Background lunch with McGeorge Bundy July 13 196 on 7th floor Mr in chair Discussion centered on foreign policy implications of ELF plus these additional pointsa- Cuba Private indications have been received that Castro will not act rash on overflights Why wasn't Administration more responsibve to his overtures about rapprochement in recent N Y Times interview Impossible for Administration to do so in this election period and Castro knew that for he mentioned it Part of his Ila motive presumably was to offset impending action against him by OAS ministers But Castro also obviously wanted to try to keep a line out toward us Life has not been going to well for him We know he was spanked by the Russians for his Venezuelan subversion venture He also thinks what he inflatedly looks on as his Brazilian potentialities have collapsed He would like more flexibility of maneuvering area in the world less tied to Soviet umbilical cord Told that U S reasons given for refusal to deal with Castro were not too logical Mac retorted that they were convincing enough for our constituency--the U S electorate and that's what counts Said would be insane to start anything with Castro in election period Said he could not confirm published report that N Viets running air shuttle to Tchepone in Southern Laos and funneling troops and supplies from there to both Laos and S Viet-Nam Said air reconnaissance II of area is limited and there is also problem of being unable to get accurate reconnaissance through folia 8 Clear that Tchepone is a supply point ut I extent unclear Also said he had seen nothing directly of Khanh report that North Viet battalions are moving into South Still very til clouded still concern about Greek-Turk buildup Acheson still in early stages of his operation at Geneva is supposed to see Greek there today or tomorrow POLITICS- Before going in said he believes Goldwater left his pli position open to consider accepti security briefings from Administration if he is nominatgg This will be offered again Mac's own work while keeping on Cyprus SEAsia etc is centered on upcoming political campaign President sees dirty campaign coming platform assures that lots of foreign policy in store on basic simplicities rather than subtleties Nuclear issue will et kicked around a lot along with Berlin Wall Cuba E Asia etc Mac with mang Republican friends knowns no one i0 venturing to defend oldwater He laughingly encouraged speculative stories about Goldwater s cabinet Soviet Peacekeeping Offer Mixed views inside Administration on this actually more sharply mixed than he indicated but Presidents position is that it should be treated as openin move as Eli Harlan Cleveland says Soviets appearing over horizon of negotiations It is basiibposition in iBundy-Z-July 13 1964 - a - if 1 this as in Kennedy Administration in contrast to Dulles rthat what the Sovs toss up that contains in it any seeming Iii opportunity for serious discussions should be treated 1 seriously ramher than being automatically unlit rejected because it ineludes some curves This doubly so in this case as it was response awaited for four months to U S robe at Interesting to note that President has taken gleveland line it here rather than considerably harder line of most Soviet experts in State and also more tractable line than has publicl come out of either delegation at U N or out of London MLF Discussions too extensive to recall or reproduce in detail but highlights were Administration now firm on pressing ahead with MLF Mac said'pws position has evolved when point was raised that Eisenhower and Kennedy Administration raised MLF only as a suggestion and not as firm policy Questioned on pros an cons Mac said first said the fundamental issue is wrapping in Germans to head off any independent German nuclears First he rather minimized military case for ELF then tried to make that too When it was pointed out that McNamara in st said no military re uirement for ELF and that it was olitical esture ind cated that McNamara position has a so inten81fied for MLF Agreed that - deep in their hearts both German Erhard group and Socialists probably would prefer leaving - x i nuclear situation as it is in our hands but need it as safety valve to head off danger of Strauss and his wing eventually taking separate course No chance of French ever really sharing It nukes with Germans Germanstonly would be in pa sition of dependency on French Whole of our postwar European policy has been based on tieing Germans in to responsible role in Atlantic 15 Comuni ty Said MLF is not becoming crux issue in our policy toward Europe but agreed it was about on a par with ir European Defense Community debate of 19503 in its significance Minimized real I Soviet concern about said that than view reinforced by private talks with some Stuck to that when Marder noted that private Soviet line to other American officials is that Sovietsng say as they agree with U S intention to tie in Germans and prevent nuclear proliferation but disagree with U S assumption that it can work a Mac sought to reinforce his position by stressing that no danger tha U S ever would give nuclear capacity to Germans if we wouldn't give aid to France He indicated however more concern about East-West implications than he actually stated by saying he personally would favor--after German elections next spring--giving assurances that Uder-Neisse dividing line would be maintained to calm Polish in fears of German Illilwlh revanchism EELiBundy-3-Julyl3 1964 Agreed under questioning that Sovs now can use propaganda ill to advantage on Eastern Europeans to try to tighten its hold over them based on their German fears Conceded that this is a minus but one we can live with Disagreed that MLF proposal contradicts U S policy on advocating East-West freeze on nuclear production and delivery systems Said both can be done Denied that MLF is nuclear addition Said we had to meet problem of Soviet targeted on Western Europe and ithis is efficient was way to do it with additional boon of ' ilit getting Europeans to pay part of the cost Denied that we are doing what sovs tried to do to us in Cuba changing nuclear status quo maintained that we are simply using means of meeting Soviet MRBM threat that exists Sin Europe Brushed aside argument that MLF may impel Sovs to in 'build seagoing nuclear farce off our shores by saying they have that capacity anytime Also brushed off alternative suggestion of multilateralizing some of existing Minutemen in U S with European participation to alleviate demands for voice in U S domination of Allied nuclear policy Said for one thing security requirements would prohibit that Said German participation in MLF could enhance rather than inhibitl German position in bar ainin over its fate with Soviets Never fully developed %his %ut seemed to be saying they might someday bargain out of ELF if When asked if he meant German reunification smiled and said he was not one who sees that likelihood said most he II can envision is East German regime and operation that West Germans could tolerate Assume that Mac in part here was alluding elliptically to fact that none of Allies has real drive or desire for runn lliil reunification Jag-run 7 nhietekuu w u- 1 Mac said Administration is taking proposal for adding to MLF control the Pershing MRBE missiles and the planned British strike aircraft When it was noted that while that is official U b position many officials are highly suspicious of offer as a curve to pi put off the MLF asiinh said he knew some difference of views exist here on it but he thought best to treat it as serious offer He was fuzziesrbn key question of evolution of MLF Said he does not know what it will evolve into but was not fearful of outcome because any change would have to come back to Congress Kiln He sidestepped comment that different officials are saying different things il some that it will evolve into Euro ean nuclear force free of U b veto others saying they don' believe that will ever hippie happen With-her Icompletely disagrees with Bowie yet that is exactly what many officials including President himself have inplied EBUNDY - 4-Ju1y 13 1964 When it was noted that Bob Bowie one of architects of MlF said logical conclusion is eventual withdrawal of American veto strongly dissented said on that he a said we have llt now gotten away from unfortunate havertising council kind of Presentation of MLF that was going on in the spring meaning over-selling arm-twisting etc to him At one point he indicated that most important thing in this operation was to convince Germans that we tried our utmost to get MLF into the water i even if the plan collapses He specifically ducked discussing whether we would go ahead with-I without Billil ilillili Britain g _Italy or without Britain and Italy official posture seems to be aimed at saying the former and suggesting the latter he was going in down elevator Mac seemed to confirm that that is the 33 ploy by saying he was aware of the danger of pushing present year-end deadline too far that it I could mean loss of a potential major participant He earlier had said he saw possibility hthat British LabOr Party could swing around to supporting ELF 3 if they win election summation to me Mac was dutifully arguing case but hedging his own bets on outcome Harder                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu