DECLASSIFIED '7cf7 Z -------- G Secret Authority CANADIAN r lIS 3ION TO THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY SECRET September 24 1958 @---- J Dear Mr IvIcKinney As you know tri-partite discussions have been going on between the United States United Kingdom and Canada for some time on the question of what sort of a safeguard system is necessary to ensure that nuclear materials supplied for peaceful purpos es to other countries are not diverted to military purposes In accordance with the understanding reached some time ago that each of the three countries would parpare a paper outlining its views on the nature of such a safeguard system the Canadian authorities have prepared the attached document entitled tiThe Application of Safeguards to Nuclear Exports If This paper has already been given by Mr Watson of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited to Mr Schaetzel of the State Department and to Mr r lichaels in Geneva HOldever I thought you might like to have a copy of the document here in Vienna for your information Yours sincerely D-I tJ M H Wershof Mr Hobert M McKinney American Delegate to I A E A Conference VIII Schmidgasse 14 VIENNA - Secret Secret SECRET The Application of Safeguards to Nuclear E x ports ART 1 - general Considerations It is the policy of the Canadian Government that safeguards against diversion to military use should be applied to nuclear materials exported from Canada for peaceful useo A similar policy is pursued by the United States and United Kingdom Governments in respect of such exports from their countries and the bilateral agreements of all three countries with other countries or regional organizations provide for the application of safeguardso o 2 The standard Safeguards article' Canadian bilaterals which is reproduced as Appendix B of this report provides for the application of safeguards to identified material only ioeo as defined in our Agreements this means broadly speaking uranium and thorium and derived substances Other nuclear materials such as heavy water reactors etc serve an essential role in the production processes by which nuclear source materials are converted into fissile materials usable for military purposes These items must therefore be controlled in 'auy comprehensive safeguards system However since it will be several years before Canada is in a position to export such items we will have neither the right nor opportunity to exercise safeguards over them during this periodo The remainder of this paper will therefore address itself to 0 0 e r$ blem ' H S mui S1fio 'v _ l r Ized 'tha nu ea r '''pTl int is as essential to the production of fissile material as are nuclear source materials that safeguards during the process of production t fissile materials must be applied in the nuclear plant itself and that it would be inequitable to expec't the producers of source materials alone to bear both the burden and possible commercial disadvantage of applying a safeguards system Q J tives of a afe Y ds System 3 'While nuclear energy has a variety of military applications including propulsionS power supply and materials' irradiation the essential object of a safeguards system from Canada'vs point of view is to prevent the diversion of uranium supplied for peacefUl uses to tb e manufacture of atomic weapons Natu ral uranium cannot be used directly for this ptlirpose but fissile materials notably the isotope U235 ana plutonium can be derived from i't respectively by passage through an isotope separation plant and by thei treatment of irradiated natural uranium in a chemical processing plante j 4 Since isotope separation plants are extremely expensive to build and operate j it is doubtful 'Whether any country other than the USA UK and USSR which at present have such plants and France which is considering building a plant would contemplate their cQnstruction in the near future and it is even more doubtful whether _ if they should decide to do so the construction and operation of such a plant 'could be kept secret This is nots however true of a chemical processing plant which lTould be substantially cheaper and might be clandestinely constructed and operatedo Secret 0 - ---- 2 - 50 In view of the foregoing ll it is considered that for the next few years the main problem facing canada will be to apply safeguards against the diversion of natural uranium to the manufacture of atomic weapons via the plutonium cycle Natural 'uranium might be diverted with a view to its irrqdiation and processing in clandestine plants or the plutonium might be diverted either before or after chemical processing It is therefore necessary to contemplate the application of S 4feguards to natural uraniu m in all of the forms in which it may be supplied by this country and at all stages in its processing and use abroad during refining ll during fabrication into metal and fuel elements during irradia'tion and subsequent storage $1 during chemical processing and finally ll safeguards will also be required over the plutonium produced and over the f ther uses of this plutoniUIDo 0 e imitations ol_the Safe uards concept 60 For both technical and practical reasons no safeguards system can oompletely prevent wilful diversion of uranium and plutoniunlo Except for uranium metal it is not possible J even for those respons tble for operating nuclear plants to make completely aCC'lJ rate inventory reports of the e items For example pluton ium formation inca given quantity of uranium irradiated at a known power output level for a given time in a reactor of known characteristics$ can often not be predicted within 5%0 There is thus a margin of error in all such repor'ts and$ in addition ll operating staff 'Could wilfully falsify records instruments il etc o to provide a much larger margin for diversion e A safeguards system can limit the amount of diversion -possible but the na r ro-we r these 1 i mits a-re to be$ the Illore elaborate fj costly and onerous t he system required It has been suggested that a simple audit of operating reco vds might detect 25% diversion from a reactor compleXj while the best figures which can be achieved by a full time resident staff of inspectors in such a complex might be about 2% 0 70 The effectiveness of a safeguards system will depend very largely on the support of all the main countries producing xItwlear plant and uranium If as must be antiCipated tSrecipient ti countries develop their own rtuncontrolled reactors and other nuclear plant acceptahce of the principle of I safegl13rds by uraniu m producing and fabricating countries rim w iJ-will be all the more iir g pgbu rt 51 s ince the availability of substantial quantities of ttunconti'olled u uraniUlIl on the world market would mean that countries with such plant could conduct nuclear programmes free of all safeguardso Moreover producing countries would have to collaborate closely in the pplicatiQn of the safeguards system in order to permit strict accounting Xo yJ f materials and pre'V'ent e rosion and deception The chances of achieving agreement of this kind on a safeguards system among produ Ging countries are highly uncertain Qllite apart from the coIilmercial incentive to offering f uncontrolled uranium for sale there are some producing countries which are in principle opposed to safeguards and do not think that they will work and others whose position is as yet undefined but probably opposed to safeguards o I ' 8 The views of urecipient tt countries are equally important Probably no such country would voluntarily submit to safeguards as a matter of principle under present circumstances o Some c ountries have accepted them lacking any alternative means of obtaining nuclear materialsjl but other countries India Sweden Secret' ecret - 3 and France for example have curtailed their nuclear programmes or embarked on high-cost production of their own rather than purchase available material which entailed safeguards A number of reCipient countries are probably at present withholding judgment on this issue pending the establishment of a working safeguards systeme From this point of view it is desirable that such a system be put into effect as soon as possible that it be adopted as widely as possible and in consequence be no more onerous than absolutely necessary and fully protect the amour propre and sovereignty of reCipient governments Some methods of applYing safeguards 90 The most effective means of preventing the diversion of fissile materials is by the international ownership of isotope separation and ah mical processing plants combined with a small staff of inspectors to detect the construction and operation of clandestine plants Since plutonium is the main object of concern during the next rew years the international ownership of chemical processing plants could suffice during this periodo There are however grave difficulties in the way of this solution Not least among these is the fact that since the three most advanced atomic powers would probably not consider accepting such a system themselves national pride would certainly lead some other countries to a similar refusal 10 The most effective safeguards system which could be established on the basis of inspection rather than ownership would demand a fairly large resident inspection staff in each reactor complex While we have not worked out the cost or other in plications of such a system in detail it is clear that the financial burden would be heavy and the system might well give rise to friction with the reCipient country diversion could only with certainty be restricted to 2% - 3% 110 A third alternative would be a system based on a regular periodic audit of nuclear materials supplied to a recipient r country supplemented by spot checks by travelling inspectors These checks would be designed to verify the accuracy of the audit reportse Such a system could probably not with certainty detect diversion of below 5% - lO% We have considered whether it would be possible to make a choice between the foregoing alternatives on the basiS of a mathematical calculationo For example the NRX and projected ClNDU reactors may be taken as typical of a large research and of a large power reactor respectively Their thermal outputs are l 6 mw and 800 mw and their annual plutonium production 9 kg and 185 kg respectively On the assumption that 10 kg is the quantity of fissile material required for an atomic weapon it would follow that diversion at the rate of 5% would lead to the accumulation of enough diverted plutoniulIl from NRX for the l'abrication of one such weapon every 20 years or so and from CANDU for one every year Thus if a country had only one power reactor f the CANDU type and if it were considered that the acceptable level of possible clande tine production of atomic weapons was less than one per yeaI'll then it would be necessary to put into effect the more rigorous safeguards system aimed at restricting possible diversion to 2% and even this would permit the production of one illicit weapon every 2 years 120 0 ConclUSions 130 However calculations of this kind are not particularly meaningful except possibly in the very short run since the most important factors for conSideration are not 'mathematical v ones In the first place the clandestine fabrication of even one atomic weapon from materials intended for peaceful use can not be accepted with equanimitYe Since diversion cannot for technical reasons be comple e led out by any safeguards system the conclusion would o be that the objective of such a system shoUld be to reinforce the moral and legal obligations undertaken by recipient countries in bilateral agreement by making it unlikely that detection -could be evaded in the long run The corollary of this is that so long as possible misuse of nuclear nlaterials remains a cause for concern the supply of materials to y country should be refused if there appeared to be serious doubt as to that country1s good faith and willingness to carry out its obl igations scrupulouslyo 0 140 The foregoing conclusion is reinfor ed by the fact that no safeguards system can prevent the forcible seizure by'a country of the atomic installations within its borders and of the fissile material contained in themo In view of the difficulty of hiding a clandestine atomic programme and of the poiLiticalopprobrii m wbich the discovery 01' attempted diversion 'Would entail$t 1 tse m's more likely that 8 country determined on a weapons progr amnl e but without itsowlil uncontrolled means -' of carrying one out would rely on seizure rather than on diversiono 150 On the basis of t1J e foregoing it is the Canadian view that a Simple audit and spot check system WOUld in the circumstances provide the most satisfactory means of discharging the obligations incurred in the safeguards article of its bilateral agreements o Details of such a system which is also recommended for the consideration of other interested countries are given in part II of this paper 1 0 16e It is of course recognized that reCipient countries might take advantage of the margin of uncertainty inherent in an audit system to divert quantities of f issile material less than the measurement and accounting errOT On the other hand a simple audit and spot check would fulfill the practical objectives of a safeguards system as outlined above the positive advantages of Which would seem overwhelming It would be relatively inexpensive even if introduced to cover large-scale operations and it would be relatively inoffensive to reCipient countries This last may well prove to be a critical argument in its favour 'While many countries are at present prepared to accept bilateral safeguards ll at least in prinCiple in order to get their atomic programmes under way they will certainly seek to free themselves of these safeguards if they prove onerous As time passes alternative uncontrolled sources of nuclear materials will become available and all producing countries will find themselves under increasing cOnlnlercial and political press e to relax the conditions they impose on the supply of materials o In these circumstances it would seem that the only certain way in which to ensure that the bulk of the world's peaceful uses of atomic energy are subject to safeguards in the medium to long run is by the widespread acceptance of the idea that safeguards are deSirable as a matter of principle If this approach is to succeedJ the safeguards system now ad 1'Ocated must be the least onerous one compatible with security on the criteria developed in this paper 0 0 170 It is generally accepted that the International AtomiC Energy Agency is the appropriate forum in which to promote this idea and that through it a genuine multilateral safeguards system might be developed and applied For practical reasons however the first steps towards such a system are likely to be taken on a bilateral basis e It would therefore$ seem important that Canada Secret ecret I - 5- and other countries which share our concern in this matter should not now advocate a system which i l kely to prove unacceptable to the majority at a later stage o To do so would be to invite the premature demise of the multilateral safeguards concept involving a very embarrassing situation in respect of the more rigorous safeguards system which we' might in the meantime have imposed bilaterally on some countries among which will be some of our closest friends The audit and spot system would seem to offer the best chances of gaining acceptance for multilateral safeguards and would also meet our immediate needs arising out of the safeguards provisions of our bilateral agreements 0 PART II - proposed Procedure for Audit and Inspection of Source and Special Nuclear Material Supplied by Canada under Bilateral Agreements for Co-Operation in the peaceful _ _ _-- U s e s o f A9 t l o m l c E n e r lgOOldy --_____ Introductjon 180 This proposed procedure covers the materials which might be supplied by Canada under bilateral agreements within the next three or four years It assumes that no reCipient country will have an isotope separation plant e ge diffusion plant within that time In particular the proce ure will cever - a Uranium salts - such as mine concentrates and uranium oxide whether of reactor grade or not b Uranium metal in bulk form - normally this would be in the form of metal dingots or pieces c Unirradiated uranium metal or salts as fabricated units - these would normally be fuel elements and would have identifying numbers or markingsJj Irradiated uranium metal or salts - these would contain plutonium produced from the neutron irradiation e Separated plutonium as metal or salts - this ateria1 could either have been supplied by Canada or could have been produced from uranium supplied by Canada o 19 The procedure does not cover items such as enriched heavy water or reactors or major reactor components uraniuul Accounting Records to be Maintained by the Receiving Country Any country receiving material from Canada subject to inspection would be required to set up a system of accounts for this material so that a record was kept of the quantity and location of all stocks No specific method of accounting need be followed by the country but the procedure should be such that the information required for the reports described below could be obtained from these records o 200 Secret I - 6 210 The receiving country would be required to give a distinctive serial number of each fuel element made from Canadian uranium supplied The accounting records should show the location of each fuel element up to the point where it loses its identity This would occur should it be dissolved 0 The receiving country would prepare a report which would answer the questions listed in Appendix A as often as may prove necessary in order to meet the purposes of controle This might vary from once every two months to once every six months Copies of each report would be sent to the Canadian Government or if it were agreed to an outside organization deSignated by the Canadian Government 2 0 0 j 0 Audit and Inspection by he canadian Government The Canadian Government would assign to a committee or group or if greed ll to pme outside organization the responsibility for checking the accuracy of the reports submitted Each report would be examined to determine whether or not there were any apparent inconsistencies and this would be followed by spot-checks in the country concerned by representatives of the designated inspection organizatio o The extent of such inspection would depend upon the amount of material held by the country concerned the complexity of the processes containing the plutonium and uranium and on the general integrity of the country being inspected For example should a country only have fabricated natural uran um fuel elements ll in pection would largely consist of a physical inventory checko It must be expected however that in most cases competent scientists or engineers will be needed for this work They must be-alert to detect any possible flaws in the answers given to their questionso They will be at a great disadvantage if they are not good linguists It is believed that they will be most successful if they are technical experts who would be welcomed by the-organizations in the country concerned on this account 230 j j 0 0 24 The inspector s U would select at random information listed in the reports received and perform such examination of the countryfs own records and of the actual material as may be required to check the accuracy of the submitted reports If these random selected items were found to be correct the whole report would be assumed to be accurate 250 The physical check might in some cases be a direct count or measurement of the physical inventory In other cases it might be an indirect check on the accuracy of the data Examples of such indirect checks might be - a An isotopic measurement of the uranium in irradiated fuel elements or in the solution formed on dissolving these elements to determine if the isotopic composition was in accord with the reported power output b An isotopic analysis of plutonium in solution to determine if the plutonium composition agreed with the reported irradiation of the uranium from which the pluto lum was formed c Radiation measurements of monitors laced in the reactor to determine total power production 260 After each report had been found to contain no errors the receiving country would be notified that the report was accepted by the Government of canada The receiving country Secret -------------- ---------------------------- Secret - 7 might well wish to publicize this acceptance as evidence that its atomic energy activities were entirely peaceful personnel and Costs Involved 27 The routine reports on the receipt and disposition of uranium and fissile material will require analysis by experts This might be done by a committee or similar body consisting of personnel drawn from a number of departments and agencies in ottawa who would do this work as part of their regular duties The subsequent inspections will almost always have to be carried out by experts drawn from the Atomic Energy Control Hoard $ Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Eldorado Mining and Refining Limited $ and perhaps Mines and Technical Surveyso It is thought that the work might be carried out by such officials without significant inte ierence with their present duties The precise number of experts required can only be determined on an ad hoc basis at the time and in the light of the particular purposes for which the materials in question are being used It is u ikely that in the next few years the cost of carrying out control activities of th is type will be significant The main additional expense will be the cost of travelling and this could be in the region of $10 000 to $20 000 per annum It would appear difficult and undesirable to seek to charge control costs to the receiving organization It is suggested that such costs as there may be should in principle be met by the Canadian Government and it would not appear necessary at this stage to consider precisely how this should be done 280 r Secret APpENDIX A Proposed periodic Report on Uranium and Plutonium Supplied by Canada and on Plutonium Derived from Uranium Supplied by Canada In this report weight should be given in metric units as accurately as are known When weights are not knoWll approximate weights should be given together with an estimate of probable error 10 Unirradiated Uranium a Quantity of uranium that is not in form of numbered fuel elements received since last report tranferred from this category since last report quantity and location of material in stock at timeoi' report i ii iii b Quantity and serial number of fUel-elements received as finished fuel elements since last report produced in country from material in category I a since last report added to reactoDs' s1nce last report ' 1 ' removed fromi stock for re'a'sons other than adding to reactors since last report quantity location and serial numbers of elements in stock at time of report i ii iii iv v IIc Uranium undergoing Irradiation - A separate report should be made for each reactor a Quantity and serial number of fuel elements added to each reactor Since last report b Quantity seraal number and location in reactor of fuel elements in each reactor at time of report c power generated since last report by each element in the reactors o d Calculated plutonium content of each element in the reactor e Quantity serial number power generated during period irradiated and calculated plutonium content at time of removal of elements removed from reactors since last report 0 III Irradiated Uranium - A separate report should be submitted for each storage area a Quantity serial number and plutonium content and source of elements placed in storage since last repa t b Quantity serial number and plutonium content of elements removed from storage and explanation of what has been done with these elements since last report Secret Secret - 2 c IV Quantity location serial number and plutonium content of elements in stock at time of report Chemical Processing of Uranium Procured from canada A s parate report should be submitted for each chemical processing installatiI# a Quantity serial number and plutonium content of irradiated elements removed from storage for which processing has commenced since last report b Quantity serial number and measured plutonium content of irradiated elements for which chemiGal processing has been completed since last report c Quantity and location of material separated in chemical processing installation since last report i Plutonium ii Depleted uranium d Estimated losses in chemical proce'ssing installation since last report i Plutonium ii Depleted uranium e Quantity and location of material in storage after chemical processing at time of report i Plutonium ii Depleted Uranium Vo Separated Plutonium received from Canada or Separated from Irradiated Uranium a Quantity at start of report period showing source compound isotope ompos1tiQnand locationo b Receipts since last report c Disbursements and losses since last report with explanation for each entry d tity at end of report period showing compound isotope composition and location Secret APPl NDIX B Safeguards Article from Canadian Standard Draft of a Bilateral Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Each supplying Contracting Party shall be permitted to assure itself that the provisions of this Agreement are complied with and in particular that identified material is being used for peaceful purposes only and to that end the supplying Contracting Party shall have the right N t r 1 f I a to examine the design of equipment including nuclear reactorsJ or facilities in which identified material is to be a sed or stored with a view to ensuring that such identified material will not further any military purpose and that effective application of the safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall be feasible b to require the maintenance and production of adequate records to assist in ensuring accountability for identified material c to call for and receive progress d to approve the means to be used for the chemical processing of identified material after irradiation with a view to ensuring that such processing will not lend itself to diversion of identified material to military use e to send representatives designated by it after consultation with the other Contracting Party into the territory of the latter which representatives shall have access at all times to all places equipment and facilities where identified material is used stored or located to all data relating to such identified material and to all persons who by reason of their occupation deal with such identified material or such data as may be necessary to account for all identified material and to determine wn-ether such identified material is being used for peaceful purposes only Such representatives provided they shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions shall be accompanied by representatives of the other contracting Party if the latter so requests 1-1 r Il CJ o u 0 s report At or after the time the International AtomiC Energy Agency is in a PQsition to carry out the safe ards functions provided for in its statute the Contracting Parties will cQn ult together to determine whether and to what extent they may wish to modify the safeguards prOVisions set out in this Agreement so that they may conform more closely with those of the said Statute and to have the application of safeguards carried out by the said Agency 20 30 Each Contracting party if it has determined that identified material is furthering a military purpose shall have the right to suspend or cancel scheduled delivery of source material special nuclear material and fuel and to require the return of all identified material under the control of the other Contracting Party Secret -                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu