Page 473 1 Thursday 17 May 2012 2 Prosecution Opening Statement 3 Open session 4 The accused entered court 5 --- Upon commencing at 9 02 a m 6 7 JUDGE ORIE Good morning to everyone in and around this courtroom 8 Madam Registrar would you please call the case 9 THE REGISTRAR 10 Good morning Your Honours This is case number IT-09-92-T the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic 11 JUDGE ORIE Thank you Madam Registrar 12 Since the composition of the teams is not exactly the same as 13 yesterday Mr McCloskey could you introduce -- could you give us the 14 appearances for the Prosecution 15 MR McCLOSKEY Yes Good morning Mr President 16 Your Honours everyone 17 Kweku Vanderpuye Camille Bibles and Janet Stewart Good morning Today with me is Dermot Groome 18 JUDGE ORIE Thank you 19 Mr Lukic appearances for the Defence the same as yesterday 20 MR LUKIC Good morning Your Honours Good morning everybody 21 Branko Lukic for the Defence joined by Mr Miodrag Stojanovic 22 Milos Saljic and Mr Radovan Djurdjevic 23 JUDGE ORIE Thank you 24 And Mr Mladic is present as well 25 Mr McCloskey you are the one who will continue the opening Page 474 1 statement If you're ready you may proceed 2 MR McCLOSKEY Thank you 3 The expulsion and murder of the non-Serb population of Bosnia 4 described to you yesterday by Mr Groome did not stop in 1993 or 1994 5 In a period of only five days from the 12th through the 6 16th of July 1995 the armed forces of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic 7 expelled the civilian population of Srebrenica and murdered over 7 000 8 Srebrenica men and boys 9 The murders continued well beyond 16 July From 17 July through 10 the autumn of 1995 the VRS continued to capture and kill Srebrenica 11 Muslim men as the victims tried in vain to find their way through the 12 woods of Eastern Bosnia 13 14 By November 1st the VRS had eliminated the Muslim population of Srebrenica from Eastern Bosnia with the women children elderly men 15 barely existing in refugee camps left crippled almost beyond hope 16 without their fathers brothers husbands sons and grandfathers 17 This was and will remain genocide 18 As you absorb the evidence of this crime I have no doubt you 19 will reach the same conclusion 20 17 years of investigation the evidence of this crime is overwhelming is 21 unassailable 22 Today May 17th 2012 after some In brief of the over 7 000 men and boys murdered 5 977 have 23 been exhumed from Srebrenica-related mass graves 24 have been identified by DNA 25 Most of those victims We have 11 amazing men who somehow were able to survive mass Page 475 1 executions and crawl out from the carnage and find their way to safety 2 With their help and the benefit of aerial imagery we have found the vast 3 majority of Srebrenica mass graves and have exhumed them 4 We have searched the VRS commands and found vehicle logs 5 excavation records showing the date place vehicle and operator 6 working at many of those mass graves 7 machines who dug the mass graves and buried the victims We have operators of those 8 We have some of the soldiers who actually executed the victims 9 along with officers supervising those executions as well as documents 10 and records accounting for the Muslim prisoners and their fate 11 radio intercepts of VRS soldiers and officers discussing murders 12 have video of two of the actual executions themselves 13 So let me be perfectly clear We have We The crime will not be the main 14 focus of this Prosecution This case will be primarily about one issue 15 The individual criminal responsibility of Ratko Mladic 16 But of course Mladic did not commit these crimes alone 17 In July 1995 Mladic relied on a few key Main Staff officers to 18 provide him with the advice expertise and leadership needed to design 19 and implement the Srebrenica expulsion and genocide 20 To get the job done Mladic relied upon Generals Tolimir Gvero 21 and Miletic 22 three were present involved and close confidants of Mladic 23 knew the horrors of forcing a people to leave and murder yet they all 24 did their part to this end 25 There were other generals in his Main Staff but these They all In 1995 General Mladic and his Main Staff looked to Page 476 1 Generals Zivanovic and Krstic commander and deputy commander of the 2 Drina Corps to expel and murder Srebrenica Muslims 3 In turn the Main Staff and General Krstic relied upon 4 Drina Corps brigade commanders Colonel Pandurevic Major Obrenovic of 5 the Zvornik Brigade Colonel Blagojevic of the Bratunac Brigade and 6 special police deputy commander Borovcanin and other commanders to defeat 7 the Muslim forces remove the Muslim population and murder the 8 able-bodied men of Srebrenica 9 Major Obrenovic has pled guilty in this court The 10th Sabotage 10 Detachment of the Main Staff executed over a thousand victims 10th 11 Sabotage soldier Drazen Erdemovic has pled guilty to his involvement in 12 these crimes and will testify here 13 The majority of the work in supervising organising and 14 implementing the actual removal of the Muslim population from Srebrenica 15 and the murder of the able-bodied men fell to the security officers 16 Leading and supervising the VRS security organs in this process was 17 General Zdravko Tolimir and his direct subordinates Colonel Ljubo Beara 18 and Lieutenant-Colonel Radislav Jankovic 19 For the command of the Drina Corps it was 20 Lieutenant-Colonel Vujadin Popovic 21 Bratunac Brigade Captain Momir Nikolic 22 Zvornik Brigade Lieutenant Drago Nikolic and Captain Milorad Trbic 23 24 25 For the command of the For the command of the Momir Nikolic has pled guilty to these crimes and will soon testify in this case These were the men and forces who committed these crimes In Page 477 1 1995 there were no paramilitaries there were no civilian bands or 2 outside forces involved only VRS and one unit of mixed 3 Ministry of Interior police forces known as MUP forces and one MUP unit 4 from Serbia working together with the VRS 5 These crimes are etched into the terrible history of the Bosnian 6 war 7 focus this case on the evidence linking General Mladic and his men to 8 these crimes 9 The crimes have never been in serious dispute We will therefore Mladic was on the ground in command in Potocari Bratunac 10 Sandici and other places where these crimes were committed from 11 July 11 through the afternoon of 14 July 12 Mladic was on duty in command and control of the VRS while 13 conducting state business during his time in Belgrade from the evening 14 of 14 July through the evening of 16 July when he returned to Bosnia 15 This was not an army out of control or controlled by someone 16 else 17 murder over 7 000 people in four days 18 Only an army strictly controlled at the top could have managed to The VRS was a professional army with a dynamic and disciplined 19 chain of command The VRS carried out their murderous orders with 20 incredible discipline organisation and military efficiency 21 detaining transporting murdering and burying over 7 000 men and boys Capturing 22 at first in total secrecy from the outside world was a truly amazing 23 feat of utter brutality 24 25 Importantly the survivors of the Srebrenica mass executions provide some of the most valuable evidence of the organisation and Page 478 1 efficiency of the murder operation as we call it 2 experienced the same thing 3 numbers they were relieved of their property they were stored indoors 4 or in vehicles they were transported in huge convoys to some school or 5 municipal building in and around Bratunac or Zvornik they were 6 transported in vehicles to nearby mostly isolated execution sites and 7 summarily executed by firing squad and buried by heavy engineering 8 equipment the day of their death or a day or two after 9 Most of the survivors They were captured or surrendered in large So in listening to the evidence of survivors it's important to 10 appreciate what happened to the victims of course but also we need to 11 look beyond the horror and focus on the underlying system of military 12 efficiency evident from their testimony 13 The evidence proving Mladic was in command of the troops who 14 committed these crimes is only part of the evidence proving Mladic's 15 guilt 16 crimes Mladic himself was on the ground and personally involved We will also prove that during the commission of some of these 17 18 The crucial linkage evidence will come largely from three sources 19 Documents Most criminal orders in this war were given orally 20 and many of the important relevant documents have been destroyed or 21 hidden 22 survived and will help expose the crime and General Mladic's role in it 23 However there are some crucial VRS and MUP documents that Intercepts You will also see the text of radio intercepts taken 24 down by the BH army known as the Muslim army as they eavesdropped on 25 VRS conversation We are confident that you will find this evidence Page 479 1 2 reliable and credible And of course testimony Many VRS witnesses involved in these 3 crimes or very close to them will testify in this trial and provide 4 important evidence implicating General Mladic 5 Many of these VRS witnesses will not be telling you the complete truth 6 and may at times be less than truthful in most cases to avoid 7 incriminating themselves or others 8 requesting that they be provided a formal caution explaining their rights 9 under ICTY law 10 11 A word of caution here So with these witnesses we will be When evaluating their evidence it will be important to look to corroborating evidence in critically evaluating their testimony But in 12 the end we believe you will find this evidence invaluable as it gives 13 you a look inside Mladic's very operation and in most cases you will be 14 able to identify truth from untruth 15 The charges This component involves two horrendous crimes The 16 forced movement of the Muslim population on 12 and 13 the misery and 17 death resulting from that together with the mass murder of thousands of 18 Bosnian Muslim men and boys all amounting to the elimination of the 19 Muslim population from Srebrenica and genocide 20 Forced movement The forced movement on 12 and 13 July did not 21 happen in a vacuum It involved much more than providing buses and 22 trucks for the transportation 23 strangling the enclaves by limiting crucial supplies two terrorising 24 the civilian population by sniping and shelling three attacking the 25 civilian population during the assault on the enclaves and four It included the following One Page 480 1 2 finally making sure that people were put on buses and forced out Committing mass murder in this case involved all of the following 3 in equal measure Capturing thousands of Muslim men who fled Srebrenica 4 when it fell transporting the victims to detention sites detaining the 5 victims in pre-execution detention sites transporting the victims to 6 execution sites executing the victims and disposing and burying of the 7 8 9 10 11 bodies In order to understand Srebrenica and identify Mladic's role in it I will provide you with a chronology of the events and discuss briefly some of the most important evidence implicating Mladic himself It's important to understand some of the specific historical 12 background of the Srebrenica area known by many names the Drina Valley 13 the Podrinje and the Birac region 14 As outlined to you by Mr Groome the war broke out in earnest in 15 Eastern Bosnia beginning in the north in Bijeljina and working its way 16 south to Zvornik and Bratunac with the terrorising murder expulsion of 17 the Muslim population 18 In November of 1992 Karadzic and Mladic set out their criminal 19 plan for Eastern Bosnia in directive 4 20 that to you 21 Mr Groome has previously shown I will not do that again but I do want you to see and will go 22 over the Drina Corps adaptation of directive 4 It was the duty of the 23 Drina Corps to follow directive 4 - and they did so 24 24 November 1992 General Zivanovic sent out to all of his brigades these 25 words upon which to base their combat plans and operations to let go -- On Page 481 1 please let's go with the document In pertinent part 2 Launch an attack using the main body of troops and major 3 equipment to inflict on the enemy the highest possible losses exhaust 4 them break them up or force them to surrender and force the Muslim 5 local population to abandon the area of Cerska Zepa Srebrenica and 6 Gorazde 7 An order for ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica in black and white 8 VRS attacks on the Muslim civilian population in the areas noted 9 10 11 in this order were set out in UN reports and actually experienced by many of the Muslim witnesses in this case In the early spring of 1993 the Muslims fled from this onslaught 12 and crowded into the Srebrenica area creating a massive humanitarian 13 disaster some of which was caught on video where we will see 14 General Morillon stepping up on a vehicle to address the crowd 15 could play that video 16 17 If we Video-clip played MR McCLOSKEY Shortly thereafter the United Nations 18 Security Council adopted Resolution 819 creating the safe area 19 pertinent part let's see the following on slide 3 In 20 Condemns and rejects the deliberate actions of the Bosnian Serb 21 party to force the evacuation of the civilian population from Srebrenica 22 and its surrounding areas as part of its overall abhorrent campaign 23 of 'ethnic cleansing' 24 25 The UN acting with the best intentions unfortunately created a ticking time bomb because they sent too few troops to Srebrenica to Page 482 1 protect the Muslim population or disarm the BiH army 2 to fully protect the Muslim population and with the enclave surrounded by 3 a vastly superior VRS the BiH army did not disarm 4 With the UN unable Through the rest of 1993 and 1994 an unstable and eventually 5 untenable situation developed in the Srebrenica enclave where the VRS 6 sniped and shelled the enclave on the one hand and the BiH forces inside 7 the enclave ran operations outside the enclave sometimes in search of 8 food but other times as part of an established BiH policy to attack 9 villages and army positions to force the VRS to keep troops around the 10 enclave to prevent VRS reinforcements from the Sarajevo front 11 In 1994 the Bosnian Serb leadership's desire to cleanse the 12 enclave of Muslims did not go away and it was only the meager UN 13 presence that kept the VRS at bay 14 followed by an army contingent from the Netherlands known as the 15 Dutch Battalion or DutchBat a force from the Ukraine was stationed in 16 Zepa The first UN troops were Canadian 17 You will recall the short video Mr Groome showed you of 18 General Mladic driving a Canadian supporter Lesic around the Zepa area 19 on 15 August 1995 20 enclaves were still Muslim 21 quote to you and let you see Mladic's words 22 In this video Mladic revealed to Mr Lesic why the I won't show you that again but I want to You film this freely you know Let our Serbs see what we have 23 done to them how we took care of the Turks In Podrinje we thrashed the 24 Turks 25 Srebrenica in the meantime it's the Dutch would not protect them they If the Americans and English the Ukrainians and Canadians in Page 483 1 2 would have disappeared from this area long ago This was on the 15th of August 1994 In 1994 the VRS intentions 3 towards Srebrenica and Zepa were clearly set out in an official report to 4 his troops by the commander of the Bratunac Brigade shortly after he was 5 visited by General Mladic In pertinent part we see 6 We must attain our final goal - an entirely Serbian Podrinje 7 We must continue to arm train discipline and prepare the 8 RS army for the execution of this crucial task - the expulsion of Muslims 9 from the Srebrenica enclave 10 There will be no retreat when it comes to the Srebrenica 11 enclave we must advance The enemy's life has to be made unbearable and 12 their temporary stay in the enclave impossible so that they leave the 13 enclave en masse as soon as possible realising that they cannot survive 14 there 15 16 Again we see the deliberate statement to expel the entire Muslim population from Srebrenica 17 18 Words similar to these are repeated by the Main Staff and President Karadzic eight months later in the now-famous directive 7 19 On the 8th of March 1995 President Karadzic signed off on 20 directive 7 which had been drafted by the Main Staff and approved by 21 Mladic 22 each of the VRS corps on the military objectives in the upcoming period 23 which required each corps to follow such direction 24 25 Like the other directives directive 7 provided instructions to Under the heading of the Drina Corps I want to show you three critical directions Here is the first Page 484 1 By planned and well-thought-out combat operations create an 2 unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival 3 or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa 4 Here we have almost the same words spelled out by the commander 5 of the Bratunac Brigade eight months earlier the clear focus on making 6 survival or life impossible for the Muslim populations of Srebrenica and 7 Zepa 8 The directive goes on to identify a tactic to make life 9 10 unbearable in the enclaves through the planned and unobtrusively restricting issuing of 11 permits reduce and limit the logistics support of UNPROFOR to the 12 enclaves and the supply of material resources to the Muslim population 13 making them dependent on our good will while at the same time avoiding 14 condemnation by the international community and international public 15 opinion 16 This insidious plan is put in place and we actually see the 17 results on the Dutch Battalion and the civilian population Mladic is in 18 charge of this process and you will see his initials on original convoy 19 documents denying much of the needed supplies to the enclaves 20 The third key 21 In case the UNPROFOR forces leave Zepa and Srebrenica the 22 Drina Corps command shall plan an operation named Jadar with the task of 23 breaking up and destroying the Muslim forces in these enclaves and 24 definitively liberating the Drina Valley 25 This shows that while Karadzic and Mladic wanted to create Page 485 1 horrible conditions for the Muslims in the enclave at the writing of 2 this directive they did not intend to take over the enclaves due to the 3 presence of the UN forces there 4 As you will see their objective would soon change 5 The Drina Corps took this directive at its word and 6 General Zivanovic on 20 March 1995 passed on to his brigades the exact 7 language set out in directive 7 and he said 8 9 10 11 By planned and well-thought-out combat operations create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa And sure enough soon after directive 7 the Drina Corps began 12 planning a combat operation against the Srebrenica enclave 13 Krivaja 95 and dated 2 July with a planned start date of 6 July 14 It was named But just before we get to the attack on Srebrenica I would like 15 you to see two maps to help you get acquainted with the important towns 16 and features of the area 17 Here is a map showing the VRS corps zones and you can see where 18 the Drina Corps fits in the Bosnian landscape with the Drina River in 19 light brown as the border between Bosnia and Serbia 20 Let's go to the next map 21 Here is a map of the Drina Corps that shows the borders of the 22 various brigades as well as the Srebrenica Zepa and Gorazde enclaves 23 You can see Srebrenica and Zepa are close together this is important 24 Also note on this map the black line on the upper left part of the map 25 This is the approximate area of the front line roughly 50 kilometres as Page 486 1 the crow flies from the edge of the Srebrenica enclave 2 direction the Muslim army and men go to as we'll see it later 3 So the attack against Srebrenica This will be the One objective of Krivaja 95 4 was to attack the BiH forces and cut them off from the Zepa enclave and 5 separate the two enclaves from supporting each other 6 Given that the BiH had been running raids against the Serbs 7 outside both the Srebrenica and Zepa enclave this objective to stop BiH 8 army activity was a legitimate military objective 9 However Krivaja 95 had another objective that was anything but 10 legitimate that was to attack Muslim civilians and UN observation posts 11 or OPs in order to drive the Muslim population of the enclave into the 12 small urban area of the enclave and create a humanitarian disaster like 13 that of 1993 14 The UN OPs were small elevated huts fortified by sandbags and 15 manned by a few soldiers 16 border of the enclave 17 The OPs were situated at the outer ring of the Now I want to take you to the attack plan itself to show you how 18 General Zivanovic expressed the objectives I've just mentioned 19 pertinent part 20 In to split apart the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica and to 21 reduce them to their urban areas 22 to create conditions for the elimination of the enclaves 23 To split apart the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica was the 24 legitimate military objective I spoke of to stop the BiH forces in both 25 enclaves from supporting each other and running attacks outside the Page 487 1 2 enclaves However to reduce them to their urban areas meant attacking 3 the edges of the enclave and taking ground toward the city centre and 4 pushing the borders to the actual urban area of Srebrenica 5 cause the roughly 40 000 inhabitants of the enclave to be crowded into a 6 small narrow town of about 1 kilometre by 2 kilometres 7 create a humanitarian disaster just like that of 1993 that we had a 8 brief glimpse of in the video recently 9 This would This would Create conditions for the elimination of the enclave the third 10 objective this does not mean take the entire enclave 11 recall taking the entire enclave was contemplated in directive 7 only if 12 UNPROFOR left 13 14 15 As you will Now I want to go to a map graphic that should help illustrate how the crisis was planned to develop In this map we can see the border of the enclave in purple and 16 the approximate locations of the OPs around the enclave known by their 17 letter designations in military terms 18 the DutchBat forces OP F was known as OP Foxtrot to 19 You can see the yellow box indicating the small urban area of 20 Srebrenica about 1 kilometre by 2 kilometres and very narrow in the 21 middle 22 25 kilometres across is where thousands of people lived well outside 23 the urban area 24 25 The area within the purple circle of Srebrenica roughly With the VRS attack and deployment into the enclave those people would be forced to move into the urban area where there was a small Page 488 1 DutchBat compound This is of course exactly what happened 2 Before I leave this map note that Srebrenica is about 3 5 kilometres from Potocari on the main road another 5 from Potocari to 4 Bratunac and then this important road from Bratunac past Glogova 5 Kravica Sandici Konjevic Polje Nova Kasaba and Milici 6 from Jaglici to Susnjari is where the Muslim men left from and we'll get 7 to that a bit later The red lines 8 Before we get there I want to show you one more map 9 This is an actual VRS combat map 10 This was developed with the written attack plan showing Mladic's personal authorisation of the plan 11 12 as we see from his signature on the left-hand corner You can see on this slide the boundary of the enclave handwritten 13 in blue and red lines 14 the red are the VRS lines 15 The blue lines represent the BiH army lines and Not only did Mladic authorise this operation himself he also 16 noted and signed the completion of the take-over on 12 July by his 17 signature with a rough cross over the enclave 18 now Serbian 19 This was Serbian and it's You will recollect Mr Groome's words on that point So on to the attack The attack began on 6 July 1995 and on 20 7 July a UN military observer report noted that the VRS offensive was 21 steadily intensifying concentrating more on civilian targets in 22 Srebrenica town and Potocari and noting that there were several civilian 23 casualties 24 25 This would continue From 7 July through 9 July the VRS overtook key DutchBat OPs and held several DutchBat soldiers hostage in Bratunac The VRS continued to Page 489 1 drive back and defeat the BiH forces whose leader Naser Oric had been 2 transferred out of the enclave weeks earlier with some key commanders 3 By the evening of 9 July the VRS was in a position to take the 4 town of Srebrenica itself as there had been no NATO bombing and the 5 DutchBat were totally outgunned and unable to stop them So on the 6 evening of 9 July the plan changed from creating conditions for the 7 elimination of the enclave to actually going into the heart of the 8 enclave and taking it 9 General Tolimir to General Krstic who was commanding the attack This is set out in a communication from 10 In pertinent part 11 The President of the Republic is satisfied with the results of 12 the combat operations around Srebrenica and has agreed with the 13 continuation of operations for the take-over of Srebrenica disarming of 14 Muslim terrorist gangs and complete demilitarisation of the 15 enclave 16 The reference that the president has agreed with the 17 continuation of operations for the take-over of Srebrenica means that 18 Mladic has proposed to his supreme commander that the attack continue 19 and Karadzic has agreed and authorised the proposed action 20 the chain of command works in the VRS 21 22 This is how Mladic was fully aware of the VRS success in Srebrenica as we can see from the following order he issued on 10 July 23 Mladic states 24 As a result of the newly arisen situation around the Srebrenica 25 enclave and the VRS success in that part of the front separation of the Page 490 1 enclaves and narrowing the area around Srebrenica and in order to close 2 the Zepa enclave and improve the tactical position of our forces around 3 the enclave 4 5 6 The command of the Drina Corps shall plan and launch an offensive around the Zepa enclave So at this time Mladic is fully aware that the objectives of 7 Krivaja 95 have almost been met and he orders plans for attacking Zepa 8 Now getting to the fall of the enclave 9 DutchBat had fallen back the ABiH unit had collapsed and most of the By the morning of 11 July 10 able-bodied men of Srebrenica have moved to the north-west of the enclave 11 to the villages of Jaglici and Susnjari in an attempt to escape the wrath 12 of the VRS 13 Many of the residents of Srebrenica have vivid memories of what 14 had happened to their families and neighbours in 1992 and 1993 in places 15 like Bratunac as described to you earlier by Mr Groome 16 rightfully afraid for their lives 17 They were The women children and elderly men along with some able-bodied 18 men gathered together a few belongings and found some way to get to the 19 UN bases 20 in Potocari One in Srebrenica known as Bravo Company and the main UN base Potocari was 5 kilometres north of Srebrenica 21 I want you to see a brief video of what it was like in down-town 22 Srebrenica at Bravo Company on 11 July as the VRS approach the town from 23 the south 24 25 Video-clip played MR McCLOSKEY These images are remarkably similar to the video Page 491 1 we saw of Srebrenica in 1993 2 see that terror is palpable 3 stayed behind in Srebrenica town 4 the Potocari base where some were able to get on UN vehicles as you can 5 see from the video 6 If you study both these videos you will The same thing was happening Very few Most people walked the 5 kilometres to On this day the 11th of July NATO planes finally arrived and 7 dropped a few bombs near the advancing VRS troops with little effect 8 this time it is too late 9 the remaining UN troops that any significant bombing was impossible The VRS had become so close to the town and 10 addition the VRS had taken several DutchBat soldiers hostages and 11 threatened to kill them if NATO conducted any more air-strikes 12 In So by the afternoon of 11 July Mladic and his forces entered 13 Srebrenica town 14 children and elderly had gone to Potocari and the army and the 15 able-bodied men left through the woods to the Jaglici area to assemble 16 and begin the long 50-kilometre trek through the woods towards Tuzla 17 By They found it almost completely vacant The women and Mladic himself entered the town with General Zivanovic nicknamed 18 Zile and General Krstic nicknamed Krle 19 For the purpose of this opening I've taken a brief clip from the 20 complete video You will be shown the complete video at trial 21 22 And this is caught on film Video-clip played MR McCLOSKEY Mladic's comment about the rebellion against the 23 Dahis is likely a reference to the 13 July 1804 uprising of Serbs against 24 Turkish mercenaries known as Dahis 25 ominous remark about revenge Mladic's troops captured and systematically Over the next five days after this Page 492 1 2 murdered thousands of Srebrenica men and boys So by the evening of 11 July about 15 000 able-bodied men with 3 some women and children started off through the woods across the 4 northern enclave boundary trying to reach Tuzla area and about 25 000 5 women and children and old men go to Potocari seeking safety at the UN 6 base there 7 Bratunac over the next two days 8 9 First I want to speak about the events in Potocari and So by the evening of 11 July the women and children and elderly including importantly at least 1 000 able-bodied men make it to 10 Potocari seeking safety at the Dutch Battalion base there That day 11 the DutchBat forces still controlled the Potocari area and the VRS was 12 waiting until the morning of the 12th before moving in to Potocari 13 On the evening of the 11th there were two meetings at the 14 Hotel Fontana at Bratunac 15 Colonel Karremans the commander of the Dutch forces the second with 16 Mladic Karremans and a Muslim representative brought from the crowd by 17 DutchBat on the direction of General Mladic 18 The first at 8 00 p m between Mladic and Mladic dominated both these meetings in what were truly 19 frightening encounters 20 give-and-take 21 segment of the first meeting to give you some of the flavour of Mladic's 22 manner and control 23 Colonel Karremans who is facing the camera Mladic was in total control I want to show you a short You will see Mladic speaking directly to 24 25 There were no negotiations at these meetings no Video-clip played MR McCLOSKEY After the yelling stopped Mladic continued to Page 493 1 berate the DutchBat officers -- 2 JUDGE ORIE Mr Mladic do I understand that you would like to 3 have a short break 4 break of five minutes and then continue at 10 00 I saw you gesturing Yes Then we'll have a short 5 --- Break taken at 9 55 a m 6 --- On resuming at 10 03 a m 7 JUDGE ORIE Mr McCloskey you may proceed 8 MR McCLOSKEY 9 Now we left off with General Mladic yelling at 10 11 Thank you Mr President Colonel Karremans After the yelling stopped Mladic continued to berate the 12 DutchBat officers and intimidate them by making references to life and 13 death and asking Karremans whether he wanted to see his children again 14 Mladic demanded that Karremans find a Muslim representative and 15 bring him back to the hotel that evening 16 local school teacher Nesib Mandzic willing to fulfil the role of Muslim 17 representative 18 19 20 Karremans was able to find a I won't play you the video of the second meeting now but I will show you a still of a then-young Nesib Mandzic During this meeting a pig was slaughtered right outside the 21 window where they were seated the screams of the animal going on and on 22 further intimidating the DutchBat officers 23 Mladic focused on Mr Mandzic and said 24 25 At one point in the meeting In order to make a decision as a man and a commander I need to have a clear position of the representatives of your people on whether Page 494 1 you want to survive stay or vanish I am prepared to receive here 2 tomorrow at 10 00 a m hours a delegation of officials from the Muslim 3 side with whom I can discuss the salvation of your people from the 4 enclave 5 Mladic goes on to say 6 Nesib the future of your people is in your hands Bring the 7 people who can secure the surrender of weapons and save your people from 8 destruction everything's in your hands and bring someone prominent -- 9 some prominent people from around here 10 Here we can see that Mladic is obsessed with the salvation and 11 destruction of the Muslim people and this is not idle chatter for the 12 camera as it was this very evening that Mladic and his officers made 13 their first decisions on the plan to murder the Muslim men and boys 14 As I mentioned at least 1 000 able-bodied Muslim men went with 15 their families to Potocari on the 11th 16 the VRS were able to look down from their positions above Potocari and 17 see many hundreds of able-bodied men among the crowd of people in 18 Potocari 19 chain 20 On the early evening of 11 July Momir Nikolic had this information and reported it up the Generals Mladic and Krstic and other senior officers were 21 together at the Hotel Fontana and decided that when they marched into 22 Potocari and took control of the people the next morning 12 July they 23 would separate all the men and boys aged 16 to 60 and hold them in 24 Bratunac to be executed 25 Mladic did hold a third meeting at the Hotel Fontana at Page 495 1 10 00 a m on the 12th and his murder plan began to reveal itself at 2 that meeting 3 I won't show you that video now but I do want to show you a 4 still photo from the front of the Hotel Fontana right before that 5 meeting 6 On the far left of our left we see Momir Nikolic next to him 7 Radislav Jankovic keep going to the right we see a security guard for 8 Mladic and on the far left -- excuse me the far right of our screen is 9 Vujadin Popovic 10 At the 10 00 a m meeting Mladic told the DutchBat officers and 11 additional Muslim representative roughly the same thing he had said to 12 Mr Mandzic the night before stating and I quote 13 As I told the gentleman last night you can either survive or 14 disappear For your survival I demand that all your armed men even 15 those who committed crimes - and many did - against our people surrender 16 their weapons to the VRS 17 You will actually see him say this on the video during trial 18 Mladic also - and this is the crucial part - told the group at 19 the third meeting that he would be screening all men between the ages of 20 16 and 60 to determine if they were war criminals 21 cut out of the video we have received but the DutchBat officers clearly 22 remembered it and will testify about Mladic saying it 23 This statement was From this statement it's clear that Mladic and his top officers 24 had considered what to do with the able-bodied men and boys of Srebrenica 25 well prior to the morning meeting and by the morning of 12 July had Page 496 1 2 decided to separate them from their families as Mladic stated But that is not all they decided After the meeting was over 3 Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic met briefly with Momir Nikolic outside the 4 hotel and told Nikolic that the able-bodied men in Potocari would be 5 separated from their families and killed 6 provide locations in the immediate area that would be well suited for 7 executions 8 Popovic that the old Sase mine would be a good place for the job as well 9 as the local brick factory 10 And Popovic asked Nikolic to Nikolic will testify to this and tell you that he told By the early afternoon of 12 July VRS and MUP forces had moved 11 on Potocari and taken over complete control of the area including the 12 masses of Muslim civilians 13 buses and trucks arrived from all over Bosnia and the VRS and MUP began 14 the process of putting the women and children on buses to Shortly after the take-over of Potocari 15 Muslim-controlled territory and separating and holding the Muslim men and 16 boys for execution 17 Importantly there was little or no screening of men and boys 18 Their IDs and belongings were taken and discarded 19 of names or any significant effort to identify anyone 20 given no food no medical care very little water and crowded into 21 buildings in the searing 40-degree heat in horrendous conditions where 22 many were beaten and some were murdered 23 There was no listing The men were You will hear from a local official who had to pick up well over 24 50 bodies distributed inside and outside the building in Bratunac where 25 the men were held With no records made or basic procedures followed Page 497 1 along with the terrible treatment this could only mean that on 12 July 2 Mladic had no intention to allow these men to survive 3 Mladic was present in Potocari and Bratunac on 12 and 13 July 4 while the separation detention and murder was occurring His men were 5 in charge of the process including Colonel Beara and 6 Lieutenant-Colonel Jankovic 7 MUP forces expelled to Muslim-controlled territory roughly 25 000 women 8 children and elderly men and kept over 1 000 Muslim men and boys in 9 Bratunac including boys 15 years and younger and men over 65 to 70 years Over the 12th and 13th of July the VRS and 10 of age 11 I will now show you a very brief look at some of what was 12 happening in Potocari on the 12th and 13th July You will see terrified 13 people and lines of separated men many we now know were murdered 14 this is only a fraction of what really went on there 15 understand the horror And We can never truly 16 If we could play that short video Video-clip played 17 MR McCLOSKEY On that last clip you finally saw at the end only 18 men who had been separated and sent on that one side of the line of 19 buses 20 arranging transportation 21 General Zivanovic references an order by Mladic to obtain 50 buses 22 Mladic while acting for the cameras was also working and commanding his 23 forces in Potocari 24 25 Mladic was in Potocari speaking to the people on camera and In one Drina Corps order of 12 July On the early afternoon of 12 July Mladic was intercepted speaking over the radio in a text I would like you to see Page 498 1 X says 2 Go ahead General 3 Mladic 4 X Have these buses and trucks left They have So 5 Mladic 6 X 7 Mladic When Ten minutes ago Good excellent Continue to monitor the situation 8 Don't let small groups of them sneak in 9 surrendered and we'll evacuate them all - those who want to and those who 10 don't want to 11 12 They've all capitulated and The Muslims had no choice whatsoever They were all being expelled by Mladic 13 On the evening of 12 July Mladic held a dinner with the brigade 14 commanders celebrating their Srebrenica success 15 issued orders that the brigade commanders prepare their troops to march 16 to Zepa the next day and begin immediate preparations to attack the Zepa 17 enclave 18 At that dinner Mladic Now let me take you back to the roughly 15 000 Muslim men who 19 left the enclave on the evening of 11 July and tried to make their way 20 across Serb territory to the Muslim-controlled territory near Tuzla 21 this number probably one-third of the men were armed and they were 22 mostly at the front of the column leading the way 23 those men made it out of the enclave and across the asphalt 24 Bratunac-Konjevic Polje-Milici road on the 12th of July before the Serb 25 forces had a chance to fortify the road with men and armoured vehicles Of We believe about half Page 499 1 That was the road I briefly mentioned to you earlier on the map graphic 2 Those roughly 7 000 men eventually made it to the area of Nezuk 3 where after many areas of intense fighting with forces of the 4 Zvornik Brigade a corridor was opened and passage was allowed for many 5 thousands of Srebrenica Muslims 6 Serbs suffered at least 40 dead 7 8 9 This happened on 16 July after the I would like to show you now a map graphic of the route of the column If we could start with the cursor at Jaglici and show you the 10 path of the column up towards Nova Kasaba and Konjevic Polje and Cerska 11 across the Drinjaca River and on towards Hadzici and the town of Nezuk 12 which was in Muslim-controlled territory 13 and Hadzici represented the confrontation line and is the place where 14 fierce fighting broke out on the 15th and the 16th of July between the 15 Muslim column and the VRS forces as well as the Muslim 2nd Corps from the 16 direction of Tuzla 17 The purple line between Nezuk Now getting back to the 12th of July and to the Muslims that did 18 not make it over the asphalt road These people became trapped behind 19 the wall of the Serb forces lined up along the road between Kravica 20 Konjevic Polje and Nova Kasaba 21 were marked for death and would soon all be summarily executed Like the men and boys in Potocari they 22 By the late afternoon of 12 July the RS special police acting 23 under Mladic's orders had manned this road and trapped up to 6 000 24 people from the column who had not made it across the road 25 On the morning of 13 July many of the trapped men were captured Page 500 1 along the road or turned themselves in 2 started on the morning of 13 July when 15 Muslim prisoners were taken by 3 bus from a few kilometres from where they were captured along the road 4 and summarily executed by a firing squad along the banks of the 5 Jadar River 6 The organised mass executions One man survived and you will have his testimony During the day of the 13th roughly 5- to 6 000 Muslim men were 7 captured and held in large groups in three open fields near the villages 8 of Sandici Konjevic Polje and Nova Kasaba 9 I will now show you a short video-clip of some of the Muslim men 10 captured in the area of Sandici a short distance from a large warehouse 11 near the village of Kravica 12 Video-clip played 13 MR McCLOSKEY You just saw Ramo Osmanovic calling for his son 14 Nermin to come out of the woods being forced to do so by the MUP 15 soldier 16 and were buried in mass graves Ramo and his son Nermin were both murdered by Mladic's forces Their remains have been recovered and 17 identified 18 The organised executions continued in the late afternoon of the 19 13th with the murder of about 1 000 Muslims held at a warehouse next to 20 the village of Kravica 21 The same person who filmed Ramo filmed part of the executions at 22 the Kravica warehouse I will now show you that film with a slow-motion 23 segment added by us for clarity 24 the Kravica warehouse 25 the warehouse and witnesses will confirm that The cameraman is in a car driving past You will be seeing bodies piled up in front of You will also hear Page 501 1 gun-fire 2 3 Video-clip played MR McCLOSKEY By the early evening of 13 July with well over a 4 thousand Muslims held in Bratunac town itself and as many as 5 000 held 5 along the asphalt road the plan changed and it was decided by Mladic and 6 Karadzic to move the remaining prisoners to the Zvornik area to be 7 murdered outside of UNPROFOR and all the NGOs stationed in and around 8 Potocari and Bratunac 9 You will see an intercept from the evening of 13 July between 10 Karadzic and his Bratunac party chief Miroslav Deronjic discussing the 11 movement of prisoners to warehouses away from Bratunac and 12 Momir Nikolic will provide you the details of the plan 13 On the late afternoon of 13 July Mladic finally began making his 14 way from Bratunac back to his command post at Crna Rijeka He travelled 15 along the road past Kravica Sandici Konjevic Polje and Nova Kasaba 16 where the Muslim men were still held in large clustered groups along the 17 road 18 would be exchanged 19 meadow some of whom you saw from that footage several hundred prisoners 20 were taken to the nearby Kravica warehouse and murdered 21 was with a crowd of prisoners in Nova Kasaba a Muslim man in the crowd 22 was shot and killed in Mladic's presence 23 Nova Kasaba were actually making lists of Muslim prisoners that day 24 however when Mladic arrived to speak to that group he ordered the MPs 25 to stop making lists an obvious indication that there would be no Mladic stopped and spoke to these groups promising them they Shortly after speaking to the Muslims on the Sandici While Mladic The military police at Page 502 1 exchange 2 were soon transported to Bratunac spent the night and then on to 3 Zvornik on the 14th where they were all murdered 4 5 6 Like the others along the road all the men at Nova Kasaba JUDGE ORIE Mr McCloskey could you find a suitable moment within the next two or three minutes so that we can have a break MR McCLOSKEY This is a good time Mr President 7 8 JUDGE ORIE Yes Then we take a break and we'll resume at 11 00 9 --- Recess taken at 10 27 a m 10 --- On resuming at 11 03 a m 11 JUDGE ORIE Mr McCloskey you may proceed 12 MR McCLOSKEY 13 On the evening of 13 July Mladic drove away from the Srebrenica Thank you 14 area and stopped by the Drina Corps command in Vlasenica where he held a 15 small ceremony announcing the promotion of General Krstic as commander 16 of the Drina Corps and the retirement of General Zivanovic 17 Mladic then drove on to his HQ at Crna Rijeka near Han Pijesak 18 Mladic and Tolimir left Main Staff chief of security Colonel Beara in 19 Bratunac the evening of the 13th 20 organising the burial of the 1 000 men who were killed at the Kravica 21 warehouse that day 22 Beara spent much of the evening Beara also oversaw the first movements of prisoners from Bratunac 23 to schools in the Zvornik area that night the evening of the 13th 24 first group of prisoners arrived at the Orahovac school late on the 13th 25 however the vast majority of the men held around Bratunac were held Page 503 1 overnight in Bratunac to be transported on the 14th The 2 Now on the 14th Mladic spent the night of the 13th at his 3 command post and remained at the HQ on the 14th for a good part of the 4 day working before travelling to Belgrade 5 On the morning of the 14th thousands of Muslims held in 6 buildings and vehicles in Bratunac were transported in a huge convoy to 7 the Zvornik area where they were put in schools and public buildings 8 including Orahovac Petkovci Rocevic and Pilica 9 Here is a map graphic to show you the areas I'm talking about 10 This map graphic will help you understand where these towns are located 11 in relation to one another and the front line which is depicted again in 12 a purple thick line there 13 bottom of the page which indicate the route of the Muslim column 14 You will also see the red arrows at the The VRS began the organised and systematic executions in a field 15 near the Orahovac school on the afternoon of 14 July 16 murders were going on Mladic was travelling by car from Crna Rijeka to 17 Belgrade where he passed through Zvornik on the road you can see along 18 the Drina River within 10 kilometres of the Orahovac execution site 19 driving right by the Zvornik Brigade headquarters 20 the main road to the right crossing a bridge over the Drina River 21 towards Belgrade 22 23 At the time the Then he turned off The execution of up to 1 000 people at Orahovac finished late in the evening on the 14th Executions started at about midnight at the 24 Petkovci school just north of Orahovac where up to another 1 000 people 25 were murdered by firing squad This continued all through the night Page 504 1 During the day on the 15th executions continued for hundreds of 2 Muslims being held at the Rocevic school 3 banks of the nearby Drina River and executed near the town of Kozluk 4 One of the executioners will testify in this case 5 They were transported to the On the morning of the 15th Beara had run out of men to carry out 6 executions and he called Generals Zivanovic and Krstic requesting a 7 squad from the Visegrad Brigade that had been ordered by in his words 8 the commander meaning Mladic 9 direct reference to Mladic ordering a squad of soldiers for Beara on the 10 11 You will see an intercept of this a 12th and 13th One reason Beara did not have troops in the Zvornik area because 12 they were being used to defend against the Muslim column from Srebrenica 13 approaching them from the rear and many of the Zvornik Brigade resources 14 were already being used in the murder operation as we can see from the 15 interim combat report of Vinko Pandurevic 16 Pandurevic starts this report out by talking about the military 17 situation with the Muslim column approaching from the rear and the 18 2nd Corps hitting him from the front And then he goes on to say this in 19 20 pertinent part An additional burden for us is the large number of prisoners 21 distributed throughout schools in the brigade area as well as 22 obligations of security and restoration of the terrain 23 We know about the prisoners When he says obligations of 24 security he means the obligation to guard those prisoners The term 25 security in Serbian as regards the security branch is a different word Page 505 1 As it's used by Pandurevic this means security as in guarding 2 says the restoration of the terrain the term in Serbian is 3 asanacija and you will see that this is a JNA military term for 4 cleaning up the dead and debris after a battle 5 6 7 When he So what Pandurevic is saying here is that he has this incredible burden to guard and bury the Muslims distributed in the schools By the time he writes this on the 15th of July all the Muslims 8 at Orahovac are dead all the Muslims at Petkovci are dead The Muslims 9 being killed at Kozluk are probably in the process at this point That 10 leaves about 1500 Muslim men being guarded by Pandurevic's troops in the 11 area of Pilica 12 He goes on to say 13 This command cannot take care of these problems any longer as 14 it has neither the material nor other resources 15 responsibility I will be forced to let them go 16 If no one takes on this Now I'm sure his comment about letting go of the prisoners from 17 Pilica was not serious but I'm sure it got the attention of his 18 superiors because on the 16th of July Beara had obtained a unit from 19 the Main Staff the 10th Sabotage Detachment who along with others 20 murdered about 1500 Muslims that day at the Branjevo Farm near Pilica 21 and the Pilica cultural centre 22 23 By nightfall on the 16th over 7 000 Muslim men and boys had been murdered by the VRS and MUP forces 24 25 As I had mentioned General Mladic travelled to Belgrade on the 14th He travelled to Belgrade often on army business this was not Page 506 1 unusual 2 From the evening of the 14th of July through the evening of the 3 16th of July Mladic carried on VRS state business in several meetings 4 with UNPROFOR officers and international representatives and foreign 5 supporters 6 on video 7 8 These meetings are outlined in his own notebooks or captured On the 16th of July Mladic spent some time at a wedding with his wife 9 However that afternoon Mladic conducted state business with 10 visiting Canadian supporters at the veterans' hospital in Belgrade known 11 as the VMA 12 the telephone conducting army business and receiving reports on the 13 action in Zepa area and in the Zvornik Brigade 14 15 16 17 18 Video of this meeting captures General Mladic in uniform on In this first video still we'll see General Mladic and his wife at the VMA in Belgrade In this next still we'll see Mladic has stood up and moved to the telephone at the VMA At trial you'll see this video and hear General Mladic as he 19 discusses the situation in Zepa mentioning Vinko who is the 20 Vinko Pandurevic of whose report we just saw and the situation going on 21 in his brigade 22 On the evening of 16 July Mladic returned to the Main Staff 23 command at Crna Rijeka where he met with Generals Miletic and Tolimir 24 That evening General Mladic gave oral orders to Main Staff security 25 officer Colonel Keserovic to go to Bratunac area on the 17th of July and Page 507 1 command the units searching for Muslim stragglers from Srebrenica 2 Keserovic will testify here 3 that next day Keserovic proceeded to the Bratunac area By the end of the day on the 17th VRS and MUP forces 4 conducting this search operation had captured 150 Muslim men 5 thereafter those men were transported to an isolated spot in the Cerska 6 valley and summarily executed 7 Mladic's express order 8 9 Shortly This could not have happened without When you hear the exhumation evidence about the mass graves you may consider whether the victims in the mass graves were battle 10 casualties and not murder victims 11 several reasons 12 This idea is absolutely absurd for First you will recall the many survivors of the large mass 13 executions who lived to tell of the many hundreds of fallen men and boys 14 they left behind at the killing field 15 You can see a slide of the image of Branjevo Farm the day after 16 the murders as they will be described to you by the survivors and 17 Drazen Erdemovic 18 the survivors will tell you and as Erdemovic will tell you 19 estimated that about 1200 people were murdered at the Branjevo Farm at 20 this very spot where you see the United States has noted bodies marked 21 You can see the excavator noted excavator digging and probable 22 bodies 23 bodies in the very bottom of it 24 25 This image shows a field covered with bodies just like Erdemovic That's where we found a large mass grave that still had 150 Secondly many of the victims in the large mass graves were found blindfolded or with their hands tied or both Let's go to the exhibit Page 508 1 of the Kozluk mass grave 2 horror that was created by Mladic 3 as they lay and we can see at a distance what was left 4 5 6 7 8 9 This is some amazing archaeology done of the They pulled the dirt off the bodies Let's go to Exhibit 32 of one of those victims a blindfold This is clearly This man did not die in combat Let's go to the next shot These are hands from the same grave tied behind the victim's back Thirdly the VRS would never have gone in the woods where armed Muslims were and retrieved Muslim dead These were dense woods off the 10 beaten track much of the area was heavily mined 11 earth for the VRS to use valuable men and equipment and search out Muslim 12 remains and bring them back many kilometres and bury them in places like 13 Orahovac Petkovci Kozluk or Branjevo 14 There was no reason on As I mentioned in the beginning the murders continued beyond 15 16 July in places like Snagovo on 19 July Vesna on the 23 July Trnovo 16 on or about 25 July and other locations we will never know 17 In the fall of 1995 Mladic and Karadzic decided to exhume the 18 enormous mass graves near Orahovac Petkovci Kozluk Branjevo and 19 Kravica and scatter the human remains into well over 30 smaller graves 20 hidden in isolated areas where they hoped they could not be found by NATO 21 or the ICTY General Mladic himself approved the enormous amounts of 22 fuel necessary for this task 23 In a document signed by General Mladic he stated 24 This is to approve 5 tonnes of D-2 diesel fuel for carrying out 25 engineering works the logistics sector of the Main Staff of the Page 509 1 Army of Republika Srpska shall deliver the fuel to the Standard Barracks 2 in Zvornik to Captain Milorad Trpic 3 This is Captain Milorad Trbic This is a typo by the VRS You 4 may recall I said earlier Captain Trbic was a security officer with the 5 Zvornik Brigade and he was in charge of overseeing this as you will see 6 in the trial 7 With the help of witnesses and aerial imagery most of the 8 secondary graves - as we call them - have been found and exhumed The 9 original or primary graves have been connected to the secondary graves by 10 DNA analysis where parts of the same person has been identified in both 11 graves 12 casings where casings fired from the same gun were found in a primary 13 grave and a secondary grave 14 15 In addition they have been connected by bullet cartridge I will conclude now but before I do I want to show you one last short video segment We have to prove criminal intent This video helps 16 17 you to look into the mind of General Mladic After the fall of Srebrenica many Srebrenica Muslims made their 18 way to Zepa including a victim of the Kravica warehouse execution 19 Witness RM274 20 out the Muslim population of Zepa including Witness 274 who was wounded On 25 and 26 July the VRS took the Zepa town and shipped 21 Mladic himself along with Generals Gvero Krstic and 22 Colonel Pandurevic supervised the departure of these Muslims 23 show you what Mladic said to the departing Muslims of Zepa especially 24 those identified as able-bodied men 25 I want to These words should help you Video-clip played Page 510 1 MR McCLOSKEY These words I am giving you your life as a 2 gift you can see from this video that Mladic had contemplated the fate 3 of the few men on these buses and considered their lives were his for the 4 taking or for the giving 5 Srebrenica were being reported in the press and Mladic could not afford 6 to be so cavalier about murder 7 could no longer murder young men with impunity 8 watching very closely and he knew it 9 10 But by 25 July accounts of atrocities in He had the Srebrenica secret to hide and The world was now In conclusion I want to take you briefly back to the victims to remind us of why we are all here in the first place To do this I want 11 to share with you the words of one woman from Srebrenica 12 Mirsada Malagic who testified at a prior trial 13 14 15 Near the end of her testimony she came back from the weekend and said this to the Trial Chamber Yesterday afternoon when I returned from here I went out to 16 walk around your city That is what I wanted to tell you I couldn't 17 really see much but what I really liked what caught my eye was a 18 monument that we visited and that monument was to women that is women 19 awaiting sailors who never came back and the monument to those wives 20 touched me profoundly 21 Bosnia with me 22 Srebrenica who have been waiting and hoping for all those years except 23 that we followed different roads 24 We saw our sons and our husbands off to those woods and never found out 25 anything about them again whether they were alive or dead or where their I should like to find this statue and take it to Perhaps it could be likened to mothers and wives of We could turn to our empty forests Page 511 1 bones were lying 2 quite possible that all the mothers would end up like that because their 3 numbers are dwindling every day 4 5 Many mothers have died hoping against hope and it is Mirsada will testify here Mirsada lost her husband Salko her two sons Elvir and Admir Admir was only 16 her father-in-law Omer 6 both Salko's brothers Osman and Dzafer her nephew Samir 7 not unusual 8 men and boys from Srebrenica who have not come home and may never be 9 found Many suffered greater losses And this was Today there are still 1500 The loss of these victims and the crippling of those left behind 10 can be simply put 11 Thank you 12 JUDGE ORIE 13 Mr Groome do you think you would conclude in approximately 14 45 minutes It is a Bosnian genocide that we must never forget Thank you Mr McCloskey Is that -- 15 MR GROOME Yes Your Honour 16 JUDGE ORIE Yes then we might not need another break 17 We may conclude at 12 15 18 You may proceed 19 MR GROOME Your Honours Mr Mladic does not come before you 20 today accused of being a poor soldier a poor commander In fact many 21 considered him to be a proficient effective leader of the VRS a 22 formidable adversary on the battle-field 23 applied his experience and skill as a soldier his authority as a leader 24 to the commission of crimes 25 perpetrated against the non-Serb peoples of Bosnia were all related to a He is here today because he The crimes enumerated in the indictment Page 512 1 common criminal purpose 2 dissection of the crimes they were experienced as a single trauma by the 3 people of Bosnia 4 relationship to each other 5 Although a criminal trial requires some It is important that the crimes are understood in This is why the Prosecution will begin the first segment of its 6 case presentation with an overview of the crimes a presentation that 7 will demonstrate the relationship between the crimes and Mr Mladic's 8 role in the commission of them 9 Subsequent segments of the case will focus on the individual 10 components of the case 11 enterprises that cover these crimes 12 13 14 The indictment sets out four joint criminal Here on slide 1 of part 3 of the opening is a summary of these four joint criminal enterprises The first is a campaign to forcibly remove Bosnian Muslims and 15 Croats from large areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina areas intended for a 16 Bosnian Serb state a campaign that included the crime of genocide in 17 certain municipalities 18 root from which the other constituent joint criminal enterprises sprung 19 This overarching common criminal purpose is reflected in the territorial 20 and demographic ambitions of the Bosnian Serb leadership 21 three criminal enterprises are in their essence derivative 22 This overarching common criminal purpose was the The other The second joint criminal enterprise was the persistent criminal 23 shelling and sniping of the civilians of Sarajevo to induce and maintain 24 terror in them 25 The third joint criminal enterprise was the taking of UN Page 513 1 2 peacekeepers and observers as hostages and using them as human shields And lastly the elimination of the Muslims in Srebrenica the 3 genocide of Srebrenica Muslims by organising the mass executions of the 4 older boys and men and by expelling women and children from the enclave 5 At all relevant times the core members of these joint criminal 6 enterprises shared the intent to commit these crimes 7 bound them together that harmonised their individual contributions that 8 ensured that they worked in unison toward the common goal was a shared 9 criminal purpose 10 The glue that In addition to Mr Mladic's participation in these several joint 11 criminal enterprises the Prosecution asserts that he also planned 12 instigated and ordered the crimes in the indictment 13 the Prosecution pre-trial brief both set out these modes of criminal 14 responsibility in greater detail 15 The indictment and There are two primary pillars to the Prosecution's case two 16 aspects which permeate the entirety of the case and establish each of the 17 modes of criminal responsibility described in the indictment 18 The first is Mr Mladic's authority and ability as a commander 19 He was in full command of the many people who directly perpetrated crimes 20 in the indictment 21 Ratko Mladic's command authority gave him the means and the ability to 22 commit such widespread and grievous crimes 23 to plan and order the crimes in the indictment 24 25 His only superior was Radovan Karadzic He exercised his authority The second pillar is his knowledge that the crimes he planned and ordered were in fact being carried out as intended by him The VRS Page 514 1 inherited a fully functioning command structure and communications system 2 from the JNA 3 as commander channels of communication to the Main Staff and lines of 4 authority from the Main Staff to individual soldiers in the field 5 operated effectively 6 From the first hours of its existence from his first day To understand Mladic's state of mind how he would have perceived 7 his own authority I will ask you to consider two passages from JNA 8 manuals 9 concepts of command and control while he was in the JNA 10 11 12 These passages reflect what he would have been taught about the The passage now on slide 2 is from the JNA textbook on command and control It states At this point it is necessary to establish a distinction between control and command These two notions are often used concurrently 13 However control and command are not synonyms 14 the work they do 15 only in a military organisation 16 comprises the right to make decisions and assign tasks It is 17 implemented by means of various instruments of command Orders 18 'naredjenja naredbe ' commands directives and instructions 19 issued only by superior officers and not by commands staffs 20 administrations or other group structures 21 There are differences in Command is a form function of control that exists Command implements control It They can be This passage made clear to young officers that the command 22 structure should not be confused with who has control 23 officer could only get his instructions from a superior officer 24 25 A subordinate The former commander of British forces General Sir Richard Dannatt discusses this concept or model of command in Page 515 1 his expert report 2 armies that rely on conscripts 3 report 4 It is based on the Soviet model and is favoured by As he says in paragraph 28 of his It is a system particularly well understood by those brought up 5 in a communist or state-controlled society The flexibility it gives to 6 subordinate commanders especially at the lower levels of command is 7 limited 8 9 Slide 3 depicts the same principle from the perspective of the commander 10 11 The commander shall command and control subordinate units and institutions within the scope of the responsibility received 12 All authority was derivative In the context of the VRS as 13 General Dannatt will describe when he gives evidence in the context of 14 the VRS this principle required senior commanders of the army to set out 15 with precision the tasks to be taken by the troops under their authority 16 Pictured on slide 4 is an excerpt from General Dannatt's report 17 In it he draws conclusions as a result of his experience his expertise 18 and his review of the relevant documentation 19 General Mladic was the commander of the Main Staff of the 20 Bosnian Serb Army VRS the top level of command responsible for the 21 actual planning and conduct of the conflict at the military strategic 22 level 23 He continues and I point out that this is from a military 24 perspective His -- the reference here is to military responsibility and 25 not to criminal responsibility General Dannatt states Page 516 1 2 The fundamental point is that while tasks can be delegated overall responsibility can never be delegated 3 The fact that Mladic's asserted effective -- the fact that Mladic 4 asserted effective command over his troops will be borne-out in the 5 evidence in this case 6 Slide 5 that is now before you contains the evidence of 7 Pyers Tucker military assistant to commander of UNPROFOR forces 8 regular contact with VRS personnel at all levels including Mladic 9 he has testified 10 He had And Lieutenant-General Mladic barely made any effort to conceal the 11 fact that nothing could or would happen in Bosnian Serb held BH without 12 his specific approval 13 practical military decisions that mattered 14 It was very apparent that he made all the The Prosecution will also establish this with concrete examples 15 of Mladic giving orders directly to the people who would carry out the 16 criminal acts 17 28th of May 1992 in which Mladic is directing the artillery fire of one 18 of his gunners 19 the gunner Here on slide 6 is an excerpt of an intercept from the The conversation goes as follows 20 Shoot at Velusici Velusici 21 The gunner replies 22 Velusici 23 Mladic confirms 24 Velusici Mladic first tells 25 Vukasinovic the gunner responds Page 517 1 Yes sir 2 Mladic continues 3 Shoot at Velusici and also at Pofalici There is not much Serb 4 population there shoot there around Dobrovoljacko up there around 5 Humska 6 The gunner seems to confirm 7 Around Humska 8 Mladic says 9 At that Djure Djakovic Street up there and apply artillery 10 11 reconnaissance so that they cannot sleep that we drive them crazy I would ask Ms Stewart to play audio of this file and I would 12 ask the booth not to interpreter the voices into English so that we can 13 all hear Mr Mladic in his own voice 14 15 Intercept Played JUDGE ORIE Mr Groome this was not translated into French 16 Now it's not evidence therefore it's maybe less important There are 17 some problems anyhow with your speed of speech when you're reading so 18 would you please slow down 19 different position that this has not been -- it's written down in English And unless the Defence would take a 20 on our screens 21 Defence anyhow I take it that your slides will be available to the 22 MR GROOME Yes Your Honour 23 JUDGE ORIE Yes Then under those circumstances not hearing 24 evidence at this moment but an opening statement I would just proceed 25 and invite you to do so Page 518 1 MR GROOME 2 Mladic's intent to terrorise the people of that Muslim 3 neighbourhood is manifest when we see the words he used when directing 4 artillery fire into it 5 establishing how Mladic exercised his authority to perpetrate the 6 massacres in Srebrenica 7 and reliable evidence that Mladic exercised his command authority to plan 8 and order and to participate in the crimes set out in the indictment 9 Drive them crazy Mr McCloskey has already set out the evidence The Prosecution will establish with credible Turning to the second pillar of the Prosecution case Mladic's 10 knowledge that is his orders were carried out that the crimes he 11 intended were in fact committed 12 Slide 7 is another entry from his notebook made less than two 13 weeks after he ordered the mass execution of men in Srebrenica 14 his own hand he records a meeting with Slobodan Milosevic and Here in 15 General Momcilo Perisic chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army 16 He records Milosevic as telling him Srebrenica and Zepa have damaged us 17 greatly a clear reference to the growing international outrage at the 18 information coming out of the take-over of two safe areas and the mass 19 executions that took place in the aftermath 20 This next slide contains another example of Mladic recording in 21 his notebook information about crimes 22 from the 14th of October 23 24 25 The entry now on the screen is Here he records Momcilo Krajisnik telling him Vogosca - the Intervention Platoon demolished the hotel - they are raping everyone indiscriminately Commander Miladin - they plundered everything in Vogosca Page 519 1 The Prosecution will produce ample evidence that Mladic was well 2 aware of the crimes his troops were committing and that he intended them 3 to commit such crimes 4 5 6 Again turning to the Dannatt report here on slide 19 he addresses this issue Senior commanders like Mladic and Krstic whose careers I have 7 studied were professional officers with formal military command and 8 staff training 9 disciplined war fighting body In short the VRS was an organised coherent and 10 11 Reports flowed properly upward and downwards within the army enabling commanders to make well-informed decisions 12 13 On slide 10 before you now is another report from the 1st Krajina Corps 14 15 One thing is certain We are already starting to feel the cost of the needless spilling of Muslim blood 16 17 Here the author states A candid assessment that not only are Muslims being killed needlessly but that such needless killing was against Serb interest 18 Your Honours the crimes described in the indictment happened not 19 only because Mladic planned and ordered these crimes but because his 20 subordinates were willing participants 21 perpetrated similar crimes against many non-Serbs sometimes using the 22 same modus operandi 23 knew they were expected to employ his methods 24 of leadership to commit crimes and allow the commission of crimes by 25 soldiers who looked up to him was not only an inexcusable moral failure Over the course of the war they VRS soldiers knew how Mladic waged war and they His use of his position Page 520 1 and a failure of leadership but it constituted encouragement for the 2 commission of crimes 3 4 With respect to Srebrenica Mladic has offered the Defence of alibi On the 23rd of January this year Mr Mladic filed alibi notice 5 In paragraph 6 of that filing the Defence asserts that Mr Mladic was 6 not in a position to commit or aid and abet in the commission of any 7 crimes between 14 and 17 July 1995 8 on the afternoon of the 14th attended meetings with international 9 negotiators on the 15th and then attended a wedding celebration on the He asserts that he left for Belgrade 10 16th 11 some of the mass executions he was not in a position to commit or aid 12 and abet in the commission of the alleged crimes charged in the 13 indictment for 14 through 17 July 1995 14 He asserts that because he was not in the Srebrenica area during The Prosecution accepts as true that he was in Belgrade that he 15 left Srebrenica on the 14th of July attended several meetings on the 16 15th meetings with the Serb leadership and with international 17 negotiator 18 and that he visited the military hospital 19 The Prosecution accepts as true that he attended a wedding The Prosecution does not accept that he was unaware of what was 20 taking place 21 position to commit the alleged crime 22 The Prosecution does not accept that he was not in a Prior to leaving Srebrenica Mladic put into motion under the 23 control of subordinate officers the large-scale well-organised 24 operation that would murder over 7 000 men and boys within a few days and 25 forcibly remove over 30 000 women children and elderly men from the Page 521 1 2 territory On the 15th of July 1995 the killing operation in Srebrenica 3 was moving forward at full throttle 4 number of international representatives 5 General Rupert Smith and General de Lapresle had a separate discussion 6 with Mladic 7 that discussion 8 relates to what was happening in Srebrenica 9 10 11 12 On that day Mladic met with a In between two of his meetings Mladic wrote down what General Smith said to him during What he records as point 4 of what Smith told him It is shown on slide 11 Treatment of the population in Srebrenica and Zepa - there are rumours about atrocities massacres and rape Mladic in his own hand recorded that General Rupert Smith 13 informed him of rumours about atrocities massacres and rape being 14 committed in Srebrenica 15 next morning 16 afterwards 17 murdered does not mean he did not intend the men to be murdered it does 18 not mean that he did not initiate the killing operation it does not 19 excuse him of his criminal responsibility for ordering and setting in 20 motion this massive killing operation 21 attended the wedding at the very time that this picture was taken on What did Mladic do He went to a wedding the We have pictures of him at the ceremony and the party The fact that Mladic was in Belgrade when these men were On the very day that Mladic 22 that day alone over 1500 men and boys were being murdered at Branjevo 23 Farm 24 25 The other picture on the screen now is from the exhumation of that site While Mladic is seen here smiling celebrating a wedding all Page 522 1 2 the time knowing that innocent men were being murdered as he did During this trial you will also hear of General Wesley Clark's 3 conversation with Slobodan Milosevic a few weeks after Srebrenica 4 Clark questioned Milosevic regarding whether he had as much influence 5 over the Bosnian Serb army as he said Clark posed the following question 6 to Milosevic 7 When He said Mr President you say you have so much influence over the 8 Bosnian Serbs but how is it then if you have such influence that you 9 allowed General Mladic to kill all those people in Srebrenica 10 General Clark recounts what Milosevic told him 11 Well General Clark I warned Mladic not to do this but he 12 13 didn't listen to me Milosevic acknowledged to General Clark that he had spoken to 14 Mladic either before or during the massacres that he warned Mladic not 15 to do this but that Mladic didn't listen 16 The fact that Mladic went to meetings and a wedding during the 17 time the crime he ordered was taking place does not absolve him of 18 responsibility for it As General Dannatt points out in his report 19 Command and responsibility cannot be separated 20 Today Mr Mladic is protected by the presumption of innocence a 21 protection that remains with him over the course of the entire case and 22 throughout the Chamber's deliberations 23 the Prosecution to the Trial Chamber and to Mr Mladic that the 24 Prosecution will prosecute its case against Mr Mladic in a fair and 25 balanced way Today I give the commitment of Page 523 1 The next time I address you about the evidence in this case will 2 be at the end of the trial 3 the evidence presented by the Prosecution and any evidence Mr Mladic 4 wishes the Chamber to consider 5 again I will ask that you give the people of Bosnia what they have 6 waited so long for to give all people of Bosnia - be they Bosniak 7 Croat Serb or just Bosnian - to give them the truth about what 8 Ratko Mladic did to that beautiful and complex land to give them the 9 truth about what Ratko Mladic did to Bosnia's people 10 11 During that time the Chamber will have heard At that time when I come before you Your Honours the Prosecution will be ready to call its first witness when the Chamber so directs Thank you 12 JUDGE ORIE Thank you Mr Groome 13 Trial Chamber confers 14 JUDGE ORIE This hearing was scheduled to hear the opening 15 statement Nevertheless if there's any urgent matter one of the parties 16 would like to raise they have an opportunity to do so although it was 17 not scheduled but 18 Mr Groome 19 MR GROOME Not from the Prosecution Your Honour 20 JUDGE ORIE Mr Lukic 21 MR LUKIC I'm a bit caught by surprise Your Honour but I 22 think urgent matters we should discuss in the afternoon during the 65 ter 23 meeting 24 25 JUDGE ORIE Yes yes but I didn't know whether any other thing -- Page 524 1 MR LUKIC 2 JUDGE ORIE 3 4 No not --- had come up Of course it's clear that that matter is still pending Now before we adjourn I would like to address a few matters 5 This will not take very long First on the 10th of May of this year 6 the Defence informally requested the Chamber's permission to allow a 7 qualified legal assistant to conduct the cross-examination of witnesses 8 9 10 On the next day the 11th of May the Chamber granted the Defence request The Defence request and the Chamber's decision are hereby put on the record 11 I'll now deliver a statement on the start of the presentation of 12 the Prosecution's evidence which was originally scheduled for the -- to 13 begin on the 29th of May 2012 14 In light of the Prosecution's significant disclosure errors 15 which the Chamber has addressed briefly yesterday the Chamber hereby 16 informs the parties that it has decided to suspend the start of the 17 presentation of evidence 18 gathering information as to the scope and the full impact of this error 19 The Chamber aims to announce the start date for the presentation of the 20 Prosecution's evidence as soon as possible 21 The Chamber is still in the process of This concludes the Chamber's statement on the matter 22 this statement we will adjourn but sine die 23 informed about when we will proceed In view of The parties will be We stand adjourned 24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned 25 at 11 58 a m sine die