arr-me isrnompsonzmac 0 Q re and Of n r wm DEPARTMENT OF STATE h l d R y It s s ri i i t5 Memorandum of Conversation DATE December 19 1962 SUBJECT Skybolt PARTICIPANTS U S U K The President The Prime Minismr Secretary McNamara Lord Home Mr Ball Mr Thorneycroft Ambassador Bruce AmbassadOr Gore Mr Bundy Mr de Zuleta Ambassador Thompson Mr Bligh Copies to 5 1 i rime Minister began the conversation with an express of apprecia tion to the handling of the Cuban affair by the United St ates In reply the Pres -nt expressed his appreciation for the attitude of the Prime Minister and British Government which was in striking contrast with that of the press The Prime Minister said that he regretted that the wide range of the talks in which he had expected to engage at this meeting had been overshadowed by the Skybolt problem He thought he was probably the oldest of those present and knew the story from its beginning which he would like to recount He fully appreciated the U S feeling of the danger of doing something which might be considered obnoxious or unfriendly by he other European powers He did not want to cause trouble with the Germans the French the Italians and others or to impede developments which were wanted both by the United States and the United Kingdom In efirst place he wanted to mention that the atomic bomb had been de veloped almost entirely in the beginning by British scientists The British Isles had been found too small to carry out tests Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed that the development of the bomb should be carried out in the L FORM BEQLASSEFEEB 3 SECRET E O 135268EC 3 5 massage 1 15 0 908992 SECRET 3ng a ii tint iited States The whole world knew about the prtt- in in this matter 1 nich was governed by agreement He was not referring in a legal docu ment but rather to the nature of the agreement Then there had come the incidents of spies in Great Brit 2 11 and the McMahon Act There were many including some in the United State 3 who felt that Britain had been treated Amendments to the Mr mn Act had been which made greater cooperation possible At this time the em'anasis was on the bomb Later the emphasis shifted to the means of deliver Britain he spent about sixty million pounds on the Blue Streak Then arose the decision as to whether the development of this missile -uld be continued Britain was a small and heavily populated island the missile would have to be situated near towns where it would be ject to observation and would be exposed to agitators- The Prime 1ister had talked to President Eisenhower about the pr ablem and had sated the British were going to chuck it if they could as t anyt'l cing else Eng -2- _-11en Skybolt came along as well as Polaris The British ma is an an 1-6 ment to buy Skybolt He was not basing himself on the terms a the 1-1 ea ment but rather on the gentlemen 8 understanding Eisenhower had he wanted something in return namely the su marine base at 1 my Loch The British had favored another location but had agreed on Holyi och which was more remote and harder for a 'Bussell and friends reach The Prime Minister said that ircm time to time ad 5 577 St on the Skybolt development and he had assumed that i a tes as in England there were always these rumors 12 31 ritw us or services He went on to say it did now seem tiat yb it was ible ePrime Minister said he understooc the J S anxiety for ffect US-UK agreement might have on other Be though main es understood the UK relationshi as a 51kind of founder mpany as well as the special arrangement brought about by the amends 11t the McMahon Act He said othe other proble 11- was the possibility of bringing into being a larger grouping of powers as well as the po ssibi t effect of any such agreement on the Common 1 1 1 1 ket negotiations The Prime Minister said flatly that he thought the effect of a new agreeme it on the Common Market agreement would be frankly absolutely none These negotiations now depended on whether the French could maintain 1e good deal they have in agricultural procucts vis-a vis the Germans if it failed it would be on that basis The French and the British have different concept about the Common Market the French favoring an tarchical system There was the question as to what effect an igrc ment would have on European multilateral arrangements It was SECRET Transcript of page 2 drawn from Foreign Relations of the United States United States The whole world knew about the partnership in this matter which was governed by agreement He was not referring to a legal document but rather to the nature of the agreement Then there had come the incidents of spies in Great Britain and the McMahon Act There were many including some in the United States who felt that Britain had been treated harshly Amendments to the McMahon Act had been made which made greater cooperation possible At this time the emphasis was on the bomb Later the emphasis shifted to the means of delivery Britain had spent about sixty million pounds on the Blue Streak missile Then there arose the decision as to whether the development of this missile should be continued Britain was a small and heavily populated island and the missile would have to be situated near towns where it would be subject to observation and would be exposed to agitators The Prime Minister had talked to President Eisenhower about the problem and had indicated the British were going to chuck it if they could get anything else Then Skybolt came along as well as Polaris The British made an agreement to buy Skybolt He was not basing himself on the terms of the agreement but rather on the gentlemen's understanding Eisenhower had said he wanted something in return namely the submarine base at Holy Loch The British had favored another location but had agreed on Holy Loch which was more remote and harder for Lord Russell and his friends to reach The Prime Minister said that from time-to-time doubts had been cast on the Skybolt development and he had assumed that in the United States as in England there were always these rumors circulated by rival firms or services He went on to say it did now seem that Skybolt was in trouble The Prime Minister said he understood the U S anxiety for the effect any US-UK agreement might have on other allies He thought the main allies understood the US-UK relationship as a kind of founder company as well as the special arrangement brought about by the amendment of the McMahon Act He said the other problem was the possibility of bringing into being a larger grouping of powers as well as the possible effect of any such agreement on the Common Market negotiations The Prime Minister said flatly that he thought the effect of a new agreement on the Common Market agreement would be frankly absolutely none These negotiations now depended on whether the French could maintain the good deal they have in agricultural products vis-a-vis the Germans If it failed it would be on that basis The French and the British have a different concept about the Common Market the French favoring an autarchical system There was the question as to what effect an agreement would have on European multilateral arrangements It was mum-ET Edi 1 3 difficult to know what was meant by a multilateral deterrent The Prime Minister saw no conflict between independent and interdependent forces Until a supernational authority developed it did not matter whether it was army trOOps or air force Any contribution would be under the control of the Government contributing it He remarked that the problem of control of allied forces had been with us since Marlborough and really was not difficult He was aware that the French would go on and spend a lot of money They were grateful for the aid the United States had given and he had tried to explain this to de Gaulle He gave the example which he had not cited to General de Gaulle for reasons of tact of British forces in the last war which were put under the command of the French General Gamelin but at a certain time Churchill had to issue orders to Lord Ger '0 save the British forces and any French who wanted to come along by geing to the channel ports This enabled the air force to save Britain Unti there was a single state developed there must be a combination of inde - -ndent and joint forces The question was whether the switch of horses from Skybolt t9 Polaris would upset the nr1nc1pal allie9 He thought not If it did we Could make some gesture All these things we rl' were moussing were gestures in a sense since the only reality was gut J S power At present Britain had a bomber force it -1 le 1 was If 53 re were to be a role for the bomber in the future it would probably pa from a strategic one to a tactical one Why should they not hand over ore squadron to Saceur They could ask the French to do the same This we show the purpose of developing the philosophy of building a joint force They could inform the others what the targets of such a force were to 1e He thought that at present others were feeling left out and could waif oe brought in and given more information about these matters He did not see the difference in principle whether one fired a ballistic mis sile from the sea or the air He pointed out that the Skybolt was a ballism tic missile Many in Britain thought that Great Britain should not be in this game but Britain could not have such a decision forced on themu The President said he agreed that there was a danger that some would think that cutting off the Skybolt was an effort to cut off the British national deterrent He pointed out that the United States had alternative me ins In considering this matter we were conscious of the importance of the British to our relationship to Europe He had told the Prime Minister last night that the United States would divide the cost of Skybolt wh' ch would amount to some $200 milliOn It was possible that we could use it in the future if we could develop an airplane capable of staying in SE CRET the sky for several days but we have no great need for Skybolt We were prepared to join equally in finishing it He pointed out that this was 1new position beyond that which had been given to Mr Thorneycroft All of the U S judgments in regard to Skybolt were made in consideration of the eX istence of our other systems He pointed out that for $100 million the British could get $450 million worth of work which we had put in it Sky- boit should be capable of deterring Mr Khrushchev He pointed out that twenty missiles in Cuba had had a deterrent effect on us For an amount of money that was not large the British could maintain a deterrent that would take them through to a later period For $100 million they would get a $500 million system elm-aw m1 an The second point the President wished to make was that he was aware of the history of the atomic weapon and washed to point out that we were still cooper atin wants ubisupported the French in this field and th1s lia d du d our relationship with General de Gaulle The reason for this was 1 Germany We had paid more attention to the Cermamproblem than the i British and part1cularly the problem of Berlin We had supported WW Britain sentry into the Common Market although this was bcu nd to have adverse effects upon us The reason was that we felt that influ ence was important in the balance and that Britain would contribute to the stability of EurOpe We had refused help to the French because of our concern of what might happen in Germany we should assist the French this would not change de Gaulle at all but pressure in Germany would rise if we helped the French it meant that any other country which became an atomic power would expect help from us We hoped that we could use the time available to develop a multinational force E The President went on to point out that there was a greatldifference be- tween Polaris and Skybolt Moreover the problem was what these things looked like and not what they were This point had been illustrated by the introduction of Soviet missiles in Cuba These missiles had been less a military threat than a major political act If we join with the British in Polaris and refuse de Gaulle atomic or missile cooperation we would feed the concept he already has of America and raise new problems The President said he did not believe that it we went ahead together on Polaris that it would not shake our European allies All of our people who had recently been in Europe and this included Secretary Rusk Mr Ball and Ambassador Bohlen were convinced that such action would cause great difficulties He did not want the British people to think that because of our view in opposition to the proliferation of atomic weapons SECRET ml Wh Iw 1 11 mm swear that we had opposed a British deterrent If we could work out a solution in regard to Polaris which would move Europe away from national deter- rents we would be prepared to consider such a move but it should be in that context The President pointed out that all the implications would have to be considered and that this was a new problem on which study was needed The United States had made a fair offer on Skybolt so that the British people should not think that we want to cut them down -5- I The Prime Minister pointed out that it might not be a shotgun wedding out we had destroyed the virginity oi the bride The President suggested- _ this might be because we had access to other g1rls The Prime Minister said we ought to think about what a multilateral deterrent is It need not the one in which the weapons are manufactured by the others The President said the question was one of how these weapons should be put in and how they could bet aken out As the Prime Minister had described the matter last night it seemed rather Of course in extremes they could be taken out He pointed out that there was a question as to whether we could get the French in and what the effect on the Germans would be of United States3 British and French participation The P1 mie Minister said we would create a force to which the United States the French and British would contribute Tne President pointed out that if others developed atomic weapons they would expect us to give the elivery system The Polaris was not just an extension of Skybolt which was not much good after 1970 when bombers would fade out The Prime Minister pointed out that Skybolt would be good into the early seventies The Prime Minister asked if there were a multinational force was the case that the United States would contribute part-of their force while the others would contribute all of theirs The President replied in the affirmative stating this was the greatest hope fer a Polaris arrangement which would not upset other members of the alliance He thought we should discuss two possibilities The first was Skybolt If the United States did not have Polaris we would take Shybolt but we had two other systems The British did not We were continuing our bomber force with the Hound Dog missile He pointed out that we would have to discuss this whole problem with Con gress and he suggested that we and the British should set up a group to discuss these two problems and reach a judgment during the winter SECRET if WQW Mr Ball said that this should be done in a multilateral context We had a different concept of a multinational force from the British We had in mind mixed manning and that the right of withdrawal would not be en visaged but a commission should consider this problem The President said that if after study the British judgment of the effect on Europe was correct we could consider the British concept or that de scrioed by Mr Ball Lord Home said he did not share the anxiety the President had expressed France was going ahead anyway Even if there were a row with France it would be far less damaging to NATO than a rift between the United States and Great Britain The President asked if we should make a similar offer to the French Our cooperation with them now was minimal De Gaulle was beginning gto realize that the problem was not the atomic warhead but the missile Elf he asked for the missile what do we do Lord Home pointed out that if the proposal was a multinational force as described by Mr Ball it would be voted down because it was impossible to have fifteen fingers on the trigger and the Europeans did not want _--any German finger on the trigger He thought that the U S and the U K and later the French should have a joint force with NATO targets Mr Ball pointed out that we had different assessments of the German problem We thought that after Adenauer pressure would mount for some hind of partmipatlon The Germans would net be second class - Lord Home thought that the pressure would be for participation in politi cal decisions lmr Ball replied he thought we should face the situation and enable Ger- many to have participation in a manner that is controllable The Prime Minister asked what we meant by participating He doubted if Germany would be satisfied with having one of fifteen sailors t'I he President asked what was the alternative to national deterrents SECRET - - - - kmm mw euwwx 1 if it i 3 The Prime Minister said that he had taken his country a long way in participating in Europe in the economic field This was not all very agreeable for Britain but he had done it But if the whole of Europe was to be dependent upon the United States why should they do any thing It was not satisfactory to have one out of fifteen sailors The President pointed out that Europe could use the same argument against Great Britain though he agreed there was more logic in the present arrangements than in a multilateral force Lord Home thought that the Eurogoeans would be satisfied to see the United States Britain and France coopera are in a nuclear force if the Europeans knew about the deployment targeting etc None of them wanted Germany to be in and Germany did not want to bring this fact out into the open De Gaulle had made clear his view thatii itGermany were to geta atomic arms this would unite Eastern Europe The Euro peans did not want Germany to have atomic weapons and were opposed to a multilateral ferce The Prim eMinister said that de Gaulle wanted to keep alive his distant hope that the Eastern European satellites whom Germany had treated badly could achieve freedom The President said Adenauer had expressed the hope that we would not give atomic weapons to France because of the pressure this would - arouse in Germany The Prime Minister remarked that de Gaulle had quoted Adenauer as saying exactly the opposite Mr Bell said we shared the apprehensions in regard to Germany fracquiring atomic power but it would be worse if Germany became an independent nuclear power History had demonstrated that we could keep Germany in an inferior pesition forever and any attempt to do so would stir up latent forces in Germany or this reason we sup ported a NATO approach Mr Thorneycroft said we should not force the creation of a multi national force which was not wanted but rather have the Europeans come 11 at the shallow end of the pool informing them regarding targeting etc Mr Ball remarked that this would not work imam SECRET 11 Lord Home said we did not have a single ally in Europe that Would allow Germany to have its finger on the trigger - Germany would be in an in ferior position but we must contrive something to cover this up i The President referred to the diminishing cost of atomic weapons and said they might become attractive to the Italians and others If we - gave the French Polaris submarines we would save them a good deal of money and some time He said that Secretary McNamara did not think the time saved would be very great but the saving in money would be considerable Secretary McNamara confirmed this statement He thought the great protection with respect to delivery systems was their cost He thought that it was important to keep the attention of the Germans in particular on conventional weapons because of Berlin al though it it were not for Berlin'Europe could be defended with four divisions and a nuclear strategy The President asked what the argument was against giving such assist ance to the French The Prime Minister said the British had made a contract which had not worked out The President observed that France had objected to our 1958 decision agd__to Norstad proposals or two years We had been opposirig f Norstad and de Gaulle Now it was suggested that we come up with a new positiOn which Would represent a change of policy and it would be wise not to hasten this decision The Prime Minister said it wassimply a question of one horse being lame while the other was able to run The President rejoined that these were two different races The Prime Minister said he did not accept this Lord Home suggested that if we got a multinational force we could give the French Polaris at a later date The President suggested we should consider the whole situation and perhaps have a statement that should state SECRET - a- kl SECRET if -9- 5 i We had offered to make the Hound Dog missile available and he referred in this connection to the treatment of our position by the British and American press which had made it look as though we-were being unfair 2 We had offered to continue the Skybolt program and to put $100 million more into its development which would enable Britain to continue its national deterrent 3 We discussed the problem of Polaris which was a new field and which should be looked at with care 5 The President went on to say that we should look at what we meant by multinational force How should control be exercised Whether a similar offer should be made to France And finally we should make Es judgment on what the effec tof our action would be in Europe The tatement he had outlined would answer the charges of United States Ebad faith and the charge that Britain was without any alternative He did not think however that we could decide these mat ers here Lord Home expressed some concern at putting all this on paper as this would highlight the inferior position of Germany and stir up the Germans Mr Ball said this should be on the basis of a private discussion The Prime Minister asked that ii the present position had not arisen when the Skybolt would have been Operational Secretary McNamara replied that it would have been operational in 1988 The Prime Minister asked if the Skybolt was likely to be reasonably effective and if it would be safe to carry Secretary McNamara replied that it would be safe to carry and would be an effective deterrent but would have low reliability something on the order of twenty to thirty percent operational reliability The President pointed out that if we did not have other systems avail- able we would go ahead on Skybolt Secretary McNamara said that in such circumstances we would certainly consider going ahead but he did not feel that we could do so in view of the availability of alternate systems and the low reliability of Skybolt SECRET -10 The Prime Minister inquired if the record of failure was worse than normal in McNamara-replied in the affirmative stating that this was the most sample system we had yet attempted He pointed out that an error of on foot per second meant an error of one thousand feet at target Ch Prime Minister said he was terribly to blame for the situation Earutain was in as he had made an error of judgment and should have - 2 Que on to develop the Britishmissile The President observed that the British had lost time whereas we had lost $400 million Mr McNamara pointed out that he was in a difficult situation in explain ing to Congress why we had spent $200 million since 1961 He had asked Congress for $100 million for 1962 and for $180 million for 1963 the President suggested that these figures might be useful to Mr Thorneycroft in explaining the situation to Parliament 5 Thorneycroft said that his difficulty in Parliament was that the Sky bolt would be late expensive and unreliable and these facts had been made public a President said the British press had been carrying stories he ect that our action had not been taken on technical grounds but o1 iitical ones I Thorneycroft said the British press was looking at the alternative rThe Prime Minister said he agreed that the press muSt as dean with mot not utilized Hepointed out that the Hound Dog was diffiault to use British planes McNamara pointed out that the Hound Dog could be adapted to Brine- wanes although some changes in the missile would have to be made Mr Thorneycroft pointed out that this would take a long time and even when accomplished would leave only eighteen inches of clearance at take- off In any event this could not be accomplished until about the time when bombers would no longer be used SECRET SECRET _11-1 I 3 E1 53 New 521 it rThe Prime Minister said the problem was 101 him as it had been for Britain in 19410 whether to chuck __it or 9 had told $2 -111 E him in 1940 that in logic it was impos ssible 1o win the war but they had gone on There were lots of people in Britain who would like to chuck it which would enable them to have better pensions and a more Immune W satisfactory life The other alternative was to say that this is a complicated system the Americans won t give it to us we will go on and make it eventually and be free This would be better than putting a British sailor on board ship to have tea with the Portuguese To give up would mean that Britain was not the nation that had gone through its glorious history We should consider that if the people who wanted to give up in Britain came to power who would make the better ally Those were the ones we were supporting in Britain by our poli cies It was true that Germany was dangerous but not as much as be fore the war because the whole balance had changed and there were now two super powers They must find some method to deal with this problem Either Britain musts tay in the nuclear club or he would re - sign and we would have a permanent series of Gateskills Be would not engage in anything petty We coqu stay at Holy Loch He pointed out that he had taken big risks in his policies People had said that Britain was in the 1'1 out line where they were all targets but had none of the power He would be prepared to put in all of his part of a Polaris force provided the Queen had the ul timate power and right to draw back in the case of a dire emergency similar to that in 1940 Be thought the United States would do the same if we did not have a super fluity of weapons Britain could make submarines not nuclear ones to carry missiles This could be accomplished in sir years but the cost would have to be compensated elsewhere He hoped not in the Far East where the British contribution was in some ways more important than in Europe They would have to tax their people more as well There was no use prolonging the life of the somber which was bound to die in any event Submarines were much more suitable for an island like Britain which also had a great naval tradition Such a course however would lead to a deep rift with the United States He said he would not accuse America and reminded the President that he was one half American himself The President said that in the first place we were prepared to do what we said we would do He pointed out that we had spent a great deal of money in carrying out the commitment which Eisenhower had made and that there could be no suggestion of bad faith We placed great SECRET SECRET ii Wm h we We -12 value on our relationship with Great Britain He pointed out that the British had their own scientists at the Douglas Plant a11d asked what they had been say1ng during the last six monthe He recalled talking oTuIian Amory' about this problem who had seen so affected had 1a can to his bed The President had not before realized what the 5 5 1 British reaCtion to this problem would be Amory had flown out to the 5 5 Douglas Plant and on his return had thought things were not in bade shape but1Br1fish at the Douglas Plant were apparently say- trouble was not technical but political Mr Thorneycroft suggested that such reports might have come from U S personnel particularly those interested in continuing the project In reply to a question from the President as to his own opinion on Sky bolt Mr Thorneycroft said he had to rely on Mr McNamara s judg- ment as he had gone thoroughly into the matter and had publicly said that Skybolt would be late expensive and unreliable The President pointed out that McNamara s judgment was based on the fa at that he had al ternative systems He pointed out that for $250 million investment the British could get a good buy which would deter Khrushchev Mr Thorneycroft pointed out that his own experience was that systems of this kind could be successfully developed only if you went flat out in your effort and there was the prospect of a good order at the end of the line The Prime Minister asked the President what he would do if he were The President thought our only difficulty was the different judgment we had on the effect a bilateral arrangement would have in Europe and he repeated that all of our experts thought this would be very serious The Prime Minister said this appeared to be based on the assumption that this was a different weapon The President said we could not settle this matter today and then read excerpts from a U 8 draft paper which listed 1 our offer of Hound Dog 2 our offer to share equally in cost of completion of Skybolt 3 a plan for the two governments to cooperate in a NATO missile force SECRET P 3- r -57 11 i rig-ta 35 7 The President said that after consultation with NATO the two governments might agree that the forces developed under our agreement would be assigned to deterrent forces and assigned targets under agree ments approved by the U S would undertake to make similar assignment of parallel and equivalent forceswould support the creation of a NATO multilateral forceforces would be included in such a NATO multilateral force The Prime Minister inquired what would happen about SEATO The British would be contributing all of their force to NATO and he inquired what would happen it the Chinese attacked Bong Kong He threw out the suggestion that the British contribution might be made proportionate to that of the United States He said that the British force might be of the most value in the Far East The President said the same assistance might be made available to France which probably would not want it The Prime Minister thought the French might be tempted by the time that would be gained At this point the meeting broke up for lunch                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu