IV U— tL DEB—49—84 24 April 1984 Defense Estimative Brief rutso Nuclear Weapons Systems in China U SUMNARY China has established itself as a nuclear power The nuclear forces in China howev er will remain small when compared to the Soviet nuclea r forces The Chinese will not try to match the superp owers The Chinese however will continue to seek Western technology support for their underground nuclear test program • We estimate that all currently deployed CSS—l CSS—2 CSS—3 and CSS—4 missiles have nuclear warheads A small number of ti--- —----‘ ‘-7 irr’’1- rirr ly —“‘—-‘ have “— I Between 150 and 160 warheads are estimated to be in the PRC nuclear stockpile The limit of the number of warheads is not restricted by nuclear materials production but on what the Chines e perceive their needs to be The estimate of the number of warheads in the Chinese nuclear inventory is based on the delivery systems projections No direct evidence exists on the actual size of China’s present nuclear stockpile however indirect evidence derived from Chines e nuclear tests and estimates of the characteristics of deployed delivery systems give some basis for estimating types yields and approximate numbers j Discussion The Chinese have conducted 29 nuclear tests since 1 Our assignment of nuclear warheads to Chinese delivery 1964 systems is based on the correlation of 1 the nuclear testing sequence 2 analysis of the nuclear test device characteristics and 3 the technical characteristics and deployment of delivery systems 2 We assume that Chinese nuclear weapons testing will continue at a rate of only one to three tests per year and that the Chinese conduct most of their nuclear tests underground Further it is assumed that the Chinese will continue to acquire Western technology for use in test shaft preparation and diagnostics of underground nuclear tests by radiochemical electronic and nuclear techniques 3 The current Chinese nuclear stockpile appears to be based on a relatively small number of warhead designs which were proof tested in atmospheric nuclear tests 15 kt 3 MT and 4—5 MT warheads Further Chinese thermonuclear warheads above 200 kt will be constrained by the degree to which the Chinese test in the atmosphere or the success which they have in using computer models to extrapolate from lower yield underground tests to higher yields Although the Chinese are not expected to become a party to any treaty limiting the testing of nuclear weapons they will probably restrict their nuclear testing to underground tests to’ the extent their technology permits 4 Qualitative improvements that the Chinese are developing for their nuclear warheads will depend on the benefits that Chinese are now deriving from both overt contact with U S scientists and technology and the covert acquisition of U S technology There is evidence that the Chinese have been successful in assimilating into their nuclear weapons program United States technology in areas such as high explosive radiochemistry metallurgy welding super computers numerical modeling high speed photonics and underground drilling Throughout the history of the Chinese nuclear weapons program they have followed closely advances in western technology Increased access to this technology and continued Chinese efforts will in the 1980s and early 1990s show up as qualitative warhead improvements in terms of 1 increased warhead reliability and confidence 2 development of more compact warheads especially for tactical nuclear applications and possibly for MRV warheads - See PRC Defense Production for Planning DIP DDE—1500—19-84 Section VI Nuclear Implications dated April 1984 3 increased hardening of warheads in a nuclear antiballistic missile environment 4 tailored output devices such as enhanced radiation and 5 improved warhead safety stora ge and logistics procedures Thus in some areas the gap between uhited States and Chinese nuclear warhead technology may begin to narrow _5 China’s potential capacity to produce nuclear weapons delivery systems is a func tion of available economic resources materials skilled manpower and industrial facilities Economic resources materials and manpower are probably not constraining factors but we have been unable to monitor their allocations to specific indu stries The Chinese apparently have the resources materials special metals petrochemicals and special nuclear materials etc and the manpower to produce more delivery systems than are presently estimated The capacity of specific nuclear warhead and deliv ery system factories based on floorspace area observed in overhead imagery is also in excess of our estim ates of deployed nuclear systems 6 However two important factors are not taken into account in the estimates 1 a Chinese strategy for building survivable or redundant productio n capacity and 2 the effect of the turmoil during the Cultural Revolution There is evidence of both redundant nuclear productio n facilities built to increase survivability and instances where nuclear weapons facilities were disrupted during the Cult ural Revolution Given continued internal stability the Chinese have a nucl ear industrial complex in place that will allow them to increase the size of their stockpile even beyond the current estimate if so desired - 7 The Chinese might find Enhanced Radiation ER weapons particularly appropriate for use in defense of their border areas especially in the Sino—Soviet border area in Northeast China We know very little however about the exten t of tactical or theater nuclear weapons for use by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army CPLA A lack of a basic doctrine or training may indicate that the Chinese have only recently considered integrating nuclear weapons into grou nd force operations The Chinese nuclear weapons technological capa bility would limit the current ground force nuclear support to atomic demolition munitions ADMs bombs and missiles such as the CSS—l it would not include artillery—fired nuclear projectiles 8 We estimate that all currently depl oyed CSS—l CSS—2 CSS—3 and CSS—4 missiles have nuclear warheads A small number of the nuclear le A te that ntain 3 inventory although there confirming is evidence no their production or deployment See table 1 Eor the best estimate of the number of warheads allocated to the Drojected forces TABLE 1 NUCLEAR WARHE S 198 CSS—1 CSS—2 CSS—3 CS S—4 SLBM Solid ICBM MR IRBM Follow-on Bombs ADM’ s SRBM ASM Follow-on Systems 7 -E 7C 24 C 17 2CC SC C 13C L 1994 0 120 32 16 48 2 28 230 50 12 250 30 9 Implications for the West C - a as established itself as a nuclear power The nuclear force ir China however will remain small when compared to the Soviet nuclear forces The Chinese will not try to match the erpowers The Chinese however will continue to seek Weste technology support for their underground nuclear test program Prepared by Approveã EDWA FLETCHER Brigadier General USA Assistant Deputy Director for Estimates China Far East Division Directorate for Estimates 4