774 5 9 a 7 7262 6 5 COPY NO $1 5 scyogrinel SECRET SAFEGUARDS NUCLEAR EXPORTS FliE BBPY Five-Power Discussions London FebruaryZMarch 1959 Summary Conclusions Representatives of Australia Canada the Union of South Africa the United Kingdom and the United States met in London from 26th February to 3rd March 1959 for informal discussions on safeguards against the diversion to military use of nuclear materials andeaquipment exported for peaceful purposes They considered the safeguards to be applied both to bilateral transactions and to projects of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the latter case with an to the proposed safeguards scheme which the Agency Secretariat is expected to submit to the Board of Governors in June 1959 Their conclusions were reached without commitment and will be submitted to their Governments The conclusions are as follows Uniform standards and a common front 1 Safeguards of a common standard must be applied by all supplying countries and organisations at least of the Western world if reasonable effectiveness is to be achieved and if countries who apply safeguards are not to be at a political and commercial disadvantage beside thoSe who do not Should it prove impossible to form a common front among Western suppliers each of the five powers reserves the right to reconsider whether to apply safeguards to its own exports Moreover it would be highly desirable for Russia also to apply comparable safeguards if she becomes a significant exporter of nuclear goods to the free world for the West to insist on safeguards when Russia did not would give the latter a considerable advantage in the cold war 2 As the next step towards the establishment of a common front among Western Suppliers an approach should be made without delay to France preliminary to discussions with other Euratom countries and the Euratom Commission and later depending on what individual materials and plant are to trigger safeguards when exported possibly other suppliers should also be approached The aim of these approaches is an agreement by the five powers France Germany Belgium and any other supplying countries to export trigger items only under an appropriate agreement making provision for safeguards and also to work together for the adOption of a system in terms of which the safeguards applied by the I A E A other international organisations and individual suppliers are mutually compatible International Administration In the interest alike of uniform standards economy and most probably political acceptability administration of safeguards whether they Spring from a bilateral agreement or from the Statute of the I A E A or another international beheld Wm m nevar possible be undertaken by an international authority Uspt where HR 1959 3 DECLASSFFIED Authority 2 9 6 70 SECRET SECRET the exist ence of r egional organisations a lr eady rules this out t his authority should be the L A E A which should in any e ven t se t the s t anda rd f or ot her s afegua rds sys t ems 4 Exports t o the Euratom countries can only be subjected t o the Eur a t om s e curity contro l and some othe r ' es t ern European countr i es may pre f er to have safegusrds admini s t e r ed by the European Nuclear Ene r gy Agency r a ther t han the I A E A The member countri e s of th ese or gani sat i ons and the I A E A shoul d be persuaded t o worle for compatible st anda rds Mo r eover for present at i ona l r ea s ons the anno unc ement of practica l measures unde r these schemes s hou l d not precede agreement by th e I A E A on its own measures It woul d b e desirab l e f or s af egua r ds on exports by Eurat om co untr i e s ou t s i de the ur a t om a r ea t o be admini s t e r ed by the I A E A or the E N E A in appropriate c a s e s Should other r egi ona l atomic ene r gy or ganis a t ions be s t 5 up suppli er c ountri e s should be r eady t o entrust t e aJmin str a t on of safegua rds i n bila t era l agr eements t o t hem onl y f they a re satisf i ed t he ir s t anda rd s a r e compa ti bl e with t he I A E A ' s Future bi l at eral agr eement s could contain a s an a lt e rna tiv e 6 t o the current cla us e s i n mos t U S Canadi an and U K b ila t e rals giving t he supplyi ng country the righ t t o i mpose safeguards a provision for the safegua rds a rra n ements of an appr opria t e internat ional authority t o be applied A model a rticle is annexed which c ou l d be adaryt ed t o par t icular cases 7 Some r e Cipi ent countri es may prefer b ilatera l adminis tration of safegua rds part i cul a rly Ylher e these a re a lr eady in forc e In such ca s e s t he s t anda rds of safegu8rds appli ed shoul d b e compa tib l e wi th the s afegu a r ds vlhich wo uld be applied by the a ppropri a t e int ernat i ona l au thorit y Underlying principles of safeguards measures 8 Safeguards should be presented not a s an i mposition by t he suppli er but as a j oint dut y of supplier and r e Cipient flowing from t he fundamental r esponsibi lity of Gove r nments t o ensure t hB t fissil e ma t eria l i s not misused Responsib ility r e sts pr i ma rily with t he reCipient Government The a im is not to achieve a foolproof safeguards syst em but 9 r ather t o buy time during which it is t o b e hoped agr eement c an be r ea ched between Ea st and ' test involving pe rhaps control over a ll means of fissil e ma t e ri al producti on 10 The approach t o safegua r d s should be evoluti ona r y ' methods of appl ic ati on t o fa cilitie s of di fferent kinds shoul d ' be wo rked out starting with the simple r faciliti e s only a s applic a tion t o a particular type of faci lity bec omes a practic a l ne ce SSity 11 The severity of a pplica t ion s houl d be adapt ed t o the si ze and nature of the a ssi t nce supplied and of t he faci lity t o be controll ed Faci l t e s c an be di vided int o five ca t egori e s 1 Resea rch r ea ctors 2 Ma t e rials t e sting and small power r ea ctors 2 DECLASSIFIED Authority qlf7 6 70 SECRET SECRET 3 Fabrication plant for natural uranium fuel elements Large power reactors 5 Enriched fuel element fabrication and chemical re processing plant It is to be clearly understood that the application of safeguards to facilities in categories 3 and 5 will arise only where they fabricate or process material which is subject to safeguards The export of plant for such facilities in themselves would not trigger safeguards 12 Only facilities in categories 1 and 2 will require application of safeguards in the immediate future in the other categories no facilities which will be subject to safeguards will be in operation for the next few years Consiieration of detailed measures of application at the I A E A discussions in June should therefore for the present be confined to categories 1 and 2 subject however to the clear understanding that farther reaching measures for larger facilities will have to be worked out in due course Moreover in entering into bilateral agreements covering long-term assistance involving possibly the need to apply safeguards in due course to facilities in categories 3 and 5 supplying countries must ensure that the safeguards clauses include as do both the alternative formulae referred to in para 6 above provisions enabling the appropriate measures to be applied when the time comes Trigger items 13 Supplying countries should permit the export of the following items save in minimal quantities only under a bilateral agreement or project agreement of an appropriate international authority incorporating safeguards provisions Natural uranium whether as ore concentrates compounds metal or fuel elements Definition Minerals raw and treated including residues and tailings which contain uranium exceeding 0 05% by weight including Natural uranium unwrought or wrought including alloys and compounds of natural uranium having a uranium content exceeding 0 05% excepting medicinals Fissile material in all forms Definition Uranium 233 alloys containing uranium 233 and compounds of uranium 233 Uranium enriched in the isotope 235 alloys containing uranium enriched in the isotope 235 and compounds of uranium enriched in the isotope 235 Irradiated uranium containing plutonium Plutonium alloys containing plutonium and compounds containing plutonium Irradiated thorium containing Uranium 233 3 Authority 992 7O SECRET SECRET Reactors Definition Any device using nuclear fission for the PTOdUCtion or heat power and radiations It is not practicable to identify and define components and sub-assemblies of reactors In practice reactors will not be exported as a whole but in parts It will not however be practical or desirable to attempt to attach safeguards for the export of individual components of reactors most if not all of which are standard items when they are not exported as part of the sale of a reactor Nevertheless Governments should in practice be able to ensure that manufacturers do not evade the attachment of safeguards by exporting reactors in the shape of undeclared standard components Isotopic enrichment plant Definition Equipment specially designed for the separation of isotopes of uranium in Heavy water has been proposed as a trigger item It is identifiable used only for nuclear purposes and enables the construction of a natural uranium reactor with a significant plutonium output using a smaller fuel charge than with any other moderator On the other hand it is not possible to apply controls to heavy water production plant and it is arguable that the I A E A Statute does not envisage the application of safeguards to heavy water The South African representative reserves his position pending a clarification of the attitude in regard to safeguards of other existing or prospective producers Norway India Egypt and further consideration of South Africa's own plans for production of heavy water 15 The Canadian representative reserves his position pending further consideration regarding attachment of safeguards to the sale of a reactor design Such a sale to an industrially advanced country possessing its uranium would enable the latter to avoid safeguards The U K and U S representatives emphasise the impracticability of controlling export of information 16 Natural uranium and fissile Haterial re-exported after say fabrication into fuel elements or chemical reprocessing should regardless of origin or ownership attract safeguards In other words the services of fabricating fuel elements and of chemical reprocessing trigger safeguards even if the material belongs to the country for which the service is rendered 17 Supplying countries must take statutory or other appropriate measures to ensure that trigger items cannot be exported without governmental permission 18' The list Of trigger items should be eriodicall rev in the light of technical developments iewed DECLASSIFIED Authority 2 926 70 SECRET SECRET Exemption of minimum quantities $2 er ggogt or small quantities of natural uranium and fissile ith or exPerimental purposes should be permissible bilaterally out an agreement providing for safeguards The I A E A is ound by its Statute even in the case of minimal quantities to consider whether and to what extent safeguards should be applied 20 For natural uranium Canada and the United States favour the following system Each supplying country to sell each recipient country not more than a cumulative total over the years of 1% Short tons of contained uranium in any form This figure is based on the assumption that no recipient country should receive more than a cumulative total of 10 short tons and that eight potential supplier countries are in the market Individual sales to be limited to 250 lbs Recipient to give an undertaking that material will be used for peaceful research or sampling and not for reactor fuel 21 An alternative might be For each recipient country individual supplying countries to be free to negotiate for a single initial sale of up to 5 short tons of contained uranium in any form subject to notification to some agreed central register before signature of contract After the intial sale other suppliers similarly to be free to negotiate sales provided that the cumulative total over the years sold to each recipient country does not exceed 7 short tons 1 6 the minimum charge of a natural uranium reactor from all sources including the initial sale The central register to keep all suppliers notified of sales so as to ensure the cumulative total is not exceeded No limit on individual sales within the totals in the preceding sub paragraph 0 Recipient to give an undertaking that material will be used for peaceful research or sampling and not for reactor fuel 22 Both procedures might be put forward for discussion with Continental suppliers 23 In the case of enriched material a cumulative total over the years of 100 gms of contained fissile material might be sold by each supplier country to each recipient country Outline of I A E A safeguards procedures 2h The I A E A or other international authority should adopt minima below which materials and small reactors should be subject only to nominal safeguards whether these stem from a bilateral agreement or from an I A E A or other international authority's project agreement Nominal safeguards would be sufficient for a research reactor of not more than 50-100 kw for which the total fuel supplied is contained in the reactor core SECRET 25 For the up of applicati poses of the present materials taggigzlg for I'esearch phase Of orkin out measures reactors may be ub to the frequency of 26- Account the Onnreactor operation should be based on for Foreign Nations e Accountability - Information - ue according to the reactor rating submission Below 10 Annually 10 - ho ho - 100 Quarterly 27 Initially a reactor should be classified by its nominal power rating but as some reactors may substantially exceed this rating in actual operation provision should be made for periodical review and possible re-classification 28 Countries subject to safeguards will expect to know where they stand in regard to the number of inspection visits but the inspecting authority must retain both an element of flexibility and surprise and the power to make extra visits in exceptional circumstances It will normally be desirable where this is technical relevant for an inspector to be present when fuel changes take place The following formula might cover inspection rights Under normal circumstances taking one year with another the number of visits shall be of the order of per annum Visits will be arranged as far as possible to coincide with the changing of fuel elements The frequency of visits would vary with reactor size and the Secretariat will doubtlessnake their own proposals The minimum frequency acceptable to the five powers would for their own information at present be of the following order Below 10 1 visit per annum 10 - MO 3 visits per annum to - 100 6 visits per annum In no circumstances would resident inspection be necessary for reactors below 100 29 It is important that inspectors should to the extent practicable have qualifications which make them welcome as providers of technical advice and other assistance unconnected with safeguards and that visits should as far as possible also cover other ground They might for example be combined with those arising from the obligations regarding health and safety ll cretariat's general idea on limited pursuit of 3gccegrslivgegenerations of derived material appears acceptable gut discussion on details of pursuit should not be invited in 6 DECLASSIFIED Authority 3926 10 SECRET SECRET June It could be said that the five - - powers favour no more than limited 0f Slgnificant quantities of fissile material Cost 31 It would be assumed that recipient countries would bear the cost of accounts and reports most of which they must keep anyway for their own purposes The I A B A or other supplier will probably have to pay for scrutiny and auditing of reports and for visits to the site 52 Article XIV of the Statute suggests that the Agency may not be obliged to recover from the parties the full cost of administering bilateral safeguards The object should be to secure that the cost of scrutiny and audit is borne by the Agency itself although supplying countries may not be able to aVOid reimbursing inspection costs Atomic Energy Office 1 Richmond Terrace Whitehall s w 1 3th MarchI 1252 DECLASSIFIED Authority SECRET SECRET Annex t o SG 10 Fina l Dra ft Safegu ards Article T e Contra cting Pa rti es r e cognise and acc ept the ir i nd ividual and j o ln e sponsibility t o ensur e that the Lidentif i ed ma t eri a l equlpmeni -- supplied und e r this Agreement is used sol el y f or pea ceful purpos e s To tha t end the Contr act ing Part ie s 9gree t o concl ud e an arran gement W ith compet ent int er na tiona l authori t z7i' in terms of which the lnt e rnati ona l auth oritl7 shall have the ri ght to the ext en r e l evant t o the pr o j e ct or project s c over ed by the Agr eement a s decided by the L1nter na ti ona l authoritiJAA in c onsult ati on with the Contrac ti ng Pa rti e s 1 a t o examine th e des i gn of equipme nt including nuc l e ar r ea ctors or f ac iliti es i n whic h i dent if i ed ma t eria l is t o be used or st or ed with a vi ew t o en suring tha t suc identi f ied ma t er i a l will not further any milit ary purpose and tha t eff ective applic a tion of the s afe guards provided f or in t his A I'eement shall b e f ea sibl e b to requir e the ma i nt en ance and pr oducti on of adequ ate records t o a ssist in ensurinG acc ount ab ility for identifi ed material c t o call f or and r e ce ive progr e ss r eports d to approve the me ans to be us ed f or the chemical processing of identified ma t eri a l aft er irra di a ti on with a view to ensuring that such proc e SSing will no t l end itself to diversion of i dentified mater i a l t o milit a ry use e t o send represent ative s desi gna t ed by it a fter consultation with t he Contra cting Pa rty r ece iving the mat erial into the t e rrit or y of t he l att e r which r epresent ativ e s shall have a cc e s s at a ll tim es t o all places equipment and fa cilit i e s wher e i dentified ma t erial is used stor ed or l oca t ed t o a ll da t a r e l a ting to such identifi ed mat eri al and t o a ll pe r sons vlho by r eason of their occupa ti on uea l 'l ith such ident ified mater ia l or such data a s may be ne ce ssa ry to acc ount for all identifi ed ma t eri al and t o de t ermine wh ether such identifi ed ma t er i a l is be ing use d for peaceful purpose s only Such repre s entative s provided they shall n ot ther eby b e de l ayed or otherwise impeded in the exe rcise of t heir functions shall be a ccompanied by representa t ives of the Contracting Pa rty r eceiving the material i f the latter so reque sts 2 The arrangement with the Linternational authoriti7 referred to in the previous pa r a graph shall be concluded not later than months following delivery of any of the identified mat e ria l covered by this Agreement Should the Part ies by the end of this period h ave failed to agre e on the terms of the arran gement t he supplying Contracting Party shall have the ri ght t c suspend or cancel further deliveries and to require the return of all the material already delivered 1 DECLASSIFIED Authorily L-_ 9'1f 6 70 _ I -_--l SECRET SECRET 3 Should the international authority7me at any time after the conclus1on of the arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 determine that identified material supplied under this Agreement is furthering a military purpose the supplying Contracting Party shall have the right to suspend or cancel further deliveries and to require the return of all the material already delivered Explanatory Notes In the case of agreements relating only to material the identified material to which control is to be applied would be defined separately elsewhere in the agreement In the case of agreements relating both to material and equipment or to equipment only the equipment to which control is to be applied would similarly be defined separately elsewhere in the agreement and consequential changes would be necessary where identified material is referred to in paras 1 a to an Here would be inserted the name of the competent international authority It is agreed that such an authority may be the I A E A Euratom E N E A or any other analagous international organisation which the Contracting Parties both recognise as being competent to apply the safeguards provided for in this Article on a basis compatible with the standards applied by the I A E A Euratom and E N E A The provision in paragraph 2 is intended to provide for an interim period prior tothe establishment by the I A E A Euratom or E U E A of an approved safeguards system Once such a safeguards system has been established the Contracting Parties would conclude the arrangement with the international authority before delivery of any material or equipment subject to centre 8 28 59 DECLASSHHED Authority E2 4 2 6 70 SECRET                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu