r lftAfTURN no Time DATE SUBJECT CDA FIL a MLF Disar namen1 Place ES c oh I lYit iJ J t ' ll obe PARTICIPANTS M1' orsi I Kornienko o t' Chargt d'at'faires Soviet Embassy 7 t It' r ' R ' Mr Ronald I Spiers ' EUR RPM I OPJES TO RPM INR-Y A CDA ' G PM EUR SOY I b P _ ' J - to I USRO Paris Moscow US Miss i on Geneva TODIS S AL bassy SIN I y- 9 8 - ' II I ' - k' 'to at 0 '- 0 1 1 J 7 l OO p m Soviet Embassy hi te House Mr Klein r Mr Kornieoko invited me to lunch at the Soviet Embassy to get up to date on lIbat I had been doing since ve last met in March He noted that I bad just returned from the MAW Ministerial Meeting in Ottava vhere Ie had been making history He said that unfortunately tbe future vouJ d hold us responsible or tbe bad direction of this history U S pressure for the l fu1tilateral Force was something all of us vouJ d regret in the future since it couJ d only resuJ t in bringing the Germans closer to having control over their own nuclear weapons The MLF vouJ d vorsen the international atmosphere heighten international tensions and a ccordingly reduce the possibilities of reaching agreements between the US and' UsSR S niling and shaking his f ingar at me he charged that I bad to bear some of this responsibility since a enge in U S policy on non-proliferation came about the same time I moved frO ll disarmament to NATO matters Korllienko said there had been a radical change in' Deceljlber oo fore the Soviets understood our purpose in the MLF exercise as being to shov our allies hOll expens1ve and difficuJ t a nuclear -capability vas in order to convince them to leave things as they vere After Uassau there laB a clear effort to present the MLF as something deSirable Mr -- GROUP 1 Excluded from antooatic downgrading and declassification L J o SECRET-LIMIT DISTRIBUTIOn o - 'f apo oa J I 1 1 ' t o ' o I SECRET-LIMIT DISTRIBUTION -2o I said that I wished my own syperiors sbared bis assessment at ill1'l' ce on the course of history Fact rather than modesty bowever t'orc' 'i l I e to admit tbat I vas a latecomer to the MLF wieb has been 'uode - discussion internationally for over two years Nevertheless I vas rsonally a proponent of the MLF since I was firmly onvinced of the -ightness of our non-proliferation policy I continued to con ider opP z tion to proliferation of nuclear weapons capability as one of the jor areas of co -Con interest betveen our two governments and I still boped tbat this co r mon area of interest vould allo us to build mutually 'cenencial agreements He could only UIlderst md the MLF oorrectly i f he S8' it as an expression of this fundamental U S policy He and his gpverr ent IOuld be mistaken if they read into our support for the MLF any basic cbangc in our position 1be MLF was at bottom a vay of forestalling new national nuclear programs and tpis was one of the basic motivations for our support for it I I I I j I Kornienko said that be did not cballenge the sincerity of this view out that he did eballenge its objective correctness He agreed with Walter Lippc ann that our attempt to vaccinate the Germans against tbe nuclear disease by means of tbe MLF vas a Tuodamental mistake as we ourselves IOuld realize in tbe future when it vas too late e MLF would only result in tbe Germans' catching the nuclear disease He understood tbat 1Il l lY of our JATO friends felt exactly the some vay these people were correct He knew that the UK had many reservations on this 3core as did the French e US alone IOuld bave to bear the responsibility for creating the monster of a German nuclear capaCity since it vas quite clear there SID enthusiasm for the MLF outside of Germany and tbe US was having to line up 3Upport Greece and TUrkey ' ere unmportant and Italy would do watever lie wanted He boped that the US did not really believe tbat i t vas responding to European wishes It 'II8S inevitable that Geman participation in tbe I U and the physical contact with nuclear lIeapona which would result Ias a further step on the road' to disaster Von Hassel's statement on arriving back in Germany a bout the need for the US to relinquish ts veto on the MLF in due course had been vell noted by the Soviets and re-confi ed the correctness o their viev Five years ago he had l istened to a discussion'betvejln t lOl Qerman j urnalists in which the future progress tovards a German nuclear ca pability vas outl ined step-by-step beginning with the presence on German territory o i of nuclear veapons initially under U S control the sharing by Germa ny of decisions on use of nuclear weapons and finally an all-German nuclear capability Developments in the intervening time had proved so far ' that these German ne1lSpapermen knev clearly how the German master plan IOuld develop W'hat they predicted as coming true point by point hatever ve said nov the US vould not be able to' resist the demands a ll uded to by Von Hassel that tbe MLF be goverened by a IIl l jority vote ' he Germans would be a majority stockhol der and their effort IOuld be to convince SECRET-LIMIT DISTRIBUTION a I I I ' L DECLASSIFJED o Authority iVNl 1 2 8 - I SECRET-LIMIT DISTRIBUTION o -3everJbody that fairness required a majority voice for tbem 111ey would be s' lccessi'ul in tbis effort 111e Gemans would be able to use lIhat they learned as participants in the 1 fLF for their own nuclear progr 8lll in the future 111is was not just a distorted fear of the Soviet Union many RAW journalists and officials sbared tbis view entirely I asked l r Kornien 1to bether the Soviet U lion would prefer a German nuclear program or a co bined Franco-German program to the MLF I recognized that we disagI'eed ab lut the pro's pects of sucb developments C l llillg about but I thought he liaS badly mistaken i f he believed that tbe Ger- a s -ould be content Yitb the status quo indefinitely I also 'Wanted to correct an jJnpression he had about the MLP arrangements Waapons in the HLP v luld be made in the US and protected to prevent unautborized discl lsure of in ' lrmation alloYing participants to learn bow to cake nuclear weapons 011 their Olin The HLP ws not to be a device for indirect disse lination of nuclear design info ation ' Mr Kornienko said that tech licaily this may be bat 'ole bave in mind but as a practical matter this was not a system which could be preserved indefinitely I asked him bat the Soviet Union 'ol luld do in tbis situation l fr Kornienko Gaid Sign a nO l-prol1feration agreement If the UK France the US and the US sR-were t l sign such an agreement one 'olithout loopholes -- the situation' would be far better and the problem of an MLF would not arise Germany and China would probably have to sign sucb an agreement although we vould have to ask these countries directly but even i f they did not the obstacle lhicb it presented -ould be a firm one Certainly this would be vorth a try Obviously no one could guarantee that in a hundred years Germa 'lY or China veuld not become nuclear powers but the Soviet Union was a practical country interested in the developaients of the next decade or GO He did not feel tbat U S officials truly understood that the establishment of the ILF would be a serious setback to tbose who sought an bprovement in US-USs ' relations The Soviets realized that we could push tbe UK and others into it but Ie should clearly know the responsibility tbat 'ole were undertaking in so doing I said tbe MLF vas not jist a negative anti-proliferation device In our view there were other p lsi ive reas ms for it it would' be a plausible military leapon to c lunter the nuclear threat to NATO Europe from Soviet nuclear forces In this sense the MLF would fulfill a military need rfor th Westl o Secondly it would be significant politically as a way of giving concrete expression to the solidarity of tbe Atlantic cou tries this 'WaS one ' of the virtues of mixed-manning apart from its being a safeguard against use of tbe force for purely national purposes natio l Notins that tbis was only a subordinate question Mr Kornienko asked whether the force 'WaS or 'WaS not to be disguised as merchant ships I recalled that 'ole bad tried to clarify this point in our response to the Sov et April 8 note He said that despite what ve bad said tbe press and otbers repeatedly refer -ed to merchant vessels SECRET-LIMIT DISTRIBUTION o - o 1 I UI CLASSIFIED Authority Nhll 1 2 8g J I SECRET-LIMIT DISTRIBUTION -4- I i I asked why the Soviets seer 1Cd t l be so interested in a NAWWa z v non-a gression pact nAP '111' Kornienko said that in present ci tances so e kind of an agreement betveen the East and West vas 'tant e lIAP in and of itseli' vas not very significant but 11 nuld be a useful sJ'lllb ll I e did not understand why some lIAW me 1ers including tAe US lpp lsed this He knev that some of tbe NATO me ers fav lred such a pact and eh ressed the confidence tbat this' vie veuld prevail I said that there seeme d to be three major catego es of objections to an nAP 1 the legal problel lS relating to rec 6nition of East Germany 2 a pbilosophical distaste for a Kellogg i ad kind If approach in international relations where the vord vas tak n for the deed and 3 a suspicion thnt sucb an agreement once concluded miGht be used by some to mrute nore difficult actions in tbe ilitary field which the West might feel it necessary to take to improve their seli'-defenses and vhich could be mis-characterized as aggressive an - herefore c lntra --y to the agree tent i evertheless tbe US was always open to considerati ln of any real possibility for reducing tensions Our ' pro llem vas that -e did n t belie'le that an HAP in isolation represented suci an opP lrtu lity Hr Kornienko said that the legal proble l could be QS s ged to ollr sat sfacti ln He al l'eed that any agreement was a piece If paper but that if such an agreement 'served mutual interests it could be a useful step All things considered the Soviet Union believed that an r Ap could be sucb a useful step at this time and tbat it should b seriously discussed He recognized that the French and the Germans particularly vere opposed to such an agreement although be hoped tbat the wiser counsels veuld prevail in NAW 'I asked whether abandonment of the MLF vould be a pre-condition for NAP as it nov seemed to' be for a non-proliferation agreement Mr KOr lienko said that an lAP vould be useful in and of itseli' apart from the MLF question I said that I thought personally there vere tva areas in which agre nt could be achieved and vhich vould be of mucb more substantial importance the non-pr lliferation question and the nuclear test ban question an Mr Kornienko said that as a result of the Rusk- romyko talks in Ge eva in arch and April of 1962 the Soviets' had concluded tha-e a nonproliferatioD agree ent vas a real possibility Hovaver the situation o cha ged radically wen the US shifted its position and began to push for I an 1 LF e present U S formula for a non-proliferation agreement 'Would in fact require the Soviets to approve the HLF and this vas out at' the question I reverted to his earlier expression of fear that the MLF vas jUS- one step t lward a German independent nuclear capability If tbese fee s vere sL cere a non-proliferation agreement such as va had proposed sbouJd be viewed favorably by the USSR since it vould effectively stop furtber development in the direction of German national control of nuclear vea p0Ds is is an opp lrtunity which should not be missed since ve SECRET-LIMIT DISTRIBUTION o o I DECLASSIFIED Authority NNI 12 8 v SECRET-LIMIT DISTRIBUTION -5- ' ' believe our major allies wuld be prepared nov to support an agreement such as we had proposed arid this ca y not alvays be the cnse I expressed the hope that ve hnd not reached an impasse on this subject since we could not erford to reject the e possibilities vhich presented themselves to improve relations I asl ed wether if the Soviet's concluded that the MLF vas going to go abead My I3oy they migbt be prepared to accept the for nula ve had suggested 11r Kornienko said that the SOviets lIere realists and he vould not say that an agreecent wuld be out of e question vith the passage of time nod wen such an agree tent vouJ d not be taken as Soviet acceptance of t e l-ILF I said tha time vas a precious co nmodlty and I a sumed this su'bject vas being carefully considered since in ' KornieDko's Olm viev the problem vith vhich our proposal was desigr d to deal vas a real one Tbe Soviets could not on the one hand object to the HLF as e step in an nndesireble direction and at the Beme tbe reject an agreement wich v luld forestall evolution in the direction they feared Mr Kornienko agreed that this vas a good lint I asked how he felt ab lut the test ban Mr Kornienko said he vas very pessimistic He ' had been back in I'' scoll in April and none of his colleaGUes wo had supported the idea of such an agreement had much hope ' hey vere bitter because they had been deceived by1he US deliberately 'they felt He hwelf had been told more than once by highly placed U S officiala that the question vas only one of principle if the SOviets just accepted the principle of on-site inspection agreement wuld be possible One U S official hed even said that one inspection vould suffice lhese reports hed led to a hot and heavy argUJnent in oscov and many people had ne out on a limb in the deep conviction that if they accepted mandatory on-site inspection the test ban question vould be solved These officials had been seriously embarr lssed and discredited by the U S deception I said that t l my knovledge no one bad been authorized to convey the i npression 1Iilich the Soviets cls i n to have rece'ived although admitting that our emphaSis on the principle of on-site inspection might have been llisread by some as a belief on our part that numbers vere unimportant lvever Soviet officials acquainted vith the US 1 have rec gnized that this vas a heavy political question on both sides I'certatnly could have told him at that time that no U S Administration could have just accepted a SOviet position wich they had held practically at the o beginning of the nuclear test tal 1ts This vould have been rightly chare c- terized as outright capitulation to the Soviets and a re d1ng of Soviet intransi nce and the reversal and re-reversal of their position on inspecti m Unlike Mr Kornienko O l'llever I cont uad t l be an optimist In this question Certainly there vas lIoma ground vhich might involve a little more give on his side vhich vould alloy us to approach an agreement Of all of the outstanding issues this vas substantively the most important area and to borrov a Soviet phrase tbis vas the one that was SECm T-LIMIT DISTRIBUTION '--I ''-LJ ISISIFIED o Authority NNI o -I 7 2 88 I o o o v t ' SECRET-LIMrT DISTRIBUTIOll -6nri st for agreement I could not conclude that under no circwnstances vould the Soviets move further o 'this question How could the question of _hree versus seven inspections spell the doom for sometbing of such po e tially historic importance1 Since today seemed to be a day to talk of history history would hold us accountable if this opportunity were pa5ced by I did lot believe that it vas impossible to work out tbe important questio of modalities of inspections I still remembei TSarapkin's co c cnt in Geneva when we irs tabled our annex describing inspection procedures that there illS much common ground With good vill tbese odalities could be settled and this would leaye us with the que tion of numbers The Soviet Union had to be understanding of the political realities for the US The US could not accept three The Soviets say they ca ot accept seven and therefore so far at least a test ban stays just out of reach I noted that ve had discussed tbree areas of possrble agreement a test ban non-proliferation and AP Perhaps one yould COffie to think of a combination of such ele ents plus other possible steps If the Soviets vere truly interested in finding areas df agreement there were certainly real possibilities for portant accomplis ents Mr Kornienko noted that it appeared ma lY of my disarma nent colleagues vere follOWing my footsteps out of disar ament I asked if the Soviets bave an agent in our personnel depart ent U- Kornienko said this 'vas not necessary but that his people follow these things very closely does this mean we have no bope for disarmament I replied that tbis illS a matter of no al turn ver plus a eeling on the part of a number of old bands that their responsibilities and scope for initiative yaS submerged in the new organizational structure and influx of personnel MY personal belief Yas that the next W or t3ree years VDuld not see much progress in dis en Ro ver over tbe longer term this subject would be a major one on the world agenda tbe open-ended costs of modern weapons tbeir accelerating pace of obsolescence the lack of net increase in security despite mounting a ents would force statesmen of both of our countries to treat this subject wftb much more seriousness than they do today I thought tbe disB 'T lament proble n would be wLth us for s me time and become less and less academic Mr Kornienko ' nodded agreement l SECRET-LIMIT DISTRIBUTION                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu