103121904 NO 10 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum TO 3 Executive Director FROM Richard Lehman SUBJECT 1 a President's role b 6 22 efa q Cm m 1% ij 15 Novemberii bi yf' I E0 13526 1' '1 E0 13526 E0 13526 3 5 c You may want to raise pith the DCI My attempt Paras 50-57 to write around the The propriety of discussing differences in a paper to go outside CIA Paras 2 5 6 23 C - The further surfacing of the Checklist involved in any wider dissemination of this paper 2 further comments I think it would be desirable to ask the Deputies for APPROVED FOR RELEASEL DATE 31-May-2012 - - - - 15 November 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR Executive Director SUBJECT New Draft of Cuban Study 335 6 1 Attached hereto rs Cop of a rev1sed draft of the memorandum Handling of the Soviet Build-up in Cuba ou newhholdr 2 In addition to correction of minor inaccuracies and some editorial work the following major revisions have been made a Expanded comments on SNIE 85-3 Paras 27-29 h of the role of Paras i c Clarification of circumstances and purpose of requirement for NPIC corroboration Para 44 d Rewrite of Para 45 of the 01d draft to re fleet existence of a later ban on publication Paras 50-57 RICHARD LEHMAN TOP vT _ 4 14 November 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT CIA Handling of the Soviet Build-up in Cuba 1 July - 16 October 1962 A The Background 1 The USSR's decision to develop Cuba as a military base must have been made by the Spring of 1 9621 and prepara- tions within the USSR must have been under way from that time on There also must have been planning activities in Cuba particularly reconnaissance and survey work The only indication of these operations which has so far been found is a single intercepted personal message on 11 April to a Russian in Cuba who had previOusly been at the Kapustin Yar missile test range This fragment was not judged solid or important enough to warrant inclusion by itself in current intelligence publications 2 Thus until the first evidence of the deployment began to come in late in July Washington had no warning of the USSR's intention Intelligence officers dealing with Cuba were focussing during July on the direction Soviet- Cuban relations would take following Soviet acquiescence in Castro's assertion of his leadership of Cuban Communism in the Escalante affair This attitude was reflected in reporting on the visit of Raul Castro to Moscow early in the month The President s Intelligence Checklist which will normally be used in this memorandum as the record of CIA reporting to the President Secretaries of State and Defense General Taylor and McGeorge Bundy reported on 4 July that Raul was probably seeking more Soviet military aid and specifically more advanced equipment such as the MIG-21s and surface to air missiles which the USSR is already providing to Indonesia Egypt and Iraq The Checklist of 19 JulyP however noted that Raul had lElt Moscow without the usual publicity and communique and surmised that this was a pretty good sign that the visit was unproductive The Central Intelligence Bulletin whenever coordination permitted carried materiaI_genera11y similar to the content of the Checklist TO CRET C03121004 I T0 CRET 3 The Intelligence Cemmunity view of the Cuban problem in this period was in HIE 85u2 62 The Situation and PrOSpects in Cuba passed by 8318 on 1 August 1962 as the intelligence foundation for MONGOOSE This estimate stated that a By force of circumstances the U888 is becoming ever more deeply committed to preserve and strengthen the Castro regime The USSR however has avoided any formal commitment to _protect and defend the regime in all contingencies b we believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major independent military Operations overseas We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description at least for the period of this estimate c The almost certainly never intend to hazard their own safety for Cuba's sake but have sought to create the impression that Cuba was under the protection of their missile do We believe that the Bloc will continue to limit its military assistance to Cuba Ate defensive weapon 7 Such a policy would not preclude the provision of more advanced jet fighters surface to- air missiles and modern radars or even the pro- vision of a token number of jet light TO 303121004 303121004 CO3121004 C The July Overflight Program 10 On 10 July General Taylor motivated primarily by the extensive use of aerial reconnaissance in following Chi nese Communist military activities in Fukien had asked the DCI for a comprehensive review of aerial photography activi ties The end-product of this exercise was a series of mem oranda dated approximately 16 July from the to the DCI The one on Cuba recommended that flights over Cuba be continued at their current level of two a month It cited inter alia in justification that earlier missions over Cuba Had conclusive evidence that recurring reports of submarines and missile bases in Cuba have been false and that our most important need is for any evidence of the de ployment of missiles and or MIG le'in Cuba This proposal was approved by the Special Group on 19 July and later by the President 11 The first of the two Cuban U42 missions authorized for August was flown on 5 August probably just too soon to detect significant reflections of the Soviet equipment enter- ing the island at that time The second mission was orig- Uf inally scheduled for 8 August but cancelled because of weather The next day the Special Group gave the DCI discretion to fly the second August mission whenever the immediate situation with regard to Soviet materiel justified it COMOR reaffirmed its requirement for the second mission on 13 August The mis- sion was again scheduled for the period beginning on the 19th - held up for 9 days by weather and eventually flown on 29 August See Para 19 003121004 20 The 29 August mission had confirmed the establish- ment of a missile defense of western Cuba The first mission for September of-the two which had been authorized as a routine matter by the Special Group on 19 July see para 10 was flown on schedule on 5 September and revealed similar defenses in Las Villas Province In retrOSpect it can be seen that the two groups of sites surrounded the areas in which MRBM and IRBM site construction was planned Photography of these areas in the 29 August and 5 September missions however gave no recognizable enidence that any such construction was then under way although re-examination showed a few vehicles and some construction material at Guanajay Site 1 on 29 August In fact there was probably no ballistic missile equipment in Cuba at theftime see discussion in paras 36-39 21 More detailed readout of the 29 August mission had by about 6 September led CIA to suspect the presence of another kind of missile siteu-possibly surface-to-surface at Banes on the northeastern coast General Carter sot informed the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense on 6 September No equivalent of such a weapon had been identified in in earlier Uwz photography Lacking such background further information and study were necessary to determine the characteristics and range of the missiles Fragrame for both were set in motion 22 COMOR at the request of the Secretary of State on 9 September reviewed the vehicles available for reconnais- sance of Banes The next day General Carter in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense requested necessary actions including Special Group approval to provide for the employ ment when directed by higher authority of tactical-type reconnaissance against the cruise-missile site at Banes At the Special Group meeting of 14 September a JCS repre sentative briefed on capabilities for low level coverage of certain targets in_Cuba however the Secretary of Defense was recorded as not wanting the operation considered further until results of further reconnaissance of these targets were available General Carter's proposal had been overtaken by the decision on U-2 coverage taken on 10 September see paras 24-25 Meanwhile further analysis of the 5 September photography had resulted in a CIA study dated 14 September which concluded definitively that the Banes site was intended for a short-range coastal defense missile A fully checked out item appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 18 September -10- 303121004 CO3121004 3 WT 303121004 C03121004 TO C03121004 -11- CO3121004 F The New Overflight Program 24 The results of the 29 August and 5 September misa Sions in particular the confirmation of sites led to a full review of the overflight program for'Cuba This took place in the White House on 10 September Among those pres -sent were Rusk -Mr Robert Kennedy Mr EcGeorge Bandy General Carter and General Lansdale The decisions of this meeting are crucial to the record and some discussion of the atmosphere in which they were taken is required There were three major factors a On 30 August a SAC had overflown Sakhalin Island The USSR had protested on 4 September the US had acknowledged the overilight and the incident has received major play in the world press This had been followed on 8 Se tember by the loss ofl accompanied by even greater publicity As a result most of the participants wares to varying degrees ereluctant to chance another incident at this time This meant that they were naturally' hesitant to authorize any flights over areas where SA s might be operational b Second there is no record that the MRBM problem was discussed The hard intelligence gathered so far on the Soviet build-up the Banes problem was still up in the air was not such as to produce a sense of alarm or a feeling that urgent action was reguired The establishment of and other advanced defensive systems had been foreseen in the NIE of 1 August and their probable arrival had been fully reported during the intervening period Hence confirmation came not as a shock but as a problem to be dealt with deliberately It may even have served to relax the sense of urgency generated by the President's decisions of 23 August the known usually being less alarming than the unknown The participants therefore felt that the next step was to provide systematic coverage of the rest of Cuba from which the full story of what the USSR had put into the island could be developed They felt no immediate need for rescoverage of the areas covered by the two previous missions - c Finally the participants were operating in the atmosphere of the time The Cubans had been claiming that U S invasion was imminent The Soviet diplomatic and propaganda apparatus was attempting to focus attention 3 -12- CO3121004 TO RET on Berlin and hinting at a confrontation late in the year thus creating the impression that a Berlin crisis would not come until after the US election In fact the USSR in its statement of the following day 11 September on Cuba stated this explicitly There were vague hints of Khrushchev s in- tent to attend the UNGA in New York Khrushchev appears now to have been throwing-up a diplomatic smoke screen behind which to carry out the deployment of strategic forces into Cuba but those present at the meeting of 10 September did not have the benefit of this hindsight Furthermore they must all have been acutely aware that Cuba was potentially the campaign issue that could most seriously damage the Admin- istrationiin the election campaign then beginning 25 At the meeting the Secretary of State objected to w the CIA proposal for two extended overflights covering the gfr remainder of the island not covered in the 29 August and 5 ff 4 September missions He insisted instead that coverage of j w the rest of Cuba should be designed so that peripheral 4 over international waters would not be combined with oyer- flights of Cuban territory To meet his wishes the program was divided into four flights two overflights and two peri- pheral One overflight was to be over the Isle of Pines and the other over the part of Cuba east of 77 West to cover Guantanamo and Banes One'peripheral flight was to cover the north coast of eastern Cuba the other the south-coast The overflights would be quick in and out operations while all four were to be designed for maximum safety There is apparently no written record that a decision was made not to fly over known sites but in obtaining approval for the tracks it was necessary to provide assurance that they did not do so Later the D01 negotiated with the Depart ment of State permission to extend the Isle of Pines mis- sion over the Bay of Pigs area of Cuba preper _ The Presi- dent approved this program authorizing three flights in September in addition to the one remaining of the normal September allocation Special Group action of 19 July Thus the record shows that the President authorized every thing the Special Group requested _a -13- sonar 3 CO3121004 WT G SNIE 85-3 62 26 The lack of urgency expressed in these decisions was also reflected in the deliberations over and the content of SNIE 85 3 62 The Military Build up in Cuba passed by USIB on 19 September This estimate which was generated by the issuance of must be viewed as a of the state of mind in the Intelligence Community and in Washington gen erally during the first half of September There were no dis- sents and no major disagreements in preparation of the final draft Its key findings are as follows We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it and consequently that the main purpose of the military build up in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancu ing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation At the same time they evidently recog nize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose - b The Soviets themselves are probably still uncer tain about their future military program for Cuba Indeed they probably intend to test US and Latin American reactions as they go along c As the build up continues the USSR may be tempted to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defensive in purpose but of a more 'offensive' character light bomb ers submarines and additional types of short range surface-to- surface Id However they are well aware that the question of offensive as opposed to defensive weapons in Cuba has become a major political issue e The establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear striking forces which would be used against the US would be inn compatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it It would-indicate a-far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus Soviet military planners have almost certainly considered the contribution which Cuban bases might make-to the -14- WT C03121004 Soviet strategic posture and in that connection the feasibility and utility of deploying nuclear delivery systems to Cuba There fore this contingency must be examined carefully even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy f Soviet planners might see some utility in deploys ing and IRBMs to Cuba in order to supplement the limited number of ICBMs now believed to be operational in the USSR and to reach targets beyond the range of submarine launched missiles g The establishment on Cuban soil of a significant strike capability with such weapons would represent a sharp de- parture from Soviet practiCe since such weapons have so far not been installed even in Satellite Soviets might think that the political effect of defying the US by sta- tioning SoViet nuclear striking power in so menacing a position would be worth a good deal if they could get away with it ever they would almost certainly estimate that this could not be done without provoking a dangerous US reaction Although the Soviets may See some military advan- tages in Cuba as a strategic strike base the risks would be great and the political implications would run counter to the kind of policy they are actually pursuing in Latin America They do not propose to win the region for communism by military conquest They count instead on a process of political 27 In commenting on these statements it must first be rec ognized that the judgment on the degree of risk which the USSR was willing to accept was gravely in error It should also be recognized that the community was virtually unanimous'in-support of this judgment deployment of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons outside the USSR was without precedent Further while the first ballistic missiles had probably arrived in Cuba in the period 7-15 September see para 37 the first reports from ground observers who had seen them had not arrived in Washington by 19 September there was no evidence available that were on the way What the estimate failed to do however was to give adequate weight to the pace at which Soviet operations were mov ing and to the great probability that the new installations were manned by Soviet personnel The community was still thinking in terms of the rather deliberately-paced Soviet military aid prom grams for the UAR Iraq and Indonesia and indeed for Cuba in the 1960 62 period when there was already good evidence that the Cuban program had departed from this pattern 28 Mbreover the Indonesian program too had broken the pattern only a month before when the USSR showed itself will ing to accept a substantially increased degree of risk for the 15 C03121004 sake of a political gain something less than vital to Soviet interests The original contracts for Indonesia had been roughly similar to those for the UAR and Iraq They included 14 sites 12 KOMARS 26 12 equipped with air to- surface missiles and 12 submarines all to be manned by In- donesians and to be delivered at a pace consonant with the re- quired training of personnel However as the crisis over West New Guinea approached its climax of August Soviet eager ness to embroil the Indonesians in open warfare with the Dutch led them to accelerate delivery schedules and to permit the use of Soviet personnel to operate some of the Weapons being provided Six submarines manned by Soviet crews actually con ducted war patrols under nominal Indonesian command Thus by mid August the USSR had shown itself willing to take some risk of military engagement with an ally of the United States al beit the degree of risk involved was far less than in the Cu- ban venture 29 For the record there is no evidence that the ex- istence of SNIE 85-3 had any inhibiting influence on later de cisions It was not for instance cited to support an argu ment against continuing overflights Nor did it affect current intelligence reporting this is conducted independently of the estimative process and provides a check on the continuing V317 idity of standing estimates -16- RET C03121004 H Views of the 30 The only available record of dissent from the judgments made in Washington during the first half of September both estimative and operational is that of the himself who although vacationing was kept informed by CIA cable 0n 7 September he cabled General Carter urging frequent repeat reconnaissance missions and stating that my hunch is we might face prospect of Soviet short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable types in Cuba which could command important targets in Southeast US and possibly Caribbean areas On 10 September the again cabled Difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly defenses being established in to me quite possible measures now being taken are for purpose of ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as to be installed by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from overflights Suggest Board of National Estimates study The Board's response is in effect contained in SNIE 85-3 31 On 13 September and again on 16 September the DCI repeated these premonitions In the latter cable he added Do not wish to be overly alarming this matter but believe CIA and community must keep Government informed of danger of a surprise and also that detection of preparatory steps possibly beyond our capability once Cuba defense system Operative Finally on 20 September the D01 expressed reservations on the conc1usions of SNIE 85 3 which had been cabled to him saying as an alternative I can see that an offensive Soviet base in Cuba will provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position in connection with all other critical areas and hence they might take unexpected risks in order to establish such a position These views were provided to the and the Board of National Estimates 32 As a result of the DCI's pressure there was a renewed examination of other methods of reconnaissance of Cuba It should be noted here that this discuSSion was in terms of what might be necessary after the establishment of a complete defense had made use of the impossible with the implicit thought that only at this point would the Soviets risk the introduction of such weapons as On 19 September at USIB General Carter stated his desire to use RF lOls over Cuba He also said he thought use of the FIREFLY drone over Cuba could be justified to the Special -17- iT CO3121004 Group adding that we cannot put a stop to collection in Cuba otherwise the President would never know when the point of decision was reached The Special Grou ff jff next meeting approved consideration of the use of and COMORIforwarded to USIB on 27 September a program for its use 33 Another attempt during this period to get addi- tional coverage was the programming Mission 9045 29 September 2 October to photograph Cuba The results were unsatisfactory largely because of cloud coVer M13- T0 com 231304 19- 303121004 -20- C03121004 J The Soviet Offensive Deployment 36 At this point it is necessary to retrace a few steps in time and discuss what was actually going on in Cuba Examination of information now available makes it possible to outline with a fair degree of confidence a-time table of' the Soviet program which is generally consistent from site to site This begins with the construction of SAM defenses first in the west around San Cristobal and Guanajay then in central Cuba around Sagua la Grande and Remedios finally in the rest of the island Next in each case comes the eviction of local inhabitants at each site road improvement and the establishment of restricted construction areas Finally comes the arrival of equipment at each site according to what appears a carefully prepared schedule Apparently no recog- nizable missile equipment was moved to the MRBM sites and no mama-construction was begun at the IRBM sites until at least two weeks after the last 0L2 overflight of the area and until the_US had publicly acknowledged the presence of SA-2 sites in Cuba 37 The first large pieces of equipment for the MRBM Sites near San Cristobal were probably shipped from the USSR on the ship Omsk which arrived at Mariel on 7 or 8 September A second shipment followed on the Poltava which arrived on 15 8eptember This equipment was moved to San Cristobal by truck at night with the first convoys probably arriving at the sites about 17 September That is 17 September is the earliest date at which photography might have detected the first MRBM equipment at San CriStobal 38 Construction equipment and material for the Guanajay fixed IRBM sites began to arrive at mariel about mid August minor activity of an indefinite type was noted there'in the 29 August photography and major construction had probably begun by 15 September The fact that ship- ments to Guanajay started before these to San Cristobal reflects the longer lead time required for construction of a fixed site It is not possible to say how soon after- 15 September the activity might have been recognizable from the air as an IRBM site 39 The sites in Las Villas Province were established on a later but similar time scale Equipment for the Sagua La Grande MRBM sites was probably landed at Casilda on the south coast The most likely ship to have carried the large items is the Kimovsk which docked -21- c03121004 there on 22 September This equipment must have moved to the site during the last week of september and was probably detectable from photography after 1 October The Remedies IRBM site construction was parallel to the Guanajay schedule but also about two Weeks'behind Photography of 5 September was negative but road improvement began shortly thereafter andatilow of construction material from the port of Isabela on the north coast began The estimated date for the be- ginning of'major construction is about 1 October Again the date at which the site acquired a recognizable photo- graphic signature is not determinable CO3121004 K The Targeting of San Cristobal 40 Although the sites themselves were closed to ground observation the movement of equipment to them from the ports was in fact seen by CIA agents and by a number of individuals who later fled to the US The agents reported this informa tion as soon as they were able but in most cases had to de pend on secret writing for communication Hence there was a lag of several days at least before their information became available Refugee reports were delayed considerably longer for other and uncontrollable reasons the time of the fin dividual's decision to leave Cuba his discovery of means for doing so and his delivery to an interrogation center Many of the reports so received dealt with unidentifiable construc- tion activity Many of them because of the time lags noted above did not arrive in Washington until after 14 October and some are still coming in 41 Nevertheless by about 1 October the San Cristobal area had been pinpointed as a suspect MRBM site and photographic confirmation had been requested This represents a consider able technical achievementi Tb understand why it is again necessary to back track in time Since the moment of Castro's triumphal march into Havana the Intelligence Community had been flooded with reports of Soviet weapons shipments and mis sile installations in Cuba There were several hundred such - reports claiming the presence of everything from small arms to ICBMS before August 1960 before the USSR had sup plied Cuba with any weapons at all More specifically CIA's files contain 211 intelligence reports this does not include press items on missile and missile associated activity in Cuba before 1 Jan 1962 All of these were either totally false or misinterpretations by the observer of other kinds of activity CIA had naturally come to view all such reports with a high degree of suspicion -23- Tl co3121064 Erna seem 43 For the better part ing information obtained from sources with NPIC whenever it tion was of a kind that could of two years CIA had been check refugee defector and agent was apparent that the informa- be verified or negated by aerial reconnaissance In dhur1962 NPIC began publishing a series of formal listings Photographic Evaluation of Information on Cuba in which theso re aft re eva ua ogra phicxcoverage In the 7 issues of this publication between 31 may and 5 October NPIC examined 138 raw reports referred to it for comment Of this total only three cited missile activity which could not be linked directly to the and cruise mis sile deployments NPIC's evidence negated those three 44 When the first indications of build up began to come in in August these procedures were further tightened CIA current intelligence was ordered orally by the office on about 14 August not to publish any information on the cons struction of missile bases in Cuba until they had been checked out with NPIC This instruction was in the field of intelli gence technique rather than of policy it had no relation to later restrictions see para 50 Between 14 August and mid October this office sent NPIC l3 memoranda asking for a check on 25 separate reports containing information which was thought to raise the possibility of Soviet offenSive weapons in Cuba as great many more such reports were checked with NPIC informally by telephone In all cases NPIC either lacked the necessary coverage or made a negative finding 45 On 20 August the COMOR Targeting Working Group chaired and staffed largely by CIA set up the first compre hensive card file system for Cuban targets An example of its procedures is the handling of targets in the Sagua La Grande area Based on refugee reporting the COMOR Targeting Working Grou on 27'August pinpointed four farms in this area as sus pect missile sites Readout of the 29 August coverage showed an SA-Z site near sagua La Grande which apparently was the basis for the reported activity there and the target card was changed to show a confirmed site It should be noted that know ledge that this site was in the area could have led to misinterpret any subsequent reports_of MRBM activity as part of the SAM development but in fact no such reports were received 46 By September the volume of agent and refugee report ing had become very large indeed During the month 882 re ports on internal activities in Cuba were disseminated excluw sive of telegraphic dissemination The CIA clandestine col- lectors report that their output represented only the small pub lishable fraction of the raw material collected A substantial -24- C03121004 proportion of these dealt with the deployment of defensive mis- siles and related activities Knowledge on the part of the that such a deployment was in fact going on plus the normal difficulties encountered by untrained observers in tell ing an offensive missile from a defensive one tended to throw a sort of smoke-screen around the Soviet offensive deployment when it finally began The CIA analytic'apparatus however recognized and correlated the first authentic reports of MRBM equipment ever to be received in Washington and took action upon them It targeted the San Cristobal area not as another location where alleged missile activity should be negated by photography but as a scepect 88-4 site 47 This process took about three weeks from_the date when the first observation was made on the ground in Cuba to the reparation of the target card The two reports from I which triggered it were a An observation in Havana on 12 September of a convoy carryingj This re- port which was disseminated by CIA on 21 September contained sufficient accurate detail to alert intelligence b An observation on 17 September of a convoy mov- ing toward the San Cristobal area This information received on 27 September dovetailed in many respects with the earlier report 48 The arrival of the second report led CIA to a tentative conclusion that the two observers had in fact seen the same convoyp and that there was a possibility of the 33 4 identification 'being genuine A day or so earlier a target card on San Cristobal had been prepared on the basis of a vague report of Russians building a rocket baSe Now this card was removed and with the two reports cited above and other less specific information on activity in this area which was beginning to trickle in a new card was prepared between 1 and 3 October which was in effect a priority require- ment for photographic coverage This card was used in the targeting of the 14 October flight see para 63 It read as follows Collateral reports indicate the existence of a re stricted area in Pinar del Rio Province which is suspected of including an SSM site under construction particularly 38 4 The area is bounded by a line connecting the follow- ing four town Consolacion del Norte San Diego del Los Banos San Cristobal 8301N 2243l and Las Pozos Requirement Search the area deli neated for possible surface missile construction with parti- cular attention to 83 4 C03121004 49 Anether report too general to be used in the process described abeve is nevertheless of interest as the first good informationdistributed on the Soviet offensive'build-u On 20 September CIA disseminatedwen agent report had said on 9 September We have 40 mile range guided missiles both surfaceuto-surface and surface to-air and we have a radar system which covers sectOr by sector all of the Cuban air space and beyond as far as Florida There are also many mobile ramps for inter mediate range rockets - - l25_ c03121004 'fensive and defensive weapons in cuba L Limitations on Publications 50 At some point probably just after 27 September an item on the subject of possible strategic weapons in Cuba might have been written for CIA current intelligence publications It could not be written because there was an injunction not to do so By the time that hard information began to come in early in September the principals had become acutely conscious of the distinction publicly made by the President between of Aware that they were dealing with an explosive political issue and aware also that leakage of intelligence on offensive weapons true or false would Seriously limit the President's freedom of action in deal- ing with what might become a major international crisis they had evolved a system for limiting dissemination of such infor mation Analysis would continue and senior policy officials would be briefed but no material would appear in formal intel- ligence publications without the approval of the USIB principals These instructions were first issued orally and later on 11 October formalized by USIB in thel The key passages in USIB's order were Such information or intelligence will be disseminated outside each USIB intelligence component only to specific individuals on an EYES ONLY basis who by virtue of their responsibilities as ad- visers to the President have a need to know and There is no intent hereby however to inhibit the essential analytic pro cess 51 It should also be noted that the order not to publish anything on missile sites without NPIC corroboration Para had never been rescinded The effect this would have had on re porting in late September and October if the other ban had not been in effect is difficult to determine 52 These restrictions did not apply to the Checklist but the Checklist writers drew for their Cuban information largely on the Cuban Daily Summary a compendium of reporting on Cuba published by CIA Since the Summary was affected by the restrictions this practice imposed By the sheer volume of raw material coming in on Cuba had the effect of cutting the Checklist off from information on offensive weapons 53 Moreover neitherq the Checklist group nor any other current f af the Possibility that a Soviet strategic missile base might be established in Cuba had been raised by the D01 and seriously discussed by the President and his advisers more than a month earlier See Para 13 In other words the thrust of had been so watered down by -27- CO3121004 o'H' time and bureaucratic process that it reached the working level only in the form of SNIE 85-3 which held that establishment of such a base was most improbable See however para 29 54 It is difficult to say whether information from ground sources would have been published had there not been a blanket injunction against it The too were sensitive to the potential political impact of the reports they Were receiving this would not have influenced them against publication but would have made then want to be doubly sure especially on a subject with a history reaching back to Our Man in Havana In addition rigid compartmentation was maintained between the COMORanecial Group organization reSponsible for collection and the intelligence omponents responsible for analysis Few if any CIA working on the Cuban problem even had clearances As a result they did not know that no overflights of Pinar del Rio and Las Villas were included in the September program or that this program was seriously delayed They had no wayiof knowing that the photographic verification they had requested would not be soon forthcoming and they might well have delayed publication from day to day in hopes of rece-iVi'ng 55 Nevertheless it can be established that if the injunc tion against publication had not existed there would have been some reflection of the refugee reports in the Cuban Daily Summary which is not highly selective In retrospect it seems quite pos- sible -but by no means certain -that they would then have been picked up in the Checklist but it is extremely doubtful if they would have survived the Bordination process for the Central In telligence Bulletin Thus at the most the President might have learn53 that there was suspicious activity around San Cristobal more than a week before he apparently did 56 In sum the CIA believed they had done their duty by targeting the San Cristobal area for photographic cover age but no word of their concern over activity in this area had appeared in an intelligence publication It appears highly probable that-the Special Group first heard of this concern at its meeting on 9 October when see para 63 it ordered a Uez mission which covered the area 57 The gap of 7 10 days between the key analytic correla tion of reports and the Special Group meeting can probably be attributed to the cumbersome processes of-the administrative structure supporting the Special Group This machinery was dew signed to provide elaborate justifications and back up paper work before each decision was made procedures reaching back into the early history of U-2 operations over the USSR They were intended for the control of deliberate strategic reconnais sance of the USSR and not for a fast-moving situation such as that in Cuba which was rapidly becoming tactical In fact after readout of the 14 October mission they were jettisoned -23- c03121004 -coast peripheral mission was accomplished M Progress of the September Overflight Program 58 5 While the MRBM and IRBM'deployment continued and the first geod ground reports began to filter out of Cuba the four-flight reconnaissance program approved on 10 Septem her was being pushed forward Unfortunately this-program was seriously delayed by bad weather not until 26 September could the first successful mission be flown over Banes and Guantanamo A mission was flown on 17 September but its targets were completely cloud covered On 27 and 28 Septem- ber the weather was had again but on the 29th the Isle of Pines - Bay of Pigs mission was successfully flown The weather again turned had until 5 October when the south The next day the north coast peripheral mission aborted but was success fully completed on 7 October 59 Thus completion of the September program took 26 days from 12 Septembermuthe earliest date on which missions approved on the 10th could have been-flown through 7 October On 20 of these days weather was had over the areas not yet overflown the criterion for launch was a forecast of less than 25 percent cloud cover 0n four days successful mis- sions were flown On one day a mission was launched but aborted apd one day was used to alert a mission which was launched the following day Availability of aircraft was not a limiting factor 60 These missions accomplished their purpose they established almost completely the location of sites on the is1and They did not- and since they were designed to avoid SAM-defended areas could not- detect the ballistic missile deployments then under way The combined effect of the Special Group decision of 10 September and the weather conditions of the period following was to delay consideration of what reconnaissance activities should next be undertaken over Cuba until early October -29- Tor C03121004 H The Special Group Decision of 9 October 61 By late September the delays in accomplishing the four-flight program coupled with a mass of evidence that the Soviet build-up was continuing had-generated a greatly increased sense of urgency in Washington It Should again be noted however that high-level consideration of the possibility that might be deployed to Cuba had always been in terms of soviet action after the SALZ defense was fully operational There is no documentary evidence of action directed toward the overflight of SAMFdefended areas until the Special Group Augmented meeting of 4 October At this meeting the DUI pointed out that flights were now before the last two missions of the 10 September program 'restricted by the presence of SAM sites to the southeastern quadrant of Cuba According to the minutes of this meeting it was questioned gay the whether this was a reasonable restric- tion at this time particularly since the were almost certainly not Operational The Group then ordered the N30 to prepare an overall program for reconnaissance of Cuba for presentation at the Group s meeting of 9 October 62 On 6 October COMOR provided to the HBO a memo- randum entitled_ lntelligence Justification and Requirements for Overflight of Cuba for use in this presentation Para A1 of this paper stated that there is new a pressing and continuing need for up to date intelligence on the progress of the Soviet arms build-up in Cubar The very-highest levels of the government are dependent upon this intelligence to assist in making policy decisions of'immediate and vital con cern to the nation Para A2 commenting on the absence of coverage of western Cuba since 29 August included the state- ment that Ground observers have in several recent instances reported sightings of what they believe to be Soviet in Cuba These reports must be confirmed or denied by photo coverage Attached to the memorandum were a number of target lists on which the area previously targeted around San Cristobal appears together with recommendations attach of particularitargets by satellite oblique U813 considering 3 paper on S OctODer recommended to the Special Group full coverage of two of these lists which did not specifically include San Cristobal but'which by its nature would have covered that area and the other ballistic missile sites as well RET CO3121004 63 At the Special Group meeting on 9 October first recommendation was 0 2 probe over the suspect MRBM site as soon as weather permits This referred to the area targeted by COMOR near San Cristobal see Para 48 The operation was to be supported by ELINT cellection aircraft off the coast also was designed to pass over one of the SA-2 sites which was thought to be most nearly opera tional Thus the secondary objective was to determine the status of SA-2 defenses in order to measure the risk involved in getting complete U-2 coverage of Cuba-as rapidly as possible NRO's second recommendation was_therefore condi- tional If there is no reaction to the initial U42 sortie maximum coverage of the western end of the island by multiple U-2s simultaneously as soon as weather permits There were also certain other recommendations for low level oblique 64 The Group gave first priority to the San Cristobal mission and recommended to the President that he approve it The President gave his approval--presumably learning of the San Cristobal reports at this time -and the mission was immediately mounted It was delayed by weather however from 10 through 12 October On that date Operational control was transferred to SAC There is no reason to believe that the transfer in any way delayed launching the mission which SAC flew on 14 October The pilot did not fly the prescribed track but took a course at an angle to it Fortunately the planned and actual paths crossed over San Cristobal and the primary mission was accomplished 65 After this mission had been appro efore had been flown CIA received on 10 October taken two weeks earlier of the Soviet ship Kasimov off Cu a These photographs showed clearly identifiable l ziq which later showed up in U-2 photography of 17 Onto er--a ong with a number of others which must have come in on unphoto graphed ships- at San Julian airfield in the western tip of the island The information appeared in the Checklist of 11 October w '66 During this interim period the D01 briefed the CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations on 10 October on the builduup including the He also commented on essentially along the lines of his cables from Nice para 30 adding that there were many experts who did not believe the Soviets would make such a move but that he differed with them He told the Subcommittee that he had authority for an overflight in the next day or so General SECRET -31- c0312 004 Carter said much the same thing to Senator Saltonstall the following day 11 October In reply'to Saltonstall's question about Senator Keating's charges of known HRBM sites in Cuba General Carter said that there were refugee reports but no hard evidence and that CIA hoped to photograph the areas in the next day or so General Carter also briefed Senator Stennis on 15 October before the photography of the previous day Was available again along the same lines -32- T0 ET C03121004 0 Notification of the President 67 By this time photography from the'14 October' mission_had arrived in Washington and readout had begun The Director EPIC contacted the in the early evening of the 15th to inform hIM'that a possible MRBM site had been identified in the San Cristobal area The notified General Carter the being out of town _Genera1 Carter told him he would notify General Taylor and General Cerroll of DIA at dinner and MbGeorge Bundy if he as present As-the readout progressed during the evening the information became firmer and the decided not to wait until morning to notify'White abuse and State Department officials About 2200 he passed the information to Mr Bundy and Mr Hilsman who notified the Secretary of State The following morning 16 October General Carter and the DDVI briefed Bundy in detail and General Carter at 1100 briefed the President -33_ co 3 1 2 16 a A                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu