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Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Digest: Special Historical Edition, DIA 50th Anniversary, September 29, 2011. Unclassified.

• j• m ­n C Cl C I z 0 ­l z In ­4 I 0 n 0 z ‘ii 11 m 0 z n 0 z Ill n r r ‘C 0 m ­l 0 0 m ­I ­4 0 0 I­’ ­‘ 1 C L 1 0 m w m ­I m CD 0 — a ‘­ DC —0 m C m 0 z m 0 m r ­1 2 ifi ifi m ‘1 C C I C UNCLASSIFIED “I would stress to the intelligence officer that their knowledge of history is absolutely essential if they are going to do anything in the intelligence business that is worthwhile LTG EUGENE F TGHEJR USAF Director Defense Intelligence Agency September 1977—August 1981 On i October we celebrate the 5oth anniversary of the Defense Intelligence Agency SINCE 961 DIA contributions have been instrumental in shaping significant events in u s history To recognize this important milestone and to inspire reflection of the nation the DIA Historical in defense on o years of DIA’s commitment to excellence Research Support Branch in collaboration with the Directorate for Analysis has prepared this special edition of the Defense Intelligence Digest In compiling this special edition we selected a significant historical event from each of the five decades and asked our historians to prepare an article to provide background and context to discuss DIA’s unique defense intelligence contributions and to examine the historical significance of these contributions With each article we also present examples of the original intelligence products our predecessors provided to DIA customers We prepared this special edition to highlight the broad range of challenges faced by DIA’s intelligence professionals throughout the Agency’s history and to demonstrate the degree to which many of these challenges continue to resonate with today’s generation of intelligence professionals The selection of articles for this special edition is necessarily arbitrary and should not detract from an appreciation of the Agency’s contribution to other historical events that have shaped our nation’s history From the Cold War to the Gulf War from the conflict in Vietnam to the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan from confronting communism to battling terrorism the dedicated professionals of DIA have repeatedly demonstrated their commitment to excellence in defense of the nation The coming decades will present the Agency and the nation with a complex array of national security challenges and opportunities One of the best ways to prepare for this future is to understand our past N LTG RONALD L BURGESS JR Director Defense Intelligence Agency REVERSE BLANK UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED r I CUBA U The Cuban Missile Crisis October 1962 AFGHANISTAN E U The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan December 1979 9 RUSSIA SOVIET UNION 13 BOSNIA­HERZEGOVINA U Soviet Missile Force Projections U The Siege of Sarajevo fl L 1 J 17 1985 1992­1996 INDONESIA U The Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 z III 0 0 REVERSE BLANK UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 29 September iou U The Cuban Missile Crisis October U Background In May 1962 Nikita Khruschev the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party secured agreement from the Soviet Presidium to place nuclear­equipped medium range ballistic missiles MRBMs in Cuba His goal was to counter what he believed to be U S nuclear superiority and to protect his ally Fidel Castro from U S attempts to remove him from power The Soviets code­named the operation ANADYR after the river in far­northeast Siberia The plan called for a large combined­arms force of motorized infantry tanks tactical aircraft surface­to­air missiles SAMs coastal defense vessels light bombers and five missile regiments composed of SS­4 Sandal MRBMs and SS­ Skean intermediate range ballistic missiles IRBMs 1962 U By the end of August most of this force was in place MRBMs and IRBMs began arriving on 15 September and Soviet engineers in Cuba began hastily assembling the missile sites Owing to the presence of SA­2 SAMs the United States halted U­2 reconnaissance flights over Cuba between September and early October As evidence of a major Soviet deployment increased however the Kennedy administration relented and allowed a single flight on 14 October which discovered the presence of the strategic missiles Kennedy ordered a naval quarantine of Cuba and for 13 days the world sat on the brink of nuclear war Finally after a series of back­channel negotiations Khrushchev agreed to dismantle the missiles and remove them from Cuba In exchange the United States secretly agreed that it would not move to depose Castro and would remove its nuclear­equipped Jupiter missiles from Turkey U The DIA Effort DIA was not yet even a year old when the Soviets began deploying missiles to Cuba and its intelligence production capabilities were limited to current intelligence warning and estimates Nonetheless the agency was quick to recognize the seriousness of the buildup On 3 October almost 2 weeks before the United States discovered the Soviet strategic missiles Lt Gen Joseph Carroll DIA’s director set up a special Cuban Situation Room to monitor events around the clock The room was staffed by analysts from current intelligence and estimates functions Using photographs taken by high­ and low­altitude reconnaissance missions as well as HUM INT reports from debriefings of Cuban refugees F t E R I A N UNCLASSIFIED U C CD cC cC i5 U Ecuador Brazil U The relative ranges of the IL­28 Beagle SS­4 Sandal and SS Skean R UNCLASSIFIED C U UNCLASSIFIED 29 September iou UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SUPPLEMENT TEE OFFENSIVE THREAT IN CUBA Si1nifioance A significant deployment of guided missiles to Cuba is already welt advanced and has proceeded by first deploying a large force of defensive veapons followed quickly by long—range offenstve gutded missiles and aircraft A mixed force of 1 000 and 2 200—nm ballistic missiles in Cuba provides for the first time a significant strategic strike capability against almost all targets in the US and against a large portion of Canada and Latin America The planntng for this operation must have started at least one year ago and the actual deployment itself began last spring Offensive Deploy et The equipment for 1 000—nm ballistic missiles is now being deployed in western Cuba at four launch sites near San Cristobal Two of these are now operational and the other two are proceeding to this status on an accelerated basis The missiles are probably those reported •Ovlflg into this area during Septe ber Each of the four sties contains eight missiles and four unrevetted field­type launchers which rely on mobile erection check—out and support equipment This implies a reflre capabtlity from each unit Other l OO0—n ballistic missiles are deployed at two sites nine miles apart east of Havana in the Sagua La Grande area These sites closely resemble the sites at San Cristobal but appear to be more permanent in nature Terrain features have dictated considerable clearing and grading for deploy ent of the system Also there are permanent structures at the launch positrons at each site and we estimate an operational capability for each site within one week The sizes of the missiles associated equipment and building found at the San Cristobal and Sague La Grande sites are almost identical and are compatible with the 1 000—nm missile system 23 Oct 62 DIA Intelligence Summary U Extract from DIA Intelligence Summary 249­62 23 Page 1 7980 October 1962 analysts working in the Cuban Situation Room produced daily and occasionally twice­daily current intelligence updates on the crisis U DIA Intelligence Summary 249­62 published on 23 October 1962 was produced by these analysts DIA Intelligence Summaries were current intelligence summaries intended for broad distribution to the Secretary of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders in chief CINCs of U S military forces around the world Published as the crisis was nearing its climax this summary laid out in a special supplement the nature of the offensive threat presented by the Soviet deployment “A mixed force of i ooo and 2 200 REVERSE BLANK UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ­ 29 September 2011 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Two fixed sites for 2 200—nm ballistic missiles are under construction to the Guanajay area near avana Four launchers two blockhouses and underground propellant storage are being built at each site One site is ounsrdered to be in a mid—to—late stage of construction and should be operational within six weeks The other site is in an earlier stage of construction and could be operational between 15 and 30 December No missiles or support equipment has been observed within the Guanajay area to date An additional fixed site has been observed at Remedios in eastern Cuba whtcb is lmilar to those at Guaoajay This is probably a valid indicator of deployment of a second grouping of 2 200—n ballistic missiles In addition to missiles rL—28 light bomber aircraft with a combat radius of about 750 miles are also arriving in Cuba Approximately 22 of these bombers most still in crates have been observed These are in addition to the force of about 40 MIG—21 fighters there Nuclear Wafheads A nuclear warhead storage site is believed under con struction adjacent to the more complete of the fixed—missile launch sites near Guanajay Construction is proceeding at a high rate This site could become operational in about six weeks A curved—roof building similar to that at tbe Guanajay Site but only about 35 by 65 feet has been observed at the newly identified possible missile site near Remedios Foudatjons of structures approximately 60 by 35 feet which may be intended to be future nuclear warhead storage facilities have been observed at two of the San Cristobal Sites and at one Sagua La Grande Site The appearance of concrete arches nearby indicates that these buildings will be earth—covered Observation of the major airfields in Cuba has not as yet revealed any structures that can be identified as intended for nuclear storage a ci a0 a 23 Oct 62 DIA intelligence Summary aS Page 2 ci 79l0j U Extract from DIA Intelligence Summary 249­62 23 October 1962 nautical mile range ballistic missiles in Cuba ” its authors wrote “provides for the first time a significant strategic strike capability against nearly all targets in the U S and against a large portion of Canada and Latin America ” U The Intelligence Summary’s authors however could not prove definitively that nuclear warheads were in Cuba Although they noted the construction of nuclear storage facilities none of the facilities were complete “Nevertheless ” they concluded “one must assume that REVERSE BLANK UNCLASSIFIED 0 UNCLASSIFIED I — 29 September iou nuclear weapons may now be in Cuba to support the operational missile capability as it becomes available ” Their assumption was both logical and accurate In fact the Soviets began moving nuclear warheads into Cuba through the port of Mariel on 4 October U Sometimes overlooked in subsequent histories of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the presence of Soviet 11­28 Beagle bombers which was considered an offensive weapon by DIA analysts This Intelligence Summary noted that at least 22 were in Cuba but did not draw out the full implications of their deployment because DIA and the rest of the Intelligence Community were focused on the primary offensive threat posed by the missiles This Intelligence Summary did not raise the possibility of the IL­28s being equipped with nuclear bombs Indeed the 4 October Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons included six 12­kiloton tactical nuclear weapons for the bombers U Historical Significance U S intelligence performance during the Cuban Missile Crisis presents a series of important intelligence lessons learned It was on one hand a tactical intelligence victory the unmasking of an extraordinarily secret and dangerous Soviet military deployment before offensive weapons could become operational was a major victory On the other hand the failure to anticipate Khrushchev’s gambit given the international climate and fears over Cuba on both sides was a strategic failure The Soviets had never before deployed nuclear weapons outside the Soviet Union and analysts throughout the Intelligence Community were too reliant on historical precedent as a predictor of Soviet behavior They failed to account for the possibility of anomalous behavior and were thus surprised when they did discover offensive strategic weapons in Cuba U Analysts while concerned about the deployment of offensive nuclear weapons failed to account for the possibility that the Soviets might deploy tactical nuclear weapons for defensive purposes Intelligence analysts raise the question of tactical nuclear weapons and no collection requirements were specifically issued that focused on such weapons But on the 4 October delivery alone in addition to the 40 1­megaton warheads for the SS­4s 12 2­kiloton warheads for tactical rockets and 36 12­kiloton warheads for cruise missiles arrived in Cuba This intelligence became known some 30 years after the crisis Thus while the Cuban Missile Crisis was an event unique in history its analytical intelligence lessons—the importance of recognizing the potential for anomalies and of continuously challenging analytical assumptions—resonate even today DIA DA Historical Research Support Branch REVERSE BLANK UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 29 September U The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan December loll it9 U Background On 27 April 1978 communist officers aligned with the Moscow­supported People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan PDPA launched a military coup that overthrew the government of Afghan President Mohammad Daoud Khan Following a brief internal power struggle one faction within the PDPA the Khalq assumed leadership of the new government and immediately tried to implement a number of Marxist­inspired reforms These efforts failed to account for the complexities of Afghan society and generated widespread anger and discontent Popular resistance to the Khalq regime continued to grow throughout the summer and fall of 1978 Soviet officials viewed these developments with growing alarm They were concerned about the security of their southern border worried that the United States would take advantage of the unsettled situation to establish “an imperialist bridgehead ” and troubled by the geopolitical implications of a counterrevolution that succeeded in toppling a communist regime In early December 1979 the Soviets decided on military intervention UNCLASSIFIED U In late November elements of a Soviet airborne division began arriving at M ry Du h nb Bagram Airbase Two weeks later they •Ire Ktyb were joined by an armored unit Units in the Turkestan and Central Asian Military M h Hen Rubat Ku Districts were brought up to strength r0A through the recall of reservists and moved Sb ndand MRD • I • M hn od e Er q S g r •Pn1 w K® BDH to the Afghan frontier Late on 24 j ‘ SePMR A’ December additional airborne elements J hI bd Ghu n flthnm r­ A • T r n began arriving at Kabul Airport with Kb Zurutti other troops flying to Bagram to a base K nd h r T gbu Sep MR IRA near Herat and to Kandahar On 27 TerrA Ory ont’oUee by Sent Inert d nng December Soviet forces occupied key war A15k nr tan locations in Kabul including the main ministries and assaulted and captured the U Soviet Invasion Routes and Soviet­Controlled Territory presidential palace that night These forces were soon followed by two more divisions Within a few days 5o ooo troops and i ooo armored vehicles had occupied the country Within a few weeks the strength of the invasion force was about 8 ooo LA MRb HQ N A’ — j Pe hawur rIte i U The DIA Effort On 31 December just days after the Soviet invasion a DIA analyst published a Defense Intelligence Note DIN on the recent events commenting on the “unprecedented deployment of Soviet combat forces to a country outside the Warsaw Pact” excluding Cuba The document correctly identifies Islamic fervor rugged terrain the availability of weapons and “Afghan xenophobia” as factors militating against a quick resolution of the problem and makes the prescient observation that “the possibility of the BEVERSE BLANK UNCLASSIFIED U 0 0 0 1j U 0 U UNCLASSIFIED I 29 September iou UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED DIADIN 365—5A AS OF 2208 EST 31 DEC 79 USSR—AFGHANISTAN SOVIET COMMENTARY U MOSCOW’S FIRST OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE PRE SENCE OF SOVIET CC’4BAT TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN APPEARED IN A PRAVDA EDITORIAL ON 31 DECEMBER THE LIMITED MILITARY CONTINGENT” IS ALLEGEDLY IN AFGHANISTAN AT THE REQUEST OF TEE HOST GOVERNMENT THE NEW SOVIET PUPPET RIME HEADED BY BABRAK KARNAL THE SOVIETS SUPPOSEDLY ARE ASSISTING IN “REPELLING AGGRESSION” AND “RESTORING PEACE” IN ACCORD ANCE WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER AND ARTICLE 5 OF THE SOVIET—AFGHAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS AND COOPERATION L’NDER THE EUPHEMISM OF “INTERNATIONALIST HELP ” SOVIET INTERVENTION IS BEING CONDONED BY MOST EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ­­ THIS UNPRECEDENTED DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET COMBAT FORCES TO A COUNTRY OUTSIDE THE WARSAW PACT EX CLUDING THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN CUBA CLEARLY REFLECTS MOSCOW’S INTENTION TO KEEP A SOCIALIST­ORIENTED R3 IME IN POWER IN AFGHAN I STAN BAR RAK XARMAL WHO WAS FORMERLY LIVING IN EXILE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS MORE SUS CEPTIBLE TO SOVIET MANIPULATION THAN HIS PREDECESSORS HIS REPUTATION AS AN EXTREME MARXIST HIS INSTALLATION BY SOVIET TROOPS AND HIS IDENTIFICATION WITH THE USSR ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE OPPOSITION TO THE MARXIST AFGHAN GOVERN MEFT AND TO THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN DESPITE THE BID FOR MILITARY ALLEGIANCE AS INDICATED BY THE IN CLUSION OF FORMERLY PU1ED MILITARY MEMBERS IN TEE CABINET REPORTS OF THE SOVIETS KILLING OR CAPTURING AFGHAN TROOPS MAY RESULT IN MORE WIDESPREAD MILITARY DISSIDENCE ESPECI ALLY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE ­— ­­ ISLAMIC FERVOR THE RUGGED TERRAIN THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS TO THE INSURGENTS AND AFGHAN XEN OPHOBIA ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO A QUICK SOVIET RESOLUTION OF THE AFGHAN PROBLEM THE POSSIBILITY OF THE USSR BEING DRAWN INTO A VIETNAM­TYPE QUAGMIRE CANNOT BE DISMISSED THE NEW RIUE’S LACK OF A SOLID PER BASE AND BABRAX’S ACCEPTA BILITY TO THE KHALQ FACTION THE MILITARY AND THE POPULACE INDICATE A LAFGE AND LONG­TERM SOVIET PRESENCE SOVIET TROOPS ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE WITHDRAWN IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND IF NECESSARY MORE SOVIET COMBAT FORCES COULD BE 1PLOY— ED IF THIS CURRENT OPERATION IS SUCCESSFUL IT WILL SERVE AS A PRECEDENT FOR SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN OTHER THIRD­WORLD SOCIALIST­ORIENTED COUNTRIES HEW 31 DEC 85 U 0 C 0 Declassified by SlO IDO DANIDIA on 8 Aug 11 C U 7981 U DIA Defense Intelligence Note 365­5A 31 December 1979 The DIN correctly identifies Islamic fervor rugged terrain the availability of weapons and “Afghan xenophobia” as factors militating against a quick resolution of the problem and makes the prescient observation that the possibility of the USSR being drawn into a Vietnam­type quagmire cannot be dismissed REVERSE BLANK UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED z r 29 September 2011 USSR being drawn into a Vietnam­type quagmire cannot be dismissed ” The author concludes that “Soviet troops are not likely to be withdrawn in the near future and if necessary mote Soviet combat forces could be employed ” U The DIN’s author was a member of an intelligence task force formed under theJ­2 in the immediate aftermath of the invasion That task force included analysts from the newly established Assistant Directorate for joint Chiefs of Staff Support the Directorate for Research and the Directorate for Estimates Working in 12­hour shifts the task force responded to a flood of requests for information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and military commands around the globe This DIN was one of the task force’s first attempts to address the larger implications of the invasion and is an example of current intelligence reporting that does more than simply describe events It uses the full cultural political geographic and historical context to make an informed convincing and as we now know quite accurate judgment U In the immediate aftermath of the invasion the most pressing worry among defense planners foreign policy specialists and DIA analysts concerned the strategic implications of the Soviet invasion Would the Soviet Army once it secured Afghanistan march south through Pakistan to the Indian Ocean in order to seize a long­sought­after warm­water port or would it turn west to threaten the oilfields of Iran Initially there was little unanimity within DIA regarding Soviet intentions A DIN prepared by the task force in mid­January 1980 suggested Soviet military action from Afghanistan into Iran was unlikely since the largest Iranian oilfields were separated from the Afghan border by mote than i ooo miles and 2 mountain ranges Other analysts however feared that the invasion portended a major Soviet effort to remake the political geography of the Middle East and Central Asia with the ultimate goal of controlling the oil resources and infrastructure in the region as a means to pressure the West By February these concerns had receded and the analytic consensus that eventually emerged within DIA was that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan neither increased nor decreased the Soviet threat to the Middle East DIA analysts also concluded that a Soviet move into Pakistan to secure a warm­water port was unlikely given the daunting logistic challenges associated with such an undertaking U For the next decade DIA analysts tracked Soviet force structure and capabilities and monitored the expanding insurgency against the government in Kabul Following the signing of the Geneva Accords DIA personnel monitored the months­long withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan U Historical Significance The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a watershed event in the Cold War Its legacy is seen in many of the issues that shape today’s national security environment The experience in Afghanistan weakened the Soviet Union militarily economically and politically directly contributing to the collapse that ended the Cold War and dramatically altering the geopolitical landscape The conflict attracted Islamic fighters from around the globe producing a new generation of global jihadists who were R t V t H u C A N K UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 2 k 29 September iou experienced internationally networked and emboldened by their success against the Soviet superpower Finally the conflict left Afghanistan in turmoil setting the stage for a long period of instability and civil war that led to the rise of the Taliban a development of great historical significance for the region for the United States and for the world DIA DA Historical Research Support Branch REVERSE BLANK UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Ib ‘N 29 September 2011 U Soviet Missile Force Projections 1985 U Background By 1985 after three decades of effort the Soviet Union had amassed an arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons that rivaled and in some respects surpassed that of the United States The growth of the Soviet strategic arsenal and the threat it presented to the West made the question of Soviet military capabilities and intentions one of the most important issues of the Cold War Military planners and policymakers at many levels in the DoD had long needed specific knowledge of Soviet research and development production and deployment of these weapons so they could structure U S forces to meet the threat develop doctrine to defeat a Soviet attack and attempt to limit their potential for damage Since DIA’s inception the Agency had been at the center of debates over these questions U This issue came to a head in the late 19705 and early­to­mid 19805 as the Soviets embarked on a large­scale ballistic missile modernization effort to match the new U S modernization program Soviet development of advanced fourth­ and fifth­ generation ballistic missiles which were highly accurate and capable of carrying between i and 10 independently targeted re­entry vehicles was a major threat to Western security UNCLASSIFIED • 4 ­I U U The DIA Effort The DIA study “Strategic Ballistic Missile Systems Projections—USSR ” dated 3 June 1985 was part of the Agency’s efforts to understand Soviet ballistic missile development one U An SS­iS Mod is loaded into its silo of the most important analytical issues facing the agency at that point By 1985 DIA had developed a strong managerial and cooperative relationship with Service intelligence organizations such as the U S Air Force Foreign Technology Division FTD which would become the National Air and Space Intelligence Center or NASIC in 2003 As it did with many scientific and technological projects related to Soviet strategic missile technology DIA tasked FTD with projects such as this one and analysts in DIA’s Deputy Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence DT worked closely with them on the effort U The pages presented here are the summary of the much larger 52­page study of projected Soviet strategic ballistic missile development over the next 20 years The study presents an assessment of Soviet ballistic missile system development trends subsystem technologies and potential systems that its authors projected might be developed within the period of study It was intended to fulfill the requirements of estimators planners and system designers in the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Office of the Secretary of Defense the Unified and Specified Commands and the various military departments It was therefore an REVERSE BLANK UNCLASSIFIED 0 0 0 0 UNCLASSIFIED c_ j ­ 74 I U S ­ 29 September iou UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY Thn lono1 00 00001004 II 9000 1 9 1000010 In boon norroonly dnood oono105n boiL 040 01o k y ooo Eopooa 01 A 10oon 01 rr d dono n dnopn hoon onbon pp h on no 01 10oonh In ond 01o oy 40noI io boor oond bnyood Oh lion hn pphn bk 10 oo oI dqdoynd y onoon Tbn n onooOon w lboo now lno 01 hO do od tlu 011 000 “ 0 012n ho look 10000040900 10 40 a” 0 00009 0000 900110100000 900000 000001 onhi0 o 01 pand p poloon a bo10 ponhod 01 An dn oononn 1 1 nib r twon onrony 01 r yh d 01 40 01 innono’d Ro­obo Iy jo UI Tho 0 on 0100 loon ho1 0 soo ha don y og 1010 090 hn doo do 3o by 14 TOIM 3 RPM I URRM0 od 9 SLIM Mlhn n own ICIM dod’ opon nprogooon SSX­I0 odSS­X­I3 a URPM porOom 55­It nd woo SUM poogoon 5S­NX 13 000 p1 0000 onnon F” ICBM oon SLBM oooIRBMo don’URBM o ob rooonolu b” n hr powoO00I boon Tb ICHU do S5 X 24 An SS X25 RIM ho wd SLIM ho S5 NX­21 o 0 hn 0ho wo o go 01 deodopsnnt 000mrn o wwA€ao o o oioIwc ‘w on boon 0 boon 9 nad Uod fin a 01 o 0 1 010 ” 110 pooooown 01 oboyoor n od d qy 10oono • d l Io lb 4 01’ no on on 0 o ao • only ihoiy 5 1 1 non oW doooIy mpo 01 oonbo ology on nho g d o 01oo rnqanno000 Owl1 50 000 p40” on o on boo fiogho­onod Tho a op40An nn 000 po b o boo on 01 do 10140 io woo 0000 on do qn fron10ponnl o l nod pnd noo n loop F dowg b oon on on no pobmo 0000 000 00 f o i iIr yoooon donol oo l Thony do kn bnon o dobyon h dno n I nooionIo ho o ono oriy on 40o o bk In An Podobono Ohoo gb An Mihooy Undo Idol Conn odoo IVPK Thn n b on n on n Ion 50 00 9610 01 1 01 04 ho boo 930 01 nonly dndInd ho o wn wn 10 doodnp g 010010­ 900 ndon mwok non 1 0 ho know on Oom no d ho 0141110 ho US wonlog n nok boron own ho n oly 970’ S non Aol 0 00 004 olo ooo ho poron­n ho Soon bonn no nq h k hn ponw011y on non Any hbdy o do noon IS non oo nh oonn ThySoon ’ kIon nd010000000I01 k nynowol worIho L’S on 0000014k h41 won w o1 n ho po o dnd do ‘onowoo oo hol ha llon k boo on do d10 nohonoIlr 109 0 000000 000 01Anon 0111 140 oon do 0 10 10 7 l 0 90001 00 SI T501 nuoonoo poo ’n01 nn hooonIbol ’ now 01 10 oln ISo Snoon 000 0090 001 00 do orIp 01 opho 00 00 0 010 l 20 yna Tho n 9 0000 0 0 on had “ obonynod ba dhg 000 nd ow pn00oond 500 ooonon wq ro wo0 wdo o k n Iy OowondIy onw n I y 01 pony 01 on ho Own non o40th non bond on 4001 000r hn b14honknnI01nn dSlonon 001 proonoon by AnoqnI 1100 900001 0 0 0 aon bond on polo ­01 bwinn 001000 00l 00 0001097 n i ono d 0040 00 Tho bonbon in A 10I on 9009 0002000 0 01onoon 01 o boo nontndoon hnny on ho pnooonIon TodnoA gy 01 ononJ onaiyn 0 0 0 04 O donon y lnw podonoonon p•000000fl Inn po ynond yoono En lo on 0110o o no no noon 000 y40hapby ’o nw I poho” 01 na onobo ho yoond ho nyo 01 lb 001 ho how o ponn oondody noon r jw dnw40wonnlo Thoon o01 oo w hoSon0 wp npono 0o 1 05 on U” 111000 0 0 10000100 b fl oo obb yonno 40 10 no nw ­ bopn onM CISC on 55­Il F01hoo­On 01 o 9 S ’ Fo1 o­O on do 53­SO • oop ond no ho o 04 o n01o A Mod on ho 940 X 24 40 o p nwd I 5 boon boon n m opp0010d by on nowo ononnoob 010 1100 nod do n boon woponobbo hon looknd oo 00on ono 100 1 onb y o­on IOn Inn 0190 odd I pnrolu who obyno honoooo onn hoS5­l9ni b gno nn b01op 133 700k4 ond hon ooro4hId po 4 520 kg dnoloo nrno Unlil on­ooody Ib boon boo on ha on UNCLASSIFIED 01 on I0 01­p npd1000 In 01qo boU 0obo UNCLASSIFIED • O flI E I nfl ­ a ­ ­ 000 00 0210 U 00100 0 000 ­ — — — •1 jZ 2 2 z °J 0_0 EE1TT a 0 U 1 1 0 a LLJ U Extracts from “Strategic Ballistic Missile Systems Projections R E V £ R S E B L A N In Ii 7953 — USSR” 3 June 7985 K UNCLASSIFIED SI I UNCLASSIFIED 29 September iou extraordinarily wide­ranging study that influenced the work of many key policymaking and warfighting institutions U The study opened with a prescient caveat It noted that “Evaluation of factors such as force­mix philosophy internal politics and economics is beyond the scope of this study but their impact certainly may influence future weapon developments ’ All three factors noted would later undergo significant change as Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to overhaul the Soviet economy which was heavily dependent on military outlays Under Gorbachev the use of strategic weapons for national defense received heavy emphasis and the modernization program continued while conventional forces saw major cuts The dislocations resulting from the rapid demobilization of large numbers of troops and the cancellation of many conventional weapons programs contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union U The accuracy of the study’s technical projections was mixed but nonetheless impressive given the difficulty of the task For example the study predicted that a follow­on to the SS­i8 Satan heavy ICBM would begin testing in 1988 No follow­on to the 55­iS actually materialized but the SS­i$ Mods and 6 were deployed in 1988 they are currently operational and according to open­source reporting will remain so until 2016­2020 The forecast for the testing and development of a modified experimental 55­24 Scalpel however was exceptional The modified SS­24 known by the Soviets as the Molodets system could be silo­ rail­ and road­based as opposed to the solely rail­based version of the original Flight tests as analysts predicted began in April 1986 and were complete in November 1988 The SS­24 was in service for 17 years According to open­source reporting the last 55­24 was removed from operational status in August 2005 U Historical Significance This study was significant for several reasons In March 1985 months before the study’s publication and 3 months after the study’s information cutoff date Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party and de facto Soviet head of state Gorbachev publicly proclaimed his intention to restructure the Soviet economy a policy known as Perestroika “re­structuring” and intended to do so in part by drastically reducing military expenditures “Strategic Ballistic Missile Systems Projections” helped provide policymakers with a baseline understanding of Soviet strategic missile development and deployment Moreover U S President Ronald Reagan would meet with Gorbachev at a summit in Geneva in November 1985 and he would do so armed with the knowledge that despite Gorbachev’s claims to be reducing military expenditures the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces were modernizing and expanding as quickly as ever Soviet strategic force modernization would continue even as the Soviet Union itself began its terminal decline in the late 19805 U The study also highlights the increased authority over and cooperation with other organizations that DIA had achieved by 1985 Since its establishment in 1961 the Agency had struggled to coordinate and manage national­level military intelligence production F V 1 ii 5 R I A N K UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 29 September oii Most other military intelligence organizations operated largely independent of Agency guidance A long series of changes beginning in the 19705 slowly addressed these shortcomings and by 1985 the Agency had clear lines of authority and better managerial procedures to coordinate key aspects of intelligence production for national and command­level consumers DIA DA Historicol Research Support Branch R E V E R S E B L A N K UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 29 U The Siege of Sarajevo September 2011 1992­1996 U Background The Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia created in 1946 consisted of six republics and two autonomous areas For most of the Cold War Yugoslavia was ruled by Communist leader Josip Broz Tito a dictator who managed to control and suppress the tensions resulting from the country’s multiethnic composition After his death in 1980 strong ethnic and nationalist currents reemerged to threaten the unity of the country and by the end of 1990 t was clear the end for Yugoslavia was near National Intelligence Estimate 15­90 published in October 1990 noted that “Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within one year and will probably dissolve within two ” U In 1991 Slovenia and Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia fighting a short war against the remnants of the Serbian­led Yugoslav National Army After a referendum that was boycotted by its Serbian population Bosnia­H erzegovina declared its independence on 3 March 1992 In response Bosnian Serbs established the Republika Srpska within Bosnia­H erzegovina and with direct support from Serbia began a genocidal war against the Muslim Bosniak and Croat populations in order to secure the territory of their new republic As part of their campaign the Bosnian Serbs laid siege to the city of Sarajevo on April 1992 On 6 April European Community countries recognized the independence of Bosnia­Herzegovina and the United States followed on 7 April Both began supplying humanitarian aid to Bosnia immediately UNCLASSIFIED U 0 0 U The DIA Effort Between 17 and 19 April in the U The Bosnian Parliament building burns after being earliest days of the siege of Sarajevo USDAO Belgrade hit by Serbian tank fire 1992 This building was only 250 meters south of the American Center in Sarajevo members traveled to Sarajevo Their mission was to coordinate the delivery of U S relief supplies scheduled to arrive on iB April to assess security at the airport for the arrival of U S Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Ralph Johnson and to report on conditions inside the city itself For 3 days they extensively toured the airfield the city center and old Sarajevo The dispatches sent back to DIA after this trip provided a reliable firsthand account of conditions in the embattled capital of Bosnia­Herzegovina U One of these dispatches dated 20 April 1992 provides a snapshot of the Bosnian government’s collapsing ability to maintain public order The report documents random acts of violence between Serbs Croats and Bosniaks within the capital and evidence of sniper mortar and artillery fire landing in the city Gunfire could be heard in the distance each night REVERSE BLANK UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 29 September 2011 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY U USDAO BELGRADE’S OBSERVATIONS AFTER THREE DAYS IN SARAJEVO SITUATION IS TENSE FOOD SUPPLIES ARE ALMOST NONEXISTENT AND THE PROBLEMS THERE MAY ONLY GET WORSE 1 U RO’S WERE ON THE GROUND IN THE CLIV OF SARMEVO FROM 1230 LOCAL L ON 17 APRIL 1992 UNTIL 1850119 APRIL 1992 RS TRAVELLED EXTENSIVELY BETWEEN THE SARAJEVO ILIDZA CIVILIAN AIRFIELD AFLD AND THE AMERICAN CENTER IN THE CITY CENTER 3 U THE AMERICAN CENTER IS APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED METERS NORTH OF THE HOLIDAY INN HOTEL 250 METERS NORTH OF THE BOSNIA­HERZEGOVINA B­H ASSEMBLY BUILDING 4 U RO’S SPENT THE NIGHT OF 17 18 APRIL IN THE AMERICAN CENTER DIRECTOR’S OFFICE FOR SECURITY REASONS AT APPROXIMATELY 1O1SL ON 17 APRIL ABOUT SEVEN ARMED PEOPLE WEARING BERETS COLOR COUW NOT BE DETERMINED AND PARTS OF MILITARY UNIFORMS WERE OBSERVED ATTACKING AN UNARMED PROBABLE MALE WHO DID NOT APPEAR TO BE ARMED THE ARMED GANG CARRYING AUTOMATIC WEAPONS SHOTGUNS AND STICKS KICKED AND H IT THE UNARMED MALE WITH THE BUTT OF THEIR RIFLES SCREAMS WERE CLEARLY HEARD AND THE ASSAULT LASTED ABOUT FIVE MINUTES A MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS MUP POLICE PATROL CAME BY ABOUT 30 MINUTES AFTER THE LAST ATTACK BUT THE TWO POLICE DID NOT GET OUT OF THEIR VEHICLE 5 U AT ABOUT O13OL ON 18 APRIL THREE MORTAR AND OR ARTILLERY ROUNDS WERE OBSERVED IMPACTING JUST SOUTH OF THE AMERICAN CENTER THE CONCUSSIVE FORCE OF THE EXPLOSIONS RATTLED THE WINDOWS IT WAS CONFIRMED THE NEXT MORNING THAT THE B­H ASSEMBLY BUILDING WAS HIT BY THREE PROBABLE 120MM MORTAR ROUNDS TWO ON THE ROOF AND ONE ON THE BACK WALL OF THE BUILDING 6 U SMALLS ARMS FIRE AND MORTAR ROUNDS WERE HEARD THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT BUT SOUNDED MUCH FURTHER AWAY ON RADIO SARAJEVO THE MORNING OF 18 APRIL IT WAS REPORTED THAT THE PREVIOUS NIGHT WAS THE QUIETEST IN B­H I N TEN DAYS 8 U AFTER THE LAST FLIGHT OF THE DAY RO’S RETURNED TO THE AMERICAN CENTER AT APPROXIMATELY 19001 ON THE WAY IVEHICLE WASJ STOPPED AT A ROADBLOCK CONSISTING OF THREE TRASH DUMPSTERS AND MANNED BY THREE “GREEN BERET’ FIELD COMMENT MUSLIM PARAMILITARY FORMATIONS IN B­H ARE CALLED GREENS BERETS END COMMENT SOLDIERS ARMED WITH ONE M­59 SEMI­AUTOMATIC RIFLE AND IWO PROBABLY M­7 AUTOMATIC RIFLES ALL THREE HAD WEAPONS TRAINED ON VEHICLE — 10 U THE NIGHT OF 18 19 APRIL WAS VERY QUIET IN THE AREA OF THE AMERICAN CENTER WITH ONLY SMALL ARMS FIRE HEARD IN THE DISTANCE 11 U ON EASTER SUNDAY 19 APRIl AT 0820L RO’S DROVE AROUND THE OLD CLIV SECTION OF SARAJEVO THIS AREA IS MORE THAN 90 PERCENT ETHNIC MUSLIM RO’S WERE INFORMED BY “MUSLIM POLICE” THAT THE OW CLIV AND THE MAJORLIV OF SARMEVO PROPER WAS CONTROLLED BY MUSLIM AND CROAT POLICE UNCLASSIFIED 7982 U Dispatches from Saraevo REVERSE 20 April 1992 BLANK UNCLASSIFIED ‘ UNCLASSIFIED 29 Septembcr iou UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 12 U RO’S DROVE TO THE SQUARE AND WERE STOPPED BY FIVE ARMED CIVILIANS THE YOUNGEST OF WHICH WAS WEARING AN ALMOST NEW POLICE GREATCOAT WHICH WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT HIS THE MEN ALL WORE GREEN BERETS TWO WORE BULLET­PROOf VESTS THEY TOLD RO’S ABOLIT A RECENT SERBIAN MORTAR ATTACK ON THIS SQUARE WHICH KILLED FOUR CIVILIANS THE GREEN BERETS WERE FRIENDLY AND OFFERED RO’S SOME FRESH BREAD THIS IS THE ONLY FOOD AVAILABLE TO THEM ACCORDING TO ALL PRESENT THEY SHOWED RO’S THE EFFECTS OF THREE MORTARS WHICH DAMAGE D THREE HOUSES ANDJ FOUR ROUNDS WHICH IMPACTED ON THE STREET AND ANOTHER AREA A CHILDREN’S HOME WHERE THE GREEN BERETS CLAIMED THAT 40­50 ROUNDS FELL RO’S WERE ALSO SHOWN 11 NEW GRAVES IN THE SQUARE OF THE PEOPLE FROM THIS NEIGHBORHOOD KILLED IN THE FIGHTING THUS FAR THE CHIEF OF MUSLIM POLICE IN THIS NEIGHBORHOOD STRESSED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE UNttED STATES SHOULD NOT BE BRINGING FOOD TO B­H BUT SHOULD BE BRINGING WEAPONS TO HELP THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE OF THIS NEW COUNTRY 14 U ONE AMERICAN CENTER EMPLOYEE A SERB TOLD RöS ABOUTTHE SITUATION IN SAPAJEVO HE STATED THAT SERBS CONTROLLED THE HILLS SOUTH OF THE CIIY AND THE HILLS NORTHWEST OF THE CIEY ASO THE NEIGHBORHOODS SOUTH OF ZAGREBACKA­MICE SOKOLOVICA­DOBROVOUACKA STREETS WERE BLOCKADED AND CONTROLLED BY SERBS THE EMPLOYEE CLAIMED THAT MUSLIMS CONTROL THE CrIY CENTER AND THAT AT NIGHT ANYONE CAUGHT AFTER CURFEW WOULD BE 9AUGHT A LESSON AND TOLD NOT TO BREAK CURFEW AGAIN ” 16 U ADDITIONALLY THE CHIEF OF B­H PROTOCOL ALSO TOLD THE U S DEFENSE ATTACHE THAT THE B­H WANTED WEAPONS FROM THE U S MORE THAN THEY WANTED FOOD COMMENTS 1 U FIELD COMMENTS THE SITUATION IN SARAJEVO IS VERY TENSE WITH ARMED GANGS PATROLING THE CITY AT NIGHT AND THE CITY SLOWLY BEING STARVED OUT RO’S WERE CONTINUALLY TOLD THAT ONLY BREAD WAS READILY AVAILABLE WHICH APPEARS TO BE THE CASE AMERICAN CENTER EMPLOYEES DIDAPPROPRIATESOME HAM AND SALAMI FORSANDWICHES ONE DAY AND FOUND FUEL TO VEHICLES WHICH THEY OFFERED TO RENT TO RO’S 2 U SERBIAN FORCES OUTSIDE THE CI1Y HAVE REPEATEDLY TRIED TO DESTROY RADIO­TELEVISION SARAJEVOAND rtS WTRANSMISSIONTOWER OFTEN MISSING AND KILLING INNOCENtCMLIAN BYSTANDERS SERBIAN FORCES ARE ALSO PROBABLY STOPPING VIRTUAL ALL TRAFFIC INTO AND OUT OF SARAJEVO THUS PREVENTING EVACUATION OF CITY RESIDENTS AND THE RESUPPLY Of SARAJEVO WITH FOOD 3 U AS THIS SITUATION CONTINUES IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME UNTIL A MUSLIM­CROAT COALITION ARMY ATTEMPTS TO LIBERATE SARAJEVO AND DRIVE OUT THE SERBS AND THE JNA AROUND THE CAPITAL CI1V THIS LIBERATION MAY MAKE THE BATTLE FOR VUKOVAR PALE IN COMPARISON 4 U UNFORTUNATELY UNPROFOR FORCES AND cIVILIANS REMAINING IN SARAJEVO MAY BE CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE WITH NO EVACUATiON ROUTES IN THE CENTER OF B­H 0 0 0 UNCLASSIFIED 0 7952 U Dispatches from Sarajevo o April REVERSE 1992 BLANK UNCLASSIFIED 0 “ UNCLASSIFIED 29 and on the night of i8 April three mortar rounds Center in Sarajevo where the staff were located by manned roadblocks and armed gangs roamed witnessed two separate beatings on his first night September 2011 impacted just south of the American Movement within the city was obstructed freely at night One individual personally in the city U Serbian forces were in the process of cutting off Sarajevo’s contact with the outside world Except for bread food was in short supply and the city according to the report was “slowly being starved out ” Recognizing the disparity in military strength between Sarajevo residents and the besieging Serbian forces representatives of the Bosnian government pleaded for weapons instead of humanitarian aid The report warned that “as this situation continues it is only a matter of time until a Muslim­Croat coalition army attempts to liberate Sarajevo and drive out the Serbs and the Yugoslav National Army around the capital city ” Indeed 2 days after this visit fighting escalated to unprecedented levels The siege of the city lasted nearly 4 years During the siege more than 9 500 men women and children died either from the fighting or from malnutrition and 55 ooo were wounded U Historical Significance This report demonstrates the unique military intelligence value of attaché reporting on the ground At the time of the siege the United States had no trained military intelligence personnel in Sarajevo and no U S defense attaché representation in Bosnia Herzegovina As a result the duties and responsibilities with respect to Sarajevo fell to the USDAO in Belgrade While open­source reporting on the events was abundant dispatches from the USDAO staff provided an eyewitness account and expert analysis from a defense intelligence perspective that could not be obtained elsewhere Moreover reports such as these served to underline the urgency of the crisis in the Balkans and helped spur the creation of the Director of Central Intelligence Interagency Balkan Task Force consisting of DIA CIA NSA and Joint Chiefs of Staff officials in June 1992 The task force would ultimately play a huge role in U S decisionmaking regarding the Balkans This report provides an excellent example of the unique and invaluable contributions of DIA’s defense attaches DIA DA Historical Reseorth Support Branch REVERSE BLANK UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 29 September iou U The Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 U Background The terrorist attacks of ii September 2001 ushered in a period of transformation for DIA as it reorganized to support military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq forward­deployed hundreds of analysts and significantly expanded its counterterrorism mission As DIA adapted to the new requirements of the post­9 11 world the Agency continued to provide policymakers and warfighters with timely analysis of a broad range of issues relating to more traditional adversaries such as Iran and North Korea The threats and challenges of the new century however were not limited to those arising solely from the tumult of human affairs During this same period countries and regions across the globe suffered from a series of devastating natural disasters including an earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean 2004 a hurricane on the U S Gulf Coast Katrina 2005 a cyclone in Myanmar 2008 and destructive earthquakes in India 2001 Pakistan 2005 China 2008 and Haiti 2010 U The Indian Ocean tsunami 26 December 2004 ranks as one of the worst natural disasters in recorded history resulting in more than 230 000 deaths and devastating large areas of Indonesia Thailand Sri Lanka and India The toll included more than 125 000 injured 45 752 missing and about 1 69 million people displaced The catastrophe prompted a massive response from the international community On 28 December the forward command element of Combined Support Force CSF 536 arrived in Thailand to begin coordinating military assistance to U S relief efforts as part of Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE Charged with providing assistance to the governments of affected nations to minimize the loss of life and mitigate human suffering the Commander U S Pacific Command through CSF 536 conducted operations in support of other U S government agencies and in coordination with international organizations nongovernmental organizations and participating nations UNCLASSIFIED U The tsunami devastated large areas of Indonesia including Banda Aceh on the island of Sumatra The Hospital Ship USNS MERCY can be seen in the background U The DIA Effort DIA’s Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center AFMIC designated the National Center for Medical Intelligence NCMIJ in 2008 played a central role in the Agency’s response to the disaster providing warfighters and policymakers with a full A E V E A S E B L A N K UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 29 September 2011 UNCLASSIFIED U Infectious Disease Alert DI­1812­ 722­04 28 Dec 2004 PACOM U Asia Health Impacts from Indonesian Earthquake and Tsunami U Date December 2004 U Summary A 26 December earthquake reportedly the largest worldwide in the past 40 years occurred off the coast of Sumatra Island in Indonesia causing tsunamis and widespread damage in multiple Southeast Asian countries Hardest­hit areas are the southwestern coastal areas of Thailand especially Phuket Island Aceh Province in Sumatra Indonesia and coastal areas of eastern Sri Lanka and India As of December 28 an estimated 40 000 people were reported dead and many thousands were missing The total homeless population in the region is estimated in the millions U Several countries and international aid organizations have pledged aid and sent assessment teams and relief supplies Concern exists about potential aflershocks or earthquakes with resulting additional tidal waves and flooding U Assessment A natural disaster of this magnitude and wide geographic area is unprecedented in modem times the true extent of the damage in terms of lives human health and infrastructure likely will not be known for days or weeks Damage to potable water supplies and delivery systems and consumption of water contaminated by bacterial or virat pathogens are the most immediate health concerns Outbreaks of diarrhea and other waterborne diseases are likely among survivors large numbers of whom will likely congregate in relief shelters or other areas without adequate clean water and sanitation These diseases are likely to disproportionately affect the elderly and the very young U Bacterial and viral respiratory diseases likely will increase among people overcrowded in relief camps or shelters UNCLASSIFIED 7983 U Extracts from “Asia Health Impacts from Indonesian Earthquake and Tsunami” z8 December REVERSE 2004 BLANK UNCLASSIFIED U UNCLASSIFIED LI k 29 September iou ‘z spectrum of medical tntelligence products In the immediate aftermath of the event AFMIC analysts produced updated assessments of infectious disease and environmental health risks in the disaster area and evaluated the status of medical infrastructure and disaster response capabilities in the region AFMIC expanded its hours of operation to ensure responsiveness to the dynamic complex and evolving situation The Center forward­deployed analysts to support PACOM where with CONUS­based reachback support they provided round­the­ clock support to the Director for Intelligence J2 Surgeon J7 Joint Intelligence Center Pacific JICPAC and the Joint Task Force Combined Support Force JTF CSF ­536 AFMIC personnel also provided a predeployment briefing to a disaster relief team aboard the U S Navy hospital ship Mercy U  AFMIC’s Knowledge Management Team created SIPRNet and JWICS crisis pages to provide a centralized resource for medical intelligence products related to the disaster The first product posted by AEMIC U Asia Health impacts from Indonesian Earthquake and Tsunami 28 December 2004 was soon followed by more than ioo additional assessments on topics ranging from the risks posed by the thousands of corpses left in the tsunami’s wake to the chemical hazards posed by damaged infrastructure to the evaluation of potential bed down sites for deploying relief workers U Historical Significance AEMIC’s response to the 2004 tsunami in southeast Asia garnered high praise from a broad spectrum of DIA customers to include the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs the PACOM J2 the PACOM J7 U S Strategic Command and first responders It also serves to highlight the importance of relevant and timely all­source medical intelligence a mission unique to DIA and one that helps protect military and civilian personnel deploying to inhospitable or potentially dangerous environments Finally it provides an excellent example of the organizational agility responsiveness and interagency coordination required to support military operations in a complex and unpredictable world that presents today’s intelligence professionals with a challenging diverse and dynamic set of threats of both human and natural provenance DIA DA Historical Research Support Branch REVERSE BLAN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNBHASSIFIED BEN 28%