AD-A28 6 005 COMMAND CONTROL WARFARE PUTTING ANOTHER TOOL INTHE WAR-FIGHTER'S DATA BASE7 d c _ ey'-z -pp cved LT COL NORMAN B HUTCHERSON x y N 94-34791 y'v14 Research Report No AU-ARI-94-1 COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE PuttingAnother Tool in the War-Fighter'sDataBase I c I--- --- -- NORMAN B HUTCHERSON Lt Col USAF A h ur vi ' A -I ARI Command-Sponsored Research Fellow PacificAir Forces Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama 36112-6610 September 1994 D17 --1 '- 77 7 3 Disclaimer This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of defense-related concepts The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States government This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release U To Donnie Holfand PaulEichenlaiLbb andRckFranks- three dearjfiicnds that were lost along the way Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIM ER ii FOREW ORD vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi INTRODUCTION xiii N otes xvii I PRELUDE 1 Background 2 Problems in Development 5 N otes 7 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE WHAT IT IS Elements of Combat Power Components of Strategy The Strategic Mix Nr tes 11 12 14 15 16 3 COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE WHAT IT IS NOT 17 N otes 19 4 5 THE FIVE PILLARS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL W ARFARE Operations Security Military Deception Psychological Operations Electronic Warfare Physical Destruction Interrelationships Intelligence Communications Notes 21 22 23 24 25 27 27 29 31 32 COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE-AS A WAR-FIGHTER'S TOOL 35 What This Means for the Air Force War Fighter 37 N otes 39 V Chapter 6 Page CONCLUSIONS 41 Recommendations 44 Notes 45 RECOMMENDED READINGS 47 GLOSSARY 49 ACRONYM S 59 BIBLIOGRAPHY 61 illustrations Figure 1 Command and Control Warfare C2W on the Battlefield xiv 2 Shaping the C2W Battlefield xv 3 The Five Pillars of Command and Control Warfare xvi 4 2 36 AM 5 2 36 PM 6 Levels of W ar 11 7 Elements of Combat Power 13 8 The Five Pillars of Command and Control Warfare Expanded 22 9 The Command and Control Warfare Umbrella 28 10 Intelligence Support to Command and Control Warfare 30 11 The Command and Control Warfare C2W Connection 42 2 3 vi Foreword With this monograph Lt Col Norman B Hutcherson the Pacific Air Forces PACAF command-sponsored research fellow for 1993-94 opens the debate regarding command and control warfare information warfare electronic combat and the Air Force's role in these three divergent disciplines It is a timely debate that should be heard and heeded by all war fighters Without the full understanding of command and control warfare one cannot hope to develop a strategy that will give quick and decisive victory in the battle arena This well-written piece provides that understanding and if used will give the war fighter increased combat capability RONALD W IVERSON Major General USAF Director of Operations Headquarters Pacific Air Forces vU About the Author Lt Col Norman B Hutcherson Lt Col Norman B Hutcherson was born in Delano California in 1950 A fifth generation Californian he graduated from California State Polytechnic University Pomona with a bachelor's degree in history in 1973 and received a master's degree in management from Troy State University in 1982 After being commissioned through Officer Training School OTS in 1974 Colonel Hutcherson completed Undergraduate Navigator Training UNT and Electronic Warfare Officer Training EWOT prior to being assigned to serve as an EB-57 squadron electronic warfare officer EWO and plans officer in the 17th Defense Systems Evaluation Squadron at Malmstrom Air Force Base AFB Montana From 1979 to 1982 following transition into the F-111 he served as an F-111E weapons systems officer squadron electronic warfare officer and wing base strike planner in the 55th Tactical Fighter Squadron 20th Tactical Fighter Wing RAF Upper Heyford United Kingdom From 1982 to 1985 he served at Headquarters USAFE Ramstein Air Base Germany as the electronic combat staff officer responsible for the establishment of the trinational Polygone electronic warfare training facility along the French-German border planned and implemented upgrades to the Spadeadam electronic training range along the English-Scottish border wrote the initial briefing that resulted in the establishment of the Warrior Preparation Center and served as a NATO Tac Eval operations evaluator under whose auspices he flew in numerous US and allied aircraft including the F-15 F-16 F-4E F-4F F-104 Drakken and T-17 Canberra Designated a distinguished graduate in both his F-1i1A requalification and EF-111A transition training Colonel Hutcherson served from 1985 to 1988 as a flight commander squadron division chief EF-111A instructor electronic warfare officer special mission planner and deployment commander in the 390th Electronic Combat Squadron at Mountain Home AFB Idaho From 1988 to 1991 Colonel Hutcherson served as a Joint Staff liaison officer to US European Command USEUCOM where he was responsible for ensuring effective electronic warfare EW and command and control warfare C2W support to USEUCOM and its associated subordinates During this assignment he facilitated the provision of EW and C2W analysis support to both US and allied units during both exercises and in preparation for combat operations served on seven evaluation teams looking at the employment of EW and C2W in joint and combined operations and facilitated the development of the Joint ixc Electronic Combat Electronic Warfare Simulation JECEWSI model which is used to replicate the effects of EW and C2W operations in numerous US and allied war-gaming centers worldwide In December 1990 Colonel Hutcherson was selected to provide EW and C2W analysis support during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm to Joint Task Force Proven Force at Incirlik Air Base Turkey Following the war from 1991 to 1993 he served as chief of the Electronic Combat Division at Hickam AFB Hawaii From August 1993 to June 1994 Colonel Hutcherson attended Air War College in residence while researching and writing this monograph Colonel Hutcherson and his wife Diane presently reside in Montgomery Alabama where he is serving on the faculty of the Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course and she is teaching in a local elementary school x Acknowledgments The research and writing involved in this study would not have been possible without the support encouragement expertise and patience of many people Along the road I have had the opportunity to serve with and for a number of great mentors including Adm Leighton W Smith USN Gen Frederick M Franks USA Lt Gen James L Jamerson USAF Maj Gen Ronald W Iverson USAF Maj Gen Anthony C Zinni USMC Maj Gen Charles E Wilhelm USMC Brig Gen Steven R Polk USAF Col Bob Osterloh USAF Col Sid Dodd USAF Mr Bill Swart JEWC DT and Mr Ray Bradbury the science fiction writer Each in their own way shaped my perspective regarding what a war fighter is and especially Mr Bradbury challenged me to discover what the one thing is that I truly wanted to be a war fighter and to be as good as I can possibly be at it For this I am eternally grateful At Headquarters PACAF I owe a special thanks to Maj Gen Ronald W Iverson and Col Bubba Lewis who sponsored me in this program It was their faith in me and their desire to make command and control warfare a viable war-fighter's tool that made the study possible At Air University Col Jim Roper Capt George Moore USN and Dr George Stein of the Air War College faculty and the men and women of the Air War College class of 1994 were extremely helpful in providing access to the rapidly growing amount of information being discussed and debated regarding information warfare and the military's role in this emerging strategy Within the Airpower Research Institute Dr Jim Titus my research adviser helped sharpen my thinking and find the right words to express my ideas Emily Adams my editor deserves a special thanks for her tireless efforts in improving the readabihity and accuracy of this report Col Robert M Johnston Lt Col Orv Lind and Maj Mike Peterson provided invaluable assistance by creating an environment in which frustrations could be vented and the creative process encouraged Finally I wish to thank my wife Diane and our family for their support and patience during yet another year away from home NORMAN B HUTCHERSON Lt Col USAF Research Fellow Airpower Research Institute xi Introduction In orderto win victory we must try our best to seal the eyes and the ears of the enemy making him blind and deaf and to create confusion in the minds of the enemy commanders driving them insane -Mao Tse-Tung On the ProtractedWar 1938 Command and control warfare C2W is the military strategy that implements information warfare IW on the battlefield 1 Its objective is to attack the command and control C2 decision-making capabilities of an adversary while protecting friendly C2 C2W's focus is as Mao so aptly noted sealing the eyes and ears of the enemy commander It does this by disrupting and dominating the flow of information between the enemy's combat forces and their associated decision-making command elements Ideally through information dominance friendly commanders will be able to work inside the enemy commander's decision-making cycle forcing him to be reactive and thus cede the 2 initiative and advantage to friendly forces In any conflict from large scale transregional to small scale localized counterinsurgency a joint or coalition team drawn together from the capabilities of each service and orchestrated by the joint force or theater-level commander will execute the responses of the United States armed forces Units should perform their specific roles in accordance with the doctrine and policies provided in joint publications The training and execution of a unit's response and a commander's C2W actions should be based on doctrine policies and terminology provided in joint publications By looking at basic documents such as Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations 9 September 1993 and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CJCS Memorandum of Policy MOP 30 Command and Control Warfare 8 March 1993 the reader can establish a base upon which to discuss and understand the various concepts ideas and strategies associated with command and control warfare including command and its associated interlinking with command and control Command is the authority and responsibility for planning organizing directing coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions 3 The commander uses an associated command and control system consisting of facilities equipment communications devices procedures and personnel to plan direct and control assigned missions and taskings 4 This ability to command and control gives commanders and their forces flexibility and maneuverability on the battlefield With this relationship between command and control established the reader can next look at C2W C2W involves the integrated use of operations security OPSEC military deception psychological operations PSYOP electronic warfare EW and physical destruction C2W focuses on attacking the mind and decision-making capabilities of an adversary commander while seeking to protect friendly command and control 5 In theory this integrated attack across the full spectrum of conflict from competitive peace to general war has the potential to deliver a decisive blow even before actual armed conflict breaks out 6 This capability to have xui a decisive impact at the strategic level of war makes C2W and its integrated approach so revolutionary fig 1 C2W OPTIONS SOFT KILL OPERATIONS SECURITY OPSEC I HARD KILL IGNORE EXPLOIT PSYOP MILITA DECEPTIL ELECTRONIC WARFARE EW PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION Ole V C2W is a strategy for determining how to attack the decision-making C2 capabilities ot an adversary while protecting the decision-making capabilities of friendly forces At the heart of the stategy is a targeting process whereby appropriate targets vulnerabilities are determined and a decision is made regarding which targets threats should be ignored exploited soft killed or if necessary hard killed ENM FRIENDY yMM D SCOMMAND AND CONTROLy R STRATEGIC LEVEL OF WAR OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR TACTICAL LEVEL OF WAR I Figure 1 Command and Control Warfare C2W on the Battlefield The offensive arm of command and control warfare is counter command and control counter-C2 Its objective is to decapitate the C2 of an adversary force by separating the commander from his associated combat forces 7 The defensive arm of C2W is command and control protection C2-protection Its purpose is to maintain effective C2 of friendly forces by negating or turning to advantage the counter-C2 efforts of an adversary 8 While the value and impact of employing counter-C2 has been long recognized and was a vital consideration during the Persian Gulf War the defensive arm of C2W C2-protection is usually underemphasized by the United States armed forces If properly integrated C2-protection shows great promise for directly enhancing the command and control capabilities of the field commander fig 2 xiv COMMAND AND CONTROL PROTECTION C2-PROTECTION DEFENSIVE COUNTER COMMAND AND CONTROL COUNTER-C2 OFFENSIVE Command and control warfare C2W' is a balancedstrategy of offense and defense At the heart of any offensive action must be firm defensive support The purpose of C2-protection is to maintain effective command and control C2 of friendly forces by establishing C2 superiority information dominance in the contested battle space C2 superiority is like air superiority It has both offensive and defensive components Means used to establish this dominance include encryption jam resistance redundancy decoys reconstitution plans counter-C2 attacks and screen jamming By encrypting you protect the data flowing through the system By incorporating jam resistance and redundancy you protect the means by which the data is communicated Through decoys and reconstitution you complicate the counter-C2 targeting plans of your adversary Through counter-C2 attacks you lessen the adversary's ability to effectively command and control his forces Through screen jamming you protect the medium by which critical C2 decisions are conveyed the tocus ot these actions should be to negate or turn to friendly advantage any adversary efforts to deny information to influence degrade or destroy the friendly C2 system Commanders must be able to understand their vulnerabilities assess the risks and execute a protection plan that ensures C2 superiority or information dominance Figure 2 Shaping the C2W Battlefield A key reason for the great impact that C2W has on the bsattlefield is that its focus on attacking and disrupting the command and control capabilities of an adversary while protecting the C2 capabilities of friendly forces is applicable at each level of war and across the operational continuum 9 Each of its key pillars-operations security military deception psychological operations electronic warfare and physical destruction-can be applied to any contingency or major conflict situation fig 3 Many aspects of these C2W tools can be applied either individually or collectively at the strategic operational and tactical levels of conflict or war By their incorporation and application as a strategy they allow the commander to shape his forces and capabilities to meet the enemy in combat under advantageous conditions ' 0 This ability to meet the enemy under advantageous conditions is the essence of strategy and explains why incorporation of command and control warfare concepts and ideas into a nation's military strategy has taken on such an important aspect In the next few pages this study considers why C2W is important to the United States armed forces both as a capability and as an overarching strategy for employment of C2W capabilities both on and off the battlefield First the study describes the background and development efforts that resulted in the strategic capability the United States armed forces today calls command and control warfare Second the study explains what C2W is and is not and the five pillars-operations security military deception psychological operations electronic warfare and physical destruction-that C2W is based upon Next the study determines how to use xv this unique war-fighter's tool at each level of war and the role that each war fighter plays Finally the study addresses the question Has the United States Air Force translated the concept of C2W as depicted in relevant joint and service publications into doctrine training and education programs equipment intelligence and communications infrastructure and command appreciation for the strategic implications of this function COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE C2W COMMAND AND CONTROL PROTECTION C2-PROTECTION COUNTER COMMAND AND CONTROL COUNTER-C2 _ OPERATIONS SECURITY OPSEC PROTECT FRIENDLY COMMAND AND CONTROL C2 ' FOCUS ON THE OF THE IND COMMANDER ELETROAGNTICENEMY E HEM INA WARFRE EW SPECTRUM TARGETING PRIORITY ELE TR NICDO P R i IGNOREIEXPLOIT IF POSSIBLE SOFTKILL IFABLE HARD KILL DESTROY ONLYIFNECESSARY DISRUPT ENEMY 'PSYCHOLOGICAL DECISION-MAKI OPERATIONS PSYOP SMILITARYDIRPENM DECEPTION _oPHYSICAL DESTRUCTION DECISION-MAKING AIK yyIBR11E LTHINGS oLEP Figure 3 The Five Pillars of Command and Control Warfare xut Note 1 Maj James G Lee Air Force Space Command XPXS in his 10 March 1994 presentation at the USAF Air and Space Doctrine Symposium defined information warfare as Actions taken to create an informatton gap in which we possess a superior understanding of a potential adversary's political economic military and social cultural strengths vulnerabilities and interdependencies the t our adversary possesses on friendly sources of national power The key difference between IW and C2W is that IW is a national strategy that employs all the tools of national power to create a competitive advantage at the national strategic level On the other hand C2W is the military strategy that seeks to establish an information advantage by focusing on the C2 decision-making capabilities of both friendly and adversary forces at the tactical operational and strategic levels of war 2 Andrew F Krepinevich The Military Technical Revolution a PreliminaryAssessment Washington D C OSD Office of Net Assessment July 1992 22 defines information dominance as a superior relative understanding of a potential adversary's military political social and economic structures Another interesting concept that US military planners should be aware of is the warning provided by William J Martin in The Information Society London Aslib 1988 58 noting that along the continuum of susceptibility the more a society relies on technology the more vulnerable it is 3 Joint Publication Pub 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionaryof Military and Associated Terms 1 December 1989 77 4 Ibid 5 Joint Pub 3-53 Doctrine for Joint PsychologicalOperations 30 July 1993 GL-4 The five pillars of C2W introduced in this paragraph should not be considered the final fixed composition of the strategy called command and control warfare These pillars should be viewed as a quiver of arrows that the war fighter has at his disposal As new techniques or capabilities are made practical the war fighter should be able to just add another arrow to his quiver 6 Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrinefor Joint Operations 9 September 1993 111-41 7 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff MOP 30 Command and Control Warfare 1st revision 8 March 1993 2 8 Ibid 9 Joint Pub 3-53 GL-4 10 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary Springfield Mass Merriam-Webster Inc 1984 1165 defines strategy as 1a 1 the science and art of employing the political economic psychological and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war 2 the science and art of military command exercised to meet the enemy in combat under advantageous conditions xvii Chapter I Prelude It is repeated ad nauseam that in consequence of the vastly improved means of transmitting information surprise on a large scale is no longer to be feared It should be remembered however that the means of concentrating troops and ships and airplanes are far speedier than of old that false information can be far more readily distributed and also that if there is one thing more certain than another it is that the great strategist surprise being still the most deadly of all weapons will devote the whole of his intellect to the problem of bringing it about -Col G F R Henderson War Encyclopedia Britannica 1902 At 2 36 A M two helicopters launched four air-to-surface missiles at a key early warning site located in the southeastern air defense sector fig 4 Five technicians were killed four injured and three additional personnel are missing The radar and communications equipment located at the site were effectively destroyed and the interface boxes connecting the site's radar to the nation's command and control network are missing Given the extent of the destruction and the loss of technically trained personnel the Defense Ministry estimates that it will take up to six months to reestablish an effective replacement capability in that portion of the nation In the subsequent 12 hours since the initial attack the nation has suffered 135 additional attacks on various targets including the national telephone exchange various air defense early warning and threat acquisition sites critical communications nodes airfields command and control facilities naval and port facilities electrical power generating facilities and ground forces arrayed along the nation's southern border fig 5 At this time the nation's capital is said to be without utilities food and fuel There is no capability for observing or reporting enemy actions in the southern portion of the nation's airspace nor without resorting to personal messengers a capability to command and control air and land forces in the southern portion of the country 1 Fact or fantasy Fallacy or truth This sort of highly effective attack on an isolated early warning site and integrated application of the tools of command and control warfare during the 1991 Gulf War made national policymakers and war fighters around the world aware that the strategy of 2 C2W had arrived 1 N TARGETING PRIORITIES IGNORE EXPLOIT IF POSSIBLE IF ABLE oSOFT KILL E IN HARD KILL DESTROY ONLY IF NECESSARY S 7 D Legend O Regional 02 center - A 0 - 02 communications linksASTR Critical 02 sensor nodes Strike location Route of air attack 2 36 A M two helicopters launch four air-to-surface missiles at a key early warning site located in the southeastern air defense sector C Direction of surface combatant movement Figure 4 2 36 A M Background Although the subject is not new the concept of command and control warfare achieved prominence within the United States armed forces during the mid to late 1970s At that time various pockets of advocacy began to form and official concern in C2W became codified in August 1979 by Department of Defense DOD Directive 4600 4 Command Control and Communications Countermeasures k3CM 27 August 1979 This directive which was the first step in detailing our armed forces' interest in 02W defines what was then called as the integrated m3CM use of OPSEC military deception jamming and physical destruction to influence degrade or destroy enemy command control and communications 03 2 N TARGETING PRIORITIES IGNOREiEXPLOIT IF POSSIBLE E SOFT KILL IF ABLE HARD KILL DESTROY ONLY IF NECESSARY Legend Nation's capitol 0 - -m Regional C2 center C2 communications links ACritical SRSULTS C2 sensor nodes Stnke location ' Route of air attack NATIONAL J AUTHORITY EFFECTIVELY BLINDED SoNATION'S C2 SYSTEM PARALYZED C Direction of surface combatant movement Figure 5 2 36 P M while protecting friendly C3 from similar actions 3 This directive outlines the responsibilities of the services and various DOD agencies in support of C2W It provides an excellent general set of guidelines as to what C2W is what it' objectives are and policy guidance for the pursuit of those objectives DOD Directive 4600 4 in turn gave rise in 1983 to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CJCS Memorandum of Policy MOP 185 Command Control and CommunicationsCountermeasures which sought to expand on the subject by providing policy guidance for the pursuit of C2W objectives in joint operations and training MOP 185 phrased the goals of C3CM as being to deny enemy commanders effective command and control of their forces and to maintain 4 effective command and control of United States and allied forces 3 Although MOP 185 used the term C3CM its objective was to affect the enemy's command and control of his forces while protecting friendly forces Apparently the JCS added the third C communications in the acronym C3CM to reflect the necessity for effective communications as an adjunct to command and control However this change in terminology does not reflect an intention to displace the real objective of denying command and control to the enemy commander with the more superficial objective of communications countermeasures The communications network of any command and control system is generally vulnerable and accessible but it is the C2 decision system that commanders should attack not just its communications infrastructure During the buildup to Operation Desert Storm the United States and its coalition allies were able for the first time to bring together the four classic elements of C2W--operations security military deception electronic warfare and physical destruction-into a single integrated C2W game plan In a major change from previous doctrine Gen H Norman Schwarzkopf added the strategy of attacking the entire Iraqi information system including the human element through the fifth pillar of C2W-psychological operations 5 Because of its effectiveness during Desert Storm command and control warfare with its more offensive outlook has become a central element in the theater commander's planning and has fostered fear and consternation among potential 6 adversaries worldwide Desert Storm was a textbook application of the C2W strategy It included military deception-the phantom Marine amphibious landing which kept Iraqi coastal defense units in place operations security to mask the westward movement of the coalition ground forces physical destruction of the Iraqi command and control system and associated air defense network psychological operations that included leaflet drops urging Iraqi ground forces to give up and surrender and electronic warfare that included intensive electronic jamming of critical communications and noncommunications nodes 7 in the Iraqi defense system This integrated approach to attacking Iraqi communications and noncommunications nodes is important because by denying deceiving disrupting or destroying the communications nodes land wires telegraph and radio communications of the Iraqis coalition forces were able to effectively deny them their ears Likewise by denying deceiving disrupting or destroying their noncommunications nodes radars intelligence collection assets and identification friend or foe 1FF equipment the coalition was able to deny the Iraqis free and effective use of their eyes Thus effectively deaf and blind the Iraqis were unable to respond in an effective and efficient manner to friendly actions The key to the coalition's success during Desert Storm was the real-time 8 coordination of the various C2W actions performed by the coaliation nations This integrated approach was a big change from the use of C2W capabilities in previous conflicts In the Falklands War neither the British nor Argentineans chose to employ the tools of C2W in an integrated fashion Although the British had portions of the C2W tools necessary to prosecute such a strategy 4 they had neither the doctrine nor inclination to make it work Argentina on the other hand was resource limited both in doctrine and assets and would 9 have been hard pressed to develop and employ such a strategy Desert Storm proved the relevance and effectiveness of C2W to war-fighting commanders and squadron aircrews alike Since then the United States has integrated the lessons 'learned during Desert Storm into revised joint doctrine policy and education and made the focus of both C2W and electronic warfare more offensive 10 This change in focus gave rise to the new namecommand and control warfare-and a new revised series of joint and servicespecific regulations and publications including CJCS MOP 30 Command and Control Warfare 8 March 1993 and DOD Directive 3222 4 Electronic Warfare and Command Control and Communications Countermeasures 31 July 1992 that incorporate the many C2W lessons learned or reexperienced during Operations Desert Shield Desert Storm As a result theater commanders are now active in the application of C2W and C2W has become a central element in preparation for conflicts both big and small 11 Problems in Development As a result of DOD Directive 3222 4 and MOP 30 the commands applied more effort to attack the problems involved in performing C2W Individual efforts grew in many diverse Air Force units among several commands As might be expected the subject was open to varying interpretation by those in the many disciplines to which C2W has meaning and application The resulting situation was similar to the cartoon showing many different caricatures of a rope swing in a tree Each successive drawing depicts the swing as seen first by the designer then the engineer then the installer then the user and so on Each view of the same swing is markedly different depending on who is looking at it and from what standpoint And so it has been with C2W It is viewed variously as communications jamming electronic warfare military deception or intelligence exploitation-depending on who is discussing it and his frame of reference The current state of C2W development poses three related problems First a majority of C2W efforts to date have focused on the technical details of such obvious tasks as intelligence support to the war fighter and electronic warfare Such preoccupation has paid off well but these areas need more work With all our attention focused on technical details we have sometimes failed to see the big picture-C2W's strategic context The primary focus of C2W is and should remain to deny deceive defeat or if necessary destroy the enemy's capability to command and control his forces effectively while protecting friendly command and control This focus involves a thinking process by which an overarching strategy and related tactics are applied to an evolving situation While these enabling technologies and techniques can have an impact on how the C2W strategy is applied 5 it is still the thinking person in the loop that makes this capability so devastating on the battlefield 12 A second problem is that various groups working on different technical capabilities have adopted C2W as their own mission in life Each group or discipline feels that they own C2W and that they are therefore its spokesperson Command and control warfare has tended to become too narrowly defined according to these specialized views and again the big picture has often been lost One example of this problem is the development of the EC-130H Compass Call to perform communications jamming the EF- 111A Raven to perform noncommunications jamming and the F-4G Wild Weasel to suppress enemy threat systems by threatening to hard kill target their associated acquisition sensors using antiradiation missiles ARM Taken separately each of these high-value assets performs critical tasks that rarely can be performed by the assets they support Taken together they become a complementary team as was amply demonstrated in the now defunct 65th Air Division-sponsored regular training missions RTM in Europe and their actual employment in support of combat operations during Desert Storm 13 Last but certainly not least indiscriminate use of the terms C2W or C3CM has led to confusion and misinformation at almost every level C2W has become a buzzword and therefore is often meaningless As a result we have C2W assets C2W systems C2W procedures C2W units and C2W everything else This seemingly innocent misuse of the C2W label has been detrimental to development of productive C2W thought in the United States military In the Air Force both the EC-130H Compass Call and the F-4G Wild Weasel have been described as C2W assets While both of these platforms can be used to conduct missions related to the overall goals and objectives of a C2W strategy they are by no means capable of performing all the various tasks and responsibilities associated with the planning and execution of a strategic operational or even tactical level C2W strategy Compass Call for the most part is an airborne communications jammer focused on disrupting the air-to-air and air-to-ground communications employed by enemy airborne interceptors The F-4G on the other hand employs ARMs and a specialized collection capability to suppress the radar-directed surface-to-air threats located in a given region or locality In neither case can either asset execute a fully coordinated comprehensive C2W strategy C2W is not asset dependent It is not just a strategy that integrates the employment of its associated tools Being more an art than a science C2W can be equated to the postdoctoral level of war In planning and execution C2W offers the decision maker four distinct options-hard kill soft kill exploit or ignore C2W can have an impact at the strategic operational and tactical levels of war and in some cases even be decisive before the initial hard-kill weapon is delivered In view of the specialized technical pockets of expertise the bandwagon appeal of the subject and the indiscriminate and sometime improper use of 6 terms C2W is presently a very confusing and hazy subject to the majority of the Air Force In the operations community C2W as an employable strategy does not presently exist Several of the tools associated with C2W-such as electronic warfare and physical destruction-are encompassed in the nonstandard Air Force-specific term electronic combat EC This term which is described as an enabling capability in Air Force Manual AFM 1-1 Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force should be considered counterproductive for two reasons First by using nonstandard concepts and terminology members of the Air Force are often unable to effectively communicate what specific EC assets like the RF-4C EF-111 F-4G RC-135 or U-2 can offer to the joint war fighter Second by focusing on EC as an enabling capability vice C2W as a strategy the Air Force war fighter tends to focus on platforms and their impact at the tactical level instead of discerning how a similar capability employed with strategic adeptness can impact the decision-making capabilities of the enemy force In the Air Force intelligence community a similar dichotomy exists when available assets are focused on information warfare IW --a highly classified national policy level strategy-at the expense of C2W and its associated benefits at the operational and tactical levels of war While some efforts at IW may be complementary to the C2W strategy focusing efforts at the national strategic level as any information warfare effort normally would may lead Air Force intelligence to fail to support effectively the C2W needs of operational and unit level commanders To ensure these lower echelon needs are addressed the Air Force needs a coherent coordinated policy for C2W that can help its war fighters to understand what C2W is and conversely what it is not Moreover that framework should effectively integrate all appropriate disciplines and show the contribution of each Notes 1 Joseph P Engelhardt Desert Shield and Desert Storm A Chronologyand Troop List for the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis Carlisle Pa US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute 25 March 1991 50-53 2 Brigadier V K Nair War in the Gulf Lessons for the Third World New Delhi India Lancer International 1991 Barely six months after the conclusion of the Gulf War Brigadier Nair published this informative piece noting that India as an emerging regional and world power should consider and learn from Iraq's Gulf War experiences Mary C FitzGerald The Soviet Image of Future War 'Through the Prism of the Persian Gulf Washington D C Hudson Institute May 1991 discusses Russian views regarding the long-term lessons that can be learned from the Persian Gulf War and proposes actions that would allow the Soviets to prepare for future combat Similar articles and books on the same subject have been published in Iran France Brazil Australia and South Africa 3 DOD Directive 4600 4 Command Control and Communications Countermeasures 27 August 1979 enclosure 4 CJCS MOP 185 Command Control and Communications Countermeasures 20 December 1983 5 7 5 Jim Gray Turning Lessons Learned into Policy Journal of Electronic Defense 16 October 1993 88 6 Brigadier Nair's book see note 2 was one of many books and articles that noted the impact that the coalition's C2W effort had on the Iraqi ability to effectively command and control their units In some cases such as in Brigadier Nair's book they offer specific recommendations regarding how their nation can prepare to counter the displayed US C2W capabilities in a future crisis or conflict 7 Gray 92 A noncommunications device is one such as radar and IFF systems that is employed for purposes other than the receipt or transmission of communications signals 8 Ibid A key factor in the allied C2W effort during the Persian Gulf War was the integrated air campaign that kept Iraqi airborne reconnaissance assets on the ground thus permitting the end run shift of forces prior to execution of the ground campaign As a consequence Iraqi commanders did not know the direction or timing of the allied attack until well after it had commenced 9 Anthony H Cordesman and Abraham R Wagner The Lessons of Modern War vol 3 The Afghan and Falklands Conflicts and the Conclusions of the Study Boulder Colo Westview Press 1990 280-82 10 Memorandum Paul E Funk subject J3 Electronic Warfare Command Control and Communications Countermeasures EW C3CM Conference 25 March 1992 At the conference held in San Antonio Texas 3-5 March 1992 the J3s of the various combatant and support commands reviewed the C3CM lessons learned from Desert Storm and set about to better define its role in war Some of the key issues discussed at the conference included changing the name of C3CM to C2W recognizing that C2W is a strategy not just an enabling capability or function agreeing that the five tools of C2W included OPSEC military deception PSYOP EW and physical destruction and noting that timely and effective intelligence was critical to the success of the strategy Subsequent semiannual J3 meetings have monitored the implementation of C2W in the field A key point to recognize is that in the transition from C3CM to C2W primary responsibility for its consideration and employment transitioned from being the sole responsibility of stovepiped C3CM planning experts to being a command responsibility With space and electronic warfare SEW the Navy solved this problem by appointing a C2W commander who was responsible for all activities associated with the planning and employment of C2W by a fleet or supported joint task force 11 The series of J3 meetings called to better define the role of C2W in war are in response to a perceived need to better define C2W and equip today's leaders to meet tomorrow's challenges Unfortunately it is the service control of assets and resources that makes it difficult to make C2W a realistic reliable strategy that can be employed by today's war fighter to meet emerging challenges 12 The Air Force as an organization has long sought to take the person out of the loop by automating functions or concepts associated with a given position Examples of this focus include the use of numerical control to take people out of the loop in nuclear C2 systems the reliance on automated decision aids to perform intelligence or flight navigation functions and the reduction of administrative personnel in units and command elements worldwide This desire to take the person out of the loop in a combat or crisis situation can be dangerous After all it is the well-trained highly experienced professional who retains the best most flexible capability to work his perceptions through the fog of war and develop an unpredictable response that in most cases will result in something approaching the desired result The key for supervisors is not to dictate the solution to a given situation but instead to provide their subordinates with the training and opportunity to develop the tools that will allow them to develop the proper response in a challenging situation 13 As stovepiped entities the F-4G EF-111 and EC-130H Compass Call communities protected their piece of the fight Compass Call was designed for communications jamming the EF-111 was designed for noncommunications jamming and the Wild Weasel was concerned with the hard-kill attributes of the AGM-88 missile Each community felt that they were in competition with the other two sides for the same dwindling resources The 8 65th Air Division gave these competing stovepipes an opportunity to train together and employ together as a team By Desert Storm the EF-111 Compass Call and F-4G Wild Weasel had through the 65th Air Division-sponsored RTMs broken down their parochialism and became an exercise weary well-integrated war-fighting team 9 Chapter 2 Command and Control Warfare What It Is It is difficult to know yourself if you do not know others -Myarnoto Mushaski A Book of Five Rings Wars are conceived at the strategic level campaigns directed at the operational level and battles fought at the tactical level fig 6 In any conflict the key to victory is a clear view of what is occurring at all three levels of conflict and a firm hand effectively communicating from the highest national command authority to the lowest wrench turner or shooter the purpose of planning and executing a given task The purpose of any mission should be reaching the nation's strategic goals with the lowest possible cost in loss of life and resources For commanders at all levels each day opens with a new set of challenges and often a radically altered situation Commanders must not dwell on yesterday's gains or losses Instead they must focus on the task at hand and with the long-range finesse of a chess grand master put the opponent on the defensive One way to do this is to incorporate and employ the strategy of command and control warfare LEVELS OF WAR FUNCTIONS AND TASKS SPAN OF RESPONSIBILITY Establish objectives Sequence initiatives Define limits and assess risks Develop global theater plan Provide resources Strategic National or Multinational Entire War Effort Operational Campaign Planning Theater or Area of Operation Tactical Employment of units in combat Battles and Engagements Units or Task Forces Establish operational objectives Link tactics to strategic objectives Sequence events initiate actions and apply resources Provide logistical and administrative support to tactical units Provide means to exploit successes respond to disasters Accomplish assigned objectives tasks Responsible for the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements to achieve combat objectives Figure 6 Levels of War 11 A model of employment of C2W on the battlefield provides a useful framework for understanding the role of C2W and why it is so important A familiar and easily defined pattern is the theater air-land-sea battle because it provides an action area large enough to encompass the full range of combat power yet not so large that forces must consider such strategic factors as the enemy's national will or high-level political activity This study limits its view to a scenario wherein theater air land and sea forces engage an enemy capable of projecting a set of offensive and defensive capabilities into any of the regions of the world containing United States national interests Arguably various regional powers such as Brazil or Argentina in South America India or Pakistan in South Asia China or Japan in East Asia Iran or Iraq in the Middle East and France Germany Russia or the Ukraine in Europe could mount such a capability Elements of Combat Power There are three basic elements of combat power forces in contact forces in reserve and command and control fig 7 Arrayed along the forward edge of the battle area are those forces both friendly and enemy that are directly engaged in battle In the traditional sense this is what war is all aboutseparate and sporadic engagements which pit individual versus individual weapon versus weapon system versus system unit versus unit army versus army and nation versus nation The purpose of the integrated employment of C2W and maneuver warfare is to lessen the effectiveness of the enemy's forces while enhancing the effectiveness of friendly forces The commanders' ability to apply their reserve and replenishment forces supplies and equipment at the opportune point in time and space can make an enormous impact in determining if they are to win a battle or gain a political or military objective While these second and third echelon forces may not be in the traditiomal contact zone they represent a capability that can be engaged and depleted by long-range strike assets-Army tactical missile systems ATACMS F-111 interdiction aircraft and Tomahawk cruise missiles This extension of the modern battlefield makes commar d and control warfare a viable strategy for national theater and unit-level commanders The third and most flexible element of combat power is the command and control backbone that ties the forces in contact to the forces in reserve Defined as the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned or attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission the command and control capability gives deployed forces the elasticity and maneuverability necessary to survive and successfully engage on the modem battlefield ' At any level of war from the strategic to the tactical forces required to fulfill the national political and military objectives can be subdivided into the three elements of combat power listed above At the national strategic level 12 For purposes of this study the three elements of combat power are defined as forces In contact forces in reserve and command and control C2 Forces in contact are those forces actively engaged in combat Forces in reserve are those that can at the direction of a commander bring force to bear The heart of the construct is command and control-the system by which commanders at the strategic operational and tactical levels of war manage available assets to ensure that available lives and assets are not wasted or opportunities lost In some ways C2 is analogous to air power or naval power Rather than happening in air space or sea it happens in the virtual domain of information FRIENDLY COMMAND AND CONTROL FORCES IN RESERVE FRIENDLY ENEMY COMMAND AND CONTROL FORCES IN RESERVE ENEMY STRATEGIC LEVEL OF WAR OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR TACTICAL LEVEL OF WAR Figure 7 Elements of Combat Power 13 C2W seeks to cause an enemy leader to change his mind surrender or accept conditions as they are At the theater operational level the commander translates the national strategic direction into theaiter-specific objectives and goals for each subordinate unit When developing unit-focused goals and objectives the theater- and unit-level commanders should consider their present alert status deployment and condition of both enemy and friendly units and how theater- and unit-level C2W can be combined to disrupt enemy command and control while retaining friendly C2 capabilities At the tactical level forces in contact and reserve add to the roles they will play in the theater's operational game plan Determining where local concerns may disrupt the overall effectiveness in achieving national or theater-level objectives and goals is of critical importance The best way for national and theater leaders to handle this conflict is to issue mission-type orders explaining to the on-scene tactical commanders their mission and objectives 2 and their role in the theater-specific C2W game plan Almost any force level from the overall national command authority to the individual combat function or organization can also be divided into the three elements of combat power listed above Each force unit which can be actively engaged will need to be replenished and will be commanded and controlled The replenishment or reconstitution effort also needs command and control to accomplish its objectives effectively Replenishment and command and control are the battle manager's key functional responsibilities and their intelligence collection analysis and dissemination organizations exist to support these functions An examination of the three components yields ways to counter them We can therefore devise a strategy mix-a way to fight the overall enemy forces by countering the major components in some combination of efforts Components of Strategy Engaging the enemy involves confronting both forces in contact and forces in reserve with a properly equipped trained and integrated air-land-sea team Changing the enemy's will to attempt hostile actions is the definitive activity of war has been so always and shows little sign of changing Each side whittles away at the will of the other in an attempt to overcome the opponent or at least defend against his offensive efforts This is the classic war of attrition and employing the strategy of attrition warfare may work well if you have the largest and most capable force in the conflict the resources necessary to continue the effort through to its desired objective and the support and goodwill of the people and political leaders whose interests and objectives you have been sent to protect Attrition warfare is not an effective strategy if the opposing forces outnumber or will outlast your own and most societies do not generally support the idea of pure attrition warfare since it is wasteful of human life and resources A key point to note is that 14 attrition warfare may not be necessary at all if the strategy of command and control warfare as outlined in this paper is effective Although attrition warfare may become necessary to some degree in certain conflicts such as Gen Ulysses Grant's pursuit of Gen Robert E Lee during the latter stages of the American Civil War the strategy of attacking the enemy's replenishment or reserve called interdiction or indirect warfare has recently gained favor 3 The advent of the airplane made interdiction warfare a permanent feature of war Airplanes can find and attack the enemy's replenishment power before it can become part of his combat power Other services have also developed means to employ the strategy of interdiction warfare in support of the overall battle i e long-range artillery special unconventional units and submarines Services view the strategy of interdiction warfare as supporting the total battle effort DOD and JCS guidance frames C2W as a major strategy of warfare C2W does not focus on directly attriting or interdicting the enemy but rather on disrupting the enemy's command and control Its value is in denying enemy commanders the command and control of their combat and replenishment forces thus enhancing and assisting friendly attrition and interdiction efforts 4 The Strategic Mix Note that the above discussion does not include the means of strategy implementation but focuses on what to attack Traditional combative strategies have employed destructive means against things and people DOD Directive 4600 4 also levies destruction against things and people involved in command and control but it does not end there Commanders are also enjoined to attack enemy perceptions decision processes and control mechanisms 5 through deception jamming and OPSEC as well as destructive means The resultant mix of the three major strategy elements-forces in contact forces in reserve and command and control-could take any of several forms depending on the battle scenario Confrontation by itself could be the sole definitive strategy If you are the biggest meanest most effective and can last the longest this might work well Supporting the direct engagement of combat forces designed to degrade the enemy's replenishment and reinforcement capability has long been the hallmark strategy of the United States The selection of the strategy mix and the weight of each element is how the commander decides to fight the war and he must base his decision on a full knowledge of the strategy elements he can and should employ This is not meant to imply that such a mix is in any sense a static one except that it generally will include forces in contact forces in reserve and command and control Their relative weights of importance will of course vary with time and situation 15 Thus picture C2W as the fourth dimension of war after air land and sea a major way of combating an enemy force This analogy can be easily adapted to any battle level where the appropriate force components and equivalent strategy elements exist The key thought is that deciding to combat the opposing decision system through operations security deception psychological operations electronic warfare or physical destruction is the essence of C2W Friendly forces should focus their C2W planning on creating through the integrated use of the five pillars of C2W the decision by the enemy leadership to retire from battle The peacetime institutionalization of C2W concepts should result in the evolution of intelligence communications and logistics systems that will help the unit or theater commander to accomplish this goal Notes 1 CJCS MOP 30 Command and Control Warfare 1st revision 8 March 1993 enclosure 1-10 2 Franz Uhle-Wettler Auftragstaktik Mission Orders and the German Experience in Maneuver Warfare An Anthology ed Richard D Hooker Jr Novato Calif Presidio Press 1993 243-45 describes the historic roots of mission-type orders and how they were successfully employed at the tactical level during World War I and World War II Key points made by the author include the need to develop highly trained independent self-confident professional war fighters capable of adapting an existing mission or commander's intent to an emerging situation an acceptance by superiors that a subordinate's solution to a given problem need not be the solution they expected or considered best a willingness to foster risk takers through appropriate selection promotion education and assignment and superiors who reprimand discourtesy indiscipline and inaction but applaud initiative The author notes that the key to the development of an environment that fosters initiative and individual action that are the hallmark of an effective mission-type order system starts with the education of the superior not the subordinate Another factor to consider is the blurring of boundaries between the strategic operational and tactical levels that occurs when operations other than war are considered Specifically as nations integrate their military command structure into their national infrastructure they greatly complicate the planning and targeting processes used to employ C2W on the battlefield Excellent examples of where such blurring has occurred include Somalia the former Yugoslavia Rwanda and Haiti 3 Daniel P Bolger Maneuver Warfare Reconsidered in Maneuver Warfare 30 4 Joint Pub 3-13 Joint Command and Control Warfare C2W Operations first draft 15 January 1994 1-3 5 Ibid 1-8 16 Chapter 3 Command and Control Warfare What It Is Not Fundamental to understanding command and control is to know who you're talking to If he is a technocratyou can talk to him in terms of a C2 system If on the other hand you're talking to a manager you'd best talk about C2 as a financial line item because you're talking about a program-a chunk of the Departmentof Defense budget If you're talking to an operator then you're talking about a process facilitated by a program They all have a differing perspective on what it is you're talking about when you say command and control -Lee Paschall quoted in Frank M Snyder's Command and Control The Literature and Commentaries Command and control warfare is not just hardware software systems or procedures It is an integrated military strategy focused on attacking the command and control capabilities of an adversary while protecting friendly C2 capabilities Its objective is to decapitate the adversary's decision-making apparatus from its combat forces At the heart of the strategy is a targeting process by which the war fighter must decide what elements of the enemy's C2 system can be soft killed either jammed deceived or disrupted what elements should be hard killed radar sites communications nodes command centers intelligence collection points or en route threat sites and what elements can be ignored In the ideal situation-when all remaining C2W targets fall into either the soft-kill or ignore categories--remaining hard-kill assets bullets bombs missiles and directed-energy weapons can be reallocated to other targets or retained for subsequent employment C2W is not just another name for information warfare knowledge warfare KW space and electronic warfare or electronic combat Information warfare involves actions taken at the national strategic level to create an information gap between what is understood regarding the political economic cultural and military strengths vulnerabilities and interdependencies of a potential adversary and what the adversary possesses regarding friendly capabilities The key difference between information warfare and C2W is that 1W is a national strategy that employs all the tools of national power to create a competitive advantage at the national strategic level while C2W is the military strategy that seeks to establish an information advantage by focusing on the C2 decision-making capabilities of both friendly and adversary forces 1 at the tactical operational and strategic levels of war In knowledge warfare or knowledge-based warfare each side in a confrontation or conflict attempts to shape its opponent's actions by 17 manipulating the amount and type of intelligence available to support its opponent's decision-making process Similar in nature and scope to information warfare knowledge warfare is intended to be a powerful lever capable of altering high-level decisions by the opponent 2 A natural derivative of both information warfare and command and control warfare knowledge warfare may evolve to be the integrated national and military strategy that dominates the strategic operational and tactical battlefields of the twenty-first century Space and electronic warfare was defined by the Navy as the destruction or neutralization of enemy SEW targets Its specific objectives included controlling an adversary's use of the electromagnetic spectrum separating the enemy commander from his deployed forces and making him remote from his people Offensive in nature SEW's key attributes included an understanding that information is the key to a commander's decision-making process that to be effective SEW must be included in both joint and multinational operations and that a single point of contact the space and electronic warfare commander SEWC was the key to SEW success on 3 today's battlefield What differentiated SEW from C2W was its single-service focus and reliance on a single point of contact the SEW commander to coordinate SEW activities across service and national bounds The recent Navy decision to replace SEW with C2W and to rename its single point of contact the C2W commander is a meaningful first step towards providing the joint war fighter with a credible cross-service C2W capability 4 In Air Force terms EC is a specialized task that includes electronic warfare those elements of command and control warfare that delve into the electromagnetic spectrum i e electronic warfire and portions of the suppression of enemy air defense effort that are directed at an enemy's electromagnetic spectrum capability i e antiradiation missiles fired at an emitting threat acquisition radar Within the context of the Air Force definition of EC C2W is a means to achieve superiority in the 5 electromagnetic spectrum AFM 1-1 defines EC as action taken in support of military operations against the enemy's electromagnetic capabilities Bounded within the confines of the electromagnetic spectrum this Air Force enabling capability is primarily focused on EC-specific platforms like the EF-111A Raven the EC-130H Compass Call or the F-4G Wild Weasel whose primary missions are to provide jamming or area suppression support for aircraft performing missions at the tactical level of war Primarily focused on the suppression of enemy air defenses SEAD electronic combat as a concept does not easily 6 translate to the operational needs of the other three services C2W is not just an attack in the electromagnetic spectrum Some commentators assume that C2W by its very nature is just another name for electronic combat or electronic warfare Further in lesser-developed nations where the communications network is not strongly tied to the electromagnetic spectrum such a strategy is irrelevant By looking at C2W in this light they 18 miss the key point that C2W is a strategy that ties the capabilities of its various supporting tools to determine when and how an adversary's command and control decision-making process can be countered while providing protection for the command and control decision-making system of friendly forces This focus means that C2W is not medium-bound C2W involves a targeting process whereby decisions are made regarding what nodes in an enemy's command and control system can be soft killed hard killed or ignored Since the objective of C2W is to get inside the decision-making cycle of the adversary and force him to become reactive it is important that this key factor at the strategic operational and tactical levels of war not be forgotten Notes 1 Maj James G Lee Air Force Space Command XPXS presentation at the USAF Air and Space Doctrine Symposium Maxwell AFB Ala 10 March 1994 2 Alvin Toffier and Heidi Toffler War and Anti-War Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century Boston Little Brown and Company 1993 140 3 Chief of Naval Operations OP-094 Space and Electronic Warfare A Navy Policy Paper on a New Warfare Area Washington D C Government Printing Office June 1992 1-2 23 4 Information regarding Navy changes in its SEW program were reported during various telephone calls between the author and various Navy Air Force Army and Joint Staff representatives in the April May 1994 time frame Army Field Manual FM 100-6 Doctrine for Information Operations 10 is presently in draft form Where this draft will lead and how its key constructs and terms will interact with C2W are yet to be determined 5 FM 90-24 Multi-Service Procedures for Command Control and Communications Countermeasures 17 May 1991 vii 1-5 through 1-7 6 AFM 1-1 Basic Aerospace Doctrineof the United States Air Force vol 2 March 1992 283 19 Chapter 4 The Five Pillars of Command and Control Warfare The way of the warrioris to master the virtue of his weapons -Myamoto Mushaski A Book of Five Rings Command and control warfare is the military strategy that implements information warfare on the battlefield and integrates physical destruction into its litany of available tools Its objective is to decapitate the enemy's command structure from its body of combat forces 1 Tools used to perform this task which can be referred to as the five pillars of C2W include operations security military deception psychological operations electronic warfare and physical destruction fig 8 The key considerations underlying this strategy are that commanders must protect the command and control of deployed friendly forces while at the same time seeking to deny deceive disrupt or if necessary destroy the command and control capabilities of the enemy The goal of this action is to get inside the decision-making cycle of the opponent thus forcing the enemy to lose the initiative and resort to a reactive mode of operation Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism allied forces did not target the command and control of enemy forces to prevent escalation That focus meant that the enemy had the initiative and the opportunity to exploit his highly valuable strategic and tactical advantage Today nations must realize that previous focus was shortsighted Without effective command and control units will be forced to commence autonomous operations that while locally may be very effective in the long run will lose the synergistic advantage of units fighting as a coordinated whole For this reason commanders must make the denial disruption deception and if necessary the destruction of the enemy commander and his deployed command and control structure a primary objective By denying both command and control friendly forces will gain an unpredictable fleeting advantage which can be exploited via operations security military deception psychological operations electronic warfare and physical destruction In the next few pages we will take a closer look That only five pillars are included in the present C2W construct should not be considered as a limitation As new techniques or capabilities are developed and perfected they should be added by the war fighter just like arrows in a quiver 21 COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE C2W COUNTER COMN AND CONTROL COUNTER-C2 COMMAND AND CONTROL PROTECTION C2-PROTECTION - I I Z -I DECEIVEVE OFFEDENY THNGONTUC 12 SPHSICAL RIE1DL D FOTRCUSTIOND OFEFCUSIT PECEPTIONS ENEYMOMECEOMANS '1CONTROL C2 -- PENEMYFAE W COMMUNIMCATIONS ELECTROMANEIC DNECVE DDISRUPT PROTEITT OPERATIONS PSYOP PROCESS DECEPTION PROCESS ELEOT OMSINLEI HARD KILL DESTROY Figure 8 The Five Pillars of Command and Control Warfare Expanded at the five tools that are integrated and employed by C2W to achieve its strategic effect First we will look at operations security the most passive of the five and the one that is useful in any given situation ranging from peacetime to war Operations Security OPSEC is a process used for denying adversaries information about friendly intentions capabilities or limitations 2 It does this by identifying which actions can be observed by an enemy collection system determining which indicators 22 could be interpreted or pieced together to derive friendly intent and then developing and employing selected measures that eliminate or reduce friendly vulnerabilities to such actions 3 Used correctly OPSEC is an excellent means to achieve strategic or tactical surprise Combined with deception some elements of electronic warfare and or psychological operations OPSEC can be 4 used to conceal friendly preparations for crisis or war Not systems dependent the OPSEC process can protect US and allied forces from an enemy C2W strategy identify friendly actions that an adversary can observe determine indicators that an adversary could use to derive critical information and develop and execute measures that eliminate or reduce friendly vulnerabilities to exploitation by adversary collection means 5 It implies bringing along a red team in development of a friendly C2W strategy Applicable at every level and the responsibility of all Department of Defense personnel OPSEC provides for the protection 6 of friendly decision systems from enemy counter command and control efforts During the Persian Gulf War OPSEC combined with the other tools of C2W and an unrelenting strategic air campaign allowed the allies to move virtually undetected over 130 000 armed troops in preparation for the ground campaign From the command level because of the effectiveness of this integrated effort US and allied forces were told to mount up in their vehicles turn on their headlights stay off the radios follow the flashing lights and head north 7 This is a markedly different situation from what occurred during the Vietnam conflict when B-52 bombers attacking the northern portion of Vietnam had their flight plans passed to the North Vietnamese air control facility in Hanoi Included in these flight plans were details regarding the time and place of proposed entry into the country the number of aircraft in the formation and what their squawks would be If the Vietnamese had a more effective air defense network crews following these questionable 8 procedures may have been shot down like ducks in a shooting gallery Military Deception Military deception involves actions taken to mislead enemy decision makers or protect friendly capabilities Its stated goal is to cause the enemy decision maker to respond in a manner that assists in the accomplishment of friendly objectives 9 During the American Revolutionary War Gen George Washington used military deception to offset the numerical superiority of his British opponents An example of this deception was the use of fabricated documents to convince the British that his 3 000-strong army at Philadelphia was actually 40 000 This deception which included allowing American couriers to be captured so that the fabricated documents could fall into enemy hands and inserting forged documents into temporarily detained British diplomatic pouches provides an excellent example of how similar tactics could be used on the battlefield 23 During World War I Colonel later General George Catlett Marshall did the detailed planning for the Belfort Ruse a comprehensive deception operation that ensured that surprise was achieved during the first all-American offensive at Saint-Mihiel 11 By 1941 deception as a mission area had been relegated to the intelligence directorate in the War Department an asset poor support area which would explain its strategic disuse by US forces in the early portion of World War II It was not until 1943 that the British our coalition allies were able to gain American interest in this fine art that they had learned by close study of the American Civil War campaigns of Confederate Gen Thomas Stonewall Jackson General Jackson during his short time as a leader in the Confederate army employed a large array of these same ruses-and coordinated 12 them with Gen Robert E Lee's overall strategy During the Persian Gulf War deception played a large part in the success of coalition forces During Desert Shield Iraq was exposed to weekly aircraft sortie surges o- periodic mass tanker launches that desensitized Iraqi collection assets a decision makers to the key indicators and actions that could have warned them that a coalition attack was imminent 13 Likewise the continuous use of amphibious rehearsals and exercises along the Persian Gulf and associated deception operations convinced the Iraqis that the coalition's primary intenLon was to mount an _amphibious assault and thus they were not prepared when the coalition executed the end around play to the west 14 Ideally military deception will be used to inject ambiguity into the decision-making processes of the enemy The various means available to employ military deception include portraying false friendly intentions capabilities and dispositions Key factors are 1 the deception must have an objective 2 the targeted enemy commander must have the decision authority to make the desired decision 3 a story complete with a notional order of battle must be available to back up the executed deception and 4 a means must exist to evaluate the effectiveness of the ongoing deception as the scenario progresses 15 Psychological Operations Psychological operations convey specific information and indicators to an adversary audience to affect or influence their emotions motives objective reasoning and behavior Their objective is to cause or reinforce attitudes and behavior that will result in the favorable attainment of friendly objectives When used properly PSYOP can lower morale reduce the efficiency of enemy forces and cause dissidence and disaffection within their ranks 16 As in military deception psychological operations require extensive information from intelligence sources regarding the location and identity of the target their vulnerabilities and susceptibilities and existing political economic social cultural and historic conditions within the target area 17 PSYOP tools include political and diplomatic communiques leaflet drops loudspeaker broadcasts and other means of transmitting information and 24 can be used to gain a strategic advantage or simply to encourage enemy forces to defect desert flee or surrender ' 8 Taken alone PSYOP can be a very effective tool on the battlefield When combined with physical destruction and military deception it can be extremely effective Historically US military interest in psychological operations has been episodic at best Following the success of Marshall's Belfort Ruse during World War I the War Department failed to establish a psychological warfare point of contact in the interwar years from 1918 to 1941 During World War II the focus of US psychological operations evolved to a focus on the dissemination of propaganda to undermine the enemy's will to resist demoralize his forces and sustain the morale of friendly supporters ' 9 Despite the success of these efforts during World Wars I and II in the 1960s and 1970s US capabilities to conduct psychological operations became seriously eroded Examples of this erosion included the lack of PSYOPtrained officers to man the unit when the 6th PSYOP Battalion was activated in 1965 and an active component that was understrength overcommitted inadequately trained and poorly equipped when President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981 20 Following his election to office in 1980 President Reagan published an initial national security strategy that focused on four basic components including information as a source of national power This refined focus led in 1984 to a presidential directive for the Department of Defense to rebuild its military PSYOP capability and in 1985 the approval of a DOD PSYOP Master Plan 2 1 During Desert Storm PSYOP was used with spectacular success by US and coalition forces Perhaps the most vivid example was the employment of pamphlets and leaflets combined with hard-kill assets like the BLU-82 These 15 000-pound bombs which were used to blast a path through Iraqi ground defenses were considered by PSYOP units as a means to cause mass defections within the ground forces of the Iraqis Successfully integrated with pre- and postdrop leaflet efforts the psychological impact of this highly destructive conventional attack was a dramatic increase in the number of 22 defectors crossing the line to surrender An important aspect of psychological operations on today's battlefield is that the message conveyed to an adversary must be based on fact should be verifiable by whatever means the adversary has available and must consider the perceptions and considerations of those who are targeted If the enemy does not believe the message conveyed or friendly forces cannot carry out the implied threat or stated action then the effectiveness of PSYOP will be greatly diminished 2 3 Electronic Warfare Electronic warfare EW is any military action that involves the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack an enemy or control the 25 electromagnetic spectrum 24 Its three major subdivisions are electronic attack EA electronic protection EP and electronic warfare support ES The electromagnetic spectrum is the entire range of wavelengths or frequencies of electromagnetic radiation extending from gamma rays to the longest radio waves and including visible light 2 5 The offensive arm of electronic warfare is electronic attack It involves the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel facilities or equipment with the intent of degrading neutralizing or destroying enemy combat capabilities It includes actions taken to prevent the enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum and employment of hard-kill weapons like bombs or missiles that use either electromagnetic or directed energy to destroy targets 26 Previously called electronic countermeasures ECM electronic attack employs either hard-kill destructive agents like antiradiation missiles and directedenergy weapons or soft-kill actions like electronic jamming or electronic deception to meet its targeting goals In either case each action involves a targeting decision in which the cost and benefit of employing the available means is weighed against the thought that perhaps the selected target mnay be irrelevant to the task at hand and thus can be ignored The defensive arm of electronic warfare is electronic protection It includes actions taken to protect personnel facilities and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare 27 Examples of activities that are included in electronic protection include the deconfliction of assigned communications frequencies and clearance for jamming activities The final division of electronic warfare is electronic warfare support It provides information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical action such as threat avoidance targeting and homing 28 During Desert Shield US EP-3 and RC-135 aircraft monitored Iraqi radar and communication networks to identify which nodes appeared to be critical and the value each added to their assigned network This intense collection of Iraqi emissions allowed the coalition's planning staff to develop the integrated counter-C2 campaign that was extremely successful in the early portion of the air war 2 9 The success of this effort helped the coalition air forces gain air supremacy as the conflict widened in intensity Prior to Desert Storm electronic warfare was considered the primary soft-kill option of C2W With its focus on electronically jamming the enemy's communications and electronic sensors it was effective in disrupting the Iraqi command and control system limiting its ability to gather accurate information and to transmit decisions Since the war EW with its addition of a hard-kill capability has become more offensive in outlook 30 It is no longer just self-protection or a defensive jamming suite installed on an ingressing aircraft Today in conjunction with the other pillars of C2W EW can be used to introduce delays into the enemy's decision-making cycle and decrease the reliability of the information being collected by the enemy's intelligence assets thus making their perception of the evolving situation more suspect and the chosen course of action probably more suspect 26 Physical Destruction Physical destruction requires the ability to identify locate and prioritize enemy targets accurately and then to destroy them select bely 31 While physical destruction is arguably the best way to delay command and control to the enemy it can also be a great waste of critical resources C2W remains a strategy of options In many cases the use of destructive means such as bombs artillery or torpedoes may not be the best solution 'I he idea is to integrate disruptive means such as deception or jamming without expending large numbers of limited destructive resources In some cases hard kill may not be required 3 2 During the Falklands War except for a few Vulcan bombers employing antiradiation missiles against radar sites located near Stanley the British had only a limited hard-kill capability to suppress Argentinean radar-directed ground fire This meant that despite being rapidly equipped with chaff and flare dispensers and some active electronic countermeasures equipment British Harriers were regularly attacked by heavy and accurate radar-directed ground fire This in turn led the British government and military to conclude in their 33 lessons learned that there is a need for local area suppression of enemy defenses Ideally C2W targets can be separated into targets which can be ignored targets which can be suppressed through nonlethal means and targets which should be attacked Once the decision is made to attack a target using lethal munitions the next question is which targets can be effectively suppressed by attacking their sensors using antiradiation munitions and which targets must be destroyed using hard-kill weaponry Once this decision is made the proposed mission with its optimized selection of support assets can be tasked and executed as assigned Interrelationships Heraclitus of Ephesus in the sixth century B C noted that 'if you do not expect the unexpected you will not find it 34 During the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 the Germans recognized but the Russians did not various exploitable deficiencies in the existing Soviet command and control system Employing the various tools of C2W in an interrelated fashion the Germans were able to effectively disrupt exploit and destroy the Soviet C2 system Using weapons built for that purpose the Germans attacked the various elements of the Soviet system by air artillery and sabotage The results of these attacks were startling Due to cross-border German sabotage efforts many of the Soviet units did not receive the war alert order when it was issued from Moscow on the night of 20-21 June 1941 By 24 June large gaps had already been torn in the Soviet communications network thus forcing commanders to rely on easily exploitable unprotected radio networks This in turn led to the successful targeting of 27 exposed command posts and associated units throughout the theater These attacks because of their effectiveness led Soviet commanders to prohibit the 35 use of radios because they might give their positions away The synergistic effects of the coordinated use of the five pillars of C2W provide commanders with the potential to deliver a decisive blow against an adversary both before and after the outbreak of armed conflict C2W allows commanders to observe the situation orient available forces to meet the perceived threat and act in a quick and effective manner fig 9 OPSEC military deception and PSYOP when used together can effectively disrupt an enemy's perception of friendly intentions Physical destruction and electronic warfare when used together give a commander an extended list of options regarding which targets should be destroyed and which targets can be ignored Intelligence and communications the bedrock of the five pillars of C2W are critical today and will remain so for the foreseeable future Commanders can attain maximum military effectiveness when they integrate the employment of all five pillars of C2W It is also important to emphasize that in every case the best option is to use the best mix of available assets to support the commander's concept of operations The key capabilities for recognizing this opportunity are intelligence and communications COUNTER COMMAND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROTECTION C2-PROTEC TION AND CONTROL COUNTE R-C2 DEFENSIVE OFFENSIVEI PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION MILITARY DECEPTION PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PSYOP OPERATIONS SECURITY OPSEC ELECTRONIC WARFARE EW INTELLIGENCE INFRASTRUCTURE COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE Figure 9 The Command and Control Warfare Umbrella 28 Intelligence In order for the five C2W tools to be effective intelligence must be integrated at the tactical operational and strategic levels and used as part of campaign planning Mutually supportive intelligence enhances C2W effects against the enemy The intelligence must be timely to support the curre mission Out of date or inaccurate data could lead to disaster for the commander's overall mission Since it is the adversary's situations intentions 36 and capabilities that are targeted time and accuracy is of the essence Achieving this accuracy and timeliness requires all-source intelligence and support from all available intelligence-related agencies Sources include human intelligence HUMINT signals intelligence SIGINT imagery intelligence IMINT and photographic intelligence PHOTINT provided not only by defense agencies but by37 analysis centers and scientific and technical intelligence production centers Intelligence is the end product that results from the collection processing 38 integration analysis evaluation and interpretation of available informationm emphasis added A key distinction is the difference between data which are the representation of facts concepts or instructions in a formalized manner and information which is unevaluated material of every description 39 This key distinction makes it readily apparent why well-trained intelligence personnel no matter how greatly their collection functions are automated are a critical requirement for war fighters in the field Intelligence like command and control warfare is a thinking person's activity Without the critical man in the loop it becomes a useless regurgitation of previously reported facts that may or may not be relevant An early example of how a responsive intelligence capability enabled one side to use tools of C2W in this case deception and psychological operations against two substantial opponents occurred in 1094 when the emperor of Byzantine Alexis used visual and verbal deception to deceive Raymond a crusader and the Turks during the siege of Nicaea Raymond full of crusading zeal was convinced that the city of Nicaea then occupied by the Turks was an outpost of the anti-Christ and thus a reasonable target for siege Alexis wanting Nicaea for himself and not wanting to be drawn into a religious war with the Turks set about to gain Nicaea 40 First at Raymond's request Alexis supplied the crusaders with a fleet of ships and a detachment of archers whose presence convinced the Turks that they should evacuate the city Then he encouraged the crusaders to encircle the walls of Nicaea and attack at sunrise while Alexis's fleet attacked from the lake Unknown to the crusaders based on a previous arrangement Alexis's waterborne warriors were admitted into the city without a fight and the Turks prepared to abandon Nicaea The next morning after the crusaders once again swarmed to attack the banners and standards of Byzantine were soon displayed all along the walls of Nicaea Assuming that Nicaea had fallen under Alexis's assault from the lake the crusaders withdrew to their tents and rejoiced at the great victory Thus empowered by his much more effective 29 intelligence capability Alexis was able to placate both the Turks and the crusaders and achieve his desired goal the possession of the unravished Nicaea 4 1 During World War II information obtained through signals intelligence was fused with other sources to prove the German vulnerability in oil Based on these data Gen Dwight D Eisenhower in May 1944 made oil the targeted center of gravity The impact of this decision from Germany's point of view was catastrophic As Albert Speer said It meant the end of German 42 armament production Lessons regarding the applicability of intelligence to the five pillars of C2W that arise out of the above examples include 1 a firm foundation of intelligence support to operations is critical 2 timely intelligence support requires preparations focused on meeting the needs of the supported unit 3 success depends on good intelligence and the intelligence collector's ability to communicate that intelligence to the decision makers at each level of war and 4 all of these efforts must be focused on the commander's intent It is important that intelligence agencies have a basic understanding of the commander's operational plans and objectives It is equally important that commanders and operators 1understand the basic capabilities and limitations of the intelligence agencies that provide them support fig 10 At Nicaea Alexis had the intelligence support necessary to support his operational goals and the communications dominance necessary to make these goals a reality By 1944 intelligence had provided General Eisenhower the conclusive evidence he needed to confirm that the primary vulnerability of the German war-fighting machine was its reliance on scarce oil resources PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION Target identification Target location Time for optimal attack ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS SECURITY Target location Friendly vulnerability Electronic preparation of the assessments battlefield Frequencies critical nodes Battle damage assessment modulations and link distances Intelligence preparation of the battlefield Time for optimal attack MILITARY DECEPTION PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS Identification of deception targets Identification of enemy Selectrion of perceptions strengths and Identification of C2 enemy C2W threat believable story vulnerabilities Identification of enemy order of Selection of a focus for PSYOP Denial of friendly capabilities and battle to include intelligence campaign efforts intentions collection system Identification of Evaluation of deception efforts Placement of assets Battle damage assessment Analysis feedback Joint restricted frequency list enemy order of battle to include key commanders and their associated C2 support systems Placement of assets Analysis feedback Figure 10 Intelligence Support to Command and Control Warfare 30 Intelligence is critical to C2W planning and execution In striving to achieve information dominance the commander's goal is to extend the adversary's decision-making and execution activity beyond that of friendly processes Intelligence assessments of vulnerabilities of command and control targets allow planners to identify and select the appropriate tools for C2W operations Intelligence monitoring activities prior to and during a military operation provide planners with the necessary information to tailor operations and to gauge the effectiveness of the overall campaign Estimates of adversary capabilities to exploit friendly vulnerabilities allow planners to determine priorities of hostile targets while increasing 43 protective measures Communications During World War I the radio was the means to extend the tentacles of command and control on the battlefield In response to this fact various nations including France Austria and the United Kingdom established special units whose primary purpose was to exploit intercepted radio message traffic Throughout the war the Russians cooperated in this effort by not encoding their message traffic This failure to practice reasonable communications or operations security procedures led to the German victory over the Russians at the Battle of Tannenberg During the buildup to the battle the Austrians intercepted and passed to the Germans the entire Russian order of battle This allowed the Germans to preposition their forces to achieve maximum effectiveness at crucial points during the ensuing battle 44 During the Persian Gulf War another communications failure ii this case an information glut threatened US and coalition operations In Riyadh alone over 7 000 personnel worked to put out a daily 300-page 2 000-plus sortie air tasking order This along with thousands of other operationally essential pieces of message traffic sometimes resulted in a 70 000-message backlog which meant that even the highest priority ' flash messages took four 45 or five days to deliver This information glut made it difficult for intelligence analysts to provide timely battle damage assessment reports to the operational personnel who prepared the next day's air tasking order This meant in many cases targets that had been previously damaged or destroyed were either retargeted or restricted Also in numerous cases EF-111A and EA-6B aircraft providing standoff jamming support were tasked to jam acquisition and threat radar sites that no longer existed This failure to perceive and communicate a change in the existing electronic order of battle often meant that other equally high-priority threat signals were possibly left uncovered and that in a worst case a supported aircraft may have been shot down 31 Notes 1 CJCS MOP 30 Command and Control Warfare 1st revision 8 March 1993 enclosure 3 2 Joint Pub 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionaryof Military and Associated Terms 1 December 1989 265 3 Ibid 4 Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrinefor Joint Operations 9 September 1993 111-40 through 111-42 5 Armed Forces Staff College Pub 1 The Joint Staff Officers Guide 1993 1-32 through 1-33 6 While serving as the USAFE command officer of primary responsibility OPR for operations security from 1983--85 I had the opportunity to observe firsthand the value of having an effective OPSEC program at Ramstein Air Base in Germany Maj Ken Thurman then wing electronic warfare officer EWO for the 86th Tactical Fighter Wing had an outstanding communications monitoring and jamming exercise program First he established a communications monitoring program to monitor unit activities and issue periodic reports These reports detailed operational information that an aggressive enemy could have acquired Then he tied this aggressive communications program to an equally aggressive communications jamming program that rapidly made the existing ground communications procedures suspect Startled by the effectiveness of Major Thurman's efforts the wing commander quickly instituted wingwide countermeasures focused on revised communications procedures and OPSEC training for all assigned personnel 7 Personal notes from lecture delivered by a guest Air War College speaker who served as a joint force commander during the Persian Gulf War 8 Personal notes from 1983 conversation with Col Frank Boyd then USAF operations security point of contact regarding why the operations security program had been implemented in the Air Force 9 Joint Pub 1-02 230 10 BDM Corporation A Historical Survey of Counter-C3 McLean Va BDM Corporation 27 April 1979 23 11 Barton Whaley Stratagem Deception and Surprise in War vol 1 Cambridge Mass Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1969 54 12 Ibid 58 13 US Department of Defense Conduct of the PersianGulf War Conflict An Interim Report to Congress Washington D C Government Printing Office July 1991 24-2 14 Ibid 15 Joint Pub 3-13 Joint Command and Control Warfare C2W Operations first draft 15 January 1994 GL-5 16 Joint Pub 3-53 Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations 30 July 1993 1-1 17 Ibid 18 Joint Pub 3-0 111-44 through 111-45 19 Janos Radvanyi ed Psychological Operationsand PoliticalWarfare in Long-Term Strategic Planning New York Praeger 1990 20-21 20 Ibid 23-24 21 Ibid 23 22 Ibid 23 National Defense University Joint Command and Control Warfare Staff Officer Course Student Text Norfolk Va Armed Forces Staff College April 1993 12-14 24 Joint Pub 3-0 GL-7 through GL-8 25 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary Springfield Mass Merriam-Webster Inc 1984 401 Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary New York The Riverside Publishing Company 1988 422 defines the electromagnetic spectrum as The total range of radiation extending in frequency approx from 1023 cycles per second to 0 cycles per second or in corresponding wavelengths from 10-13 centimeters to infinity and including cosmic-ray photons gamma rays x-rays ultraviolet radiation visible light infrared radiation microwaves radio waves heat and electric currents 26 Joint Pub 3-0 GL-7 through GL-8 27 Ibid 32 28 Ibid 29 James P Coyne Airpower in the Gulf Arlington Va Air Force Association Books 1992 119 30 The success of C2W and associated EW efforts during the Persian Gulf War showed that effective C2W on the battlefield depends on the integrated application of both hard-kill and soft-kill assets This realization led to the inclusion of hard-kill assets that use electromagnetic or directed energy as their kill mechanism in the revised EW and electronic attack procedures 31 Joint Pub 1-02 113 In the modem world surgical destruction as part of C2W has significant implications for intelligence collection targeting criteria and rules of engagement As the advertised accuracies of weapons platforms increase the need for increasingly refined intelligence to support their employment expands exponentially At the same time the rules of engagement regarding the employment of such weapons could concurrently expand thus negating the margin of error that was traditionally allowed to account for the fog of war 32 FM 90-24 Multi-Service Proceduresfor Command Control and Communications Countermeasures 17 May 1991 viii 33 UK Secretary of State for Defense The FalklandsCampaign The Lessons London Her Majesty's Stationery Office December 1982 24 34 Dagobert D Runes Treasury of Philosophy New York Philosophical Library 1955 496 35 BDM Corporation 14-18 36 Joint Command and Control Warfare Staff Officer Course 2-2 37 CJCS MOP 30 6 38 Joint Pub 1-02 188 39 Ibid 102 184 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 325 620 and 629 defines data as factual information as measurements or statistics used as a basis for reasoning discussion or calculation information as the communication or reception of knowledge instruction knowledge obtained from investigation study or instruction and intelligence as the ability to understand or to deal with new or trying situations Given these two sets of definitions those contained in Joint Pub 1-02 and those contained in Webster's it is important to note that data provides the basis for reasoning and discussion information is the unevaluated material upon which the intelligence process is based and that intelligence is the product resulting from the analytical examination of both data and information sources It is intelligence not raw data or information that should be the basis for a war-fighter's decisionmaking process 40 BDM Corporation 21-23 41 Ibid 42 Air Force Doctrine Document 50 Air Force Intelligence Doctrine draft 29 April 1994 28 43 Ibid 23 44 BDM Corporation 23 45 Joseph S Toma Desert Storm Communications in The FirstInformation War ed Alan D Campen Fairfax Va AFCEA International Press 1992 1-5 33 Chapter 5 Command and Control Warfare-as a War-Fighter's Tool The warrioris different in that studying the way of strategy is based on overcoming men -Myamoto Mushaski A Book of Five Rings Neither C2W nor its antecedent C3CM is included in the March 1992 edition of AFM 1-1 1 This omission is disturbing for two reasons First the authors f the text did not recognize that the overarching strategy employed during the Persian Gulf War was the jointly accepted C2W not the Air Force-specific and narrower concept electronic combat Second another generation of airmen and officers will miss an opportunity to learn what C2W 2 brought to the battlefield during both Desert Shield and Desert Storm C2W with its strategic focus on integrating the synergistic effects of its five supporting pillars can use either operations security psychological operations deception or various elements of electronic protection to hide friendly intentions during routine exercises or even during periods of 3 peacetime leading up to conflict or war To understand how C2W can be employed on the battlefield it is important to recognize the profound effect that the third industrial revolution also called the information revolution is having on nations worldwide The pace of progress in hundreds of disciplines including science medicine and information processing is accelerated beyond our greatest expectations It is no wonder that new products including directed energy and nonlethal 4 weapons will have a decisive impact on future warfare At the operational level a theater commander performs four tasks 1 to determine when and where to apply a given force 2 to create conditions that give units applying force the best chance for success 3 to direct adjustments to operations in accordance with mission results and the combatant commander's revised intent and 4 to exploit the often fleeting opportunities that result from combat The nature of the enemy should also be a primary consideration in C2W campaign decisions Information on the enemy's centers of gravity how they fight and the threat they pose to friendly objectives 5 should shape and determine C2W campaign priorities Absolute control of the electromagnetic spectrum and enemy communications channels is the ideal aim of C2W operations Generally this desired capability 35 is not possible as long as the enemy possesses C2W forces capable of successfully disrupting the offensive and defensive C2W efforts of friendly forces 6 Of particular importance is the required linkage between strategic objectives campaign objectives and tactical objectives and how available C2W assets and their supporting infrastructure can be optimized to afford strategic advantage to war fighters operating at the tactical and operational levels of war An excellent example of such dominance was the Israeli employment of C2W during the buildup and execution of their strategic attack on Egypt during the Six Day War in 1967 The entire buildup for the attack was shrouded in a mix of Israeli deception and Egyptian misperceptions Given an extended period of warning the Israelis used lessons learned from the 1956 Suez conflict to conduct a quiet efficient mobilization Outnumbered 25 to 1 100 million Arabs versus 2 5 million Israelis and fighting from a geographically unfavorable position it was obvious to the Israelis that a 7 preemptive strike provided the only means of survival for the nation Egypt on the other hand was confident that Israel would not attack Reasons for this perception included an Egyptian intelligence report that assessed Egyptian forces as being much stronger than Israel's and President Nasser's assumption that without external assistance from Britain France or the United States Israel's armed forces were in fact a paper tiger ready to be bagged by a well-led aggressive foe 8 The Israeli attack commenced at 0845 Cairo time on Monday 5 June 1967 The time of day was chosen for two specific reasons First at that time of morning the angle of the sun would be at the back of the attacking force thus making it difficult for Egyptian observers to itect the incoming forces and give warning that such an attack was under way Second Israeli intelligence had noted that the Egyptian early warning radars usually shut down about 0830 and that most Egyptian officers did not arrive at their assigned posts until around 0900 This left a 30-minute gap during which the defending Egyptian forces would be most vulnerable to such an attack To further enhance the effectiveness of their strategy the Israeli attacks started under radio silence Approaching at low altitude in most cases under 100 feet above ground level the attacking aircraft flew below the remaining Egyptian radar coverage The operation was a complete success by 1145 the Israelis gained air superiority over the Egyptians by using over 500 sorties to attack the 19 nearest Egyptian air bases and laying waste to their associated facilities and 309 of 340 combat serviceable Egyptian aircraft 9 C2W should be centrally controlled at the combatant commander or joint task force commander level to achieve advantageous synergies establish effective priorities capitalize on unique strategic or operational flexibility ensure unity of purpose and minimize the potential for conflicting objectives Execution of C2W missions should be decentralized to achieve effective spans of control responsiveness and tactical flexibility At each level the commander should employ available C2W to disrupt the enemy's perceived centers of gravity Examples of applicable C2W targets include the enemy's 36 1 command elements 2 war production assets 3 supporting infrastructure 4 communications infrastructure and 5 personal perceptions Ideally friendly forces will be able to work inside the enemy's decision cycle force them into a reactive set of actions and provide friendly commanders and forces strategic and tactical advantage on the battlefield Forces must integrate C2W with other missions to reduce the dangers they face while increasing their ability to accomplish campaign objectives and to respond to the changing combat environment Success depends on interweaving C2W activities with appropriate surveillance reconnaissance intelligence and communications efforts 10 Factors which determine the friendly course of action include the precise nature of the threat the needs and capabilities of the host nation supporting the operation the affected social and cultural environment the technical capabilities of the systems 1 being used to support the operation and the political nature of the objective 1 Establishing an effective C2W war-fighting capability requires 1 a workable doctrine 2 the development of an effective means for employing C2W on the battlefield 3 the education and training of officers airmen and civilians tasked to employ this capability and 4 a supporting infrastructure that can enable the planning orchestrating and execution of the proposed C2W operations Technically effective C2W needs surveillance systems that can sample the expected battle environment reconnaissance sensors that can detect applicable targets communications that allow the tasking of the appropriate platforms and weapons capable of achieving the desired results either by hard killing to target with ordnance soft killing to deny deceive disrupt or jam or ignoring the selected target The issue here is not whether forces need C2W The issue is how best to conduct it exploit it and use it on today's battlefield 12 The employer of C2W must have an operational and technological understanding of all sensors and electronic systems that can impact the battle space the capabilities and limitations of available weaponry and surveillance and the communications and soft-kill capabilities that tie it all together 13 What This Means for the Air Force War Fighter Many of the same capabilities and attributes that AFM 1-1 ascribes to air and space warfare are also applicable when discussing C2W and its employment on the battlefield Specifically C2W is most effective when focused on one purpose meeting the strategic objective of the supported commander and not needlessly dispersed 0 C2W as a strategy should be centrally controlled in planning and tasking but decentralized in execution Effective C2W requires adequate surveillance reconnaissance and intelligence organizations capabilities and procedures 37 C2W battle damage assessment BDA should include measurements of how effective a given deception plan or psychological operation is Such measures should assess how the minds of the targeted commanders are impacted Traditional BDA methods such as simple photography wreckage estimates and body counts are insufficient New and creative means of assessment must be developed and employed e Use of C2W enables supported forces to operate at a higher operational tempo reduces risk and decreases collateral damage Because of its overarching strategic nature C2W is able to affect objectives at the strategic operational and tactical levels of war and must be a part of the strategy and campaign thinking at all levels The versatility of C2W may be easily lost if C2W forces are subordinated to other elements of power Commanders and employers of C2W forces should be alert for the potential diversion of C2W-tasked assets to missions of marginal importance C2W efforts should be persistent and coordinated so as to affect the enemy's capability and possibly his will to wage war Discerning both friendly and enemy strategic vulnerabilities is a function of C2W C2W's ability to delay and disrupt may have a devastating impact on the enemy's plans and ability to respond to the actions of friendly forces C2W like command and control is a key enabler of maneuver warfare Ideally by disrupting enemy command and control and at the same time protecting friendly command and control it will allow friendly decision makers to effectively operate within the decision cycle of the opponent Ultimately C2W depends on the performance of the people who operate command and sustain C2W platforms and equipment CJCS MOP 30 and Joint Pub 3-0 are each effective tools for enabling combatant commanders to establish and implement C2W policy and doctrine in their areas of responsibility The establishment of a theater C2W planning cell augmented with technical expertise from the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center JC2WC and units providing the supporting assets provides the means by which service-component provided C2W assets can be centrally controlled while the execution of C2W missions can be decentralized to achieve an effective span of control responsiveness and tactical flexibility 14 Various joint and service-sponsored schools including the joint command and control warfare staff officers course JC2WSOC at Norfolk Virginia provide commanders and other decision makers operating elements and staffs with the training necessary to plan task execute and evaluate C2W operations during both exercises and combat operations A continuing decline in force structure personnel and assets has two specific impacts First the Air Force and its sister services may no longer have the resources needed to man train and equip dedicated specialized units like the 390th Electronic Combat Squadron to perform the various tasks associated with executing an integrated C2W strategy Second in order 38 to compensate for this shortfall in unit theater and national C2W capabilities commanders and personnel at all levels should take up the slack and become highly proficient appliers of C2W and its associated capabilities The key to this is a focused lifelong education and training program that gives potential decision makers at all levels the knowledge they need to make the strategy work To fail to do so especially in the information age when information dominance having a superior understanding of an adversary's military economic social and political structure has become a major determinant in 5 even small-scale conflicts is buying into a potent recipe for disaster ' Air Force war fighters need to be educated on the interrelationship and importance of the five pillars of C2W At the tactical level they must understand how C2W contributes to air superiority by enabling friendly forces to destroy or isolate elements of 'he enemy's command and control system At the operational level they must understand how the impact of air power can be enhanced if effectively integrated into the CINC's C2W strategy They also need to develop and exploit joint C2W doctrine and capabilities Since war fighters will conduct tomorrow's battles as a joint team it is important that C2W training education and exercises be based on joint publications and terminology Even in drawdown the sister services allies and potential enemies will re -in a significant capability to employ assets in support of C2W-speci -c tives Only by using commonly accepted joint or coalition terms can the inherent synergistic advantages of C2W be exploited and communications breakdowns avoided Today's warrior faces a multitude of challenges By reviewing today's newspaper headlines it is easy to imagine today's war fighter responding in a wide array of confusing situations such as providing humanitarian assistance in response to a natural disaster augmenting or replacing local police in an effort to curb crime on the streets joining with regional or international partners to stem conflict and restore stability in a third nation or region by assisting in peacekeeping peacemaking or nation building or combating low-intensity conflicts or resurgent nationalism that could lead to regional or even global nuclear war Notes 1 AFM 1-1 Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force vols 1 and 2 March 1992 2 The key difference between the Air Force concept of EC and the jointly agreed strategy of command and control warfare is that EC is an equipment-bound medium-based enabling capability primarily focused at the tactical level of war C2W on the other hand is people-driven and focused on having a war-winning effect at the strategic operational and tactical levels of war If EC instead of C2W had been allowed to dominate the planning and tasking during the Persian Gulf War then such ideas as the integrated attack on Iraq's strategic command and control network would not have taken place 3 Joint Pub 3-13 Joint Command and Control Warfare C2W Operations first draft 15 January 1994 11-4 39 4 Chief of Naval Operations OP-094 Sonata Washington D C Government Printing Office 1993 48 5 AFM 1-1 vol 1 9 6 Ibid vol 1 10 7 Chaim Herzog The Arab-Israeli Wars War and Peace in the Middle East New York Random House 1982 151 and Ritchie Ovendale The Originsof the Arab-Israeli Wars 2d ed London Longman 1992 199 8 Sydney D Bailey FourArab-Israeli Wars and the Peace Process Nei' York Si Martin's Press 1990 192 and Herzog 151 9 Bassam Tibi Conflict and War in the Middle East 1967-91 Regional Dynamic and the Superpowers trans Clare Krojzl New York St Martin's Press 1993 69 75-76 Barry Dean ElectronicCombat vol 1 Wiesbaden Germany 65th Air Division 19 June 1989 1-15 Bailey 223 and Herzog 151-52 10 AFM 1-1 vol 1 14 11 Ibid vol 1 19 12 Sonata 44 13 Ibid 45 14 Joint Pub 3-13 1-15 The Joint Electronic Warfare Center JEWC will in the near future change its name to the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center JC2WC to better reflect its operational mission and get in step with emerging joint and service trends 15 Andrew W Krepinevich The Military Technical Revolution a Preliminary Assessment Washington D C OSD Office of Net Assessment July 1992 22 40 Chapter 6 Conclusions Strategy is the craft of the warrior Commanders must enact the craft and troopers should know the way -Myamoto Mushaski A Book of Five Rings Command and control warfare is the military strategy that implements information warfare on the battlefield Its concepts and tools are nothing new For centuries many great commanders including Napol6on and Rommel sought to dominate the battlefield by controlling the timing and the flow of intelligence to the enemy decision maker This time-based competition gives agility by forcing opponents to become reactive and thus cede the initiative What is new what is revolutionary is the integrated use of the tools of C2W to attack the command and control decision-making processes of an enemy while protecting friendly decision-making capabilities Each C2W tool has its place but the key to understanding C2W is the realization that communications and intelligence provide a base for the strategy If done right communications will allow decision makers at each level to work inside the decision-making cycle of the enemy At each level from strategic to tactical the decision maker works within a series of cycles during which a situation is observed resources oriented a decision made and action taken Repetitive in nature these cycles require an effective intelligence network which can describe 1 friendly capabilities and limitations 2 enemy capabilities and limitations 3 the perception bias that both friendly and enemy decision makers are working under and 4 how these biases can be exploited on the battlefield Central to this effort is an intelligence system tailored to the needs of the users who know what they need and an adaptive communications and intelligence organization prepared to fulfill them The goal of such an organization should be information or knowledge dominance In other words give friendly decision makers at each level the information they need at the time and place they want it and in a format they can use fig 11 It does no good to field an elaborate computer-based intelligence network if the decision makers cannot make sense of displayed information or a prepared set of printouts buries the relevant data in a sea of irrelevant trash Likewise it is wasteful to hide information from a decision maker simply because of need-to-know or because the analyst is unwilling or unable to make a call based on available data 41 FRIENDLY COMMAND AND CONTROL C2 -PEOPLE EQUIPMENT COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES -PROCEDURES PREVENT INFLUENCE EXPLOIT COMMAND AND CONTROL PROTECTION 02-PROTECTION SDEFENSIVE7 OPERATIONS SECURITY MILITARY DECEPTION R Z WARFARE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION o ENEMY COMMAND AND CONTROL C2 -PEOPLE EQUIPMENT oCOMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES -PROCEDURES IMPOSE INFLUENCE DEGRADE DESTROY COUNTER COMMAND AND CONTROL COUNTER-C2 XPLOIT OFFENSSVE Figure 11 The Command and Control Warfare C2W Connection In addition to a strong communications and intelligence base the other keys to developing a meaningful and reliable C2W strategic capability are a jointly agreed comprehensive doctrine career-long training and education opportunities not just for stoveniped specialists command emphasis at the highest levels of each organization rigorously evaluated real world and exercise exposure to C2W concepts and ideas for both commanders and subordinates and the realization that well-trained effective people provide the strength of C2W on the battlefield To this end the following observations and recommendations are made 42 1 Although AFM 1-1 makes no mention of C2W or its antecedent C3CM Joint Pub 3-0 and CJCS MOP 30 can serve as an effective basis for training and educating Air Force personnel 2 Joint Pub 3-13 requires that the strategy and tools of C2W be included in professional military education If the Air Force wants to be a leader in this field then it should consider including an introductory level version of this critical training even in basic military training Officer Training School OTS Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps AFROTC and the Air Force Academy ' Carl Builder in The Icarus Syndrome decries the lack of professionalism than exists in today's Air Force officer corps 2 Early exposure to strategic concepts such as C2W and its related tools can provide tomorrow's leadership with a firm basis for critically thinking beyond the unit level 3 C2W as a strategy is not equipment dependent While the basic doctrine of C2W should evolve based on changes in technology or existing capabilities its basic objectives-protecting friendly command and control C2 while attacking the C2 of an adversary-should remain constant 4 Many of the intelligence and communications improvements needed to support C2W more effectively are also needed by units attempting to employ precision guided or nonlethal munitions In both cases the key remains timely reliable intelligence available to the decision maker at the time and place of his choosing in a format he can use 5 The essence of C2W is attacking the opposing decision-maker's command and control system While Air Force senior leadership recognizes the need for this capability there is a problem in getting the doctrine education equipment and support infrastructure required to meet this need Commanders must protect the command and control of deployed friendly forces while seeking to deny deceive disrupt or if necessary destroy the command and control capabilities of the enemy The goal remains to get inside the decision-making cycle of the opponent thus forcing the enemy to lose the initiative and resort to a reactive mode of operation Without effective command and control units will lose the synergistic advantage of fighting as a coordinated whole The synergistic effects of the coordinated use of the five pillars of C2W provide commanders with the potential to deliver a decisive blow against an adversary's command and control system both before and after the outbreak of armed conflict C2W allows commanders to observe the situation orient available forces to meet the perceived threat and act in a quick and effective manner OPSEC military deception and PSYOP all nonlethal activities can effectively disrupt an enemy's perception of friendly intentions Physical destruction and electronic warfare give a commander an extended list of options including which targets can be soft killed which targets should be hard killed and which targets can be ignored Intelligence and communications the bedrock of the five pillars of C2W are critical today and will remain so for the foreseeable future Commanders can attain maximum military effectiveness when they integrate the employment of all five pillars of C2W 43 Command and control warfare performs a critical task All personnel must be aware of their part The key to this awareness is education During the next crisis or conflict the forces the United States sends will only be able to succeed if they are given the proper tools Recommendations C2W should be centrally controlled at the combatant commander or joint task force commander level to achieve advantageous synergies establish effective priorities capitalize on unique strategic or operational flexibilities ensure unity of purpose and minimize the potential for conflicting objectives Execution of C2W missions should be decentralized to achieve effective spans of control responsiveness and tactical flexibility At each level the commander should employ available C2W to disrupt the enemy's centers of gravity Ideally friendly forces will be able to work inside the enemy's decision cycle force the enemy into a reactive set of actions and provide friendly commanders and forces strategic operational and tactical advantage on the battlefield Forces must integrate C2W with other missions to reduce the dangers they will face while increasing their ability to accomplish campaign objectives and to respond to the changing combat environment Success depends on interweaving C2W activities with appropriate surveillance reconnaissance intelligence and communications efforts Factors which must be considered include the precise nature of the threat the needs and capabilities of the host nation supporting the operation the affected social and cultural environment the technical capabilities of the systems being used to support the operation and the political nature of the objective During peacetime military forces should use C2W concepts to improve the intelligence communications and logistics systems that help the unit or theater commander As many information-based commercial organizations like Federal Express have learned without the critical person in the loop intelligence often becomes a useless regurgitation of previously reported facts that may or may not be relevant The training and execution of a unit's response and a commander's C2W actions should be based on the doctrine policies and terminology provided in joint publications Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations 9 September 1993 and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy 30 Command and Control Warfare 8 March 1993 provide an excellent doctrinal and policy basis for understanding the various concepts ideas and strategies associated with command and control warfare Air Force basic doctrinal publications like AFM 1-1 should minimize the use of Air Force-specific terms like electronic combat and instead focus on commonly accepted terms like C2W and use these terms as a basis for unit and individual education and training 44 The primary focus of C2W is and should remain to deny deceive defeat or if necessary destroy the enemy's capability to command and control his forces effectively while protecting friendly command and control This focus involves a thinking process by which an overarching strategy and relevant tactics are applied to an evolving situation While these enabling technologies and techniques can have an impact on how the C2W strategy is applied it is still the thinking person in the loop that makes this capability so devastating on the battlefield The adoption of this overarching strategy requires a structural and attitudinal change in the Air Force C2W is a strategy not just an enabling capability Its focus on targeting the C2 decision-making process of an enemy needs an adept agile organization able to detect recognize and exploit enemy and friendly vulnerabilities when and where they arise Notes 1 The following actions would promote a better more integrated C2W training and education program At the basic training level make inductees and student officers aware that C2W and its associated tools exist and that their integrated employment on the battlefield is important e During first-level professional military education PME provide a more detailed description of C2W stressing how it can be used to support combat operations at the tactical operational and strategic levels of war At mid-level PME and professional development courses like the Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course JDACC at Maxwell provide instruction to students on how they can plan for and execute a C2W strategy at the national theater and unit level At senior-level PME and senior leadership war-fighting courses like the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course JFOWC stress how command emphasis is the key element needed to make C2W an operational reality 2 Carl H Builder The Icarus Syndrome The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fateof the U S Air Force New Brunswick N J Transaction Publications 1994 20-24 45 Recommended Readings If you are interested in furthering your knowledge about command and control warfare information warfare electronic warfare or any other related topic you could examine the following sources to develop a firm grasp of the basic concepts discussed in this text Brown Anthony Cave Bodyguard of Lies New York Harper Collins Publishers Inc 1975 Campen Alan D The First Information War Norfolk Va AFCEA International Press October 1992 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CJCS Memorandum of Policy MOP 30 Command and Control Warfare 1st revision 8 March 1993 Cooper Jeffrey R The Coherent Battlefield-Removing the 'Fog of War' A Framework for Understanding an MTR of the 'Information Age' Draft SRS Technologies June 1993 De Landa Manuel War in the Age of Intelligent Machines Swerve Editions New York Zone Books 1991 Hooker Richard D ed Maneuver Warfare An Anthology Novato Calif Presidio Press 1993 Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations 9 September 1993 Joint Pub 3-13 Joint Command and Control Warfare C2W Operations First draft 15 January 1994 Powell Colin L Information-Age Warriors Byte July 1992 Toffler Alvin and Heidi Toffler War and Anti-War Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century Boston Little Brown and Company 1993 47 Glossary Terms contained in this glossary are unless otherwise indicated drawn from Joint Pub 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 1 December 1989 analysis-In intelligence usage a step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in which information is subjected to review in order to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation antiradiation missile ARM -A missile which homes passively on a radiation source attrition-The reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of personnel and materiel battle damage assessment BDA -The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force either lethal or nonlethal against a predetermined objective Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators Joint Pub 3-0 campaign-A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space Joint Pub 3-0 centers of gravity-Those characteristics capabilities or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action physical strength or v to fight Joint Pub 3-0 chaff-Radar confusion reflectors which consist of thin narrow metallic strips of various lengths and frequency responses used to reflect echoes for confusion purposes combatant command COCOM -Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 United States Code section 164 exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands combatant commander-A commander-in-chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President command-The authority that a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of organizing directing coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions command and control C2 -The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel equipment communications facilities and 49 procedures employed by a commander in planning directing coordinating and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission command and control protection C2-protection -To maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to influence degrade or destroy the friendly command and control system C2-protection is the defensive arm of C2W Joint Pub 3-0 command and control system-The facilities equipment communications procedures and personnel essential to a commander for planning directing and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned command and control warfare C2W -The integrated use of operations security military deception psychological operations electronic warfare and physical destruction mutually supported by intelligence to deny information to influence degrade or destroy adversary command and control capabilities while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions Command and control warfare applies across the operational continuum and all levels of conflict C2W is both offensive and defensive Its offensive arm is counter command and control counter-C2 Its defensive arm is command and control protection C2-protection Joint Pub 3-0 command and control warfare's five pillars-Operations security military deception psychological operations electronic warfare and physical destruction Joint Pub 3-0 command control and communications countermeasures C3CM -The integrated use of operations security military deception jamming and physical destruction supported by intelligence to deny information to influence degrade and destroy adversary command control and communications C3 capabilities and to protect friendly C3 against such actions communications-A method or means of conveying information of any kind from one person or place to another control-Authority which may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinates or other organizations counter command and control counter-C2 --To prevent effective command and control of adversary forces by denying information to influencing degrading or destroying the adversary command and control system Joint Pub 3-0 critical node-An e 1ement position or communications entity whose disruption or destruction immediately degrades the ability of a force to command control or effectively conduct combat operations data-Representation of facts concepts or instructions in a formalized manner suitable for communication interpretation or processing by humans or by automatic means Any representations such as characters or analog quantities to which meaning is or might be assigned 50 deception-Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests deconfliction-Deconfliction is the process of satisfying conflicting spectrum usage requirements where C2 and EW systems are operated simultaneously in battle Joint Pub 3-13 destruction-A type of adjustment for destroying a given target directed-energy DE -An umbrella term covering technologies that relate to the production of a beam of concentrated electromagnetic energy or atomic or subatomic particles directed-energy device-A system using directed-energy primarily for a purpose other than as a weapon Directed-energy devices may produce effects that could allow the device to be used as a weapon against certain threats directed-energy weapon-A system using directed-energy primarily as a direct means to damage or destroy enemy equipment facilities and personnel disruptive means-Military action employed to damage degrade deceive delay or neutralize enemy surface-to-surface air systems temporarily Active means include jamming chaff flares and tactics such as deception and avoidance evasion flight profiles Passive means include camouflage infrared shielding warning receivers and material design features Joint Pub 3-13 dissemination--Conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form Air Force Doctrine Document 50 doctrine-Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives It is authoritative but requires judgment in application early warning-Early notification of the launch or approach of unknown weapons or weapon carriers education-Instruction to prepare students to define problems in an environment of complexity and uncertainty to comprehend a range of alternative solutions and to develop the analytical skills required for reaching preferred solutions How to think as opposed to what to think AFM 1-1 vol 2 electromagnetic radiation-Radiation made up of oscillating electric and magnetic fields and propagated with the speed of light Includes gamma radiation X-rays ultraviolet visible and infrared radiation and radar and radio waves electromagnetic spectrum-The range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands 51 electronic attack EA -That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic or directed-energy to attack personnel facilities or equipment with the intent of degrading neutralizing or destroying enemy combat capability EA includes actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum such as jamming and electromagnetic deception and employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed-energy as their primary destructive mechanism Joint Pub 3-0 electronic combat EC -Action taken in support of military operations against the enemy's electromagnetic capabilities Electronic combat includes electronic warfare EW elements of command control and communications countermeasures C3CM and suppression of enemy air defenses SEAD AFM 1-1 vol 2 electronic countermeasures ECM -That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum Replaced by electronic attack electronic deception-The deliberate radiation reradiation alteration suppression absorption denial enhancement or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to convey misleading information and to deny valid information tc an enemy or to enemy electronics-dependent weapons electronic protection EP -That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel facilities and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade neutralize or destroy friendly combat capability Joint Pub 3-0 electronic warfare EW -Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed-energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy The three major subdivisions of EW are electronic attack EA electronic protection EP and electronic warfare support ES Joint Pub 3-0 electronic warfare support ES -That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by or under direct control of an operational commander to search for intercept identify and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition Joint Pub 3-0 elements of combat power-For purposes of this paper the elements of combat power are defined as forces in contact forces in reserve and command and control Author's definition emissioni control EMCON -The selective and controlled use of electromagnetic acoustic or other emitters to optimize command and control capabilities while minimizing for operations security OPSEC detection by enemy sensors to minimize mutual interference among friendly systems and or to execute a military deception plan 52 force enhancement-Operations conducted to improve the effectiveness of both terrestrial and space-based forces These include such capabilities as communications navigation and surveillance Missions that directly support both aerospace and terrestrial combat forces but do not by themselves counter or apply force against enemy targets AFM 1-1 vol 2 human intelligence HUMINT -A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources Also called human resources intelligence imagery intelligence IMINT -Intelligence information derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography infrared sensors lasers electro-optics and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film electronic display devices or other media informati n-In intelligence usage unevaluated material emphasis added of every description that may be used in the production of intelligence The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation information dominance-A superior relative understanding of a potential adversary's military political social and economic structures Maj James G Lee Air Force Space Command information warfare IW -Actions taken to create an information gap in which we possess a superior understanding of a potential adversary's political economic military and social cultural strengths vulnerabilities and interdependencies that our adversary possesses on friendly sources of national power Maj James G Lee Air Force Space Command intelligence-The product resulting from the collection processing integration analysis evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas interdiction-An action to divert disrupt delay or destroy the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces interoperability-The ability of systems units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together joint-Connotes activities operations organizations etc in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate joint force-A general term applied to a force which is composed of significant elements of the Army the Navy or the Marine Corps and the Air Force or two or more of these Services operating under a single commander authorized to exercise unified command or operational control over joint forces joint task force JTF -A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army the Navy or the Marine Corps and the Air Force or two or more of these Services which is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of 53 Defense or by the commander of a unified command a specified command or an existing joint task force knowledge--The state or fact of knowing Familiarity awareness or comprehension acquired by experience or study The sum or range of what has been perceived discovered or learned Erudition Specific information Webster's Ninth New CollegiateDictionary knowledge warfare knowledge-based warfare KW -Each side in a confrontation or conflict attempts to shape their opponent's actions by manipulating the amount and type of intelligence available to support their opponent's decision-making process Intended to be a powerful lever capable of altering high-level decisions by the opponent Toffler and Toffler War and Anti-War Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century lethal weapon--Capable of causing death Of relating to or causing death Extremely harmful devastating Mel Gibson in a series of movies made with Danny Glover Author's definition levels of war--Loci or frames of reference where certain military activities are performed Each is concerned with means and ends and ways to link the two The commonly perceived levels of war are strategy the operational level and tactics AFM 1-1 vol 2 liaison-That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action maneuver-A movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the enemy Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire or fire potential to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission military deception-Actions executed to mislead foreign decisionmakers causing them to derive and accept desired appreciations of military capabilities intentions operations or other activities that evoke foreign actions that contribute to the originator's objectives military education-The systematic instruction of individuals in subjects which will enhance their knowledge of the science and art of war military strategy-The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force military training-The instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific military functions and tasks the exercise of one or more military units conducted to enhance their combat readiness mission-The task together with the purpose which clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor mission type order-Order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters 54 Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished emphasis added noncommunications-Not a method or means of conveying information of any kind from one person or place to another Author's definition nonlethal weapon-Not capable of causing death Author's definition operation-A military action or the carrying out of a strategic tactical service training or administrative military mission the process of carrying on combat including movement supply attack defense and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign operational continuum-The general states of peacetime competition conflict and war within which various types of military operations and activities are conducted AFM 1-1 vol 2 operational level of war-The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic ojectives sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives initiating actions and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives operations security OPSEC -A process of analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to a Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems b Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries c Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation order of battle OB -The identification strength command structure and disposition of the personnel units and equipment of any military force photographic intelligence PHOTINT -The collected products of photographic interpretation classified and evaluated for intelligence use physical destruction-The fully coordinated use of lethal assets to suppress neutralize or destroy enemy troops equipment and or facilities This method enables friendly forces to physically destroy enemy C2 functions Applying limited destruct resources requires the capability to accurately locate and prioritize enemy targets Joint Pub 3-13 policy-A principle plan or course of action as pursued by an organization AFM 1-1 vol 2 55 professional military education PME -A means of understanding the art and science of war and the military environment AFM 1-1 vol 2 propaganda-Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions emotions attitudes or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly psychological operations PSYOP -Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions motives objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments organizations groups and individuals The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives psychological warfare PSYWAR -The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions emotions attitudes and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives reconnaissance-A mission undertaken to obtain by visual observation or other detection methods information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area signals intelligence SIGINT -A category of intelligence information comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence electronics intelligence and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence however transmitted space and electronic warfare SEW -The destruction or neutralization of enemy SEW targets Sonata stovepipe-A pipe usually of thin sheet iron used to conduct smoke or fumes from a stove into a chimney flue Used in the military to describe specialist organizations like space intelligence communications logistics and operations that tend to focus on their area of emphasis often to the detriment of the organization Webster's Ninth New CollegiateDictionary strategic level of war-The level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives Activities at this level establish national and alliance military objectives sequence initiatives define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of power develop global or theater war plans to achieve those objectives and provide armed forces and other capabilities in accordance with the strategic plan strategy-The art and science of developing and using political economic psychological and military forces as necessary during peace and war to afford the maximum support to policies in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat 56 suppression of enemy air defenses S D -That activity which neutralizes destroys or temporarily degrades enemy air defenses in a specific area by physical attack and or electronic warfare surprise--To encounter suddenly or unexpectedly catch unawares To attack or capture suddenly and with no warning To cause to feel wonder or astonishment To cause someone to do or say something unintended To elicit or detect through surprise The act of surprising or the state of being surprised Something that surprises Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary surveillance-The systematic observation of aerospace surface or subsurface areas places persons or things by visual aural electronic photographic or other means tactical level of war-The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to eaciu other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives tactics-The employment of units in combat The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and or to the enemy in order to utilize their full potentialities theater-The geographical area outside the Continental United States for which a commander of a unified or specified command has been assigned military responsibility training-Instruction to impart received knowledge to provide answers to technical questions and to acquaint students with correct solutions to specific problems What to think as opposed to how to think yAFM 1-1 vol 2 57 Acronyms AFM Air Force Manual AFROTC Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps ARM antiradiation missiles ATACMS Army tactical missile systems BDA battle damage assessment C2 command and control C2-protection command and control protection C2W command and control warfare C3 command control and communications C3CM command control and communications countermeasures CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff COCOM combatant command counter-C2 counter command and control DOD Department of Defense DE directed-energy EA electronic attack EC ECM electronic combat electronic countermeasures EP electronic protection ES electronic warfare support EW electronic warfare HUMINT human intelligence also called human resources intelligence IMINT imagery intelligence IW information warfare JC2WSOC joint command and control warfare staff officers course JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff JTF joint task force KW knowledge warfare 59 MOP Memorandum of Policy OPSEC operations security OTS Officer Training School PHOTINT photographic intelligence PME professional military education PSYOP psychological operations PSYWAR psychological warfare SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses SEW space and electronic warfare SEWC space and electronic warfare commander SIGINT signals intelligence 60 Bibliography AFM 1-1 Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force March 1992 Air Force Doctrine Document 50 Air Force Intelligence Doctrine Draft 29 April 1994 Air Force Policy Directive 10-7 Policyfor Command and Control Warfare C2W 12 August 1993 Arcangelis Mario de Electronic Warfare From the Battle of Tsushima to the Falklandsand Lebanon Conflicts Poole Dorset U KI Blandford Press 1985 Armed Forces Staff College Pub 1 The Joint Staff Officers Guide 1993 Bailey Sydney D FourArab-IsraeliWars and the Peace Process New York St Martin's Press 1990 BDM Corporation A Historical Survey of Counter-C3 McLean Va BDM Corporation 27 April 1979 Builder Carl H The Icarus Syndrome The Rclc of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U S Air Force New Brunswick N J Transaction Publishers 1994 Chairman of the Joi t Chiefs of Staff CJCS Memorandum of Policy MOP 30 Command and Control Warfare 1st revision 8 March 1993 Chief of Naval Operations OP-094 Sonata Washington D C Government Printing Office 1993 __ Space and Electronic Warfare A Navy Policy Paperon a New Warfare Area Washington D C Government Printing Office June 1992 CJCS MOP 185 Command Control and Communications Countermeasures 20 December 1983 Cordesman Anthony H and Abraham R Wagner The Lessons of Modern War Vol 3 The Afghan andFalklandsConflicts and the Conclusionsof the Study Boulder Colo Westview Press 1990 Coyne James P Airpower in the Gulf Arlington Va Air Force Association Books 1992 De Landa Manuel War in the Age of Intelligent Machines Swerve Editions New York Zone Books 1991 Dean Barry Electronic Combat Wiesbaden Germany 65th Air Division 19 June 1989 Department of Defense DOD Directive 3222 4 Electronic Warfare and Command Control and Communications Countermeasures 31 July 1992 DOD Directive 4600 4 Command Control and Communications Countermeasures 27 August 1979 61 Engelhardt Joseph P DesertShield and DesertStorm A Chronologyand Troop List for the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis Carlisle Pa US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute 25 March 1991 FitzGerald Mary C The Soviet Image of Future Wars Through the Prism of the Persian Gulf Washington D C Hudson Institute 17 May 1991 FM 90-24 Multi-Service Proceduresfor Command Control and Communications Countermeasures 17 May 1991 Electronic Warfare Command Funk Paul E Memorandum Control and Communications t Lermeasures EW C3CM Conference 25 March 1992 Gray Jim Turning Lessons Learned into Policy Journal of ElectronicDefense 16 October 1993 87-92 Herzog Chaim The Arab-IsraeliWars War and Peace in the Middle East New York Random House 1982 Hooker Richard D ed Maneuver Warfare An Anthology Novato Calif Presidio Press 1993 Joint Pub 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 1 December 1989 Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrinefor Joint Operations 9 September 1993 Joint Pub 3-13 Joint Command and Control Warfare C2W Operations First draft 15 January 1994 Joint Pub 3-53 Doctrinefor Joint PsychologicalOperations 30 July 1993 Jones R V The Wizard War British Scientific Intelligence 1939-1945 New York Coward McCann Georghegan Inc 1978 Krepinevich Andrew F The Military Technical Revolution a Preliminary Assessment Washington D C OSD Office of Net Assessment July 1992 Kurzweil Raymond The Age of Intelligent Machines Cambridge Mass MIT Press 1990 Lee Maj James G Air Force Space Command XPXS Information War Concepts presented to the USAF Air and Space Doctrine Symposium at Maxwell AFB Ala 10 March 1994 Martin William J The Information Society London Aslib 1988 Nair Brigadier V K War in the Gulf Lessons for the Third World New Delhi India Lancer International 1991 National Defense University Joint Command and Control Warfare Staff Officer Course Student Text Norfolk Va Armed Forces Staff College April 1993 Ovendale Ritchie The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars 2d edition London Longman 1992 Radvanyi Janos ed Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long-Term Strategic Planning New York Praeger 1990 Runes Dagobert D Treasury of Philosophy New York Philosophical Library 1955 62 Tibi Bassam Conflict and War in the Middle East 1967-91 Regional Dynamic and the Superpowers Trans Clare Krojzl New York St Martin's Press 1993 Toffler Alvin and Heidi Toffler War and Anti-War Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century Boston Little Brown and Company 1993 UK Secretary of State for Defense The Falklands Campaign The Lessons London Her Majesty's Stationery Office December 1982 US Secretary of Defense Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict An Interim Report to Congress Washington D C Government Printing Office July 1991 Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary New York The Riverside Publishing Company 1988 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary Springfield Mass MerriamWebster Inc 1984 Whaley Barton Stratagem Deception and Surprisein War Cambridge Mass Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1969 OU 3 COVKOMMU PRINTING OYFIC 1994-533-166 00035 63                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu