Hr MORI DOCID 152 9471 BO 12958 E0 12958 I 3 30 l 25Yrs APPROVED Eon RELEASE BATE MAR - Chi lean Cou of Se teuber l973- Post-Mortem Report of Production in the IntEIIigence Community BACKGROUND 0n ll September l973 the Chilean Armed Forces mounted a successful coup against the Marxist government of President Salvador Allende U S intell gence collectors did an excellent Job of obtaining information concerning the immediate events which led up to the coup and concerning the development of the coup itself This critique briefly examines the performance of the producers of intelligence during this period HIGHLIGHTS Intelligence produced immediately prior to and during the coup was good The NIE published the previous June did not provide advance warning of the coup but current intelligence publications in CIA and DIA and special reports issued by these two agencies and by State INR informed the consumer that the chances of a coup were increasing The consumer was not however provided with coordinated national intelligence during the crucial period_iust prior to or during the coup Sane recommendations for product improvement appear on the last page of this report - - DISCUSSION me National Int-slugger Estimate l The National Intelligence Estimate HIE 94-73 Chile dated 14 June 1973 failed to foresee the seriousness of the developing crisis 'and gave a successful militany coup only an I outside chance It con- cluded that the most likely eventuality was a political standoff The next most likely courses- given roughly egual ueight--nere said to be a nepudiation of the regime or converse- a consolidation and strength- ening of the regime The term repudiation as used in the NIE indicated circumstances in which Ailende had retained his office but had lost some of his power as a consequence of the solitary's ability to limit his political freedom of action 2 The three principal possibilities examined in the NIE standoff arepudiation or consolidation reflected the three positions supported one or another element in the Intelligence Community in June A standoff or muddling through had been the dominant estimate in ast NIEs but uneaSIness over this position mounted during the spring he Office of National Estimates felt that the chances of institutional collapse in Chile had grown substantially although it was timid in cleariy stating MORI DOCID 1529471 this conviction DIA considered consolidation of the Allende regime the most likely course and DIA representatives initially pressed for this position but subsequently agreed that a political standoff was more likely State INR representatives held more closely to the views of earlier papers i e that Allende and his regime would somehow survive There were individual in other agencies who shared this view 3 The initial draft of the NIE by ONE did not rank the three possibilities in terms of probability Under pressure from some of the representatives however a ranking of alternatives was added Still neither the proponents of repudiat on our those of consolidation felt- firm enough in their views to press them vigorously against the conventional - wisdom that Allende would-be able somehow to muddle through And in truth - Allende's oft-demonstrated ability to weather crises during the first- three years of his administration lent considerable credibility to this conclusion 4 Readers of the NIE could not readily see the divergence of views that lay behind the finished Estimate 0n the contrary the NIE made it appear that the Intelligence Community as a body saw approximately the same possibilities in the same order of likelihood The consumr would surely have been better served if the preparing element ONE had stated its position with less diffidence and if others with different views had set these forth clearly and without unnecessary equi vocation At the very least this would have permitted consumers to ponder both the evidence and' the arguments of the experts all within the context of a complex and uncer- ta tuat on - 5 The NIE became stale over the summer Events in August-n ie failure of the military to force any real changes in Allende's course and the ultimate resignation of the moderate-General Prats--called for a It would not have been possible to predict a coup with any real certainty but the institutional crisis haddeepened especially wi Prats' departure and the customer should have been warned that a military coup was something more than nerely an' outside chance current Ibtelliggnas 6 A revised Estimate would have helped to provide focus for current intelligence production in August and early Septenber Current intelligence like estimators were reluctant to conclude that the Chilean military would ever actually move against Allende To be sure there was I considerable Justification for this wariness It had appeared on saveria'l occasions that the armed forces were preparing to move but Allende had demonstrated great skill in dealing with military threats often at the last moment And the military itself had demonstrated no real desire to take over the reins of government - - ths 'x esignafion and its impact on events had not been anticipated in 2 3 1- 9 '3 MORI DOCID 1529471 7 Current intelligence publications during August emphasized the general worsening of economic and political conditions in Chile The DIA INTSUM of 25 August noted that the resignation of General Prats removed e main factor mitigating against a coupAugust recognized that the resi nation of General Prats marked Tmajor change in 'the situation in Chile The CIA Heekl Review of 3l August however was not consistent with the C13 It failed o ig light the seriousness of the Prats resignation the TE paragraph is in the air and contending forces are taking another look at whether they can put off a day of reckon ng - 8 During the period from l5 August to 12 September the Department of State's weekly Current Forei Relations carried only one item on Chile Thai item from the regional Bureau not INK concerned the resignation of Chilean Air Force CINC and Minister of Public works 'Gene'ral Cesar Ruiz Danyau No INR papers on Chile for externalsdistributi on were produced during the period from 1 August to mi'd-September 9 The DIA Crisis Situation Alert Re art of Septenber pointed out the increasing possibility of a confronta on Between Allende and the armed- forces and Allende's increasingly restricted political maneuvarability But it also said that conciliatory moves vis-a-vis the opposition were still a way out for Allende The September 18 noted _a tamporary respite for Allende and several CIBs during the first week of September and the CIA Heekl Review of 7 September did not carry items on Chile By 6 September the are now looking more toward easing into power than attainpting a classic takeover l0 Despite growing violence accompanying massive pro and anti- government demonstrations the CIA CIB of 7'Septenber left the impression at Allende was still managing to ddle through The CIB of Ihemexiscusse me some detail Although the 3 September INTSUM did not state that a coup was inevitable it left a clear impression that a coup was close at hand The CIA of 10 Septenber contained only a brief note on'Chile which did not mention a possible coup The DIA INTSUM of lo September reported that naval officers plotting against the regi'ne ad postponed their move that the other services had become more interested in a coup but that Allende might still avert it _ aa noted Prats resignation in earlier CIBs but detailed analysis did not appear until 28 August largely because of cETays encountered in coordinating the in-depth item with DIA and State to 4' MORI DOCID 1529471 ing of ll Septenber sources of the Defense a ing of the impending coup Starting on that morning each intelligence agency produced those items it perceived as best meeting user needs Daily publications were supplemented By Spot Reports CIA produced five and DIA seven State INF produced about 20 Chilean Situation Reports during the crisis CIA and DIA Task Forces were dissolved on 12 September - but the INR Task Force continued to operate for a longer period In addition each agency provided briefing supportas required 12 A survey indicates that consumers were generally well satisfied with the intelligence they had received during this period 13 There was no coordinated national intelligence produced innediately prior to-oi' during the crisis The ma piece of 7 September was the last coordinated item provided difficulties attend the coordina- tion of the C13 e the pressure of deadlines conmunications problems and bureaucr'it'i'c de avs accom anyingthe preparation and approval of dissenting footnotes DIA advised CIA at it had available to coordinate - intelligence but CIA did not respond State INR indicated that they were not asked to coordinate ascouienomons a It would be impractical and robably undesirable to try to force formal estimates to serve a current ro e butntime permi tting NIEs should be updated when events occur which significantly alter basic Judgments It would probably have served both the convmuii'tytand its consumers well if a Memrandum to Holders of HIE 94-73 had been written on say 1 Septenber the obsolescence of earlier judgments could in this way have been exposed - - and the then growing instability of the political scene in Santiago could have been forcefully delineated b An ression of the probability of events in quantified tor-ms would probably ave been useful to the consumer Either quantified expres sions the odds are 2 to l the chances are in 10 or the chances are better then even or clear language indicating probabilities would have provided greater precision than was the case in the muf ed verbalizations of prospects that appeared in the CIA 13 or the BIA INTSUM on 8 Septenber D e important message from the Defense Attache DATT 616 reported a visit 5 by two Chilean Air Force general officers 'to the US Air Attache The infor-- nation the Chi leans provided about the coup reached DIA at ll0323 EST but the message did not reach the CIA addressees until some 24 hours later r MORI 1529471 5' c There is no effective machinery for producing national intelli- genoe in crisis situations Preposa'ls currently under consideration for National Hatch Officers Bu'lietins National Anaiysts Summaries or other national ub'lications wou'ld help to give the customer an inte'l'ligence product in ich would provide for the expression of reasoned dissent or the identification of oomnity-uide agreement                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu