REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE STUDY TEAM TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REASSESSMENT OF DEFENSE AGENCIES AND DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES By Direction of the Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 Public Law 99-433 October 1 1986 October 1987 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Administration Directorate for Organizational and Management Planning The Pentagon Washington D C 20301 Appendix DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIA I SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS Mission and Oversight 1 That the Defense Intelligence Agency DIA retain the intelli- gence mission with added authority and resources 2 That oversight of Department of Defense Intelligence be assigned to a single senior Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD official reSponsible for all Defense intelligence policy plans programs and budgets 3 That integrated Defense intelligence program management with the exception of SIGINT be vested in the Director of BIA with oversight arrangements as currently structured 4 That the Director of DIA be given the authority to fulfill the expanded mission outlined for Combat Support Agencies in the Defense Reorganization Act Combat Support Agency directors should participate in the PPBS process for those matters affecting their mission areas Readiness and Responsiveness 1 That DIA be given the authority and resources to fulfill more effectively its mission of satisfying Unified and Specified Command intelligence requirements OSD Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff OJCS and the Director of Central Intelligence DCI should identify minimum requirements and initiate corrective action as apprOpriate 2 That DIA expand its efforts to develop joint intelligence doctrine DIA should work closely in this regard with OJCS the Commands and the Military Departments 3 That DIA in collaboration with the DCI OSD OJCS Commands and Military Departments develOp an achievable schedule and plan of action for development of an integrated Defense Intelli- gence Master Plan emphasizing intelligence support to the Combatant Commands 4 That DIA work with the Defense Communications Agency DCA OJCS the Commands and the Military Departments to ensure that survivable secure intelligence voice and data communications will exist to support DIA and Command combat support require- ments The communications operations and intelligence communi ties should work together to document validate and translate these requirements into operational capability D-l 5 That DIA be more responsive to U58 Command requirements and improve communication with consumers to ensure that users are aware of Agexicy capabilities and limitations Organization and Functions 1 That DIA determine the organizational changes required to support its wartime mission and document them in the Defense Intelligence Master Plan 2 That DIA consider consolidation of those planning and manage- ment funCtions in direct support of U88 Command requirements into a single organization 3 That DIA be granted increased authority to fulfill its role in counterintelligence matters OSD OJCS and DIA should determine the most appropriate way to ensure the J-2 can guide review and ensure the Commands have adequate counter intelligence capability Efficiency Economy and Effectiveness That DIA explore with the of the COmmands possible ways to rotate DIA civilian intelligence professionals through command activities Manpower And Budget l That DIA not be reduced by the general Agency and management headquarters reductions identified in Title VI of the Defense il x Reorganization Act 2 That requirements and budget constraints drive future manpower requests 3 That the Assistant Secretary of Defense Force Management and Personnel and CJCS review the Combat Support Agency military manpower billets against Joint Duty Assignment criteria and where appropriate designate billets as joint duty assignment positions II HISTORY Enactment of the 1958 Reorganization Act prompted Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS to review the adequacy of Defense intelligence activities Concurrently White House concern about the management of all Government intelligence activities resulted in an interagency study chaired by Lyman Kirkpatrick Jr Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency In December I960 the Joint Study Group reported a number of deficiencies in the military intelligence system including duplication of requirements collection activities and D-Z publications The Joint Study Group's recommendations to the National Security Council NSC included proposals for consoli dating Defense intelligence efforts In early 1961 Secretary McNamara asked the JCS to develop a concept and plan to activate DIA A compromise was developed that provided for an agency reporting to the Secretary through the JCS with overall responsibility for managing and controlling Defense intelligence resources although the arrangement left a number of intelligence functions with the Military Departments With establishment Secretary McNamara abolished the Assis tant to the Secretary for Special Operations his previous point of contact for coordination of Defense intelligence activities and for liaison with other Government intelligence organizations Additionally the JCS transferred their Joint Staff Direc torate to DIA In 1970 the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel reported that The principal problems of the Defense Intelligence Agency can be summarized as too many jobs and too many masters The panel believed that supervision of Military Department intelligence collection and processing and fiscal control over Military Department intel ligence programs was largely impotent In response Secretary Melvin Laird established an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence This new official was charged wi h e er cising a greater degree of authority over resource allocation than DIA had been able to achieve Despite the changes in oversight and a number of internal reorganizations during the early l970s DIA continued to operate under the charter Secretary McNamara issued In February 1976 President Ford issued Executive Order ll905 to strengthen control and management of U 8 intelligence activities Secretary Rumsfeld established an Inapector General for Intelli- gence and double hatted the the Director of Defense Intelli gence DDI The Director of DIA was instructed to report to the Secretary of Defense through the DDI and to the CJCS Additionally the Secretary directed further DIA reorganization to emphasize its production and managerial responsibilities Under the the Carter Administration staff supervision on policy matters was assigned to the Under Secretary for Policy and staff supervision for resource allocation to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command Control Communications and Intelligence Under present arrangements the Director DIA reports to the Secretary of Defense and CJCS Staff supervision is received from the 3 4 MISSION OVERSIGHT i on r In accordance with its charter DireCLive 5105 2l mission is to satisfy or to ensure the satisfaction of the foreign intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense the CJCS DOD Components and other authorized recipients and to provide the military intelligence contribution to national intel- ligence The Director of DIA wears four hats He is the Director of a Combat Support Agency the of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the senior military intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Program Manager of the General Defense Intelli- gence Program GDIP Mission Alignment Alternatives Alternative l Retain the present DIA mission Although additional resources and authority are required to carry out the intelligence funCtion the mission should continue to be consolidated in a single agency Further fragmentation of intelligence activities would reduce overall efficiency economy and effectiveness and mitigate the benefits of consolidation Alternative 2 Return the mission to the Military Departments Returning the mission to the Military Departments would compromise efficiency effectiveness and economy fragment resources promote analytical duplication and provide decision makers with uncoordi- nated intelligence data Inherent in this alternative is the potential for manipulation of intelligence assessments to support weapon system choices Alternative 3 Centralize in DIA all DODawide intelligence production processingj and infrastructure activities that do not provide direct support to the Commands and their Component Commands but are common to more than one Military Department On the surface this alternative appears to eliminate the frag mentation of intelligence activities by merging intelligence production processing and infrastructure in a single agency However most interviewees believe it is neither politically feasible nor warranted The largest Military Department production activities are the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Centers They support both national and Military Department specific requirements under the functional management of DIA and resource management of the Director of DIA as the General Defense Intelligence Program GDIP Manager DIA currently manages the intelligence production that is shared among DIA and Military Department Intelligence Centers Few efficiencies and many problems would result by consolidating this function in HLA Oversight DIA is under the authority direction and control of the Secretary of Defense Staff supervision and policy guidance are provided by The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intel ligence Oversight ensures that actiVities are in compliance with existing law The Director of DIA is under the Operational control of the CJCS for the intelligence support required by the CJCS to perform his statutory and other assigned responsibilities As Program Manager of GDIP and as an activity in the Foreign Counterintelligence Program further guidance and oversight is provided by DCI and the Intelligence Community Staff Although diffused among different officials and performed in different ways the record of performance would indicate that oversight of DIA has been effective However fragmented oversight of the broader intelligence community is problematic due largely to the multiplicity of programs and proponents with frequently competing institutional interests For example within OSD all programs are not centrally managed Others such as the National Foreign Intelligence Program NFIP are largely outside the control of Although each impacts upon the others they are frequently not integrated into a coherent planning and programming framework Direct involvement in the planning programming and budgeting system PPBS process is needed to ensure that the Combat Support Agencies are able to perform the increased responsibilities they were assigned in the Defense Reorganization Act Currently they do not have sufficient authority to carry out their expanded responsibility Each Combat Support Agency director is responsible to both CJCS and the Secretary of Defense for advice concerning his Agency s mission area yet none has a direct role in the planning pro gramming and budgeting decisions that effect other activities involved with their mission area Each of these Agency directors is program manager for a mission area but they cannot ensure complete mission performance Each of the Combat Support Agency directors needs more direct planning and managerial oversight for those programs that affect his area of responsibility Alternative 1 Leave Defense intelligence oversight as currently structured with performing DIA staff supervision and CJCS overseeing DIA as the This alternative would retain oversight of DIA and the Defense Intelligence Community as it exists today Most Command and Component Command interviewees noted the programming and budgeting problems inherent in this arrangement eSpecially the difficulty of working within separate program management guidance and time lines Most frequently cited was the program and budget sub missions of the NFIP the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Program TIARA and the Tactical Program TCP All Command intelligence capability is spread among these programs yet each program is built and reviewed in isolation Alternative 2 Leave DIA oversight by CJCS and DCI as currently structured Select a single senior OSD official to be responsible for all Defense intelligence policy plansl programs budget and oversight Assign to DIA responsibility for development of integrated Defense intelligence plansl programs and budgets There was substantial agreement among interviewees that a senior OSD official should be in charge of all intelligence policy The advantages of this arrangement include integrating all Defense intelligence providing a unified thrust to policy and resource programs and establishing a single spokesman for Defense intelli- gence DIA performs substantive and functional management for much of Defense intelligence and validates recommends priorities for and monitors satisfaction of collection requirements The Director is the Program Manager of GDIP With additional authorities and resources the Director of DIA is the most logical candidate to be the Defense Intelligence Program Manager responsible for inte grated Defense intelligence plans programs and budgets with the exception of SIGINT As a related issue some officials believe that the oversight performed by the is less than effective and that the command control and communications side of C3I is too big and detracts attention from intelligence emphasizes data collection without determining user needs adequately and overemphasizes equipment acquisition at the expense of non hardware aspects of intelligence requirements Many proposed that there should be a separate Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence A large part of this issue rests with the knowledge and experience of the This official must be equally knowledgeable of both command control and communications activities and intelli gence If these qualifications cannot be found in one individual then consideration should be given to separating intelligence under a new Assistant Secretary of Defense or a Director of Defense Intelligence Conclusions 1 DIA provides products and services common to more than one Military Department Although some are unique to a single Military Department no transfer of DIA functions would result in increased efficiency economy and effectiveness Eliminating centralized management of the intelligence L1 function would promote duplication and provide decision makers with uncoordinated intelligence data Decentralization of production processing and infrastructure would not improve overall efficiency economy and effectiveness 3 Further consolidation of Military Department intelligence production processing and infrastructure activities is neither politically feasible nor warranted Such a consolidation would not improve overall efficiency economy and effectiveness 4 DIA does not have the requisite resources and authorities to fulfill its mission 5 Although oversight of DIA is diffused it appears to work effectively 6 Oversight of the Defense Intelligence Community at large is fragmented causing program disconnects for the Commands and their components the Military Departments and other Defense Agencies 7 The directors of Combat Support Agencies do not have the authority to coordinate and approve plans for and ensure interoperability and connectivity among the wholesale and retail strategic and tactical and long haul and tactical portions of their combat support mission areas Changes are needed to ensure that the Combat Support Agencies have the authority and resources to perform the expanded reSponsibilities they were assigned in the Defense Reorganization Act Recommendations 1 That DIA retain its present mission with added authority and resources 2 That oversight of all intelligence be assigned to a single senior OSD official responsible for intelligence policy plans programs and budgets 3 That integrated Defense intelligence program management with the exception of SIGINT be vested in the Director of DIA with oversight arrangements as currently structured 4 That the Director of DIA be given the authority to fulfill the expanded mission outlined for Combat Support Agencies in the Defense Reorganization Act Combat Support Agency directors should participate in the PPBS process for those matters affecting their mission areas IV READINESS AND RESPONSIVENESS - Readiness Although DIA is working aggressively with the Combatant Commands and Military Departments joint intelligence doctrine continues D-7 to be a major weakness Integrated intelligence plans must be Structured around coherent joint doctrine DIA needs to ensure that the intelligence capabilities of the CJCS and the Commands and their components are mission capable Interviewees cited significant disconnects between tactical and nationaij Capabilities DIA should lead the planning necessary to guarantee that a war- fready intelligence system exists to support the Combatant Commands The Defense Reorganization Act requirement for strategy-based plans underscores the need for more effective joint intelligence doctrine development and integrated planning efforts In this regard DIA is currently working with the U53 Commands and the Military Departments to ensure that achievable plans are developed and that interoperability and connectivity issues are addressed It is also actively working with the program managers of the national and tactical intelligence programs to make sure funds are available and programmed to cover execution of architecture and planning requirements With more authority DIA would be able to integrate the various efforts more effectively and ensure that the appropriate capabilities are programmed and approved DIA should work with the Commands Component Commands and the Military Departments to develop a Defense Intelligence Master Plan The plan should be based on a realistic achievable set of requirements and capabilities to document where U S Intel ligence is now where it needs to be to support the strategy based operational plans and how to get there Intelligence data bases are not complete Much additional data is needed to realistically plan for both contingencies and war DIA worked with intelligence producers and consumers to develop The Fundamental Intelligence Data Base to describe the minimum essential elements of intelligence required for all countries These data elements are being compared with the the results of the Data Base Adequacy Study to identify the gaps in intelligence data DIA is using these efforts to better define priorities for intelligence collection and analysis The ongoing Warfighting Data Base Modernization effort will attempt to correct the remaining shortfalls Command interviewees believe these initiatives must continue The intelligence structure must be linked by an effective survivable communications structure Exercises and crises are replete with examples of delays in the delivery of high precedence traffic to tactical commanders Important messages are not received Operational forces are unable to communicate with each other The near term solution for data communications is the installation of the BIA managed Intelligence Information System This network will provide the Commands a more survivable and secure data switching system This network will permit intelli gence in over 50 separate organizations throughout the world to per form a variety of sophisticated analytical tasks D-B and to exchange sensitive classified information using some 300 COmputers of various types capacities and ages The Tactical DohlIS Extension could add over 150 additional users to the network The long term search for solutions to the intelligence communica tions problem rests with the DIA managed Intelligence Communica tions Architecture INCA project INCA was established to improve the timely flow of intelligence to tactical commanders The project centering on the early 19905 time frame addresses communiv cations hardware shortfalls as well as procedural policy and organizational issues that affect the intelligence process and the flow of intelligence to operational users Command interviewees cite problems with secure survivable communi cations both for voice and data transmission DIA should continue working with OSD OJCS DCA the 0 5 Commands and the Military Departments to ensure that survivable redundant voice and data communications capabilities exist to support validated requirements Discussions with Combatant Command communication planners raise the concern that intelligence requirements are frequently unconstrained and in many cases unnecessary The intelligence communications and Operations communities must work together to review requirements and validate those that are essential to support warfighting needs Requirements should be carefully documented and translated into Operational capabilities Crisis Support crisis support is rated good However it was noted that support is generally provided by shifting resources Sustaining this support over a long period of time may degrade analytical work in other important areas Some interviewees suggest that DIA needs a dedicated crisis support team but recognize that the manpower to create this capability is not likely to be provided Responsiveness In general interviewees believe DIA is responsive within existing resources and that both BIA-produced and managed production is good but often not tailored to meet command unique requirements They want more command-focused analysis and filtered reports to avoid re reporting information that is already in the intelligence traffic and to eliminate extraneous information A number of officials expressed the view that DIA would be more responsive to Combatant Command requirements if it were more of a corporate manager They believe DIA should lead the Defense intelligence Community to ensure that duplicate can bilities are not developed eSpecially those that ultimately w at be inter operable with Combatant Command equipment DIA should institute measures to improve communications and work more closely with its consumers and producers to identify and D-9 resolve responsiveness issues In addition DIA should explore with OSD and OJCS ways to clarify DIA authorities Exercise Participation DIA participates extensively in OTCS exercises and Command sponsored exercises DIA support includes scenario development assistance scripting support and control cell augmentation with on site DIA and collection managers In OJCS sponsored command exercises DIA coordinates Command participation Interviewees believe that DIA is an effective participant in the exercise program and that participation increases its combat readiness Conclusions 1 DIA is responsible for ensuring that the Commands have adequate timely and reliable intelligence support but cannot satisfy this requirement as effectively as it might because of resource constraints 2 Although DIA is aggressively working with the Combatant Commands and Military Departments joint intelligence doctrine is not fully developed 3 Intelligence planning is fragmented Interoperability and connectivity issues are frequently not addressed or because the various intelligence plans are not linked they are not identified 4 More detailed Specific intelligence threat information is required by U s planners to develop strategy- based operational and contingency plans that are realistic and achievable DIA is working to provide this additional information but there are significant gaps in the quality accuracy and completeness of intelligence holdings needed to satisfy this requirement fully 5 Secure survivable intelligence voice and data communications are a fundamental requirement Near and long term solutions are being worked to correct shortfalls 6 Although crisis support is generally rated good there is some concern regarding its sustainability since crisis teams are created by shifting manpower from their normal tasks 7 DIA is reaponsive within existing resources however Command representatives cited the need for more tailored tactical intel ligence focused more specifically on Command mission and geographic area of responsibility 8 DIA has a consumer relations problem The Commands are not certain why DIA can or cannot perform certain functions on their behalf why products are late or cannot be produced and why additional guidance is not available 9 DIA participation in OJCS and Command exert Interviewees suggested that some peacetime exerci-- designed to use the same personnel that would be ac in an actual crisis or war situation ises is effective 3 tively inV lved Recommendations l That DIA be given the authority and resources to fulfill more effectively its mission of satisfying Command intelligence requirements OSD OJCS and DCI should identify minimum require ments and initiate corrective action as apprOpriate 2 That DIA expand its efforts to develop joint intelligence doctrine DIA should work closely in this regard with OJCS Commands and the Military Departments 3 That DIA in collaboration with OSD OJCS Commands Military Departments and DC develOp an achievable plan of action for development of an integrated Defense Intelligence Master Plan emphasizing support to the Combatant Commands 4 That DIA continue working with OJCS the Ues Commands the Military Departments and DCA to ensure that survivable secure intelligence voice and data communications exist to support DIA and the COmmands combat support requirements The commu nications operations and intelligence communities should work together to document validate and translate these requirements into operational capability 5 That DIA be more responsive to Command requirements and improve communication with consumers to ensure that users are aware of Agency capabilities and limitations V ORGANIZATION FUNCTIONS EFFICIENCY ECONOMY AND EFFECTIVENESS Organization organizational structure displayed at enclosure l is responsive to its mission Organizational changes required to support the wartime mission should be documented in the Defense Intelligence Master Plan discussed in Section IV of this report Most interviewees were satisfied with organizational struc ture but suggeSted that DEA consolidate those planning and manage ment functions in direct support of Command requirements into a single organization This would provide a focal point for Uas Command related activity and allow interoperability issues to be worked more coherently Many noted a requirement for DIA to strengthen its performance of the function A separate organization that dealt solely with Combatant Command issues might help reinforce role 'Fhe urn mlviscns tine Secrietarq oi ikziexnya oxi -nte ligeiu3e matters and is the program manager for Under lirection and c011l_rol DEA Supports 000 national level planners decision makers and operational elements by producing or managing finished basic military intelligence scientific and technical intelligence and all intelligence estimates and contributions to National intelligence Estimates NIEs Serves as the of the OJCS and provides the intelligence staff support required by the C5 to perform his assigned respon- sibilities Supervises the Indications and warning SyStem Manages and operates the National Military Intelligence Center NMIC Validates registers and recommends priorities for and monitors sat sfaction of all intelligence collection equirements Exercises DoD wide Human Source Intelligence program management authority issues policy and planning guidance and monitors operations DIA also conducts DOD HUMINT collection activities and manages and Operates the Defense Attache System Provides counterintelligence staff support to the OSD OJCS and the Uas Commands Manages and operates the central repository for all intelligence imagery the National Area Coverage Data File the Imagery Standards Laboratory and the DEA ph tographic laboratories Provides intelligence elements with a spe aEized intelligence reference library and intelligence document distri- bution dissemination and translation services Manages and operates the Defense Intelligence College Acts as management authority for all intelligence information systems except those dedicated to signals intelligence operations and support functions Provides guidance in conformance with policies of and DCI to DOD Components concerning the release of Defense intelligence information to foreign governments international organizations and the public Administers DOD security policies and programs to protect intelligence and intelligence sources and methods Adjudicates clearance eligibility for DIA civilian personnel and eligibility for access to compartmented intelligence for all personnel assigned to OSD OJCS and the Defense Agencies with the exception of NSA including contractors and consultants A number of interviewees expressed concern with reapect to ability to fulfill its counterintelligence CI responsibilities Although DIA is the CI staff of the OJCS and a participant in the CSD-managed Foreign Counterintelligence Program FCIP it does not have effective means to ensure the Commands have adequate CI capabilities In view of this deficiency consideration should be given to granting increased reSponsibility to DIA for the review and approval of Military Department programs to ensure adequate CI support to the Combatant Commands Conclusions 1 organizational structure is suited to its peacetime and crisis functions however it will require modification to support its wartime mission effectively 2 Although generally satisfied with organizational structure many interviewees believe DIA needs a focal point for Command related activity to foster improved consideration of interoperability issues and to Strengthen its performance of the J-2 function 3 Although DIA is a participant in the OED managed Foreign Counterintelligence Program FCIP it does not have a way to ensure the Commands have adequate CI capabilities In the meantime Combatant Command requirements are not being addressed adequately Recommendations I That DIA determine the organizational changes required to support its wartime mission and document them in the Defense Intelligence Master Plan That DIA consider consolidation of those planning and manage- l ment functions in direct support of Command requirements into a single organization 3 That DIA be granted increased authority to fulfill its role in counterintelligence matters OSD OJCS and DIA should determine the most appropriate way to ensure the can guide review and ensure the Uas Commands have adequate counterintelligence capabil ity Efficiency Economy and Effectiveness DEA has led lntelligence Community procurement actions that have created significant dollar savings Cross community management efforts especially in the community have ameliorated the costs associated with each activity independently developing and procuring its own intelligence processing production and dissemination hardware and software management saves funds and ensures improved interoperability across the community DIA has automated many intelligence processing and dissemination functions to streamline the analytical process New technology and methods are used to the maximum extent possible Examples of improved efficiency include Photographic processing 1977 to l986 50 percent increase in prints produced 60 percent increase in aerial reconnaissance film processed 265 percent briefing aids 1977 l986 l33 percent increase in 1977 1986 25 percent increase in intelligence reports processed l977-1986 135 percent increase in students trained by the Defense Intelligence College l977 1986 114 percent increase in hardcopy Special intelligence product La processed l98l 1986 88 percent increase in AUTODIN messages processed 1984 1986 With the exception of students trained the other increases were achieved through a combination of equipment improvements better training and use of personnel and streamlining of workflow Student training increases were accomplished by initiating new educational approaches such as course revisions and mobile training teams Mobile training teams are particularly cost effective since they allow students to be trained at their job site thus reducing travel and transportation costs and time away from their jobs Several interviewees suggested that rotatin g DIA civilian intelli- gence professionals through Command intelligence activities would increase overall efficiency economy and effectiveness Since many DIA civilians have not had military experience they would gain a better appreciation of Combatant Command requirements and other important military experience It would also help to D l4 improve DIA's readiness since these would bring this knowledge back to DIA At the same time command personnel would gain an appreciation for capabilities and limitations Conclusions 1 DIA has improved its efficiency economy and effectiveness to keep pace with the expansion of intelligence requirements 2 Rotating DIA civilian intelligence professionals through Uas Command intelligence activities would provide DIA personnel a better appreciation of Command requirements and improve readiness Command personnel would gain a better understanding of capabilities and limitations Recommendations That DIA explore with the of the Commands possible ways to rotate DIA civilian intelligence professionals through Command activities VI BUDGET AND MANPOWER The Defense Reorganization Act reduction would cut over one thousand billets from DIA The Agency cannot absorb a reduction of this magnitude perform its mission adequately and be combat ready manpower levels have changed dramatically over the past twenty years Between FY 1968 and FY 1979 DIA was reduced by over 2 300 billets This situation was reversed in the early 19805 partially in response to systemic problems and partially because of increased emphasis on Third World intelligence require ments manpower growth between FY l979 and FY 1986 was almost 1 400 billets a partial replacement of the total reductions taken in the mid l97OS but primarily authorized for new Defense intelligence requirements If implemented the Goldwater-Nichols Act reductions would significantly exacerbate Agency manpower shortfalls Intelligence requirements have grown in complexity and volume For example technology transfer was not recognized as a problem when DEA was created Now it requires scarce manpower to exploit foreign materiel and identify how U S technologies may be used to help the Soviet Union and its Bloc Allies close the Soviet technology gap Terrorism has also become a significant problem Terrorist plans and intentions are the easiest requirements to articulate but the most difficult and most manpower intensive to satisfy The U S military presence in Third World areas has increased requirements for intelligence Adequate information has never existed for some of these areas and collection is a continuing problem Contingency plans must be based on detailed mp cific threat information This threat must be based on ac curate timely and complete orders of battle installations information and nowledge of available equipment Planners need to know hat equipment is in foreign inventories and whether the weapon is an export version of Soviet U S French or another military exporter country including weapon vulnerabilities and necessary countermeasures As a practical matter the world has changed the missile U S Forces face on the battlefield may be U S manufactured or a copy reverse engineered by the Soviets Target Identification Friend or Foe IFF devices will net recognize a U S or Allied weapon unless these devices are properly programmed The information and programming comes from intelligence sources Such other areas as intelligence support for the Strategic Defense Initiative reflect new requirements representing technologies that did not exist when DIA was created Intelligence support is required for all new high technology weapons such as mobile missiles especially for onboard computer data bases Requirements for such data are increasing with each weapon developed and for each operational scenario If manpow er is reduced requirements wi not decrease The Military Departments Uas Commands and their components already share collection processing product' and infra- structure responsibility with DIA They face the same intelli gence requirements resources available gap as DIA and could not absorb the additional workload generated by a manpower reduction of DIA F1 13 Joint Dutv Assignments One of the most important contributors to Defense Agency efficiency and effeCtiveness is the quality of its manpower The Combat Support Agencies must know what the forces need understand tactics and doctrine and must be able to determine when and why require- ments are more or less important The military officers assigned to these agencies must translate these demands into war required capability both in the Defense Agencies and at the commands This translation is critical and depends on quality and well trained military personnel The features of the Goldwater Nichols Act prescribed for Joint Duty Assignments should fulfill these require- ments However the current allocation of Joint Duty Assignment billets presents a problem About 50 percent of the Defense Agency mili- tary officer billets 0 4 and above have been designated Joint Duty Assignments This creates a have and have not situation that is already affecting morale Additionally Defense Agency military are traditionally criticized as being lower in quality than those kept in the Military Departments The 50 percent ate this problem because it is unlikely that rule will ex e1 1 er ill be assigned to the non Joint assignments ac top qualityo ME tic Conclusions 1 ability to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense CJCS Commands Component Commands the Military Departments and others depends on adequate manpower current assets are not sufficient 2 Title VI general manpower reductions would further exacerbate the already significant gap between available manpower and satis- faction of requirements This gap translates to large deficiencies in U S force readiness 3 Added Combat Support Agency reSponsibilities in the Defense Reorganization Act demand more management oversight and dedicated planning support Management headquarters reductions will prevent DIA and the other Combat Support Agencies from fulfilling their expanded roles 4 Combat Support Agencies must provide operational expertise know what the forces need understand tactics and doctrine and be able to determine when and why re uirements are more or less important The military officers assigned to these Agencies play a role in each Agency s ability to translate requirements into operational capability both in the Defense Agency and at the Combatant Commands This translation demands the quality of personnel and training required by the Defense Reorganization Act provisions regarding Joint ' ty Assignments Recommendations l That DIA not be reduced by the general Agency and man -agement headquarters reductions identified in Title VI of the Defense Reorganization Act 2 That requirements and budget constraints drive future manpower requests 3 That the Assistant Secretary of Defense Force Management and Personnel and the CJCS review Combat Support Agency military manpower billets against Joint Duty Assignment criteria and where apprOpriate designate billets as Joint Duty Assignment positions ENCLOSURE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIA COMMAND ELEMENT I DIRECTOR I DEPUTY DIRECTOR I I I I I I SENIOR ENLISTED ADVISOR EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR I I i I I I GENERAL I DEFENSE PROGRAMS I I I I i ACTIONS OFFICE I EXECUTIVE SUPPORT OFFICE I ROTOCOL OFFICE I IASSISTANT ASSISTANT DEPUTY I I DIRECTOR FOR SECURITY AND I I SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEEI I I DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS PLANS I I AND TRAINING I I DIRECTOR FOR COLLECTION NANA EMENT I DEFENSE IINTELLICENCE COLLEGE I I I I I I DEPUTY DIRECTORI FOR PLANS POLICY I I I IASSISTANT DEPUTY I DIRECTOR 3 2 FOR TRAINING ME TY DIRECTOR FOP SYSTEMS I RESOURCES I DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR EXTERNAL RELATI SRNR DEFENSE GENERALI DEPUTY I DIRECTOR I OFFICERS IFOR AND ATTA STAFF ATTACHE OFFICES DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE LIASON HNENTS Ii I IA ASSISTANT ASSISTANT I DIRECTOR FOR I DIRECTOR FOR DEPUII ESTIMATES I SCIENTIFIC AND DIRECTOR I TECHNICAL FOR INTELLIGENCE IRESEARCE ASSISTANT DEPUTE I IDEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR I I JCS SUPPORT I