LUNG-ZOE ll ithml 5 Inspector General United States Departm ent'q Defense FFICE OF THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR - INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LONG-TERM INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CAPABILITIES II a 14 a a Additional tnformation The Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Programs prepared this report If you have questions please contact the signer of the report Suggestions for Audits and Evaluations To suggest ideas for or to request future audits and evaluations contact the Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program Assessments at 703 882-4860 DSN 381-4860 or UNCLASSIFIED fax 571 372-7451 Ideas and requests can also be mailed to Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Inspector General Intelligence and Special Program Assessments Attn Project Suggestions i 0J25 4800 Mark Center Drive Alexandria VA 22350-1 500 ‘EPtIE t Vt CEfVIEE h t’i I I XJ L To r portfrau4 wait mkmanagrnii nt and ah i of authorIty Iqctnpbki DeneHQ ThFenCago Wathiig DC 2O3O1WCO e-mi hodnedodgn Acronyms and Abbreviations Combatant Command CCMD DIAP Defense Intelligence Analysis Program DIE Defense Intelligence Enterprise MIDB Modernized Integrated Database Military Forces Analysis MFA - --i—-er I --’ S iI__’_’t i__ Cr’ l ’_ i INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE ALEXANDRIA RGIN 22350-1500 MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE Of THE UNDER SECRETARY Of DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SUBJECT Assessment of Department of Defense Long-Term Intelligcnce Analysis Capabilities Report No DODIG-201 3-112 tJ FOUO U We are providing this report for your information and use Wc considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report U DoD Directive 7650 3 requires that alt recommendations be resolved promptly The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Intelligence and Security’s comments were partially responsive We accepted thc proposed revised recommendation A 1 but still require an implementation plan for addressing the recommendation The Office of the Director Defense Intelligence Agency’s comments were also partially responsive DIA should develop and present a plan to address the Combatant Command concerns as described in recommendation 3 1 Therefore we request additional comments on recommendation A l and 8 1 as indicated in the recommendations table on page ii by September 5 2013 U If possible send your comments in electronic format Adobe Acrobat tile only to Copies of your comments must have the signature of the authorizing official for your organization We arc unable to accept the I Signed I symbol in place of the signature If sending classified comments electronically you must send them over SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network S IPRNEY’ to I oD 010 L ft ii rn ii or via Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System JWICS DoD OlD b ol DoD 010 hHol U We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff Please direct questions to mc at DoD OlD b 6 or_____________ at DoD 010 bIb 7 homas -flputv rrspectur Gcncrat for Intelligence and Special Programs Assessments This page intentionally left blank Report No DODIO-2013-1 12 Project No D2012-DINTO1-0186 L_L C_ Jlt’’ 1i August 5 2013 ‘ JFI’ U Results in Brief Assessment of DoD Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities What We Did -FQUO We evaluated multiple concerns about the perceived degradation in the capability of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise DiE to perform long-term intelligence analysis caused by a decadelong focus on counter-terrorism and counter insurgency crisis support What We Found fOUO The DIE did reallocate analytic resources to support the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other contingency type operations But any assessment about the impact of this resource realignment on the enterprise’s capability to perform long-tcnn intelligence analysis is much more complicated than just competition for anaLytic capacity FOU0 - Highlighting the common thread gleaned from our interviews is that it is not analytic capacity that is in shott supply but rather subject-matter expertise Additional mission requirements an increase in the magnitude and variety of analytic questions crisis response fatigue and customershortened time-horizons have alt stressed the DIE’s capability to produce and retain the subject-matter expertise essential to DoD needs ml ‘Q Additionally Combatant Command CCMD representatives stated that current Defense Intelligence Analysis Program DIAP processes are inadequate for addressing CCMD mission-essential task analysis requirements CUO Finally wc found that significant concerns exist within the CCMDs on thc DIE’s “foundational knowledge” databases and the current remediation efforts underway to address known shortfalls What We Recommend fI’OUO We recommend the 0USD I establish specific all-source analytic training certification and accreditation standards for the DTE with metrics calibrated toward developing subjectmatter experts based on defined defense intelligence priorities FOUO We also recommend that the Director DIA conduct a top-to-bottom review of all-sourcc intelligence analyst resources in the l ll so that analyst manpower billets are aligncd with current CCMD intclligcnce requirements 4FOUO In addition we recommend that the Director for Analysis DIA capture CCMD requirements for non-traditional intelligence that can hc addressed in the DIAP analytic production prioritization process Management Comments and Our Response U Of our three reconimendations management concurred with two and non-concurred with one Two recommendations still require action pLans br implementation SECRET NOFORN Recommendations Table Management OUSD Director DIA DIADI DIAP Board of Governors Recommendations Requiring Additional Comments A 1 No Additional Comments Required A 2 3 1 3 1 Please provide comments by September 5 2013 II I III’JI Table of Contents I I Introduction 2 2 2 Objective Background Scope and Mcthodotogy Subject Matter Expertise in the Defense Intelligence Enterprise not keeping pace with DoD intelligence requirements f U Finding A 5 The Changing National Security Environment and the Need for Subject Matter 5 Expertise 6 Conclusion Recommendations Management Comments and Our Response 7 U Finding B Defense Intelligence Analysis Program not satisfying Combatant Command intelligence requirements Defense Intelligence Analysis Program and the National tntcltigence Priority Framework Conclusion Recommendations Management Comments and Our Response 8 8 9 9 U Finding C Efforts to improve the Defense Intelligence Enterprise foundational data bases are not adequate 1 MIDB and the need for Non-Traditional Intelligence Data Analysis Conclusion 11 12 U Observation I Intelligence Support to the Acquisition Mission Area 13 U Observation Ii Intelligence Support to the Campaign Planning Mission Area 14 U Management Comments Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Inicltigencc and Security Director Dcfcnse Intdlligenec Agency 15 16 U Appendix I Previous Intelligence Analysis Reviews Lessons Learned Papers 1$ U Appendix II Terms of Reference 20 111 EC Ti ‘C P This page intentionally lc blank Introduction Throughout the course of history world events have always presented militaries with both complexity and unpredictability Today’s environment sustains this norm but adds the unprecedented speed at which events unfold and Information travels The pace of change Is accelerating There are emcrging factors at work in today’s strategic environment that we cannot ignore The sheer number of connections between people and societies has increascd expoitetitlally An ever-present global media can instantly elevate local actions to mattcrs of strategic import Technology and weapons once reserved to states can now find their way Into the hands of disaffected Individuals and disruptive groups U S Army Chief of Staff in “The Force of Tomorrow ” Foreign Policy February 4 2013 U U Since the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 the Department of Defense Tntclligcncc Enterprise DIE has supported an unprecedented number of military activities across a wide spectrum of conflicts ranging from major combat operations to muttiptc disaster relief efforts The major combat operations include • U Operation Enduring freedom covering primarily Afghanistan and otter small operations under the Global War on Terror GWOT or Overseas Contingency Operations OCO ranging from the Philippines to Djibouti • U Operation Noble Eagle providing enhanced security for U S military bases and for other Homeland Defense assets that was launched in response to the terrorist attacks and continues today • U Operation Iraqi freedom which began in the fall of 2002 with the buildup of troops for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and continued with counter-insurgency and stability operations and • U Operation Odyssey Dawn in support of international military operations in Libya to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution U The DIE has supported these military actions while also responding to the past decade’s rapidly-changing world geo-political environment and an increased demand for intelligence analysis in support of national security policies Below are just some of the major events requiring DIE action and resources • U The financial crisis that began in the United States in 2008 and rapidly spread to most of the industrialized world economies leading to deep recessions and economic turmoil in both U S allies and adversaries I iIFJrJI i • U ‘ he Arab Spring beginning in Dcccmher 2010 which has led to dictators being overthrown presidents ousted parliaments completely reorganized and civil wars raging across the Middle East and North African regions • U The January 2012 national security strategy of rcbalancing the nation’s defense focus toward the Asia-Pacific region afier more than a decade of counter-insurgency counterterrorism operations primarily in the Middle East and North Africa • U The unprecedented chatlengcs presented by the potential threat of Cyher Operations against U S interests U This summary does not exhaust all of the changes that have occurred in the national security environment since the 2I century began But it does capture the incredible complexity of the challenges that the DIE analytic force faced since then and provides a context for the resource allocation and prioritization decisIons under consideration Objective U Assess and determine the impact to the DIE’s long-term intelligence analysis capability due to the 10-plus-year focus on crisis and current intelligence support for DoD activities ‘The objective assessment was an attempt to determine the root causes behind the perceived degradation in capability and to capture from an “oppornmity cost” perspective the widely-held view within the Intelligence Community IC that over the past decade the intelligence analysis enterprise has reduced long-term analysis production Background U This assessment was initiated in response to requests recommendations from multiple CCMD staffs and was intended to complement the then-draft 2012 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Intelligence 0USD LI “Review of Defense Intelligence Analysis ” Representatives from 0USD I Defense Analysis and this office met early in 2012 to coordinate actions and focus areas in order to minimize duplication of eflbrt Scope and Methodology U We conducted this assessment from July 2012 through February 2013 Our approach to answering the exceptionally broad question our objective posed was to divide this assessment into two phases During Phase I we captured the DoD operational policy planning and intelligence organizational view of the current state of the DIE’s tong-tenn analytic capabilities In order to frame the discussion we asked each organizational representative to describe how they viewed the DIE analytic community’s support to the following DoD mission areas U Intelligence support to Acquisition 2 $ C C fl E’’ 0 C • U Intelligence support to Campaign Planning U Intelligence support to Indications and Warning • U Intelligence support to Theater Engagement • U Intelligence support to Human Terrain Knowledge Management o U Intelligence support to the Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy In our work we • U Reviewed DoD and Office of the Director of National Intelligence ODNI policy and doctrinc regarding intelligence preparation of the operational environment National Unified Intelligence Strategies Defense Intelligence Strategies Intelligence communitywide lessons-learned papers Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans and Defense Planning Guidance • U Visited all Geographic and functional Combatant Commands to interview General Officers Senior L-xecutive Service and Directors from the Operations Plans and Intelligence Directorates for their views on the cwicnt statc of intelligence analysis capabilities and their perspectives on which departmenLal mission areas warranted a more detailed rcvietv • U Visited all of the Military Service Directorate of Intelligence Staffs and the service intelligence production organizations to obtain their perspectives • f U Visited with a number of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy OUST P representatives to obtain their pcrspectives • U Visited with the staffs of both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence SSCI and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence I-IPSCI to obtain their perspectives • U Visited the National GeospatiaL-Intelligenco Agency NGA National Security Agency NSA Defense intelligence Agency DIA and the National Reconnaissance Office NRO and interviewed select personnel responsible for intelligence analytic production or supporting functionality to obtain their perspectives • U Interviewed both current and lbrmcr USD 1 leaders to obtain their perspectives • U Also intervicted a number of former high-ranking intelligence community and academic analysis experts to capture their perspectives U Mso in preparation for this project we researched a number of previous studies or publications concerning intelligence analysis A very short sampling of studies is attached as Appendix 1 3 ECTET’ ’ cr”r I iIt’ dI ‘ JFXi U This assessment process had built-in limitations Our Phase I assessment is subjective due to the stated objective to gather a wide range of opinions about the current status of long-term analytic capabilities Our interviewees offercd uniformly frank and candid comments We have not subscribed specific opinions to specific individuals However we believe that thcir common observations are worthy of record and consideration concerning current processes and procedures Also after an extensive review of DoD authorities policies and doctrine we determined that no formal definition of “long-term inteLligence analysis” exists The Intelligence and Special Program Assessment ISPA team recognized this absence of a definition and we purposely allowed the community stake-holders wide latitude to describe their concerns without imposing an artificial analytic time frame to limit their observations “In-depth analytic analysis” would be a more allencompassing description of the questions we asked U Finally it became clear during our interviews with both the DoD’s operational and intelligence communities that the DIE’s capability to supply long-term intelligence analysis for two of the department’s core mission activities required a more rigorous evaluation than envisioned in Phase I In Phase II we will simultaneously conduct a more in-depth objective assessment of the DIE’s current capability to satisfy the Acquisition and Campaign Planning community’s analysis requirements as outlined in Observations I and II of this report 4 c cncT Nororu U Finding A Subject Matter Expertise in the Defense Intelligence Enterprise not keeping pace with DoD Intelligence Requirements U The DIE is unable to satisfy all DoD long-term analytic intelligence requirements duc to a shortage of analysts with in-depth subject matter expertise for defense activities in the current geo political environment Thc Combatant Commands Service Intelligence Centers Combat Support Agencies and a host of other DIE stakeholders offered mtdtiple reasons for this situation Significant reductions in force during the late 1990s and the large number of new hires following 9 il led to a limited number of experienced analysts in the DTE to mentor and pass on their knowledge to junior analysts As a result large numbers of all-source analysts have been shi fled from crisis to crisis loaded down with new additional intelligence responsibililies and burdened with a production metric mentality without ever having the opportllnity to develop long-term detailed knowledge of a particular subject necessary For producing high-quality anticipatory intelligence The Changing National Security Environment and the Need for Subject Matter Expertise U U Almost all CCMD Directors told us that crisis support intelligence is prioritized in their area of responsibility and therefore the demand signal for longer-term all-source analytic effort has significantly decreased It should be noted that staff members at every level of the organization we intcrviewed assumed that “someone somewhere in the enterprise” was continuing to perform this type of analysis We found however that a crisis-focused operating environment consumes vast amounts of both command organic analytic capacity and large segments of the rest of the “inter agency” enterprise The enterprise intelligence production organizations confirmed this demandsignal increase and have given priority to “crisis support” to the detriment of their traditional indepth strategic military capability analysis U We were told thai because of significant reductions in force in the DIE during the late l900s and the large number of new hires following 9 li only a limited tiumber of “old hand” experienced analysts are available to mentor and pass on their hard-earned knowledge Many older generation analysts are now approaching retirement age and instead of prioritizing the longterm development of replacement subject matter experts the DIE has attempted short-term fixes such as analytic tradecraft training U In addition numerous operational policy and planning consumers told us that unlike before they themselves havc become more demanding customers of intelligence analysis Their requirements today range far beyond traditional threat capability analysis and have increased granularity or detail requirements along with significantly shortened response time demands These additional factors which required so much enterprise capacity contribute to and disrupt the analytic communities’ capability to develop subj eel-matter expertise S s_Is U We also learned from the CCMDs service intelligence centers and other DIE elements that DoD has significantly increased its demand for non-traditional military capability analysis For example the CCMDs described an increased requirement to emphasize the shaping and deterring phases of their Operation and Contingency Plans The infomiation requirements necessary for developing plans to execute shaping and deterrence activities are significantly different from traditional military capability analysis The CCMDs said this increased demand signal for nongeneral military intelligence analysis along with their traditional intelligence needs far exceeds the organizations current available manpower U The service intelligence organizations also described an environment where the demand signals for other non-general military intelligence such as socio-cultural and cyber threat analysis was constantly increasing These organizations acknowledged that the “new” missions offered critically important contributions for achieving national security objectives But they told us that adding these new missions onto their all-source analytic tvorkforce already constrained by resource and capability limitations would diminish their ability to conduct specified military intelligence tasks U Finally an increased emphasis has been made on producing rcporis as a metric for evaluating analyst performance Multiple analysts described an environment where they felt pressured to create event reports rather than longer-term forecasts This over-emphasis on product and production metrics at the expense of developing more in-depth knowledge has contributed to the overall negative perception about the DIE’s capability to support DoD requirements U Conc us ion U The DIE cannot currently satisfy the DoD long-term analytic intelligence requirements The reduced number of experienced subject matter experts and the large hiring effort post 9 il have forced tlie DIE to change its operating mechanisms In addition the current national security environment’s complexity and unpredictability a focus on short-term reporting an increase in scope and demand for more detailed understanding of world events and the substantial incrcasc in new analytic focus areas have all affected the DIE’s ability to develop new experts The DoD and DIE leaders must establish a culture of substantive knowledge development and empower line managers to create practical day-to-day mechanisms for developing all-sotirce analysts with the expertise the department requires As previous lessons-learned reports have consistently highlighted no quick-fix shortcuts exist to develop the in-depth understanding necessary for responding to current events as well as providing the maximum flexibility for shaping an uncertain future 6 CC T’ ’ DO7 U Recommendations Management Comments and Our Response U Revised Recommendation U A 1 We recommend that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 0USD 1 partnering with the Defense Intelligence Agency NA the Combatant Commands and the Services develop an All-Source Analysis certification program that leads to training developing and retaining a more experienced and robust workforce We recommend that such a program includes common core analytic skills and performance standards and an enterprise-wide all-source analysis occupational-specialty career track and development program Management Comments The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense ntclligcnce Security 0USD I S concurred with the recommendation’s intent and proposed revised language to align with the Department’s efforts to improve the alL-source analysis foundation in the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Our Response Although the 0USD l S concurred with the recommendation’s intent we consider their cominents as partially responsive We concur with the revised language proposed by 0USD 1 S but request an action plan with milestones to address creating the Alt-Source Analysis Certification Program U A 2 We recommend that the Director DIA conduct a top-to-bottom review of all DIE all-source intelligence analyst resources to ensure that apportioning of analyst manpower billets is properly aligned with current nil-source intelligence requirements A’Ianagemeitt C’oinments The Director DIA concurred with this recommendation DIA recognizes the need to maximize using scarce atialytic resources in a fiscally-constrained environment We are currently conducting an internal review of mission requirements capabilities and priorities and of how DIA alt-source analysts arc allocated to work these issues This review should be completed in about six months November 2013 Once the internal review results are received DIA in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Detènse for IntelLigence will expand the effort to iticlude combatant commands and service intelligence centers We anticipate that the reviews second phase can be finished within six months Our Response We consider that the comments from the Director DIA responded to recommendation A 2 and no additional comments are required 7 3 CCR T1’itGORN F Ec9rT’ flrf U Finding B Defense Intelligence Analysis Program not satisfying Combatant Command Intelligence Requirements 1 1 III I I Defense Intelligence Analysis Program and the National Intelligence Priority Framework f U U The DIAP establishes policies procedures responsibilities and levels of analytic effort required to provide timely objective and cogent military intelligence to all U S Government customers according to the August 201 DIAP Management Guidance The NIPF is a strategic priorities process that the Director of National Intelligence leads based on National Security Presidential Directives The Intelligence Community IC uses the NIPf to ensure that an emphasis is placed on key topics countries and non-state entities that are important to senior policymakers U CCMD J-2 1-3 and J-5 staff members expressed numerous concerns abottt the current DIE intelligence analysis production process they described situations where in their view the analytic capacity and priorities necessary to support their command requirements were not available either organically or in the greater enterprise due to current resource allocation directives A typical comment was “ D AP is too tightly coupled with NIP F” and the CCMDs were tasked or expected to analyze a broader set of “non-traditional intelligence for defense” requirements outside of the NIPf A number of interviewees told us that the NIPF was designed for the National Security Council and the National Command Authorities and was never intended to address CCMD requirements U Another common CCMD concern was that the prevailing DIAP-directed focus on supporting tactical counter-terrorism counter-insurgency and other crisis-action priorities left little enterprise S C’ t rut f- CLCET ’ NDtfl analytic capacity for the longer-term analytic efforts required for other command activities such as theater campaign planning CCMDs told us that under the current DIAl’ program the CCMDs were responsible for short-term analysts defined as the immediate moment up to six months Other DIE entities were tasked to perform analysis for beyond six months Theater OPLAN and CONPLAN intelligence requirements are primarily more long term in nature With the on-going reduction in organic command intelligence analyst manpower the staffs felt therefore that current DIAP priorities and resource allocations were out of synch with command requirements In their view not enough DIE greater enterprise capacity was allocated to work these longer-term analytic requirements U Conclusion Our assessment’s scope does not extend to addressing the appropriateness of specific NIPF priorities or any linkages between NlPf and DIAP current priorities But our interviews clearly reveal that the current DIAP resource allocation processes are addressing only some of the CCMDs’ intelligence requirements While we acknowledge that the DIAP is a “living” process extra vigilance must be maintained to ensure that the program captures and addresses both national policymaker needs and the present day additional departmental requirements levied on the CCMDs Once these additional non-traditional intelligence requirements are captured the DIE must seek to rebalance the analytic capacity and capability across the enterprise U Recommendations Management Comments and Our Response U B We recommend that the Director for Analysis D1A through the DIAP Board of Governors establish a plan with specific milestones and metrics agreed to by the CCMI s tor capturing DoD’s non-traditional intelligence requircments and incorporate them into the DIAP requirements analytic production priority proccsscs Management Comments The Director I IA noncoiicurred with our recommendation In his written comments the Director stated that the current DIAP governance model accommodates identifying and incorporating nontraditional intelligence requirements and associated metrics Each year a “DIAl’ Open Season” is conducied and during this season member organizations can raise new issues or requirements that the DIAl’ Board of Governors’ consider Carrying out approved changes to DIAl’ management guidance--including production topics responsibilities and related procedures--is coordinated during regularly scheduled analytic and production conferences which member organizations attend Our Response Comments from the l irector DIA were partially responsive We fully acknowledge that existing DIAP governance processes exist to address new issues or requirementc brought forward by the CC ’4Ds We also recognize the challenges of addressing additional intelligence analysis requirements in the current fiscal environment However our interviews with senior CCMD and other DIE stakehotders reveal their concerns about the DIE plan for actually 9 rtrn rr ’ inrnrri SECRET ’NOFCRrI addressing the nontraditional intelligence requirements not thc governance process These additional nontraditional intelligence requirements should be given priority during DIA’s internal review of mission requirements capabilities and priorities as defined by their responsc to Recommendation A 2 We request the DIA DI reconsider the recommendation and use the process already agreed upon to address analyst resource allocation We also request you provide this office a plan on your road map for apportioning analytic DILL resources to address their non traditional intelligence requirements 10 P t T1 h C r c r I I ’JI ‘ F’I U Finding C Efforts to Improve the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Foundational Data Eases are not Adequate U Efforts to improve the DIE’s foundational knowledge databases are not adequate to meet both CCMDs’ and Service Intelligence Center SIC requirements Thcse organizations are concerned that not enough DIE resources are allocated to ensure database currency and accuracy They also believe that the current emphasis on crisis-support operations has significantLy downgraded the priority of database maintenance In addition the CCMDs and the services said more resources need to be allocated for cataloging non-traditional military intelligence dnta currently being collected As a result the CCMD and service component elements lack confidence that their warfighting intelligence requirements will be satisfied when a crisis arises MIDE and the need for Non-Traditional Intelligence Data Analysis f U t’7Il I hIll 7I I 1I1 U To substantiate these concerns we interviewed the staff of the DIA’s Military forces Analysis Office MfA MFA provides foreign military forces analysis for the warfighter national security policymakers and the acquisition community and validates the order of battle data in MTDB The MFA staff confirmed that MIDB and other data-basing efforts had been negatively affected by the responsible production organizations prioritizing crisis support over database maintenance This was especially true for the lower priority countries f U Wc were also told that most of the personnel currently assigned to MfA will he moving to the new regional centers created as part of lilA’s Vision 2020 MFA was created in 2003 becausc the-then Dl regional ofliccs failed to provide timely management of MIDI3 Therefore the potential for a dilution of database maintenance effort under this new construct is of great concern U finally we were also told that MIDB’s “order of battle” focus does not support the entirety of command data basing requirements However a methodology for capturing non-traditional intelligence collection such as social media data in database form still presentcd a challenge Ibr the DIL The CCMDs’ did cite a need lhr applying a greater analytic effort across the DIE on the non-traditional intelligence data that was being collected and in an architecture that the entire community could access 11 Conclusion U Based on our interviews we concLude that the DIE is not adequately giving priority to creating and maintaining foundational databases necessary for CCMD operations It remains to be seen whether the current rerncdiation strategies will address CCMD concerns We also believe that the disestablishment of a dedicated MIDB production organization potentially dilutes the focus on database maintenance Addressing CCMD concerns about MIDI3 maintenance and other DlF “foundational knowledge” database requirements must be among the community leadership’s top priorities We will assess the status of the database remediation efforts currently underway during Phase 11 of this project 12 U Observation 1 Intelligence Support to the Acquisition Mission Area U Multiple organizations and individuals expressed concern about the significantly diminished science and technology expertise that the DIE possesses and the prioritizing of analytic efforts to support defense acquisition processes Background U As directed by DoDD 5000 01 The Defense Acquisition System DoDI 5000 2 Operation of the Defense Acquisition System CJCSI 3170 OIH Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System intelligence analysis integration is critical to DoD acquisition programs Identifying projected adversarial threat capabilities--to include scientific and technical developments that may affect a program or a capability’s design or implementation--is crucial to a successfuL devclopment process Furthermore the applicable threat information must be continually updated in response to adversarial capability advances throughout the acquisition lifc-cycle to maintain the programs technological superiority U Our interviews with CCMD Service Intelligence Centers and selected DIA offices revealed that the DIE has major shortfalls in scientific and technological expertise that is required to satisfy DoD acquisition directives Our interviewees offered subjective and anecdotal reasons for these shortfalls In addition to concerns expressed about analytic capability to support current and future acquisition efforts these same interviewees also said that prioritizing these activities fell victim to the requirement to shift resources in support of current operations Conclusion U Our assessment’s scope and methodology precluded tis from gathering objective data about shortfalls in specific acquisition intelligence analytic programs therefore we will initiate a separate assessment dedicated to this qucstion in Phase 11 of this project 13 U Observation II Intelligence Support to the Campaign Planning Mission Area U Multiple CCMDs expressed concerns that certain DIAP analytic time-frame reporting requirements were out of sync with the Joint Strategic Capability Plans and Guidance for Employment of force-mandated OPLANICONPLAN intelligence production requirements Background U The DoD Joint Planning series of directives Dob Series “Guidance for Employment ofForce GEF ” CJCSI 3110 01 Series “Joint Strategic Capabitities Plan ” CJCSM 3 122 01 Series “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System fJOPES Volume 1 Planning Policies and Procedures specify the policies procedures and formats to be used in the planning required to conduct military operations across the spectrum of conflict Our assessment interviews revealed general concerns fiom CCMD J-3 J-5 and J-2 personnel about the current DIAP management guidance for the Geographic Combatant Command GCC JIOCs Specifically these representatives detailed how the GCC flOC responsibilities for analyzing and reporting on nearterm zero to six months theater and national implications of activities and trends occurring throughout theft AOR are affecting their commands’ ability to satisfy current JSCP and GEF requirements We were unable to solicit during our interviews specific instances whcrc the DIAP guidance affected a command’s OPLAN CONPLAN development Therefore we will make no judgment at this time on the validity of these concerns “ Conclusion U Our assessment’s scope and methodology precluded us om gathering objective data about specific CCvfD OPLAN CONPLAN intelligence analytic requirements and potential shortfalls therefore we wilt initiate a separate assessment specifically dedicated to this question in Phase 11 of this project 14 SEcPET’INOFOPN UIIFOUO Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Intelligence Security UNCLASS1FEEDhrs41 11’ £li -tF L Line Jrt1T’ OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 5O DUE PDJTAGO 4 WASItINCTON DC 10501-5 10 JUN MEMORANDUM FOR iNSPECTOR GENERAL Oi THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLlQENCI AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS SUBJECT U Response to Draft Report ‘Asseasnunn of Department otflefccse LongTerm Intetligenco Anilytis Capahilfties’ Project No 020 12-DINTO 1-0186 000 UItF We are aware of the challaics ideatitled in the DaD Inspector Gcncrul 10 draft report issued an May 6 2013 and arc overseeing development of a rnuItI-rnnged approach so aching the identified shortfalls This approach includes otemoiza to training education and nicozoring is well as joint duty oppomrnltLes to grow a tork1brce that has tie requisite subjcct matter cprrthe to snort evolving requirements We ugnre with the intent of the rccomomalazion outlined In the subject draft report however we propose revised tarsijuage to align with efforts In the cpannlent to improve the alt-source analysis foundation in the Defame Intelligence Enterprise Revised Recommendation A 1 • C fQ Recommendation A I revised language We recommend that the Office at the Under Secretary of Defense tOUSD l hi partnership with the Defense Intelligence Agency DIA the Combatea Commands and the Senicea develop an All-Soiree Analysis certification program that leads to the training development and retention ofa more experienced and robust warlibree W recommend such a program include common core analytic tkiils and performance siandard an enterprise-wide all-source analysis occupadonol-apecialty career track and development program U My staff is preinering with DIA so lend dcvelopmcnt of a nationally accredited all-source analysis certification program that will ensure core aU-source analytic skills arid a earnanon body of knowledge am Identified taugltt end measured throughout the community in a consistent manner ThIs initiative will buIld better analytic copabilitice arid posture the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to meet the growing demand fer In-depth knowledge and analytic expertise to support the range of DoD missions and customers iIt1tT’WITttrvaiflOSDJS b 6 1 efenac Analysis Directorate at osu is bib A 1bWA’ ElM Higgins Deputy UnderSecretary of Defense Intelligence Security UNCLASSJFlED ifl fe C’t A I 0 15 nec’ I III lI ‘I U Director Defense Intelligence Agency DEH’sL i 1ELII’jV’ 1 ‘ LNCY WSflI rW T C JUN 11 2013 U-l3-10961CE To Mr William R Rnincy Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Intelligence Evaluations Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General 4800 Mark Cantor Drive Alexandria VA 22350-1500 Subject Comments on Draft Assessment otDcprtmcnt of Defense Long-Tcmi Intclllgcnco Cqabffldes — Reference Department of Defense Office of Inspector General A scsnnent of Department of Defense Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities Project No D20 12DINTDI-01t6 000 May 2013 1 As requested in the Refarence the Defense Intelligence Agency DIA provides the following comments regarding report recommendations k2 and 3 1 2 RecommendatIon k2 Director PEA conduct a top-to-bortom review of all Defense Intelligence Boteepsise ill-source intelligence analyst meoureca an ensure that the apportionment of analyst manpower bWets is properly aligned with current aU-source Intelligence reqraremsnta a DIA concurs with this recomjnendsdoa DIA recognizes the need to maximize the use of scarce analytic resources in a fiscally constrained environment Wc are currently conducting an intomal review ofmission requirements capabilities and priorities and of how DIA all-source analysts are aniyed against the letter This effort should be complete In about 6 months Qovember 201 3J Once the results of the internal review arc received MA In conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will expend the effort to Include combatant commands and service intelligence centers We anticipate that the second phase of review can be accomplished within 6 months 3 Re mmendation 3 1 Director for Analysis DIA through the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program DIAP Board of Governors establish a plan with specific milestones and metrics agreed to by the combatant commands for capturing the department’s nontraditional intelligence requirements end incorporate them into the DIM’ requizemeuWanalylic production priority processes a DIA rmnconcwi with this recommendation The current MAP governance model accommodates din identification and Incotporation of nontraditional Intelligence requirements end asmciated mcuics Each year a ‘tDIAP Open Season” Is conducted and during It member orgwrlzations can raise new Issues or rcqufrcmcnts for consideration by the NAP Board of Governors The implementation of approved changes to NAP management guidance—including production topics responsibilities 16 I ES tS 1 ¼ tflS and relazed proccdurcs- is coordinated during regularly scheduled ana ytic and production conferences which e attended by member organIzazioc DIA b03 10 US C 324 ontact fri this mfler i DIA b 3 10 Ii Sc 323 IC FLYNN USA t iycncraI 17 C’ r C’ fl r r r I I I fl r tm r I JI __ I_ I HflJI S JISfl U Appendix I Previous Intelligence Analysis Reviews and Lessons Learned Papers Schlesinger James R Office of Management and Budget March 10 1971 A Review of the Intelligence Community Brown Harold and Rudman Warren B March 1 1996 Preparing for the An Appraisal of U S Intelligence 21st Century Jeremiah David E ADM USN Ret CIA June 1 1998 The Jeremiah Report The Intelligence Community’s Performance on the Indian Nuclear Tests U Bodnar John W Joint Military Intelligence College DIA December 2003 Warning Analysis for the Information Age Rethinking the Intelligence Process Center for the Study of Intelligence CIA June 2004 Intelligence and Policy The Evolving Relationship Center for the Study of Intelligence CIA November 2004 Intelligence and Policy “Train Wreck The Haiti Crisis of 1993 ” DIA November 16 2004 Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned Project Draft Johnson Rob PhD Center for the Study of Intelligence CIA 2005 Analytic Culture in the U S Intelligence Community An Ethnographic Study Warner Michael and McDonald Kenneth J Center for the Study of Intelligence CIA April 2005 U S Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 1947 Gutjahr Melaine M H Joint Military Intelligence College DIA May 2005 The Intelligence Archipelago The Community’s Struggle to Reform in the Globalized Era Cooper Jeffrey R Center for the Study of Intelligence CIA December 2005 Curing Analytic Pathologies Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis Lahneman William J PhD Center for International and Security Studies University of Maryland March 10 2006 The Future of Intelligence Analysis Coffey Thomas G Center for the Study of Intelligence CIA December 2006 Intelligence and Policy Policymaker Perspectives The Clinton Years 1993-2001 McDonnell Janet A DIA October 2007 The 1998 Indian Nuclear Tests and the Jeremiah Report A Ten Year Reassessment 18 r T fl P TT” I “ rfl P 1-I tIIl’ Jidrl Coffey Thomas 0 Center for the Study of Intelligence CIA July 2011 Intelligence and Policy Policymaker Perspectives The G W Bush Years 2001-2009 McCullough Roy L PhD DIA 2012 Historical Perspectives The Evolution of Estimates Long —Range Analysis at the Defense Intelligence Agency 19 %tL_S aISL_ I fiISt lI S tI Sfl U Appendix II Terms of Reference U For the purpose of this assessment we needed to establish a common reference Ibr describing the Defense Intelligence Enterprise DIE In this case the I IE refers to those organizations within the Department of Defense having all-source intelligence analysis production responsibilities as defined in the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program CU We also adopted a subjective concept for discussing particular analytic practices within the DIE for Long-Term Analysis LTA and Non-Traditional Intelligence NTI These terms of reference are neither definitive nor recommended for adoption by the DIE but will hopefully help the reader understand thc framework we employed U Long-Term Analysis--As described by Mark Lowcnthal in “Intelligence From Secrets to Policy ” 4th ed 2009 -‘long-term intelligence deals with trends and issues that may not be an immediate concern but are important and may come to the forefront especially if they do not receive some current attention ” In our assessment we adopted a framework similar to Mr Lowenthal’s adding an “in-depth” or “long-stare” requirement necessary to make rational value judgments about any given particular intelligence problem We were reluctant to artificially dcfme LTA within a specified time-frame reference such as “greater than six months ” “three-five years ” etc which could potentially devolve into a product production metric assessment rather than a capability assessment--which was our objective U Non-Traditional Intelligence —Numerous CCMDs described a rapid increase in the number of requirements related to what they commonly referred to as NTI In this case Nil is anything other than general military intelLigence as defined in Joint Pub L02 military capabilities of foreign countries or organizations 20 FrflflT ” r’rr This page intentionally left blank 21 This page intentionally left blank 21 my 1 5 8xgmr fat