ApprOVed For ReleaSe SECURITY CIA 36312-151 IAC Revised 28 July 1953 Copy No 55 INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COIMMITTEE NSC STATUS REPORT ON THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM 1 Representatives of the IAC haVe prepared the attached revision of 26 June 1953 They recommend a That the IAC concur in this report b That the DCI in transmitting this report to the President and the NSC indicate that the effects of recent budget cuts on intelligence activities cannot be assessed at this time and therefore are not reflected in this Report c That inasmuch as intelligence programs by their very nature are not subject to rapid change the D01 prOpose to the NSC that hereafter a complete revision of this Status Report be prepared only on an annual basis as of 30 June or such other date as the NSC may desire and that semiuannually there be submitted a brief supplementary statement of the most significant changes which have occurred since the annual report 2 The NSC requires that this paper he submitted by 1 August 1953 It would therefore be appreciated if each agency would telephone its concurrence or preposed changes to the Secretary of the IAC by noon Friday July 31 25Xl Secretary DOEHHEHT no M- so muses cuss m 1 strum-imam sum ammo Is rs In 3mm eats a WM sum an 19-2 I fem mm m gg iff 7 1 1 v 1 women Approved For Release 2006 11 22 1 Approved For ReleaSe 2566 1 i J 1 SECURITY INFORMATION IA 36312 Revised 28 July 19 53 - Copy No 5 No 7 - THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee CONTENTS Page I Objective 1 I I Coordination 2 National Estimates1V Political Social and Cultural IntelligenCe I 5 V Armed Forces Intelligence 6 VI Economic Intelligence 8 VII Scientific and Technical IntelligenCe 10 Intelligence 13 IX Geographic Intelligence 14 X Basic Intelligence 15 XI Warning of AttackXII Collection 17 Support and Collation Facilities 2 2 Revised I TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006 11 22 Approved Retes e CIA 36312 SECURITY INFORMATION Revised VII SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE 1 Scientific and technical intelligence regarding the USSR and Satellites continued to make some progress during the first half of 1953 However in the last analysis production of realistic estimates is still dependentupon securing information on Soviet objectives and progress There continues to be improvement in the analysis and evaluation of available information however the flow of information of a scientific and technical nature from conventional sources is becoming increasingly inadequate As a consequence there is an urgent need for the further development and utilization of new and improved methods and techniques for the collection of scientific and technical intelligence information Efforts along these lines have pro- greased slowly in the past six months notwithstanding present potential in the fields ofl photographic econnais sance Z A review of the effects of DCID 3 4 which allocated primary production responsibilities between CIA and the departments of the Department of Defense-and established the Scientific Estimates Com- mittee SEC was Scheduled for the first half of 1953 In order to proving5x1 more time for an appraisal of the effects of this directive the review has been postponed until August 1953 10 Revised as TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006 11 22 A roved For Release 2006 11 0 PP towsifi f CIA 36312 SECURITY INFORMATION mop 55x4 Revised 25x1 VII SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLICEEINCE Continued 4 Existing scientific and technical intelligence on conventional Soviet armaments other than naval continues to be good so far as standardized items in current use are concerned However intelli gence on weapons and equipments pertaining to the Soviet air offensive and defensive capabilities remains generally inadequate Information regarding Soviet guided missiles programs is also poor although cer- tain projects based on German developments are becoming better known In general knowledge of key scientists test facilities and trends in military research and development remains too inadequate to be a sound basis for predicting future Soviet weapons and equipment 5 While the existence of a Soviet biological warfareprogram has not been positively confirmed there continue to be indications supporting the belief that such a program does exist Existence of a Soviet chemical warfare program has been confirmed however very little additional information related to this program has been received in the past six months The limited progress obtained in chemical warfare intelligence has come from increased utilization of Soviet open literature in related fields The extreme scarcity of intelligence in both fields offers an opportunity for the Soviets to obtain technological surprise 6 Some progress has been made in the exploitation of open scientific literature and in research in depth on institutions but knowledge of basic scientific research and development behind the Iron Curtain remains inadequate Information on Soviet long-range scientific develoPment programs is similarly poor Information on -11- Revised TOP SECRET Approved For Raiease 2006 11 22 Approved For Release SECURITY CIA 3631 2 IAC 5 4 RevisedVII SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE Continued the quantity of Soviet scientific and engineering manpower is reason-- ably adequate but estimates of its quality remain less satisfactory In View of the increasing importance of such basic scientific informa- tion to the prediction of future Soviet potential a concentrated effort to improve intelligenee in this field is planned for the coming months -12 Revised TOP SECRET Approved For R lease 2006 11 22 1 - A roved For Release 2006 11 12 - - pp cm 36312 secumw INFORMATION Revised STATSPEC XII OLLEC TION Continued b Propaganda Analysis Requirements of estimating offices and warfare activities have resulted in a slight shift in emphasis in the propaganda analysis effort leading aWay from the preparation of weekly reviews of the whole propaganda field and towards the pro- duction of more numerous specialized propaganda studies on substantive intelligence problems 8 Foreign Materials and Equipment Collection of Soviet bloc items from overt sources has in- 25 creased appreciably during the past six months and has provided useful data to economic and scientific intelligence and to the program While military operations in Korea have not led to the capture of many important military enduitems since January plans are under consideration for more intensive exploitation and analysis IAC Revised TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006 11 22 I R000800070010-0 Approved For Release SECURITY CIA 36312 Revised of captured explosives propellants and other material available in the Far Eastern theater Significant information on aircraft cowponents was obtained from inspection of me MIG 15's 25X1 I The Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee of the 110 has absorbed the functions of the former Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency in the col- lection and exploitation of foreign materials 9 Monitoring of Radio Jamming Under NSC 66 1 the agencies undertook the construction and organization of a monitoring system to obtain information on Soviet jamming and related activities in the radio frequency spectrum A pilot operation involving a very limited number of stations is being established Adequate information as to the extent of Soviet jamming concentration of the jamming stations and related information must 25x1 await the initiation and implementation of a much-expanded program IAC Revised 21- TOP SECRET Approved For Refease 2006 11 22                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu