within the categories of information listed in 8 of E0 13526 2 was originally classi ed by the providing agencies as SECRET or TOP SECRET in accordance with E0 13526 3 remains as of the date of this declaration properly classified as SECRET or TOP SECRET in accordance with ED 13526 4 does not fall within any of the prohibitions and limitations set-forth in E0 13526 5 would be as determined by the original classi cation authorities reasonably likely to result in serious or exceptionally grave danger to national security if released to the public or foreign authorities THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL JANUARY 6 2017 DECLASSIFIED VERSION OF THE REPORT ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTION DURING THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 18 When the President instructed ODNI to prepare the intelligence report assessing Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election it was understood by DNI Clapper that the subject matter of the report was of acute interest to the American public Accordingly DNI Clapper determined from the onset that the 1C would proactively share with the public any and all information contained in the report that could be safely released without exposing intelligence sources methods and activities 19 In December 2016 the DN1 directed the NIC to prepare a declassified version of the report Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U S Elections For the sake of clarity I will refer hereinafter to the original classi ed version of the report concerning Case Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 9 of 27 Russian interference with the 2016 presidential election as the classi ed report The declassified version of the report will be referred to hereinafter as the declassi ed report 20 DNI Clapper's decision to prepare the declassi ed report as opposed to a redacted version of the classified report for public release was driven primarily by three factors a First in the interests of transparency public perception and the integrity of the American electoral process DNI Clapper's intent was to release as much information to the public as possible Accordingly choosing between the release of a separate declassi ed report versus the release of a redacted version of the classi ed report was based solely on which type of release would convey the greatest amount of information to the public without jeopardizing intelligence sources methods and activities b Second the consensus within ODNI was that releasing a redacted version of the classified report would inevitably result in less information being made public As already noted the classi ed report was and remains classi ed as TOP SECRET due to contents that relate to highly sensitive matters concerning intelligence sources methods and activities the public release of which could be reasonably expected to cause serious or exceptionally grave damage to national security A redacted version of the classified report would of course require all of these areas to be blocked-out redacted However to reasonably and fully protect US intelligence sources methods and activities significant amounts of unclassi ed information in the classi ed report would also have to be redacted To an experienced reader g a foreign intelligence service analyst the unclassi ed information if left non redacted would plainly illustrate factual associations and relationships between the redacted and non redacted portions of the report These associations and relationships would then provide valuable contextual Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 10 of 27 clues to foreign intelligence organizations concerning the type subject matter and amount of classified intelligence the U S currently possesses or is capable of gathering The only cure for this foreseeable and likely possibility would be to redact signi cant amounts of unclassi ed material as well It might even be necessary to redact all of the unclassi ed information in order to properly conceal and protect U S sources methods and activities c Third a declassified report would successfully decontextualize the unclassified information i e non-redacted sections of the report would not be surrounded by or lled with conspicuously redacted portions Since the unclassi ed content would have no association or relationship with redacted classi ed content it could be safely released in-full to the American public without jeopardizing intelligence activities sources and methods This would result in a greater over all amount of information being made available to the American public For these reasons DNI Clapper directed the NIC to create a declassi ed report for public release The NIC worked on the classi ed report and the declassified report simultaneously This provided the NIC with time to carefully and thoughtfully consider in consultation with contributing agencies what information could be safely disseminated to the American public without harm to national security 22 The declassi ed report was made public on January 6 2017 This report contained the unclassified content of the classi ed report including all of the conclusions regarding Russian interference with the US 2016 presidential election 10 Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 11 of 27 IV JANUARY 9 2017 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR PRODUCTION OF THE CLASSIFIED JANUARY 5 2017 REPORT ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 23 On January 9 2017 plaintiff the Electronic Privacy Information Center EPIC transmitted an electronic request to ODNI pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act FOIA for a copy of the ODNI report Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U S Elections Exhibit This request was understood by ODNI to seek a copy of what has been referred to in this declaration as the classi ed report 24 On January 17' 2017 ODNI acknowledged receipt of EPIC's request Exhibit to 25 Following receipt of the plaintiff s January 9 2017 FOIA request and the filing of Civil Action 17-163 the NIC was tasked with re evalualing the contents of the classi ed report to determine if it could be publicly released in-part with appropriate redactions or if the request must be denied in full to preserve US national security interests 26 The NIC subject matter experts including the NlO Russia the NlOnyber and the Vice Chair of the NIC based on their experience with classi cation standards their direct and comprehensive knowledge of the sensitive information contained in the classi ed report and their understanding of the capabilities of foreign intelligence service operations to uncover classi ed information by pairing the declassi ed report with a partially or even fully redacted version of the classi ed repon concluded that release of a redacted version of the classi ed report would assist foreign intelligence operations with developing and enhancing their understanding of US intelligence sources methods and activities It was further concluded that release of a redacted report would be of particular assistance to Russian intelligence which 11 Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 12 of 27 armed with both the declassi ed report and a redacted copy of the classi ed report would be able to discern the volume of intelligence the US currently possesses with respect to Russian attempts to in uence the 20l6 election This would reveal the maturity of the U S 's intelligence efforts and expose information about the lC's capabilities including sources and methods that could reasonably be expected to cause serious or exceptionally grave danger to US national security 27 For these reasons the NIC concluded that the FOIA request for production of the classified report must be denied in full to preserve and protect classi ed US intelligence sources methods and activities 2 8 On May 2 2017 ODNI denied EPIC's FOIA request in full Exhibit 3 decision to deny the production of the classi ed report was based on the fact that the classified report contains a information that is currently and properly classi ed pursuant to E0 13526 til-4 0 and b information that is exempt from disclosure under the National Security Act of 1947 50 U S C 3024 i because it pertains to intelligence sources and methods 29 Plaintiff led the instant case Civil Action 17 163 on February 10 2017'' to compel production of the classified report V RESPONSE TO CIVIL ACTION 17-163 30 Based on my 27 years of experience as an intelligence of cer and in my capacity as an original classi cation authority with responsibilities delegated to me by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to Executive Order 13526 I agree with the that a heavily or even jhiiy redacted version of the classi ed report can not be publicly released without 12 Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 13 of 27 jeopardizing national security information properly classi ed as SECRET or TOP SECRET under E0 13526 Accordingly I believe that full denial of January 9 2017' request is reasonable and necessary under national security exception 5 U S C as well as under FOIA exemption 3 5 U S C which recognizes the DNl's statutory obligation under the National Security Act of 1947 as amended to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure 50 USC 3024 i In reaching this conclusion I note that the classified report remains currently and properly classi ed as TOP SECRET as of the date of this declaration This is a derivative-classi cation determination which I base on my review of the classi ed and unclassi ed reports and my reliance on the original classi cation determinations made by other intelligence agencies that provided the SECRET and TOP SECRET contents of the classi ed report 3 1 Within the classi ed report SECRET and TOP SECRET information is interwoven with unclassi ed information throughout the document Even if the SECRET and TOP SECRET information were to be blocked-out Le redacted a quali ed reviewer could still use the unclassi ed non-redacted portions and the context they provide to identify the nature and substance of the redacted portions including among other things the relative availabilities and maturity of US HUMINT and SIGINT capabilities This could be readily achieved simply by pairing a redacted version of the classi ed report with the contents of the declassified report Through this pairing the subject matters of the redacted texts could be identified and from there the volume of the redactions would reveal the relative strength and maturity of US intelligence sources methods and activities Even if the actual word-for-word content of the redacted portions could not be fully identified by foreign intelligence organizations this would still constitute a significant and detrimental exposure of US 13 Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 14 of 27 intelligence activities sources and methods Also revealed would be the comparative weight of the HUMINT and capabilities i e it is likely that a skilled reviewer could determine whether the U S currently has human or signal intelligence sources in speci c areas Russia would be in a better position to allocate its counter-intelligence resources to address critical areas where the U S intelligence capabilities are revealed to be the strongest as evidenced by the amount and volume of redacted text and could also tailor its countermeasures to account for the type of intelligence g HUMINT or SIGINT the U S has been able to collect 32 The NIC's conclusion that release of the classified report though heavily or even fully redacted would not only be very helpful to Russian intelligence in the midst of their on- going efforts to interfere with the U S electoral process but would also jeopardize the safety and effectiveness of the intelligence community s critical valuable and in some cases vulnerable sources methods and activities is based on my years of experience reasonable Because the intelligence that Russia could gain from acquiring even a redacted copy of the classi ed report can be reasonably expected to impair or expose U S intelligence sources methods and activities or otherwise assist Russia with future attempts at interfering with the U S electoral process release of the classified report must be regarded as a serious or exceptionally grave danger to U S national security 33 In addition the speci c information that EPIC hopes to uncover though release of the classified report would be extremely detrimental to U S national security and is precisely the type of information contemplated by and protected under E0 13526 and As plainly described in Amended Complaint A C in paragraphs 10 through 13 EPIC's concerns focus on the extent and nature of Russian interference with the 2016 U S election AC at 1110 14 Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 15 of 27 details of the understanding of Russian intrusions and the future threats they pose A C at 11 the identities of US systems that were compromised and what voter records were obtained AC at 1 and what personal information the Russians may have obtained about members of the American public AC at HHS Publicly revealing any information that would assist foreign intelligence with understanding the knowledge understanding and basic situational awareness in y of these areas would shed light on US HUMINT and SIGINT capabilities as well as our speci c knowledge of Russian actions Such public revelation could and in all likelihood would result in the compromise of existing US intelligence sources and methods and would pose immediate and grave danger to US national security It would also give the Russians the opportunity to change their tactics in order to avoid U S detection while continuing to pursue their geopolitical ambitions As EPIC correctly describes in its amended complaint the American public is most certainly concerned about and interested in all of these activities However release of the specific information EPIC seeks could prove fatal to US human intelligence sources and would roll-back U S HUMINT SIGINT and other intelligence activities designed to protect U S national security including the protection of our electoral process 34 For all of the foregoing reasons after reviewing the classi ed and declassi ed reports and based on my knowledge and experience with intelligence operations classi cation and established methods of gleaning useful intelligence information from seemingly benign innocuous records or portions thereof it is my reasoned opinion that release of a properly redacted version of the classi ed report while providing the American public with no information not already available in the declassi ed report would certainly provide foreign 15 Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 16 of 27 intelligence services with valuable information that could be used alone or in conjunction with other information to jeopardize the physical safety of U S human intelligence sources uncover U S intelligence methods and identify understand and impair critical U S intelligence activities including our continued attempts to prevent foreign actors from interfering with our electoral process This would reasonably cause serious or exceptionally grave damage to U S intelligence efforts and U S national security Accordingly the FOIA request for a copy of the January 5 2017 classified report must continue to be denied in full in the interests of national security and consistent with ODNI's statutory obligation to protect classi ed sources and methods pursuant to 50 USC 3024 i 35 I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief Executed this 313 day of June 2017' Edward Gistaro Deputy DNI for Intelligence Integration 16 Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 17 of 27 THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA __________________________________________ Plaintiff v OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE Washington D C 20511 Defendant __________________________________________ ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER Case No 17-cv-0163 RC DECLARATION OF EDWARD GISTARO EXHIBIT 1 Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 18 of 27 JAR ELECTRONIC PRIVACY eplc 0rg INFORMATION CENTER BY EMAIL Email nifoiai'rvdnigov January 9 2017 Of ce of the Director of National Intelligence Attn ReqUest Jennifer Hudson Director information Management Division Of ce of the Director of National Intelligence Washington 110 2051 Bear Director Jennifer L Hudson This letter is a request under the Freedom of information Act 5 U S C 552 and is submitted on behalfofthe Electronic Privacy Information Center to the Of ce of the Director of National intelligence EPIC seeks the public release of the unredacted ODNI 201 report Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US I llections Jan 6 2017 The full report was directly referenced in the redacted version and is nvcesszi ril in possession of the agency The redacted report released to the public makes clear that Russia interfered in the 2016 election to undermine public faith in the US democratic process 2 However the redacted report fails to provide critical technical evidence EPIC now seeks the full unredacted version of the 2017 UIJNI report DIR iiFNA f i Asset-13mm AUTEXIHFS IN Rl-Ll TNT US 3616 in headers This report is a declassi ed version of a highly classi ed this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements ofthe influence campaign 3 Id at ii Ei l FOIA Roquesl 1 ODNI Report Russian Expedited Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 19 of 27 EPIC is entitled to expedited processing under the Specifically expedited processing is justi ed under 32 CFR because this request involves an urgency to inform the public concerning an actual or alleged Federal Government activity made by a person primarily engaged in disseminating informatien 1 First there is an urgency to inform the public concerning an actual or alleged Federal Government activity The Federal Government activity at issue is 1 he intelligence Community s assessment of Russian interference in the 2016 US election The C s assessment was called into question by the incoming administration although there is ample evidence to support the conclusions from other sources Moreover EPTC has a pending FOIA request currently before the FBI that seeks to determine the Bureau s response to the Russian either threatfI rPhat activity which may T be addressed in report sought independently satisfies the second requirement for expedited processing under the ODN procedures set out in the The Senate Armed Services lommittee recently held a bee ring on Foreign ier Threats to the United States that addresaed the contents of 3 USAF 552tai hitlia vitil 32 1 id Kuroun Demirjian 8 Greg Miller Trump '5 criticism ofintc igem e dividing r Hill GOP Pti 'l' Jan 4 Ellie diViding-hill-gnp l 7f0li04il t'icl ali4-dZal-l 166-3783- cd3i a JSUt2fd la Dmitri Alpcrovich Bear-x in the Midst intrusion into the Democratic Nutimtui Committee Cit liiNl i5 201m 7 Letter from EPIC to officer FBI Dcc 22 3016 POM request regarding FBI investigation of Russian interference in U S eicCtion Eric Lipton David E Sanger and Scott Shane The Perfect ii'i upna How Riwsi ua t-hematite invaded the NY Times Dec 13 2016' describing in part FBI contact with DNC concerning Russian hacking See emieru r id EPIC Request 2 ODNI Report Russian Expedited Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 20 of 27 this report Future hearings in Congress are scheduled and legislation is anticipated ' Therefore The full report is urgently needed to resolve any outstanding questions about the accuracy of assessments and the response of the FBI and inform the public debate over imminent Congressional action Second EPIC is an organization primarily I engaged in disseminating informatien 1 5 As the Court explained in EPIC is Dept of Def satisfies the definition of representatit e of the 10 st media entitling it to preferred fee status under FOUL13 In submitting this request for expedited processing I certify that this explanation is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief '3 t tt l-ng it E-i Media Fe Status and Fee Wailtg EPIC is a representative of the news media for fee classi cation purposes Based on C s status as a news media requester EPIC- is entitied to receive the requested record with only duplication fees assessed in addition because EPIC's request satis es each ol the two alternatiVe in 32 CPR 700 6 bl for granting a fee waiver any duplication fees should also be Foreign phi-r Threats to the tinned Siam STATES on Assn- 11 Stave threats Lo-thc-unilcd-stales notice ot hearing Jan 5 2017 5 Hearings US Stats 11 COMMITTEE os listing Open Hearing Russian intelligence Activities Nomination Hearing H i 1 Up notice of nomination hearing Jan 11 2017 for Mr Rex Tillerson Jordain lime Lawmakers preparing Russia mm l imt ' bill ll l Jan 6 El 7 l3 ng-ncw-russia- sanctions lbr-ncM-wcek 3i 3 EPIC v Day of e 241 F Supp 2d 5 15 2003 1 lT OtHElb 4 24 F Supp 2d 5 at l5 5 ll S C H EPIC Request 3 Report Russian Expedited Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 21 of 27 lil lC satisfies because the interest of the United States Government would he A week into a new Congress's tenure legislation to step up sanctions against Russia is already under way 3 The US government has an interest in a full and accurate public understa riding of the Russian attempts to influence the 2016 election in order to develop the appropriate US response to Russia In addition given criticism ofthe lC- from the incoming administration the fullest understanding of the report's foundation is vital to securing US confidence in the PC and its assessments In the alternative EPIC also satisfies 1700 61 l ilt2 because it is in the public interest to provide responsive records because the disclosure is likely to contribute significantly to the public understanding of the operations or activities of the United States Government and is not primarily in the conimercial interest of the requester m' First disclosure of the full report is in the public interest because the disclosure is likely to contribute signi cantly to the public understanding of the operations or activities of the United States Because this request pertains to a joint report of the 1C published by the regarding their assessments of Russian activities- it speaks to operations or activities of the Federal Disclosure of requested record will contribute significantly to public understandina of those operations because it will clarify the basis on which the formed its conclusion s3 - rl he report itsell' noted it did not include ldidl not include the full supporting inlormation even for the key elements of the interference As just stated this inlet- nation is required to inform the U S response to Russia and the puhlic's assessment of the 1C t 'arnc supra note 10 Kai'uun Ucmirjian Greg Miller Trump criticism til intelligence Hi1 GOP W -ts lthi'l'ilN Pos'i' Jan 4 2mm dividing-hill-gopr ll WU ill-4H til I a 4-d a l loo a783 I'hnm _1L tni ll0c8fi 41's 3 3 3' It 3 Id 33 It Sec El tlt f t DIR lN'l l'l supra note i li'OlA Request 4 Report Russian Expedited Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 22 of 27 Seroml the request is not primarily in the commercial interem of tho EPIC has no commercial interest in disclosure ofthe records EPIC is a rcgistcred non-pro t organization committed to privacy open government and civil libt'l ticst For them Feat-3 01151 a the runitii- or should be granted Thank you for your consideration of this roqumt As provided in 32 ORR 1 700 1203 I will anticipate your determination on our request within ten calendar day's For questions regarding this rcqucst I can be contacted at 202-483- 1-10 or FOlAtmepiccrg Respectfully Submitted MI Kyrm ufr Eleni Kyriukides EPIC FOIA Fellow 371 8 Connecticut Ave NW Suite 200 Washington DC 20009 202 483 1140 Au 5 I mom bit 1- 2 Id thum ENC EPlC tiRti lil lC chuwt ODNI itcpurt Russian ll ixpet liiptll Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 23 of 27 THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA __________________________________________ Plaintiff v OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE Washington D C 20511 Defendant __________________________________________ ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER Case No 17-cv-0163 RC DECLARATION OF EDWARD GISTARO EXHIBIT 2 Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 24 of 27 LFI i ti Iran it a 2'1 i a - - no 1 in - lilcni Kyriakides JAN i 701 FUIA Fellow l718 'onnectieut Ave NW Suite 200 h- ashington 2000 Reference 0DNI Case Dear Lilcni Kyriakides 'l his acknowledges receipt ot your email dated 9 lanuary 20 Enclosure - received in the Management Division ofthe Of ce of the Director i National Intelligence tt' l Nl on 10 January 2t117 Pursuant to the l-reedom of nihrmation Act RNA 5 H 515 552 as amended you ucsted the public release oi the unredacted 2017 report Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections Jan 6 201 7 We will initiate searches and contact you as soon as possible il additional information or clari lication is needed to process your request All fees associated with the processing of this request have been waived With respect to your request for expedited processing please be advised that ODNI handles all requests in the order we received them on a lirst-in lirst-out basis We make exceptions to this rule only when a requester establishes a compelling need under the standards in our regulations A compelling need exists 1 when the matter involves an imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual or 2 when a person primarily engaged in Disseminating information makes the request and the information relevant to a subject of Public urgency concerning an actual or alleged federal government activity Your request does not demonstrate a compelling need under these criteria and- therefore we deny your request for expedited processing We may be unable to provide a response within the 20 working days stipulated by the RNA line have not responded to you by the 20 working day- you have the right to consider our inability to meet the 20 day requirement for a response as a denial and may appeal to the JIJNL information Management Division Washington DC 205 within 90 days of that date It would seem more reasonable however to allow us suf cient time to continue processing your request and respond as soon as we can You will have the right to appeal any denial of recordstiniormation at that time Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 25 of 27 you have any questions picaso Feel free to email our Roquextcr Scrvicc Center at or call us 1116013243449 You can aloo contact FOIA Liaison at 1 17 1 1 1 1-11-1 1-1 1 111-111-1131 1 1 Sally A Nicholson hicil Branch Manugtn icm Division Enclosure Case 1 17-cv-00163-RC Document 17-1 Filed 06 26 17 Page 26 of 27 THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA __________________________________________ Plaintiff v OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE Washington D C 20511 Defendant __________________________________________ ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER Case No 17-cv-0163 RC DECLARATION OF EDWARD GISTARO EXHIBIT 3 Case 27 of 27 Ul- i- Itll-i 11 1111- H1 Wasnmo'lox DC 2 151 i Eleni Kyriakides Al 0 2 7 EPIC FOIA Fellow 1718 Connecticut Ave NW Suite 200 Washington DC 20909 Reference ODNI Case Dear Eleni Kyriakides This responds to your request dated 9 January 2017' received in the Information Management Division of the Of ce ofthe Director of National Intelligence on 10 January 2017 Pursuant to the FOIA 5 U S C 552 as amended you requested the unredacted ODNI 2017 report Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections Your request was processed in accordance with the U S C 552 as amended A search of our records and databases located the document responsive to your request After thorough review we have determined that the document must be denied in full pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions I which applies to information that is currently and properly classi ed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 Section 1 4 and - which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute The relevant statute is the National Security Act of 1947 as amended 50 U S C 3024 i 1 which protects information pertaining to intelligence sources and methods If you have any questions your attorney may contact Trial attorney Jennie Kneedler at Jennie L Kneedler@usdoj gov or 202 305 8662 Please refer to the reference number shown above and the civil action number 17-cv-163 on all correspondence about this case Sincerely J4 Mariam Sally A icholson Chief FOIA Branch Information Management Division                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu