OFFICIAL USE ONLY PrenDecisionaH -- Not Subject to FOIA NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW UN OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Pre-Decisional Not Subject to FOIA UFFECIAL USE Pre Decisiorial Not Subject to FUIA CONTENTS Secretary s Preface Executive Summary Introduction to US Nuclear Policy and Strategy II An Evolving and Uncertain International Security Environment The Return of Great Power Competition Other uclear Armed States Have Not Followed Our Lead Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism Uncertainties Regarding the Future Security Environment Why US Nuclear Capabilities IV Enduring Nuclear Capabilities and the Roles of Nuclear Weapons in US National Security Strategy Deterrence of Nuclear and Non Nuclear Attack Assurance ofAllies and Partners Achieve U S Objectives if Deterrence Fails Hedging Against an Uncertain Future Security Environment Tailored Strategies and Flexible Capabilities Tailored Deterrence Flexible Capabilities VI US Strategies to Counter Contemporary Threats A Tailored Strategy for Russia A Tailored Strategy for China A Tailored Strategy for North Korea A Tailored Strategy for Iran Extended Deterrence and Tailored Assurance Hedging Against Diverse Uncertainties VII Current and Future US Nuclear Capabilities US Nuclear Enterprise Personnel The Strategic Nuclear Triad The Three Legs of the Strategic Nuclear Triad The Department of Defense Replacement Program Flexible and Secure Nuclear Capabilities An A ordable Priority Enhancing Deterrence with Non-strategic Nuclear Capabilities Nuclear Command Control and Communications Modernization - Nuclear Weapon Infrastructure IX Countering Nuclear Terrorism - Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Non-Proliferation and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Arms Control UNCLASSIFIEDHFOR OFFICIAL USE GNLY PreuDecisional Not Subject to FOIA USE GNLY PrenDecisionai Not Subject to FUEA Secretary s Preface On January 27th the President directed the Department of Defense to conduct a new Nuclear Posture Review NPR to ensure a safe secure and effective nuclear deterrent that safeguards the homeland assures allies and deters adversaries This review comes at a critical moment in our nation s history for America confronts an international security situation that is more complex and demanding than any since the end of the Cold War In this environment it is not possible to delay modernization of our nuclear forces and remain faithful sentinels of our nation s security and freedom fer the next generation as well as our own For decades the United States led the world in efforts to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty START set a ceiling of 6 000 accountable strategic nuclear warheads a deep reduction from Cold War highs Shorter range nuclear weapons were almost entirely eliminated from America s nuclear arsenal in the early 19903 This was followed by the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty and the 2010 New START Treaty which lowered strategic nuclear force levels to 1 550 accountable warheads The US nuclear weapons stockpile has been reduced by more than 85 percent from its Cold War high It was a promising time Many hoped conditions had been set for deep reductions in global nuclear arsenals and perhaps for their elimination These aspirations have not been realized America s strategic competitors have not followed our example The world is more dangerous not less - While Russia initially followed America s lead and made similarly sharp reductions in its strategic nuclear forces it retained large numbers of non-strategic nuclear weapons Today Russia is modernizing these weapons as well as its strategic systems Even more troubling has been Russia s adoption of military strategies and capabilities that rely on nuclear escalation for their success These developments coupled with Russia s mva-sion of Crimea and nuclear threats against our allies mark Moscow s unabashed return to Great Power competition China too is modernizing and expanding its considerable nuclear forces Like Russia China pursues entirely new nuclear capabilities tailored to achieve particular national security objectives At the same time China is modernizing its conventional military challenging traditional U S military'superiority in the Western Pacific Elsewhere the strategic picture is no less bleak North Korea s nuclear provocations threaten regional and global peace despite universal condemnation by the United Nations Iran s nuclear ambitions remain a significant concern Globally nuclear terrorism remains a constant threat We must look reality in the and see the world as it is not as we wish it to be This NPR realigns our nuclear policy with a realistic aSSessment of the threats we face today and the uncertainties regarding the future security environment Given the range of adversaries their capabilities and strategic objectives this review calls for a exible tailored nuclear strategy In nuclear deterrence no one size fits all A diverse set of nuclear capabilities provides an American President with exibility to tailor the approach to deterring one or more potential adversaries in different circumstances OFFICIAL USE ONLY Predkcisional Not Subject to FOIA 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 103 109 1'10 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 OFFEQIAL USE GNLY PremDecisional Not Subject to FGHA For any President the use of nuclear weapons is contemplated only in the most extreme circumstances to protect our vital interests and those of our allies and partners This nuclear strategy along with our conventional forces and other instruments of national power are therefore first and foremost directed towards deterring aggression and preserving peace Our goal is to convince adversaries they have nothing to gain and everything to lose from the use of nuclear weapons In no way does this approach lower the nuclear threshold Rather by convincing adversaries that even limited use of nuclear weapons will be more they can countenance itraises that threshold To this end this review confirms the findings of previous NPRs that the nuclear Triad supported by North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO dual-capable aircraft and a robust nuclear command control and communications system is the most cost effective and strategically sound means of ensuring nuclear deterrence The Triad provides the President needed exibility while guarding against technological surprise or sudden changes in the geopolitical environment To remain effective however these nuclear forces must be recapitalized The United States last did this during the Cold War By the time these forces are replaced they will have served decades beyond their initial life expectancy This review affirms the modernization programs initiated during the previous Administration to replace our nuclear ballistic missile submarines strategic bombers nuclear air launched cruise missiles ICBMs and associated nuclear command and control Modernizing our dual capable fighter bombers with next generation fighter aircraft will maintain the strength of deterrence posture and maintain our ability to forward deploy nuclear Weapons should the security situation demand it Recapitalizing the nuclear weapons complex of laboratories and plants is also long past due it is ital we ensure the capability to design produce assess and maintain these weapons for as long as they are required Due to underfunding by previous administrations significant and sustained investments will be required over the coming decade to ensure that National Nuclear Safety Administration will be able to deliver the nuclear weapons at the needed rate to support the nuclear deterrent in the 20303 and beyond Maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent is much less expensive than fighting a war that we were unable to deter Maintenance costs for today s nuclear deterrent are approximately Q9 percent of the annual defense budget Additional funding of another 3 to 4 percent over more than a decade will be required to replace these aging systems This is the top priority of the Department of Defense We are mindful of the sustained financial commitment and gratefully recognize the ongoing support of the American people and the United States Congress for this important mission While we will be relentless in ensuring our nuclear capabilities are effective the United States is not taming away from its long-held arms control non-proliferation and nuclear security objectives Our commitment to the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT remains strong But the'current environment makes further progress toward nuclear arms reductions in the near term extremely challenging ii OFFICIAL USE ONLY PreuDecisional Not Subject to FOIA 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 USE QNLY PreuDecisienai Nat Subject tn FGEA This review rests on a bedrock truth nuclear weapons have and will continue to play a critical role in deterring nuclear attack and in preventing large scale conventional warfare between nuclear armed states for the foreseeable future US nuclear weapons not only defend our allies against conventional and nuclear threats they also help them avoid the need to develop their own nuclear arsenals This in turn furthers global security I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the vital role our Airmen Sailors Marines Soldiers Coast Guardsmen and civilians play in maintaining a safe secure and ready nuclear force Without their tireless and often unheralded efforts America would not possess a nuclear deterrent At the end of the day deterrence comes down to men and women in uniform in silos in the stratosphere and beneath the sea To each and every one of them I wish to express my personal gratitude and that of a grateful and safe nation UNCLASSIFIEDHFOR GFFICIAL USE ONLY Pren ecisional Net Subject to 01A 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 USE PreuDecisionai m- Not Subject to Executive Summary Introduction On January 27 2017 President Donald Trump directed Secretary of Defense James Mattis to initiate a new Nuclear Posture Review NPR The President made clear that his first priority is to protect the United States allies and partners He also emphasized both the longnterin goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and the requirement that the United States have modern exible and resilient nuclear capabilities that are safe and secure until such a time as nuclear weapons can prudently be eliminated from the world The United States remains committed to its efforts in support of the ultimate global elimination of nuclear biological and chemical weapons It has reduced the nuclear stockpile by over-85 percent since the height of the Cold War and deployed no new nuclear capabilities for over two decades Nevertheless global threat conditions have worsened markedly since the most recent 2010 NPR including increasingly explicit nuclear threats from potential adversaries The United States now faces a more diverse and advanced nuclear threat environment than ever before with considerable dynamism in potential adversaries development and deployment programs for nuclear weapons and delivery systems An Evolving and Uncertain International Security Environment While the United States has continued to reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons others including Russia and China have moved in the opposite direction They h'ave added new types of nuclear capabilities to their arsenals increased the salience of nuclear forces in their strategies and plans and engaged in increasingly aggressive behavior including in outer space and cyber space North Korea continues its illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities in direct violation of United Nations UN Security Council resolutions Iran has agreed to constraints on its nuclear program in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action JCPOA Nevertheless it retains the technological capability and much of the capacity necessary to develop a nuclear weapon within one year of a decision to do so There now exists an unprecedented range and mix of threats including major conventional chemical biological nuclear space and cyber threats and violent non state actors These developments have produced increased uncertainty and risk This rapid deterioration of the threat environment since the 2010 NPR must now shape our thinking as we formulate policy and strategy and initiate the sustainment and replacement of US nuclear forces This 2018 NPR assesses previous nuClear policies and requirements that were established amid a more benign nuclear environment and more amicable Great Power relations It focuses on identifying the nuclear policies strategy and corresponding capabilities needed to protect America in the deteriorating threat environment that confronts the United States allies and partners It is strategy driven and provides guidance for the nuclear force posture and policy requirements needed now and in the future The United States does not wish to regard either Russia or China as an adversary and seeks stable relations with both We have long sought a dialogue with China to enhance our understanding of our respective nuclear policies doctrine and capabilities to improve iv OFFICIAL USE ONLY PrewDecisional Not Subject to FQEA 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 2'10 -- 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 GFFICHAL USE Pres ecisional -- Not Subject to FQEA transparency and to help manage the risks of miscalculation and misperception We hepe that China will share this interest and that meaningful dialogue with China can commence The United States and Russia have in the past maintained strategic dialogues to manage nuclear competition and nuclear risks Given Russian actions including its illegitimate annexation of Crimea this constructive engagement has declined substantially We look forward to conditions that would once again allow for peaceful and constructive engagement with Russia Nevertheless this review candidly addresses the challenges posed by Russian Chinese and other states strategic policies programs and capabilities particularly nuclear It presents the exible adaptable and resilient U S nuclear capabilities now required to protect the United States allies and partners and promote strategic stability The Value of U S Nuclear Capabilities The fundamental reasons why U S nuclear capabilities and deterrence strategies are necessary for U S allied and partner security are readily apparent U S nuclear capabilities make essential contributions to the deterrence of nuclear and non nuclear aggression The deterrence effects they provide are unique and essential to preventing adversary nuclear attacks which is the highest priority of the United States U S nuclear capabilities cannot prevent all con ict and should not be expected to do so But they contribute uniquely to the deterrence of both nuclear and non nuclear aggression They are essential for these purposes and will be so for the foreseeable future Non nuclear forces also play essential deterrence roles but do not provide comparable deterrence effects as is re ected by past periodic and catastrophic failures of conventional deterrence to prevent Great Power war before the advent of nuclear deterrence In addition conventional forces alone are inadequate to assure many allies who place enormous value on U S extended nuclear deterrence for their security U S Nuclear Capabilities and Enduring National Objectives The highest U S nuclear policy and strategy priority is to deter potential adversaries from nuclear attack of any scale However deterring nuclear attack is not the sole purpose of nuclear weapons Given the diverse threats and profound uncertainties of the current and future threat environment U S nuclear forces play the following critical roles in U S national security strategy They contribute to the I I Deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear attack 0 Assurance of allies and partners 0 Achievement of US objectives if deterrence fails and 0 Capacity to hedge against an uncertain future These roles are complementary and interrelated and the adequacy of U S nuclear forces must be assessed against each role and the strategy designed to fulfill it Preventing proliferation and denying terrorists access to finished weapons material or expertise are also key considerations in the elaboration of U S nuclear policy and requirements These multiple roles and objectives constitute the guiding pillars for'U S nuclear policy and requirements OFFICIAL USE ONLY PrenDecisional m- Not Subject to FOIA 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 SFFECEAL USE GNLY Pre- Becisienai m- Net Subject to FQEA Deterrence of Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Attack Effective U S deterrence of nuclear attack and non-nuclear strategic attack requires ensuring that potential adversaries do not miscalculate regarding the consequences of nuclear first use either regionally or against the United States itself They must understand that there are no possible benefits from non-nuclear aggression or limited nuclear escalation Correcting any such misperceptions is now critical to maintaining strategic stability in Europe and Asia Potential adversaries must recognize that across the emerging range of threats and contexts 1 the United States is able to identify them and hold them accountable for acts of aggression including new forms of aggression 2 we will defeat non nuclear strategic attacks and 3 any nuclear escalation will fail to achieve their objectives and will instead result in unacceptable consequences for them There is no one size fits all for deterrence Consequently the United States will apply a tailored and exible approach to effectively deter across a spectrum of adversaries threats and contexts Tailored deterrence strategies communicate to different potential adversaries that their aggression would carry unacceptable risks and intolerable costs according to their particular calculations of risk and cost U S nuclear capabilities and nuclear command control and communications N C3 must be increasingly exible to tailor deterrence strategies across a range of potential adversaries and threats and enable adjustments over time Accordingly the United-States will maintain the range of exible nuclear capabilities needed to ensure that nuclear or non nuclear aggression - against the United States allies and partners will fail to achieve its objectives and carry with it the credible risk of intolerable consequences for potential adversaries now and in the future Tn do so the United States will sustain and replace its nuclear capabilities modernize NC3 and strengthen the integration of nuclear and non-nuclear military planning Combatant Commands and Service components will be organized and resourced fOr this mission and will plan train and exercise to integrate U S nuclear and non-nuclear forces to operate in the face of adversary nuclear threats and employment The United States will coordinate integration activities with allies facing nuclear threats and examine opportunities for additional allied burden sharing of the nuclear deterrence mission Assurance of Allies and Partners The United States has formal extended deterrence commitments that assure European Asian and Pacific allies Assurance is a common goal based on collaboration with allies and partners to deter or defeat the threats we face 0 country should doubt the strength of our assurance commitments or the strength of U S and allied capabilities to deter and if necessary defeat any potential adversary s nuclear or non nuclear aggression In many cases effectively assuring allies and partners depends on their confidence in the credibility of U S extended nuclear deterrence which enables most to eschew possession of nuclear weapons thereby contributing to U S non-proliferation goals Vi OFFICEAL USE ONLY PreuBecisinnal Not Subject te 01A 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 283 289 290 291 292 293 294 2'95 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 QFFECKAL USE GNLY PreaDecisional Not Subject to FQHA Achieve U S Objectives Should Deterrence Fail If deterrence fails the United States will strive to end any con ict at the lowest level of damage possible and on the best achievable terms for the United States allies and partners US nuclear policy for decades has consistently included this objective of limiting damage if deterrence fails Hedge Against an Uncertain Future The United States will continue efforts to create a more cooperative and benign security environment but must also hedge against prospective and unanticipated risks Hedging strategies help reduce risk and avoid threats that otherwise may emerge over time including geopolitical technological operational and programmatic They also contribute to deterrence and can help reduce potential adversaries confidence that they can gain advantage through a break out or expansion of nuclear capabilities Given the increasing prominence of nuclear weapons in potential adversaries defense policies and strategies and the uncertainties of the future threat environment US nuclear capabilities and the ability to quickly modify those capabilities can be essential to mitigate or overcome risk including the unexpected US Nuclear Enterprise Personnel Effective deterrence would be impossible without the thousands of members of the United States Armed Forces and civilian personnel who dedicate their professional lives to the deterrence of war and protecting the Nation These exceptional men and women are held-to the most rigorous standards and make the most vital contribution to US nuclear capabilities-and deterrence The service members and civilians involved in the nuclear deterrence mission do so with little public recognition or fanfare Theirs is an unsung duty of the utmost importance They deserve the support of the American people for the safety security and stability they provide the Nation and indeed the world The service reforms we have accordingly implemented-were long overdue and the Department of Defense remains fully committed to properly supporting the service members who protect the United States against nuclear threats Triad Present and Future Today s strategic nuclear Triad largely deployed in the 1980s or earlier consists of submarines armed with submarine launched ballistic missiles land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers carrying gravity bombs and air-launched cruise missiles ALCMs The Triad and non strategic nuclear forces with supporting C3 provides diversity and exibility as needed to tailor U S strategies for deterrence assurance achieving objectives should deterrence fail and hedging The increasing need for this diversity and flexibility in turn is one of the primary reasons why sustaining and replacing the nuclear Triad and non strategic nuclear capabilities and modernizing NC3 is necessary now The Triad s synergy and overlapping attributes help ensure the enduring survivability of our deterrence capabilities against attack and our capacity to hold at risk a range of adversary targets throughout a crisis or con ict Eliminating any leg of the Triad would greatly ease adversary attack planning and allow an adversary to concentrate resources and attention on defeating the remaining two legs Therefore we will sustain our legacy Triad systems until the planned replacement programs are deployed vu OFFICIAL USE ONLY PrewDecisional a Not Subject to FOEA 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 323 3 29 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 OFFISIAL USE ONLY PrenDecisionai Ne t Subject to FOEA The United States currently operates 14 OHIO class and will continue to take the steps needed to ensure that OHIO remain operationally effective and survivable until replaced by the SSBN The COLUMBIA program will deliver a minimum of 12 to replace the current OHIO fleet and is designed to provide required deterrence capabilities for decades The ICBM force consists of 400 single warhead Minuteman missiles deployed in underground silos and dispersed across several states The United States has initiated the Ground-B ased Strategic Deterrent GBSD program to begin the replacement of Minuteman in 2029 The GBSD program will also modernize the 450 ICBM launch facilities that will support the fielding of 400 ICBMs The bomber leg of the Triad consists of 46 nuclear-capable and 20 nuclear capable stealth strategic bombers The United States has initiated a program to develop and deploy the next generation bomber the Raider It will first supplement and eventually replace elements of the conventional and nuclear capable bomber force beginning in the mid 20203 The 83 1 and 1361 11 gravity bombs can hold at risk a variety of protected targets As a result both will be retained in the stockpile at least until there is sufficient confidence in the B6l 12 gravity bomb that will be available in 2020 Beginning in 1982 bombers were equipped with ALCMs Armed with ALCMs the 52H can stay outside adversary air defenses and remain effective The ALCM however is now more than 25 years past its design life and faces continuously improving adversary air defense systems The Long Range Stand Off LRSO cruise missile replacement program will maintain into the future the bomber force capability to deliver stand-off weapons that can penetrate and survive advanced integrated air defense systems The current non snategic nuclear force consists exclusively of a relatively small number of 1361 gravity bombs carried by and allied F-l6 dual capable aircraft DOA The United States is incorporating nuclear capability onto the forward deployable nuclear-capable 5A as a replacement for the current aging DCA In conjunction withthe ongoing life extension program for the B61 bomb it will be a key contributor to continued regional deterrence stability and the assurance of allies - Flexible and Secure Nuclear Capabilities An Affordable Priority Throughout past decades senior US officials have emphasized that the highest priority of the Department of Defense DOD is deterring nuclear attack and maintaining the nuclear capabilities necessary to do so While cost estimates for the program to sustain and replace US nuclear capabilities vary even the highest of these projections place the hi ghpoint of the future cost at approximately 6 4 percent of the current budget Maintaining and operating our current aging nuclear forces now requires between two and three percent of the budget The replacement program to rebuild the Triad for decades of service will peak for several years at only approximately four percent beyond the ongoing two to three percent needed for maintenance and operations This 6 4 percent of the current budget required for the long term replacement program represents less than one percent of the overall federal budget This level of spending to replace US nuclear capabilities compares favorably to the 13 9 percent of UNCLASSIFEEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Prea ecisionai Not Subject tn FOIA 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361' 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 3 73 3721- 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 USE ONLY Pie-Decisienai m- Net Subject te FOEA the budget required during the last such investment period in the 19805 which at the time was almost 3 2 percent of the federal budget and the 24 9 percent of the DOD budget required in the early 1-9608 Given the criticality of effective US nuclear deterrence to the safety of the American people allies and partners there is no doubt that the sustainment and replacement program should be regarded as both necessary and affordable Enhancing Deterrence with Non-strategic Nuclear Capabilities Existing elements of the nuclear force replacement program predate the dramatic deterioration of the strategic environment To meet the emerging requirements of US strategy the United States will now pursue select supplements to the replacement program to enhance the exibility and responsiveness of US nuclear forces It is a re ection of the versatility and exibility of the US Triad that only modest supplements are now required in this much-more challenging threat environment These supplements will enhance deterrence by denying potential adversaries any mistaken confidence that limited nuclear employment can provide a useful advantage over the United States and its allies For example Russia s belief that limited nuclear first use potentially including low yield weapons can provide such an advantage is based in part on Moscow s perception that its greater number and variety of non strategic nuclear systems provide a coercive advantage in crises and at lower levels of con ict Correcting'this mistaken Russian perception is a strategic imperative - - To address these types of challenges and preserve deterrence stability the United States will enhance the exibility and range of its tailored deterrence options To be clear this is not intended to nor does it enable nuclear war-fighting Expanding exible US nuclear options now to include low yield options is important for the preservation of credible deterrence against regional aggression It will raise the nuclear threshold and help ensure that potential adversaries perceive no possible advantage in limited nuclear escalation making nuclear employment less likely 2 - Consequently the United States will maintain and enhance as necessary the capability to forward deploy nuclear bombers and DCA around the world We are committed to upgrading DCA with the nuclear capable 5A aircraft We will work with NATO to best ensure and I improve where needed the readiness survivability and operational effectiveness of DCA based in Europe Additionally in the near term the United States will modify a small number 'of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low yield option and in the longer term pursue a modern nuclear armed sea launched cruise missile SLCM Unlike DCA a low yield SLBM warhead and SLCM will not require or rely on host nation support to provide deterrent effect They will provide additional diversity in platforms range and survivability and a valuable hedge against future 1 nuclear break out scenarios and National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA will develop for deployment a low yield SLBM warhead to ensure a prompt response option that is able to penetrate adversary UN CLASSIF IEDHF 0R OFFICEAL USE ONLY fl Prea ecisional Net Subject to FOIA ix 'miI-A 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 UFFECEAL USE Prew ecisionai Not Subject to rota defenses This is a comparatively low cost and near term modification to an existing capability that will help counter any mistaken perception of an exploitable gap in U S regional deterrence capabilities In addition to this near term step for the longer term the United States will pursue a nuclear- armed SLCM leveraging existing technologies to help ensure its cost effectiveness SLCM will provide a needed non strategic regional presence an assured response capability and an Treaty compliant response to Russia s continuing Treaty violation - In the 2010 NPR the-United States announced the retirement of its previous nuclear armed SLCM which for decades had contributed to deterrence and the assurance of allies particularly in Asia We will immediately begin efforts to restore this capability by initiating a_ requirements study leading to an Analysis of Alternatives for the rapid development of a modern SLCM These supplements to the planned nuclear force replacement program are prudent options for enhancing the exibility and diversity of U S nuclear capabilities They are compliant with all treaties and agreements and together they will provide a diverse set of characteristics enhancing our ability to tailor deterrence and assurance expand the range of credible U S options for responding to nuclear or non nuclear strategic attack and enhance deterrence by signaling to potential adversaries that their limited nuclear escalation offers no exploitable advantage Nuclear Command Control and Communications Modernization - - - The United States must have an NC3 system that provides control of U S nuclear forces at all times even under the enormous stress of a nuclear attack NC3 capabilities must assure the integrity of transmitted information and possess the resiliency and survivability necessary to reliably overcome the effects of nuclear attack During peacetime and crisis the NC3 system performs five crucial functions detection warning and attack characterization adaptive nuclear planning decision making conferencing receiving Presidential orders and enabling the management and direction of forces - - - Today s NC3 system is a legacy of the Cold War last comprehensively updated almost three decades ago It includes interconnected elements composed of warning satellites and radars communications satellites aircraft and ground stations fixed and mobile command posts and the control centers for nuclear systems - W'hile once state-of-the-ait the NC3 system is now subject to challenges from both aging system components and new growing let century threats Of particular concern are expanding threats in space and cyber space adversary strategies of limited nuclear escalation and the broad diffusion within DOD of authority and responsibility for governance of the NC3 system a function which by its nature must be integrated In light of the critical need to ensure our NC3 system remains survivable and effective the United States will pursue a series of initiatives This includes strengthening protection against cyber threats strengthening protection against space-based threats enhancing integrated tactical warning and attack assessment improving command post and communication links advancing UNCLASSIFEEDHFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PreuDecisionai Not Subject to FGIA 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 '440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 443 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 USE QNLY Preu ecisionai Not Subject to F014 decision support technology integrating planning and operations and reformng governance of the overall NC3 system Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure An effective responsive and resilient nuclear weapons infrastructure is essential to the U S capacity to adapt exibly to shifting requirements Such an infrastructure offers tangible evidence to both allies and potential adversaries of US nuclear weapons capabilities and thus contributes to deterrence assurance and hedging against adverse developments It also discourages adversary interest in arms competition generates military requirements for the nuclear warheads to be carried on delivery platforms NNSA oversees the research development test assessment and production re programs that respond to warhead requirements Over the past several decades the US nuclear weapons infrastructure has suffered the effects of age and underfunding Over half of infrastructure is over 40 years old and a quarter dates back to the Manhattan Project era All previous NPRs highlighted the need to maintain a modern nuclear weapons infrastructure but the United States has fallen short in sustaining a modern infrastructure that is resilient and has the capacity to respond to unforeseen developments There now is no margin for further delay in recapitalizing the physical infrastructure needed to produce strategic materials and components for US nuclear weapons Just as our nuclear forces are an affordable priority so is a resilient and effective nuclear weapons infrastructure without which our nuclear deterrent cannot exist 0 The U S must have the ability to maintain and certify a safe secure and effective nuclear arsenal with replacement programs the United States will sustain and deliver on time the warheads needed to support both strategic and non- strategic nuclear capabilities by Completing the LEP by Fiscal Year FY 2019 Completing the B61 l2 LEP by Completing the W88 alterations by 0 W80-4 life extension with DoD s LRSO program and completing the LEP by I Advancing the W78 warhead replacement one year to FY19 to support fielding on GBSD by 2030 and investigate the feasibility of fielding the nuclear explosive package in a Navy ight vehicle I Sustaining the 83 1 past its currently planned retirement date until a suitable replacement is identified and 0 Exploring future ballistic missile warhead requirements based on the threats and vulnerabilities of potential adversaries including the possibility of common reentry systems between Air Force and Navy systems xi OFFICIAL USE ONLY Pre Decisional Not Subject to FOIA 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 UNCLASSEMEIMEGR DEFKCEAL USE Pren ecisional Not Subject to The United States will pursue initiatives to ensure the necessary capability capacity and responsiveness of the nuclear weapons infrastructure and the needed skills of the workforce including the following I Pursue a joint DOD and Department of Energy advanced technology development capability to ensure that efforts are appropriately integrated to meet-DOD needs 0 Provide the enduring capability and capacity to produce plutonium pits at a rate of no fewer than 80 pits per year by 2030 A delay in this would result in the need for a higher rate of pit production at higher cost 0 Ensure that current plans to reconstitute the US capability to produce lithium compounds are sufficient to meet military requirements I Fully fund the Uranium Processing Facility and ensure availability of sufficient low enriched uranium to meet military requirements 0 Ensure the necessary reactor capacity to produce an adequate supply of tritium to meet military requirements 0 Ensure continuity in the US capability to develop and manufacture secure trusted strategic radiation hardened microelectronic systems beyond 2025 to support stockpile modernization I - 0 Rapidly pursue the Stockpile Responsiveness Program established by Congress to expand opportunities for young scientists and engineers to advance warhead design development and production skills - Develop an NNSA roadmap that sizes production capacity to modernization and hedging requirements I Retain confidence in nuclear gravity bombs needed to meet deterrence needs 0 Maintain and enhance the computational experimental and testing capabilities needed to annually assess nuclear weapons Countering Nuclear Terrorism The US strategy to combat nuclear terrorism encompasses a wide range of activities that comprise a defense in depth against current and emerging dangers Under this multilayered approach the United States strives to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons or weapons usable materials technology and expertise counter their efforts to acquire transfer or employ these assets and respond to nuclear incidents by locating and disabling a nuclear device or managing the consequences of a nuclear detonation For effective deterrence the United States will hold fully accountable any state terrorist group or other non state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or employ nuclear devices Although the role of US nuclear weapons in countering nuclear terrorism is limited our adversaries must understand that a terrorist nuclear attack against the United States or its xii BFFICEAL USE GNLY Pre- Becisional Not Subject to F0114 503 504 505 506 507 503 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 I523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 USE ONLY Pro Decisions Not Subject to FQEA allies and partners would qualify as an extreme circumstance under which the United States could consider the ultimate form of retaliation Non proliferation and Arms Control Effective nuclear non proliferation and arms control measures can support U S allied and partner security by controlling the spread of nuclear materials and technology placing limits on the production stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons decreasing misperception and miscalculation and avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms competition The United States will continue its efforts to 1 minimize the number of nuclear weapons states including by maintaining credible U S extended nuclear deterrence and assurance 2 deny terrorist organizations access to nuclear Weapons and materials 3 strictly control weapons usable material related technology and expertise and 4 seek arms control agreements that enhance security and are verifiable and enforceable The Nuclear on Proliferation Treaty NPT is a cornerstone of the nuclear non proliferation regime It plays a positive role in building consensus for non proliferation and enhances international efforts to impose costs on those that would pursue nuclear weapons outside the Treaty However nuclear non proliferation today faces acute challenges Most significantly North Korea is pursuing a nuclear path in direct contravention of the NPT and in direct opposition to numerous UN Security Council resolutions Beyond North Korea looms the challenge of Iran Although the JCPOA may constrain Tehran s nuclear weapons program there is little doubt Iran could achieve a nuclear weapon capability rapidly if it decides to do so In continuing support of nuclear non-proliferation the United States will work to increase transparency and predictability where appropriate to avoid potential miscalculation among nuclear weapons states and other possessor states through strategic dialogues risk reduction communications channels and the sharing of best practices related to nuclear weapons safety and security Although the United States does not support ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test an Treaty it will continue to support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Committee and through the U S Atornic Energy Detection System continue its support for the related International Monitoring System and the International Data Center The United States will not resume nuclear explOsive testing unless necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the US nuclear arsenal and calls on all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing Arms control can contribute to US security by helping to manage strategic competition among states It can foster transparency understanding and predictability in adversary relations thereby reducing the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation The United States is committed to arms control efforts that advance U S allied and partner security are verifiable and enforceable and include partners that comply responsibly with their obligations Such arms control efforts can contribute to the US capability to sustain strategic stability Further progress is difficult to envision however in an environment that is OFFICIAL USE ONLY Pre-Decisional Not Subject to FOIA 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551' 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 USE ONLY i reu-Decisioriai Not Subject to FGIIA characterized by continuing significant non compliance with existing arms control obligations and commitments and by potential adversaries who seek to change borders and overturn existing norms In this regard Russia continues to violate a series of arms control treaties and In the nuclear context the most significant Russian violation involves a system banned by the Intermediate range Nuclear Forces Treaty In a broader context Russia is either rejecting or avoiding its obligations and commitments under numerous agreements and has'rebuffed U S efforts to follow the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty START with another round of negotiated reductions and to pursue reductions in non strategic nuclear forces Nevertheless New START is in effect through February 2021 and with mutual agreement may be extended for up to five years to 2026 The United States already has met the Treaty s central limits which go into force on February 5 2018 and Will continue to implement the New START Treaty if The United States remains willing to engage in a prudent arms control agenda We are prepared to consider arms control opportunities that return parties to compliance predictability and transparency and remain receptive to future arms control negotiations if Conditions permit and the potential outcome improves the security of the United States its allies and partners xiv USE GNLY PrenDecisional Not Subject to FOIA 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 USE PreuDecisicnal Net Subject to 801A 1 Introduction The Secretary shall initiate a new Nuclear Posture Review to ensure that the United States nuclear deterrent is modern robust exible resilient ready and appropriately tailored to deter 21stcentary threats and reassure our allies President Donald Trump 2017 On January 27 2017 President Donald Trump directed Secretary of Defense James Mattis to initiate a new Nuclear Posture Review NPR The President made clear that his first priority is to protect the United States allies and partners He emphasized both the long term goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and the requirement that the United States have modern exible and resilient nuclear capabilities that are safe secure and effective until such a time as nuclear weapons can prudently be eliminated from the world The United States remains committed to its efforts in support of the ultimate global elimination of nuclear biological and chemical weapons It has negotiated multiple arms control treaties and has fully abided by its treaty commitments In addition the United States has deployed no new nuclear capabilities for over two decades continuously advanced further nuclear reduction and non-proliferation initiatives to Russia and others and strengthened alliance commitments and capabilities to safeguard international order and prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons evertheless global threat conditions have worsened markedly since the most recent 2010 NPR There now exist an unprecedented range and mix of threats including major conventional chemical biological nuclear space and cyber threats and violent non state actors International relations are volatile Russia and China are contesting the international norms and order we have worked with our allies partners and members at the international community to build and sustain Some regions are marked by persistent disorder that appears likely to continue and possibly intensify These developments have produced increased uncertainty and risk While the United States has continued to reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons others including Russia and China have moved in the opposite direction Russia has expanded and improved its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces China s military modernization has resulted in an expanded nuclear force with little to no transparency into its intentions North Korea continues its illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities in direct violation of United Nations UN Security Council resolutions Russia and North Korea have increased the salience of nuclear forces in their strategies and plans and have engaged in increasingly explicit nuclear threats Along with China they have also engaged in increasingly aggressive behavior in outer space and cyber space As a result the 2018 NPR assesses recent nuclear policies and requirements that were established amid a more benign nuclear environment and more amicable Great Power relations It focuses on identifying the nuclear policies strategy and corresponding capabilities needed to protect America its allies and partners in a deteriorating threat environment It is strategy driven and provides guidance for the nuclear force structure and policy requirements needed now and in the future to maintain peace and stability in a rapidly shifting environment with significant future uncertainty USE ONLY PrenDecisional am Not Subject to FOIA 601 602 603 604 605 606 UFFKCIAL USE Preu ecisional Net Subject to FOHA The current threat environment and future uncertainties now necessitate a national commitment to maintain modern and effective nuclear forces as well as the infrastructure needed to support them Consequently the United States has initiated a series of programs to sustain and replace existing nuclear capabilities before they reach the end of their service lives These programs are critical to preserving our ability to deter threats to the Nation QFFICIAL USE ONLY PrenDecisionaI Not Subject to FOIA 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 OFFICIAL USE INIJY PresuEecisional Not Subject to EGIA II An Evolving and Uncertain International Security Environment For the rst time in 25 years the United States is facing a return to great power competition Russia and China both have advanced their military capabilities to act as global powers Others are now pursuing advanced technology including military technologies that were once the exclusivehprovince of great powers this trend will only continue Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson 2017 Each previous NPR emphasized that changes in the international security environment shape US nuclear policy strategy and posture The US Joint Chiefs of Staff recently assessed that the emerging security environment can'be described by simultaneous and connected challengesw contested norms and persistent disorder The rapid deterioration of the threat environment since the 2010 NPR must now shape our thinking as we formulate policy and strategy while we sustain and replace US nuclear capabilities The last NPR was based on a number of key findings and expectations regarding the nature of the security environment that have not since been realized Most notably it re ected the expectations that The prospeets for military confrontation with Russia or among Great Powers had declined and would continue to decline dramatically - The United States could decrease incentives for nuclear proliferation globally and reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons employment by reducing both the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy and the number of nuclear weapons in the US arsenal This was based in part on the aspiration that if the United States took the lead in reducing nuclear arms other nuclear armed states would follow US efforts to reduce the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons and convince other states to do the same have included reducing the US nuclear stockpile by over 85 percent since its Cold War high Potential adversaries however have expanded and modernized their nuclear forces This and additional negative developments in the international seCurity environment presents new and serious challenges to U S allied and partner security They have rendered our earlier sanguine findings and expectations an outdated basis for US nuclear policy strategy and posture going forward The Return of Great Power Competition Since 2010 we have seen the return of Great Power competition To varying degrees Russia and China have made clear they seek to substantially revise the post Cold War intemational order and norms of behavior Russia has demonstrated its willingness to use force to alter the map of Europe and impose its will on its neighbors backed by implicit and explicit nuclear first use threats Russia is in violation of its international legal and political commitments that directly affect the security of others including the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces INF Treaty the 2002 Open Skies Treaty and the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives Its occupation and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and direct support for Russia led forces in Eastern Ukraine violate its commitment to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine that they made in the 1994 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Pre-Decisional Not Subject to FOIA 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 OFFICIAL USE Preu ecisionai Not Subject tn FQEA Budapest Memorandum China has rejected the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration Tribunal that found China s maritime claims in the South China Sea to be without merit and some of its related activities illegal under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and customary international law Subsequently China has continued to undertake assertive military initiatives to create facts on the ground in support of its territorial claims over features in the East and South China Seas Russia and China are pursuing asymmetric ways and means to counter U S conventional capabilities thereby increasing the risk of miscalculation and the potential for military confrontation with the United States its allies and partners Both countries are developing counter-space military capabilities to deny the United States the ability to conduct space based intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance nuclear command control and communications and positioning navigation and timing Both seek to develop offensive cyberspace capabilities to deter disrupt or defeat US forces dependent on computer networks Both are fielding an array of anti access area denial AZAD capabilities and underground facilities to counter U S precision conventional strike capabilities and to raise the cost for the United States to reinforce its European and Asian allies and partners While nuclear weapons play a deterrent role in both Russian and Chinese strategy Russia may also rely on threats of limited nuclear first use or actual first use to coerce us our allies and partners into terminating a con ict on terms favorable to Russia The United States does not wish to regard either Russia or China as an adversary and seeks stable relations with both We continue to-seek a dialogue with China to enhance our understanding of our respective nuclear policies doctrine and capabilitiesyto improve transparency and to help manage the risks of miscalculation and misperce'ption The United States and Russia have in tire past maintained strategic dialogues to manage nuclear competitien and nuclear risks Given Russian actions including its illegitimate annexation of Crimea this constructive engagement has deo iined substantially The United States looks forward to a new day when Russia engages with the United States its allies and partners peacefully and constructively without aggressive actions and coercive nuclear threats Nevertheless this review candidly addresses the challenges posed by Russian Chinese and other states strategic policies programs and capabilities particularly nuclear and the exible adaptable and resilient US nuclear capabilities required to protect the United States allies and partners Other Nuclear-Armed States Have Not Followed Our Lead Despite conceited U S efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international affairs and to negotiate reductions in the number of nuclear weapons since 2010 no potential adversary has reduced either the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy or the number of nuclear weapons it fields Rather they have moved decidedly in the opposite direction As a result there is an increased potential for regional con icts involving nuclear armed adversaries in several parts of the world and the potential for adversary nuclear escalation in crises or con ict Figure 1 illustrates the marked difference between US efforts to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons and the contrary actions of others over the past decade UNCLASSIFIEBXIFOR OFFICIAL USE QNLY PreaDecisionai Not Subject to F014 688 539 590 591 592 593 594 595 595 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 GFJFICIAL USE PrenDecisional -- Not Subject to FOEA Figure 1 New Nuclear Delivery Vehicles Over the Past Decade NUCLEAR MODERNJZATION SINCE 2010 Ada- 6 Russia Russia considers the United States North Atlantic Treaty Organization MAID to be the principal threats to its contemporary geopolitical ambitions Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the potential coercive and military uses of nuclear weapons It mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation of actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to de escalate a con ict on terms favorable to Russia These mistaken perceptions increase the prospect for dangerous miscalculatiOH and escalation Russia has sought to enable the implementation of its strategy and doctrine through a comprehensive modemization of its nuclear arsenal Russia s strategic nuclear modernization has increased and will continue totincrease its warhead delivery capacity and provides Russia with the ability to rapidly expand its deployed warhead numbers In addition to modernizing legacy Soviet nuclear systems Russia is developing and deploying new nuclear warheads and launchers These efforts include multiple upgrades for every leg of the Russian nuclear triad of strategic bombers sea based missiles and land based missiles Russia is also developing at least two new intercontinental range systems a hypersonic glide vehicle and a new intercontinental nuclear armed undersea autonomous torpedo orricmt use ONLY 'PreaDecisional Not Subject to FGIA 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 UFFECIAL USE QNLY i reuDecisional Not Subject to FQEA Nuclear ambitions in the US and Russia over the last 20 years have evolved in opposite directions Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US security strategy is a US objective while Russia is pursuing new concepts and capabilities for expanding the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategy - US National Intelligence Council 2012 Russia possesses significant advantages in its nuclear weapons production capacity and in non strategic nuclear forces over the U S and allies It is also building a large diverse and modern set of non strategic systems that are dual-capable may be armed with nuclear or conventional weapons These theater and tactical range systems are not accountable under the New START Treaty and Russia s non strategic nuclear weapons modernization is increasing the total number of such weapons in its arsenal while significantly improving its delivery capabilities This includes the production possession and ight testing of a ground launched cruise missile in violation of the INF Treaty Moscow believes these systems may provide useful options for escalation advantage Finally despite Moscow s frequent criticism of US missile defense Russia is also modernizing its long standing nuclear-armed ballistic missile defense system and designing a new ballistic missile defense interceptor Russia s increased reliance on nuclear capabilities to include coercive threats nuclear modernization programs refusal to negotiate any limits on its non-strategic nuclear forces and its decision to violate the INF Treaty and other commitments all clearly indicate that Russia has rebuffed repeated U S efforts to reduce the salience role and number of nuclear weapons China Consistent with Chinese President Xi s statement at the 19th Party Congress that China s military will be fully transformed into a first tier force by 2050 China continues to increase the number capabilities and protection of its nuclear forces While China s declaratory policy and doctrine have not changed its lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization program raises questions regarding its future intent China has developed a new road mobile strategic intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM a new multi warhead version of its silo-based ICBM and its most advanced ballistic missile submarine armed with new submarine launched ballistic missiles SLBM It has also announced development of a new nuclear capable strategic bomber giving China a nuclear triad China has also deployed a nuclear capable precision guided intermediate range ballistic missile capable of attacking land and naval targets As with Russia despite criticizing US missile defense China has announced that it is testing a new mid course missile defense system plans to develop sea-based mid- course ballistic missile defense and is developing theater ballistic missile defense systems but has provided few details Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism The security environment has worsened given these developments and the threats posed by further proliferation of nuclear weapons potentially including proliferation to extremist groups GFFICTAL USE QNLY Pre Decisional - Not Subject to FOIA 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766- 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 773 779 780 731 732 733 734 explicitly threatens with nuclear attack UNCLASSEFEEBHFOR iiFiClAL USE GNLY Pren ecisionai Not Subject to FOEA North Korea North Korea has accelerated its provocative pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities and expressed explicit threats to use nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies in the region North Korean officials insist that they will not give up nuclear weapons and North Korea may now be only months away from the capability to strike the United States with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles In the past few years North Korea has dramatically increased its missile ight testing most recently including the testing of intercontinental range missiles capable of reaching the US homeland It has conducted six nuclear tests since 2006 including a test of a significantly higher yield device Further North Korea continues to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons Given North Korea s current and emerging nuclear capabilities existing chemical biological and conventional capabilities and extremely provocative rhetoric and actions it has come to pose an urgent and unpredictable threat to the United States allies and partners Consequently the United States reaffirms that North Korea s illicit nuclear program must be completely verifiably and irreversibly eliminated resulting in a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons North Korea s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities poses the most immediate and dire proliferation threat to international security and stability In addition to explicit nuclear threats enabled by North Korea 3 development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems North Korea poses a horizontal proliferation threat as a potential source of nuclear weapons or nuclear materials for other proliferators North Korea s nuclear weapons program also increases nuclear proliferation pressures on non nuclear weapon states-that North Korea directly and North Korea s nuclear weapons and missile programs will continue to pose a serious threat to US interests and to the security environment in East Asia in 2017 North Korea s exportiof ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries including Iran and Syria and its assistance to Syria s construction of a nuclear reactor destroyed in 2007 illustrate its willingness to proliferate dangerous technologies Director of National Intelligence Daniel R Coats Worldwide Threat Assessment 2017 Iran Iran too poses proliferation threats Iran s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has most recently stated that America is the number one enemy of our nation While Iran has agreed to constraints on its nuclear program in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action J CPOA many of the agreement s restrictions on Iran s nuclear program will end by 2031 In addition Iran retains the technological capability and much of the capacity necessary to develop a nuclear weapon within one year of a decision to do so Iran s development of increasingly long range ballistic missile capabilities and its aggressive strategy and activities to destabilize neighboring governments raises questions about its long-term commitment to foregoing nuclear weapons capability Were Iran to pursue nuclear weapons after JCPOA restrictions end pressures on other countries in the region to acquire their own nuclear weapons would increase OFFECHAL USE ONLY Pren ecisional Not Subject to FOIA 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 use ourv - Net Subject tn FQEA Nuclear terrorism remains a threat to the United States and to international security and stability Preventing the illicit acquisition of a nuclear weapon nuclear materials or related technology and expertise by a violent extremist organization is a significant U S national security priority The more states particularly rogue states that possess nuclear weapons or the materials technology and knowledge required to make them the greater the potential risk of terrorist acquisition Further given the nature of terrorist ideologies we must assume that they would employ a nuclear weapon were they to acquire one Uncertainties Regarding the Future Security Environment and the Threats it May Pose The significant and rapid worsening of the intemational security environment since the 2010 NPR demonstrates that unanticipated developments and uncertainty about near and long term threats to the United States allies and partners are factors we must consider in formulating U S nuclear policy strategy and posture These uncertainties are a concern in the near term and potentially profound in the long term Because this NPR lays the policy strategy and programmatic foundation for sustaining and replacing the entire U S nuclear forceneeded to address threats decades into the future it focuses on the implications of such uncertainties There are two forms of uncertainty regarding the future security environment which U S nuclear policy strategy and posture must take into account The first is geopolitical uncertainty This includes the potential for rapid shifts in how other states view the United States its allies and partners changing alignments among other states and relative power shifts in the international system The collapse of the government of a nuclear armed state or a so called proliferation cascade would also fall in this category - The second form of uncertainty is technological This includes the potential for unanticipated technological breakthroughs in the application of existing technologies or the development of whoily new technologies that change the nature of the threats we face and the capabilities required to address them effectively For example breakthroughs that weuid render U S nuclear forces or U S command and control of those forces highly vulnerable to attack would dramatically affect U S nuclear force requirements policy and posture The proliferation of highly lethal biological weapons is another example Such geopolitical and technological uncertainties are by definition unpredictable particularly over the long term Yet it is near certain that unanticipated developments will arise Consequently we must take them into account to the extent possible as we plan the U S nuclear forces and related capabilities needed now and in future decades OR OFFICIAL USE BNLY Pre eeisienal Net Subject to FUIA 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 346 847 848 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFQR GFFICIAL ESE PreaDecisionai Net Subject to FOIA Why US Nuclear Capabilities Our nuclear deterrent anderwn'tes all courses of diplomacy and every military operation there is a direct line between a safe secure and reliable nuclear deterrent and our responsibility as global defenders of freedom US Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein 2017 US Nuclear Capabilities The fundamental reasons why US nuclear capabilities and deterrence strategies are necessary for U S allied and partner security are readily apparent As Secretary of Defense Mattis has observed a safe secure and effective nuclear deterrent is there to ensure a warthat can never be won is never fought The deterrence effects they provide are unique and essential to preventing adversary nuclear attacks which is the highest defense priority of the United States U S nuclear capabilities cannot prevent all con ict or provocations and should not be expected to do so But the US Triad of strategic bombers ICBMs and supplemented by dual capable aircraft DCA overshadows any adversary s calculations of the prospective benefits of aggression and thus contributes uniquely both to deterring nuclear and non nuclear attack and to assuring allies and partners The Triad and DCA are essential for these purposes and will be so for the foreseeable future As the Bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission led by former Defense Secretaries William Perry and James Schlesinger emphasized in 2009 The conditions that might make possible the global elimination of nuclear weapons are not present today and their creation would require a fundamental transformation of the world political order That fundamental transformation has not since taken place nor is it emerging For centuries prior to the era of nuclear detenrence periodic and catastrophic wars among Great Powers were the norm waged with ever more destructive weapons and in icting ever higher casualties and damage to society During the first half of the 20th century and just prior to the introduction of US nuclear deterrence the world suffered Bowl 00 million fatalities over the relatively short war years of World Wars I and II averaging over'S 0 000 fatalities per day Since the introduction of US nuclear deterrence US nuclear capabilities have made essential contributions to the deterrence of nuclear and non nuclear aggression The subsequent absence of Great Power con ict has resulted in a dramatic sustained reduction in the number of lives lost to war globally as illustrated by Figure 2 UNCLASSIFIEDHFOR GFFICIAL USE QNLY PremDecisional Not Subject to FOIA 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 - 856 857 858 859 860 861 USE oNLv Pre Becisionai Net Subject to FQIA Figure 2 Wartime Casualties Percentage of World Population Wartime Casualties of the World 1 Percentage of Total Population tn civilian milita 0 3 2 6% 2% 2% 1 85% 1 5% 1 1% 1% -- 0 4% I 1600 1650 1700 1750 1303 1350 1900 1950 Non-nuclear forces also play essential deterrence roles Alone however they do not provide comparable deterrence effects as re ected by the periodic and catastrophic failures of conventional deterrence to prevent Great Power wars throughout history Similarly conventional forces alone do not adequately assure many allies who place enormous value on US extended nuclear deterrence- - - Properly silstained US nuclear deterrence helps prevent attacks against the United States allies and partners and the return to the frequent Great Power warfare 'of past centuries In the absence of US nuclear deterrence the United States allies and partners would be vulnerable to coercion and attack by adversaries who retain or expand nuclear arms and increasingly lethal non nuclear capabilities Until the fundamental transformation of the world political order takes place US nuclear weapons remain necessary to prevent war and safeguard the Nation 10 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Priea ecisional Not Subject to FOIA 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 - 879 880 881 882 883 884' 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 UNCLASSHMEWIFQR SFHCIAL Pren ecisional Not Subject to rent IV Enduring National Objectives and the Roles of Nuclear Weapons in US National Security Strategy We believe that by improving deterrence across the broad spectrum we will reduce to an even lower point the probability of a nuclear clash between ourselves and other major powers Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger 1974 The highest US nuclear policy and strategy priority is to deter potential adversaries from nuclear attack of any scale However deterring nuclear attack is not the sole purpose of nuclear weapons Given the diverse threats and profound uncertainties of the current and future threat environment US nuclear forces play the following critical roles in US national security strategy They contribute to the Deterrence of nuclear and non nuclear attack 0 Assurance of allies and partners 0 Achievement of US objectives if deterrence fails and 0 Capacity to hedge against an uncertain future Thesetroles are complementary and interrelated and we must assess the adequacy of US nuclear forces against each role and the strategy designed to fulfill it Preventing proliferation and denying terrorists access to finished weapons material or expertise are also key considerations in the elaboration of US nuclear policy and requirements These multiple'roles- and objectives are the guiding pillars for US nuclear policy strategy and requirements Deterrence of Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Attack The highest US nuclear policy and strategy priority is to deter potential adversaries from nuclear attack of any scale Potential adversaries must understand that the United States has the will and response options necessary to deter nuclear attack under any conditions The specific application of deterrence strategies changes across time and circumstance but the fundamental nature of deterrence endures it is about decisively in uencing an adversary s decision calculus to prevent attack or the escalation of a con ict Potential adversaries must understand that aggression against the United States allies and partners will fail and result in intolerable costs for them We deter attacks by ensuring the expected lack of success and prospective costs far outweigh any achievable gains U S deterrence strategy has always integrated multiple instruments of national power to deter nuclear and non-nuclear attack Integrating and exercising all instruments of power has become increasingly important as potential adversaries integrate their military capabilities expanding the range of potential challenges to be deterred This is particularly true of threats from potential adversaries of limited nuclear escalation and non nuclear strategic attack For US deterrence to be effective across the emerging range of threats and contexts nuclear armed potential adversaries must recognize that their threats of nuclear escalation do not give them freedom to pursue non-nuclear aggression Potential adversaries must understand that 1 11 UNCLASSIFIEDHFOR OFFICIAL USE GNLY PrenDecisional Not Sub ject to FOIA 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 i 918 I 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 923 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 UFFECEAL USE PrewDecisional lot Subject to Fan the United States is able to identify them and hold them accountable for acts of aggression including new forms of aggression 2 we will defeat non nuclear strategic attacks and 3 any nuclear escalation will fail to achieve their objectives and will instead result in unacceptable consequences for them For effective deterrence the United States will acquire and maintain the full range of capabilities needed to ensure that nuclear or non nuclear aggression against the United States allies and partners will fail to achieve its objectives and carry with it the credible risk of intolerable consequences for the adversary US forces will strengthen their ability to integrate nuclear and non nuclear military planning and operations Combatant Commands and Service components will be organized and resourced for this mission and will plan train and exercise to integrate US nuclear and non nuclear forces and operate in the face of adversary nuclear threats and attacks The United States will coordinate integration activities with allies facing nuclear threats and will examine opportunities for additional allied burden sharing in the nuclear deterrence mission An important element of maintaining effective deterrence is the articulation of US declaratory policy regarding the potential employment of nuclear weapons The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States its allies and partners Extreme circumstances could include signi cant non nuclear strategic attacks Significant non nuclear strategic attacks include but are not limited to attacks on the US allied or partner civilian population or infrastructure and attacks on US or allied nuclear forces their command and control or warning and attack assessment capabilities The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear Weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NET and in compliance with their nuclear non proliferation obligations Given the potential of significant non nuclear strategic attacks the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of non-nuclear strategic attack technologies and US capabilities to counter that threat To help preserve deterrence and the assurance of allies and partners the United States has never adopted a no first use policy and given the contemporary threat environment such a policy is not justified today It remains the policy of the United States to retain some ambiguity regarding the precise circumstances that might lead to nuclear response In addition the United States will maintain a portion of its nuclear forces on alert day to day and retain the option of launching those forces This posture makes clear to potential adversaries that they can have no confidence in strategies intended to destroy our nuclear deterrent forces in a surprise first strike The de alerting of US ICBMs would create the potential for dangerous deterrence instabilities by rendering them vulnerable to a potential first strike and compelling the United States to rush 12 UNCLASSIFIEIMFOR OFFICIAL USE Pi euDecisional Not Subject to FOEA 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 - 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 GPFECIAL USE PreaDecisional Not Subject to FOEA to re alert in a crisis or con ict Further U S ICBMs are not on hair trigger alert as sometimes mistakenly is claimed Over more than half a century the U S has established a series of measures and protocols to ensure that ICBMs are safe secure and under constant Control Any U S decision to employ nuclear weapons would follow a deliberative process Finally the United States will continue its long standing practice of open ocean targeting of its strategic nuclear forces day to day as a confidence and security building measure Assurance of Allies and Partners The United States has extended nuclear deterrence commitments that assure European Asian and Pacific allies The United States will ensure the credibility and effectiveness of those commitments Assurance is a common goal and advances our common security interests It is based on collaboration with allies and partners to deter or defeat the threats we face It includes sustained allied dialogues to understand each other s threat perceptions and to arrive at a shared understanding of how best to demonstrate our collective capabilities and resolve No country should doubt the strength of our assurance commitments or the strength of U S and allied capabilities to deter or if necessary defeat any potential adversary s nuclear or non nuclear aggression In many cases effectively assuring allies and partners depends on their confidence in the credibility of U S extended nuclear deterrence They have reaffirmed that extended nuclear deterrence is essential to their security enablingrmost to eschew possession of nuclear weapons and thereby contributing to U S non proliferation goals - - Achieve U S Objectives Should Deterrence Fail For deterrence to be credible the United States must prepare to respond effectiver if deterrence were to fail in ways that will achieve U S objectives while protecting U S allied and partner interests Non nuclear capabilities can complement but not replace U S nuclear capabilities for this purpose All U S Presidents since 1945 have considered U S employment of nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances and for defensive purposes If deterrence fails the initiation and conduct of nuclear operations would adhere to the law of armed con ict and the Uniform Code of Military Justice The United States will strive to end any con ict and restore deterrence at the lowest level of damage possible for the United States allies and partners and minimize civilian damage to the extent possible consistent with achieving objectives Every U S administration over the past six decades has called for exible and limited U S nuclear response Options in part to support the goal of reestablishing deterrence following its possible failure This is not because reestablishing deterrence is certain but because it may be achievable in some cases and contribute to limiting damage to the extent feasible to the United States allies and partners The goal of limiting damage if deterrence fails in a regional contingency calls for robust adaptive planning to defeat and defend against attacks including missile defense and capabilities to locate track and target mobile systems of regional adversaries These and other non nuclear capabilities which we are now strengthening can 13 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Pre Decisionai -- Not Subject to 01A 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 USE ONLY Pre ecisicnai Net Subject to RNA complement but not replace US nuclear forces for this purpose In the case of missile threats from regional actors in particular US missile defense and offensive options provide the basis for significant damage limitation in the event deterrence fails Hedge Against an Uncertain Future The United States will continue efforts to create a more cooperative and benign security environment but must also hedge against prospective and unanticipated risks Nuclear capabilities alone do not provide the basis for hedging against future uncertainty non nuclear forces also play a critical role However US nuclear capabilities provide a necessary and unique contribution Hedging strategies help reduce risk and avoid threats that otherwise may emerge over time Given the increasing prominence of nuclear weapons in the defense policies and strategies of Russia and China and the uncertainties of the future threat environment particularly from illicit North Korean nuclear and missile programs US nuclear capabilities and the ability to quickly modify them are essential to mitigate or overcome risk The capacity to hedge contributes to deterrence and can help reduce potential adversaries confidence that they can gain an advantage via a break out or expansion of nuclear capabilities Our hedging strategies must also help mitigate and overcome unexpected technical risks throughout the life cycle of US nuclear capabilities and must mitigate risk in the development deployment and Operation of US nuclear forces As we acquire forces and those forces age this requires a framework to continually assess risks and threats identify whether to accept or mitigate risks and guide development of appropriate and effective solutions 14 SPECIAL USE GNLY PrenDecisienal - Net Subject tn FOEA 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1 1004 1005' 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 I wcosts that would accompany their aggression Adjusting our deterrence strategies accordingly is 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 I UNCLASSEFTEEMFOR USE ONLY Pres-Decisional Net Subject in 170131 V Tailored Strategies and Flexible Capabilities The challenges that each situation may present such as time place and circumstance are distinct Therefore exibility and adaptiveness are essential in a defence planning process that can never be informed reliably about the future contexts for action and requirements Professor Colin S Gray 2017 Tailored Deterrence There is no one size fits all for deterrence The requirements for effective deterrence vary given the need to address the unique perceptions goals interests strategies and vulnerabilities of different potential adversaries The deterrence strategy effective against one potential adversary may not deter another Consequently the United States will apply a tailored approach to effectively deter across a spectrum of adversaries threats and contexts Tailored deterrence strategies are designed to communicate the costs of aggression to potential adversaries taking into consideration how they uniquely calculate costs and risks This calls for a diverse range and mix of deterrence options now and into the future to ensure strategic stability Tailored deterrence also calls for on-going analyses to adapt our strategies to different potential adversaries and contingencies These analyses address how potential adversaries define unacceptable damage and how the United States can credibly communicate to them the risks and what it means to tailor deterrence Flexible Capabilities Flexibility means having the appropriate range and mix of nuclear and other capabilities required to tailor deterrence strategies now and into the future and to fulfill the other roles of nuclear weapons in U S national security strategy Flexibility must address a spectrum of adversaries and threats and enable adjustments over time U S nuclear strategies forces and NC3 must be increasingly exible to sustain that range of capabilities and options The United States has understood the value of exibility for nuclear deterrence for six decades but its importance is now magnified by the emerging diversity of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic threats and the dynamism and uncertainties of the security environment This need for exibility to tailor U S capabilities and strategies to meet future requirements and unanticipated developments runs contrary to a rigid continuing policy of no new nuclear capabilities Potential adversaries do not stand still On the contrary they seek to identify and exploit weaknesses in U S capabilities and strategy Thus U S future force requirements for deterrence cannot prudently be considered fixed The United States must be capable of developing and deploying new capabilities if necessary to deter assure achieve U S objectives if deterrence fails and hedge against uncertainty 15 USE ONLY - Net Subject to 01A 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 1040 1041 1042 1043 1044 1045 1046 1047 1048 1049 1050 1051 1052 1053 1054 1055 1056 1057 1058 1059 1060 1061 1062 1063 1064 1065 1066 1067 1068- 1069 1070 1071 1072 OERECIAK USE ONLY PremDecisional Not Subject to EOEA VI U S Strategies to Counter Contemporary Threats The number one priority of the Department of Defense is that we maintain a safe secure and effective nuclear deterrent so we make certain these weapons are never used Secretary of Defense James Mattis August 2017 A Tailored Strategy for Russia Russia is not the Soviet Union and the Cold War is long over However despite our best efforts to sustain a positive relationship Russia now perceives the United States and NATO as its principal opponent and impediment to realizing its destabilizing geopolitical goals in Eurasia Russia has Significantly increased the capabilities of its non-nuclear forces to project power into regions adjacent to Russia and as previously discussed has violated multiple treaty obligations and other important commitments Most concerning are Russia s national security policies strategy and doctrine that include an emphasis on the threat of limited nuclear escalation and its continuing development and fielding of increasingly diverse and expanding nuclear capabilities Moscow threatens and exercises limited nuclear first use suggesting a mistaken expectation that coercive nuclear threats or limited first use could paralyze the United States and NATO and thereby end a con ict on terms favorable to Russia Some in the United States refer to this as Russia s escalate to de escalate doctrine De-escalation in this sense follows from Moscow s mistaken assumption of Western capitulation on terms favorable to Moscow Effective U S deterrence of Russian nuclear attack and non nuclear strategic attack now requires ensuring that the Russian leadership does not miscalculate regarding the consequences of limited nuclear first use either regionally or against the United States itself Russia must instead understand that nuclear first use however limited Will fail to achieve its objectives fundamentally alter the nature of a con ict and trigger incalculable and intolerable costs for Moscow Our strategy will ensure Russia understands that any use of nuclear weapons however limited is unacceptable The US deterrent tailored to Russia therefore will be capable of holding at risk under all conditions what Russia s leadership most values It will pose insurmountable difficulties to any Russian strategy of aggression against the United States its allies or partners and ensure the credible prospect of unacceptably dire costs to the Russian leadership if it were to choose aggression This strategy will ens re Russia understands it has no advantages in will non nuclear capabilities or nuclear escalation options that enable it to anticipate a possible benefit from non nuclear aggression or limited nuclear escalation Correcting any Russian misperceptions along these lines is important to maintaining deterrence in Europe and strategic stability CorreSpondingly at the 2016 NATO Summit the Alliance emphasized that no one should doubt resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened NATO will maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations wherever it should arise l6 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Pre Becisional Not Subject to FOIA 1073 1074 1075 1076 1077 1078 1079 1080 1081 1082 1083 1084 1085 1086 1087 1088 1089 1090 1091 1092 1093 1094 1095 1096 1097 1098 1099 1100 1101' 1102 1103 1104 1105 1106 1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113 1114 QFFECHAL USE ONLY PreuDecisienal Net Subject to FQHA To support these deterrence goals and correct any Russian misperceptions of advantage the President will have an expanding range of limited and graduated options to credibly deter Russian nuclear or non nuclear strategic attacks which could now include attacks against US C3 in space and cyber space These requirements put a premium on the survivability exibility and readiness of Western nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to hold diverse types of Russian targets at risk throughout a crisis or con ict and point to the continuing great value of the exibility inherent in the combination 'of the US nuclear Triad US and other NATO non- strategic nuclear forces deployed in Europe and the nuclear forces of our British and French allies A Tailored Strategy for China 5 China s military modernization and pursuit of regional dominance have emerged as a major challenge to U S interests in Asia It has adopted an increasingly assertive posture in disputes with its neighbors many of whom are US allies or partners These encompass a variety of historical and border disputes including over territorial boundaries claims to contested island territory and an island-building campaign in the South China Sea China possesses nuclear warheads on protected ICBMs and capable of reaching the United States and nuclear- armed theater-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching U S territory allies partners forces and bases in the region China s expanding non-nuclear military capabilities include space and cyber warfare capabilities that could decisively affect the outcome of a conflict China is developing capabilities to counter US power projection operations in the region and to deny the United States the capability and freedom of action to protect U S allied and partner interests Direct military con ict between China and the United States would have the potential for nuclear escalation Our tailored strategy for China is designed to prevent Beijing from mistakenly concluding that it could secure an advantage threngh the limited use of its theater nuclear capabilities or that any use of nuclear urea-pens however limited is acceptable The-United States will maintain the capability to credibly threaten intolerable damage as Chinese leaders calculate costs and benefits such that the costs incurred as a result of Chinese nuclear employment at any level of escalation would vastly outweigh any benefit The United States is prepared to respond decisively to Chinese non nuclear or nuclear aggression U S exercises in the Asia Pacific region among other objectives demonstrate this preparedness as will increasing the range of graduated nuclear response options available to the President Both steps will strengthen the credibility of our deterrence strategy and improve our capability to respond effectively to Chinese limited nuclear use if deterrence were to fail The United States will also continue to seek a meaningful dialogue with China on our respective nuclear policies doctrine and capabilities in pursuit of a peaceful security environment and stable relations A Tailored Strategy for North Korea North Korea poses a clear and grave threat to US and allied security North Korea openly states that its missiles are intended to deliver nuclear strikes against U S South Korean and Japanese cities North Korean state agencies have made numerous reckless nuclear threats such as Japan is no longer needed to exist near us and Japan should be sunken into the sea by North Korea s nuclear bomb and Let s reduce the US mainland to ashes and darkness UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR OFFECIAL USE ONLY Pre Decisi0nal th Subject to F0111 1115 1116 1117 1118 1119 1120 1121 1122 1123 1124 1125 1126 1127 1123 1129 1130 1131 1132 1133 1134 1135 1136 1137 1138 1139 1140 1141 1142 1143 1144 1145 1145 1147 1148 1149 1150 1151 1152 1153 1154 1155 UNCLASSIFIEDHIFGR USE UNIX PrenDeeisienal Not Subject tn E Gia A complete verifiable and irreversible nuclear free Korean peninsula is a long-standing U S objective Yet North Korea has prioritized continuing investments in nuclear capabilities over the well-being of the North Korean people and also possesses significant conventional cyber chemical and biological capabilities Its expansive nuclear and missile programs suggest the potential for nuclear first use in support of conventional operations The Kim regime may mistakenly believe that nuclear capabilities give it freedom to engage in a spectrum of bold provocations including military attacks on South Korean territory and naval vessels and test launching missiles over Japan For North Korea the survival of the Kim regime is paramount Our deterrence strategy for North Korea makes clear that any North Korean nuclear attack against the United States or its allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime There is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive Further we will hold the Kim regime fully responsible for any transfer of nuclear weapons technology material or expertise to any state or non state actor North Korea relies on hardened and deeply buried facilities to secure the Kim regime and its key military and command and control capabilities It uses underground facilities and natural terrain features to protect North Korean military forces Consequently the United States will continue to field a range of conventional and nuclear capabilities able to hold such targets at risk In addition to ensuring the ability to impose intolerable costs on the Kim regime the United States and allies have defensive and offensive capabilities to intercept and otherwise defeat North Korea s missile capabilities and thereby limit or preclude North Korea s ability to conduct effective missile strikes Japan and South Korea have long expressed support for these capabilities Although North Korea s missile forces are expanding and increasingly mobile US and allied missile defenses are increasingly capable against North Korea s missile threat and the United States has the eariy warning systems and strike capabilities necessary to degrade North Korean missile capabilities prior to launch We will continually improve these defensive capabilities as needed to stay ahead of North Korean missile threats if they continue to grow A Tailored Strategy for Iran' Iran views US in uence in the Middle East as the foremost threat to Iran s goal to establish itself as the dominant regional power Iran is committed to increasing its in uence over neighboring countries and countering US in uence This goal directly threatens U S allies and partners and Iran s defense policy strategy and force structure indicate an attempt to create exploitable military advantages - Iran continues to invest in the largest missile program in the Middle East and could in the future threaten or deliver nuclear weapons were Iran to acquire them following expiration of the JCPOA in violation of the NPT and its nuclear non proliferation obligations Iran also is developing other non nuclear military capabilities including cruise missile systems and cyber warfare capabilities for offensive operations It may also continue to invest in chemical and biological weapons Many of the key constraints on Iran s nuclear program end by 2031 shortening the time it would take Iran to produce enough weapons grade nuclear material for a nuclear weapon 18 OFFECIAL USE QNLY PremDecisionai - Not Subject t0 FGIA 1156 1157 1158 1159 1160 1161 1162 1163 1164 1165 1166 1167 1168 1169 1170 1171 1172 1173 1174 1175 1175 1177 1173 1173 1130 1131 1132 1183 1184 1185 1186 1187 1188 1189 1190 1191 1192 1193 1194 1195 1196 1197 UFFECEAL USE EN 111 ea-Beeisional Net Subject to 1781A Iran s development of increasingly accurate and sophisticated ballistic missiles gives it the capability to threaten U S forces allies and partners in and outside the region Were Iran to decide to acquire nuclear weapons pressures on other countries in the region to acquire their own nuclear weapons would increase Our deterrence strategy is designed to ensure that the Iranian leadership understands that any non nuclear strategic attack against the United States allies and partners would be defeated and that the cost would outweigh any benefits There is no plausible scenario in which Iran may anticipate benefit from launching a strategic attack Consequently U S deterrence strategy includes the capabilities necessary to defeat Iranian non nuclear strategic capabilities including the U S defensive and offensive systems capable of precluding or degrading Tehran s missile threats The United States will continue to strengthen these capabilities as necessary to stay ahead of Iranian threats as they grow Extended Deterrence and Tailored Assurance The United States has effectively assured allies and partners for decades The United States affirms its commitment to the security of its allies and partners who are concerned about the negative trends in the security environment This concern is evident both in Europe where there are understandable allied fears of Russia s nuclear and non nuclear threats and its use of military force against neighbors and in Asia where there are understandable allied fears of China s military rise and North Korea s extreme nuclear and non nuclear threats Our ability to continue assuring alliesand partners is challenged by the range and diversity of potential adversaries and the threats they pose The United States extends deterrence to over 30 countries with different views about the threat environment and the credibility of U S security commitments Similar to deterrence there is no one size fits all strategy for assurance Assurance measures must continually adapt to the shifting requirements of ahighiy dynamic threat environment Our assurance strategies are tailored to the differing requirements of the Euro Atlantic and Asia-Pacific regions accounting for the differing security environments potential adversary capabilities and varying alliance structures - Effective deterrence is the foundation for effective assurance Allies under the U S nuclear umbrella and potential adversaries should not doubt our extended deterrence commitments or our ability and willingness to fulfill them In support of U S extended deterrence commitments the United States will maintain the capabilities necessary to deter effectively and if necessary to respond effectively and decisively across the spectrum of potential nuclear and non nuclear scenarios Critically for deterrence and assurance purposes we will retain the capability to adjust our nuclear force structure as required by the security environment We will develop the necessary infrastructure capabilities and political arrangements now and in the future to deny adversaries any confidence that they can achieve their regional objectives through nuclear threats or nuclear use Assurance also ows from a shared view of the security environment including shared interests at stake deterrence challenges and required capabilities roles responsibilities and expectations and the appropriate combined response to different con ict scenarios Consequently communication and consultation on policy strategy and capabilities are essential for assurance and will be sustained 19 UNCLASSEFIEDHFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PreuDeeisional Not Subject to FOEA 1198 1199 1200 1201 1202 1203 1204 1205 1206 1207 1208 1209 1210 1211 1212 1213 1214 1215 1216 1217 1218 1219 1220 1221 1222 1223 1224 1225 1226 1227 1223 1229 1230 1231 1232 1233 1234 1235 WSLASSEFHEDIIFOR OFFECIAL USE ONLY PreuDecisional am Not Subject to Strengthening Deterrence in Europe The US to NATO is unwavering A strong cohesive nuclear Alliance is the most effective means of deterring aggression and promoting peace and stability in the Euro Atlantic region NATO followed the US post-Cold War trend in deemphasizing the role of nuclear Weapons in deterrence and defense posture but the Alliance never lost sight of the fundamental purpose nuclear capabilities play in preserving peace preventing coercion and deterring aggression At both the 2014 Wales and 2016 Warsaw summits NATO recognized that Russia s activities and policies have reduced stability and security increased unpredictability and introduced new dangers into the security environment Importantly NATO is addressing the changed security environment to make clear that any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO however limited would not only fundamentally alter the nature of a con ict but would result in unacceptable costs to an adversary that would far outweigh the benefit it could hope to achieve The Alliance has already initiated measures to ensure that overall deterrence and defense posture including its nuclear forces remain capable of addressing any potential adversary s doctrine and capabilities - In support of these efforts the United States will consult and work cooperatively with NATO allies to I Enhance the readiness and survivability of NATO DCA improve the planning capabilities required to increase their operational effectiveness and account for adversary- nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in such planning 0 Promote the broadest possible participation of Allies in their agreed burden sharing arrangements regarding the DCA mission nuclear mission support and nuclear infrastructure 0 Replace aging aircraft and weapons systems with modernized or life extended equivalents as they age out Enhance the realism of training and exercise programs to ensure the Alliance can effectively integrate nuclear and non nuclear operations if deterrence fails and 0 Ensure the NATO NC3 system is modernized to enable appropriate consultations and effective nuclear operations improve its survivability resilience and exibility in the most stressful threat environments The United States will make available its strategic nuclear forces and commit nuclear weapons forward deployed to Europe to the defense of NATO These forces provide an essential political and military link between Europe and North America and are the supreme guarantee of Alliance security Combined with the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France as well as Allied burden sharing arrangements overall nuclear deterrence forces are essential to the Alliance s deterrence and defense posture now and in the future 20 OFFICEAL USE ONLY PreaDecisional Not Subject to FOEA 1236 1237 1238 1239 1240 1241 1242 I 1243 1244 1245 1246 1247 1248 1249 1250 1251 1252 1253 1254 1255 i256 1257 1253 1259 1260 1261 1262 1263 1264 -1265 1266 1267 1268 1269 1270 1271 1272 1273 1274 1275 1276 UNCLASSEEKEWIFOR OFFHCEAL Pi en ecisienal Not Subject to ESTA Strengthening Deterrence in Asia The US commitment to our allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region is unwavering As in Europe strong cohesive alliances and credible deterrence measures are the most effective means of assurance in the Asia Pacific region However North Korea China and Russia each present unique and in some ways more complex threats to our allies and interests in the Asia Pacific region Further the perception and immediacy of these threats is unique to different allies In addition our alliance structure in Asia is different than it is in Europe Rather than a single multinational alliance in Asia we have a series of bilateral arrangements with varying degrees of multilateral cooperation across different missions Our nuclear posture too is different Following the Cold War the United States removed all of its nuclear weapons based in Asia and instead relied on strategic nuclear capabilities complemented by a sea launched cruise missile to extend nuclear deterrence to our allies With the retirement of the following the 2010 NPR the United States currently relies almost exclusively on its strategic nuclear capabilities for nuclear deterrence and the assurance of allies in the region For these reasons consultation and cooperative arrangements in the Asia Pacific region are appropriately different than those in Europe To maintain credible extended deterrence and thus effective assurance in this complex environment the United States will - Maintain integrated exible and adaptable US nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities 0 Continue to invest in missile defenses against North Korean missile threats I 0 Demonstrate with allies our joint cornihitrnent to deterrence through military exercises and 0 Work with our allies to improve our shared understanding of nuclear dangers and corresponding deterrence requirements through continued consultative dialogues Hedge Against Diverse Uncertainties The United States will tailor its hedging strategy across the range of potential adversaries and be prepared to meet future risks and challenges that may emerge but cannot be characterized with certainty today The combination of a highly dynamic security environment and the rapid advancement and spread of military technology creates a range of possible threat developments for which we must be prepared Additionally the United States is embarking on a nuclear force sustainment and replacement program which is just in time This requires a high degree of concurrency and and thus has the potential for scheduling shortfalls We cannot predict with confidence when or if any of these potential challenges will Occur but there always exists the potential for geopolitical or technological surprise Therefore we must and will posture our nuclear capabilities to hedge against multiple potential risks and threat developments We will for example hedge against the potential rapid growth or emergence of nuclear and non nuclear strategic threats including chemical biological cyber and large scale conventional aggression The capacity to hedge helps ensure our ability to sustain effective deterrence and assurance amid unexpected change Our hedge strategy addresses four categories of potential risk 21 UNCLASSIFTEDIXFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PreuDecisional Not Subject to FOIA 1277 1278 1279 1280 1281 1282 1283 1284 1285 1286 1287 1288 1289 1290 1291 1292 1293 1294 1295 1296 1297 1298 1299 1300 1301 1302 1303 1304 1305 - 1306 1307 1308 1309 1310 - 1311 1312 1313 1314 1315 1316 1317 USE GNLY Premiiecisicnal Net Subject to FGEA I Geopolitical risk includes the emergence of new adversaries expansion of adversary nuclear forces changes in adversary strategy and doctrine new alignments among adversaries and the further proliferation of nuclear weapons 0 Technological risk includes technical challenges resulting from a breakdown of a key element of U S nuclear forces or from adversaries technological breakthroughs that create a new threat to U S nuclear deterrent capabilities 0 Operational risk includes the potential for operational shortfalls that reduce the effectiveness of U S nuclear forces It includes reduced availability of deployed forces intelligence collection gaps that inhibit identification or characterization of designated targets and any unmet requirement needed to sustain effective deterrence Programmatic risk includes potential risks to the U S sustainment of adequate nuclear capabilities such as delays to maintenance programs the age out of legacy nuclear systems earlier or more precipitously than anticipated and an inability to produce needed quantities of unique nuclear materials These risks are particularly acute today because key elements of the U S nuclear acquisition and production infrastructure have atrophied as described in 2008 by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy They noted existing U S nuclear weapons most of which were designed 20 to 30 years ago-mare being maintained well beyond the service life for which they were designed There is no further margin for delaying U S sustainment and replacement programs for our existing nuclear capabilities and nuclear weapons infrastructure We will avoid shortfalls in the next decade only by carefully managing programmatic risk to those programs 1 i 8 The U S strategy for hedging against unexpected challenges is based on two parallel approaches reducing the likelihood that challenges will emerge in the categories of geopolitical technological operational and programmatic risk and reduding the harm that would result if preventive measures prove inadequate This two track hedging strategy will help guide the capabilities and size of U S nuclear forces and supporting infrastructure Pr Venting the Emergence of Ch alienges We will counter the emergence of challenges to U S nuclear strategy by emphasizing 1 the early detection of potential problems 2 opportunities for risk reduction through diplomacy and 3 dissuading adversaries from attempting to challenge U S allied and partner security Detect and resolve potential challenges early Detecting and addressing problems before they arise is the most direct way to reduce the likelihood that dangerous technological or operational surprises will emerge To do so the Department of Energy s DOE National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA will continue to conduct robust nuclear weapons surveillance and experimental programs to identify issues early enough to help prevent technical breakdowns operational shortfalls and pro grammatic challenges DOD will continue to conduct a weapon system test and evaluation program to identify emerging issues early and NNSA will also work together to conduct ongoing evaluations of the current and potential future security environments This will include threat-based analyses of what potential adversaries are doing or considering today as well as what is possible in light of projected advancement and diffusion of 22 BFFICEAL USE QNLY PreaDecisional Not Subject to FOEA 1318 1319 1320 1321 1322 1323 1324 1325 1326 1327 1328 1329 1330 1331 1332 1333 1334 1335 '1336 -133 1338 1339 1340 1341 1342 1343 1344 _1345 1345 1347 1343 1349 1350 1351 1352 1353 1354 1355 1356 1357 USE PremDecisional as Not Subject to FOHA technology Finally the United States will remain at the forefront of science and technology to reduce the likelihood of technological surprise Risk reduction through diplomacy We will seek opportunities for diplomatic agreements that reduce the likelihood of future security challenges via mutual restraints that reduce the potential for miscalculation in crisis or con ict Treaties and agreements for this purpose can benefit US security when they are verifiable and compliance can reasonably be expected and enforced as Dissuade adversaries from seeking advantage We will reduce the likelihood of geopolitical challenges by being prepared to respond effectively to changes in the security environment and being seen as so capable Adversaries will be less likely to seek strategic advantage through arms competition if the United States clearly demonstrates the capacity and will to meet any such challenge Therefore in preparing to respond to geopolitical challenges we will prioritize measures that would help reduce the likelihood that adversaries will choose to challenge us in the first place Mitigating the Potential Consequences of Future Challenges The United States can hedge in two complementary ways One is by having a robust nuclear Weapon production infrastructure that has the design engineering and manufacturing capabilities needed to quickly produce new or additional weapons needed to address changes in the threat environment Another approach is to retain a significant non deployed inventory of 1 weapons that can be added to current delivery vehicles to address geopolitical threat or technical failure Given the current state of our nuclear weapon production infrastructure the United States will mitigate the potential consequences of future challenges to US nuclear strategy by sustaining a reserve nuciear stockpile of non depioyed weapons able to support US nuclear strategies amid unexpected change This requires maintaining the US capacity to upload hedge weapons onto existing delivery platforms to augment the deployed force as necessary if for example an unexpected operational or technical problem were to arise in U S forces I DOD will prioritize its nuclear hedge planning to sustain specific force attributes in the event of a technologi al or geopolitical challenge that threatens an element of US nuclear forces These attributes include survivability the ability to penetrate adversary defenses the ability to visibly signal deterrence messages prompt response and a range of warhead yield options This strategy for risk mitigation helps to hedge against the possibility that an operational or technical problem or adversary breakthrough would compromise the effectiveness of our nuclear forces It also helps to preclude nuclear arms competition by communicating to adversaries that we can deny them useful advantage through their arms racing Flexibility supports our strategies for deterring adversaries and assuring allies by providing options for tailoring and responding effectively to future challenges We will reduce future risk exposure by ensuring that flexibility is built into and sustained in our current and future nuclear force structure This applies to delivery systems platforms warheads command and control and early warning and attack assessment 23 OFFECIAL USE GNLY Pre Decisional Not Subject to F0114 1358 1359 1360 1361 1362 1363 1364 1365 1366 1367 1368 WCLASSEFEEDIWGR USE GNLY PreuDecisional No t Subject to FQHA Across the nuclear enterprise the United States will target investments in personnel programs and technologies that strengthen our ability to adjust course as necessary in response to emerging challenges In order to identify and address potential needs the United States will support and expand as necessary the NNSA Stockpile Responsiveness Program the Navy SSBN Security Technology Program and the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center Red Team Program In addition will explore prioritization of existing research and development funding for advanced nuclear delivery system technology and prototyping capabilities This will support the US development of hedging options and focus as necessary on the rapid development of nuclear delivery systems alternative basing modes and capabilities for defeating advanced air and missile defenses 24 UNCLASSIFIEDHFOR USE QNLY PreuDeeisional Not Subject to FOEA 1369 1370 1371 1372 1373 1374 1375 1376 1377 1378 1379 1380 1381 1382 1383 1384 1385 1386 1387 1388 1389 1390 1391 1392 1393 1394 1395 1396 1397 _1398 1399 1400 '1401 1402 1403 1404 1405 1406 1407 1408 GENERAL USE ONLY PreuDecisional Not Subject to FUEA VII Current and Future U S Nuclear Capabilities Our nuclear deterrent is nearing a crossroads To date we have preserved this deterrent by extending the lifespan of legacy nuclear forces and infrastructureuin many cases for decades beyond what was originally intended But these systems will not remain viable inde nitely In fact we are now at a point where we must concurrently modernize the entire nuclear triad and the infrastructure that enables its effectiveness Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff General Paul Selva 2017 U S Nuclear Enterprise Personnel Effective deterrence would not be possible without the thousands of members of the United States Armed Forces and civilian personnel who dedicate their professional lives to the deterrence of war and protecting the Nation These exceptional men and women are held to the most rigorous standards and make the most vital contribution to U S nuclear capabilities and deterrence As former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated in 2016 when speaking to Air Force service members at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota America s nuclear deterrence is the bedrock of our security You deter large-scale nuclear attack against the United Sates and our allies You help convince potential adversaries that they can t escalate their way out of a failed conventional aggression The service members and civilians involved in the nuclear deterrence mission do so with little public recognition or fanfare Theirs is an unsung duty of the utmost importance They deserve the support of the American people for the safety security and stability they provide the Nation and indeed the world The service reforms we have accordingly implemented were long overdue and the Department of Defense remains fully committed to properly supporting the service members who protect the United States against nuciear threats The Strategic Nuclear Triad For more than six decades U S officials have emphasized the need for U S nuclear capabilities including NC3 with the attributes necessary to deter adversaries assure allies and achieve U S objectives should deterrence fail They have called for the survivability and exibility of U S nuclear forces to provide the United States with multiple options to deter effectively and respond as necessary to different threats and circumstances This requirement is now magnified by the need to tailor U S strategies to a broader range of adversaries and contingencies and to hedge against unanticipated developments Today s strategic nuclear Triad consists of nuclear ballistic missile submarines armed with land-based and strategic bombers carrying gravity bombs and air launched cruise missiles ALCMs The Triad with supporting NC3 and non strategic nuclear forces provides diversity and flexibility to tailor strategies for deterring assuring achieving objectives should deterrence fail and hedging The increasing need for this diversity and flexibility in turn is one of the primary reasons why sustaining and replacing the nuclear Triad and non strategic nuclear capabilities is necessary The multiplicity of platforms weapons and modes of operation inherent in the Triad and U S 25 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Pre-Decisional Not Subject to FOIA 1409 1410 1411 1412 1413 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418' 1419 1420 1421 1422 1423 1424 1425 1426 1427 1428 r 1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434 1435 1436 1437 1438 1439 1440 11441 1442 1443 1444 1445 1445 1447 8131315141 USE Preui ecisionai Not Subject to FQEA non strategic nuclear forces provide a significant margin of exibility and resilience Designing flexibility into the Triad sustainment and replacement programs will help ensure that we maintain this margin in the future and NNSA will design exibility into U S nuclear capabilities during concept exploration and preliminary design phases that enable us to modify systems in the future at lower cost and with greater speed The Triad must be considered as a whole because it functions as a whole with each leg essential to overall effectiveness As Secretary of Defense Mattis concluded regarding deterrence requirements and the Triad also have looked at Ihave questioned the triad and I cannot solve the deterrent problem reducing it from a triad If I want to send the most compelling message I have been persuaded that the triad in its framework is - is the right way to go The Triad s synergy and overlapping attributes help ensure the enduring survivability of our deterrence capabilities against attack and our capacity to hold a range of adversary targets at risk throughout a crisis or con ict Eliminating any leg of the Triad would greatly ease adversary attack planning and allow an adversary to concentrate resources and attention on defeating the remaining two legs The U S nuclear Triad provides key nuclear force attributes required to maintain sufficient diversity and exibility These include Snrvivable The force and NC3 resilience needed to survive any potential adversary attack and endure throughout crises and con ict Forward Deplovable The mobility and range needed to temporarily or permanently relocate some US nuclear capability to allied or partner territory for needed political or military effect Diverse and Graduated @ptions The availability of forces with the spectrum of yield options weapon types and delivery options necessary to support the most effective tailoring of strategies across a range of adversaries and contingencies Accurate Delivery The precision needed to hold adversary assets at risk while minimizing unintended effects - Penetrating The capacity to counter active and passive defenses including hardened and buried facilities to pose credible deterrent threats and achieve military objectives with high confidence Responsive The capacity to deploy and employ forces as as is necessary to pose credible threats Diversity of Rangg The availability of forces with a spectrum of range options necessary to support the most effective tailoring of strategies Diversity of Traiectories The capacity to locate forces at multiple geographical locations and with multiple ight profiles to complicate adversary active and passive defense planning Visible The capacity to display national will and capabilities as desired for signaling purposes throughout crisis and con ict UNCLASSIFEEDHFOR GFFECIAL USE GNLY Prea ecisional Not Subject to $014 26 i 1448 1449 1450 1451 1452 1453 1454 1455 1456 1457 1458 1459 1460 1461 1462 1463 1464 1465 1466 1467 1468 1469 1470 1471 1472 1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 1478 1479 1480 1481 1482 1483 1484 USE ONLY Preu eeisional Not Subject to FOEA 0 Weapon Reallooation The capacity to change target informatiOn quickly to enable adaptive planning and effective employment Together with effective NC3 these force attributes provide the exible and resilient capabilities needed to support four essential functions 0 Provide survivable responsive capabilities to ensure adversaries do not attempt a disarming first strike 0 Demonstrate resolve through the positioning of forces messaging and exible response options 0 Ensure the U S can respond to a broad range of contingencies with tailored options and 0 Mitigate the risk of a technological failure or adversary breakthrough while providing adaptability to changes in the security environment The Three Legs of the Strategic Nuclear Triad ear-Based Deterrent oree The United States currently operates OHIO class equipped with Trident 11 D5 to provide its sea-based deterrent force Ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable leg of the Triad When on patrol are at present virtually undetectable and there are no known near-term credible threats to the survivability of the SSBN force Nevertheless we will continue to hedge against the possibility that advances in anti submarine warfare could make the SSBN force less survivable in the future - also possess a number of other needed attributes Their intercontinental range and eonstant readiness allows them to hold targets at risk throughout Eurasia fnom their launch areas in the Atiantie and Paci c oCeans They are equipped with highly accurate high-yield warheads which enhance their ability to hold many types of targets at risk are also prompt Traveling at hypersonic speed can reach their targets quickly after launch The SSBN force can upload additional warheads if necessary - contributing to the S- hedge capacity Finally are highly mobile They can demonstrate US nuclear presence and commitment for deterrence and assurance purposes via foreign port calls if desired The first OHIO class SSBN entered service in 1981 and the others entered service through the late 1990s It was originally designed for a 30 year service life and was subsequently extended to 42 years the longest of any submarine in US history The D5 SLBM was first deployed in 1990 and its service life is being extended to run through the end of the last OHIO class lifetime in 2042 The OHIO class cannot be extended further In coming decades advances in adversary anti submarine warfare and missile defense capabilities could challenge the effectiveness of current SSBN and SLBM systems Land-Based Deterrent Force The ICBM force consists of 400 single warhead Minuteman ICBMs deployed in 450 underground silos dispersed across several states These ICBMs are in constant readiness and are 27 OFFICIAL USE ONLY PreuDeeisional - Not Subject to FOIA 1485 1486 1487 1488 1489 1490 1491 1492 1493 1494 1495_ 1496 1497 1498 1499 1500 1501 1502 1503 1504 1505 1505 1507 1508 1509 1510' 1511 1512 1513 1514 1515 1516 1517 1518 1519 1520 1521 1522 1523 1524 UNCLASSEFEEBIIFGR UFFECEAL USE GNLY Pren ecisionai am Not Subject to FGEA the most responsive leg of the Triad This readiness helps preclude a potentially destabilizing rush to alert in a crisis The ICBM force is highly survivable against any but a large scale nuclear attack To destroy U S ICBMs on the ground an adversary would need to launch a precisely coordinated attack with hundreds of high yield and accurate warheads This is an insurmountable challenge for any potential adversary today with the exception of Russia In contrast in the absence of our ICBM force a large proportion of our strategic nuclear Triad including in port and non alert bombers could be subject to an attempted nuclear first strike involving a relatively small number of nuclear weapons The capability to launch ICBMs means that no adversary can be confident in its ability to destroy them prior to launch This option contributes to deterrence of a nuclear first strike attack The United States will continue to maintain open ocean targeting of its strategic nuclear forces day to day as a confidence and security building measure In addition similar to we will act to ensure that the ICBM force remains effective desPite potential advances in adversary ballistic missile defenses The ICBM force has hi gh yield accurate weapons and intercontinental range enabling it to hold at risk targets throughout Eurasia It also is prompt and can reach any target in 30 minutes or less In addition a portion of the ICBM force can be uploaded if there is a need to do so a capability that contributes to our hedging capacity The ICBM was first deployed in 1970 with a planned 10-year service life A series of life extension programs have kept Minuteman viable but component aging and inventory attrition are rapidly driving it to the end of its sustainability From 2002 4012 Minuteman underwent a life extension program intended to maintain its viability to 2030 By that time its 60 years of operation will make it the oldest deployed strategic ballistic missiie in the world The Minuteman Service life cannot be extended further In addition Minuteman will have increasing difficulty penetrating future adversary defenses Air Based Deterrent orce Heavy bombers are the most exible and visible leg of the Triad The air leg consists of 46 - nuclear capable and 20 nuclear capable B-2A stealth strategic bombers supported by a eet of Air Force refueling aircraft While these bombers and air refueling aircraft are not maintained on day to day alert as they were until 1992 they can be alerted and dispersed improving their pre launch survivability Bombers and DCA can also be forward deployed to help deter regional aggression and assure distant allies Unlike ICBMS or bombers typically require hours to reach their targets The longer ight times and ability to recall bombers in ight contribute to their exibility Flights abroad display U S capabilities and resolve providing effective signaling for deterrence and assurance including in times of tension Bombers can be refueled in ight giving them virtually unlimited range and endurance In recent years and bombers have carried out Bomber Assurance and Deterrence missions including nonstop round-trip ights from the continental United States to the Korean peninsula 28 GFFICIAL USE ONLY Preu ecisional Not Subject to 01A 1525 1526 1527 1523 1529 1530 1531 1532 1533 1534 1535 1536 1537 1538 1539 1540 1541 1542 1543 21544 1545 1546 1547 1548 1549 1550 1551 1552 1553 1554 1555 1556 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 1562 1563 1564 1565 UNCLASSIFIEDHFUR USE UNLY Prea ecisionai Not Subject to 1981A Bombers can carry a variety of nuclear weapons with diverse attributes that contribute to the exibility valuable for deterrence in different circumstances The gravity bombs carried by 2A bombers and the ALCMs carried by B-52H bombers provide multiple yield options In addition the and can hold at risk a variety of protected targets As a result both will be retained in the stockpile at least until there is sufficient confidence in the gravity bomb that will become available in 2020 The bombers also play a critical role in the U S hedging strategy Their significant payload capacity provides the ability to upload additional weapons in particular stand off cruise missiles in response to possible geopolitical surprises such as adversary nuclear breakout scenarios Similarly the upload potential of the U S bomber force provides an important hedge against programmatic risk in the strategic replacement programs The bomber is new the only long range nuclear capable U S aircraft that can penetrate advanced air defenses Beginning in 1982 our bombers were equipped with ALCMs in response to steady advances in adversary air defense systems Armed with ALCMs the B-52H can stay outside adversary air defenses and remain effective The ALCM however is now more than 25 years past its design life and faces continuously improving adversary air defense systems Life extension programs LEPs are underway to ensure the ALCM can be maintained until its replacement the Long Range Stand-Off LRSO cruise missile becomes available Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War the United States possessed-large numbers and a wide range of non strategic nuclear weapons also knoWn as theater or tactical nuclear weapons However we have since retired and dismantled almost all of those weapons Current U S non strategic nuclear forces consist eachusiveiy of 361 gravity bombs carried by 15EDCA supported by responsive air refueling aircraft Servers NATO allies also provide DCA capable of deiivering 113 3 forward deployed nuclear weapons The forthcoming gravity bomb will replace earlier versions of the 1361 and be available for these DCA beginning in 2021 U S and NATO DCA together with U S gravity bombs are forward deployed in European NATO countries Their forward presence contributes significantly to the deterrence of potential adversaries and the assurance of allies Their presence is a clear deterrence signal to any potential adversary that the United States possesses the forward deployed capability to respond to escalation If necessary the United States has the ability to deploy DCA and nuclear weapons to other regions such as Northeast Asia In sum U S nuclear capabilities include the variety of attributes and exibility needed to tailor deterrence to a range of potential adversaries and contingencies assure allies achieve our objectives if deterrence fails and hedge against multiple future risks and uncertainties No single leg of the Triad offers all of these attributes but they are available in the Triad as whole in combination with non strategic nuclear forces Relying on life extension programs since the 19803 and multiple delays in the recapitalization of our nuclear force has removed all schedule margin between the necessary retirement of our legacy nuclear systems and the fielding of planned replacement systems Consequently we will move these forward without delay 29 UNCLASSIFIEDIXFGR OFFICEAL USE ONLY PreaDecisional -- Not Subject to FOIA 1566 1567 1568 1569 1570 1571 1572 1573 1574 1575 1576 1577 1578 1579 1580 1581 1582 1583 1584 1585 1586 1537 1588 1589 1590 1591 I 1592 1593 1594 1595 1596 1597 1598 1599 1600 1601 1602 1603 1604 1605 UNCLASSIFEEDIIBOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Preulleeisinnal Net Subject in FOIA The Department of Defense Replacement Program The United States will replace its strategic nuclear Triad and sustain the warheads it carries there is no higher priority for national defense DOD and DOE will prioritize and fund their respective nuclear delivery system and warhead programs to remain on schedule for delivery and they will seek opportunities to accelerate programs where cost effective The United States has a two pronged approach to sustaining the legacy nuclear systems to the extent practicable and to begin the replacement of retiring legacy systems by the mid-20205 We will sustain these systems until the planned replacement systems are fielded This two pronged approach responds to emerging threats and is codified by the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act which directs that in support of a strong and credible nuclear deterrent the United States must A maintain a nuclear force with a diverse flexible range of nuclear yield and delivery modes that are ready capable and credible and B afford the highest priority to the modernization of the nuclear Triad dual-capable aircraft and related command and control elements The Sea Based Deterrent Force The program will deliver a minimum of 12 to replace the current OHIO eet and is designed to provide required capabilities for decades The first COLUMB class SSBN will become operational in 2031 COLUMBIA will include a number of technological features and preserve the exibility to upgrade to ensure the fleet remains survivable Under present building and fielding plans the number 0f available for deployment will reduce to ten during the 20303 as the OHIO SSBN retires and the COLUMBIA completes production During the period of fielding COLUMBIA there wiil be little to-no margin for adjusting to an unforeseen event that would force an SSBN into unscheduled maintenance or early retirement Thus the United States will ensure that the COLUMBIA program stays on schedule and will continue to ensure that the OHIO SSBN remains operationally effective and survivable until replaced Given the need to retire the OHIO at 42 years there is no schedule margin for delay without degrading the critical attributes that the sea based leg of the Triad provides We will place similar emphasis on the timely replacement of the D5 SLBM The D5 SLBM is in the early stages of a life extension that will allow it to be deployed until 2042 on both OHIO and COLUMBIA The Navy will begin studies in 2020 to define a cost-effective credible and effective SLBM that we can deploy throughout the service life of the COLUMBIA SSBN ICBMS To sustain the critical contributions to the Triad the United States must and will begin fielding its replacement the Ground B ased Strategic Deterrent GBSD on time in 2029 The GB SD program will modernize 450 ICBM launch facilities to support fielding 400 ICBMs to replace the retiring Minuteman after six decades or more of service This will provide an ICBM system effective for decades into the future 30 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Preu eeisienal Net Subject to FOIA 1606 1607 1608 1609 1610 1611 1612 1613 1614 1615 1616 1617 1618 1619 1620 1621 1622 1623 1624' '1625 1626 1627 1628 1629 1630 1631 1632' 1633 1634 1635 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 GENERAL USE Pr'euDecisionai Not Subject to FOEA Strategic Bombers and Air-Delivered Weapons The United States will sustain and modernize the and to ensure they remain effective into the future Given the continuing proliferation and improvement of adversary air defense capabilities and the continued aging of the the ALCM and the the United States has initiated a program to develop and deploy the next generation bomber the Raider The Raider will first supplement and eventually replace elements of the conventional and nuclear capable bomber force beginning in the mid 20203 The replacement for the aging ALCM the LRSO is a modern air launched cruise missile The LRSO program will maintain into the future our bomber capability to deliver stand off weapons that can penetrate and survive advanced integrated air defense systems thus holding targets at risk anywhere on Earth Arming our force of strategic bombers with LRSO is critical to ensuring their continuing effectiveness in the face of improving air defenses and to provide a diverse range of response options The LRSO will enable the B-52H to remain an effective part of the nuclear-capable bomber force and preserve upload potential as a key hedge against unforeseen technical and geopolitical challenges The will be able to deliver both gravity bombs and the LRSO Crucial to the success of the heavy bomber force is a viable aerial refueling capability which also needs recapitalization The United States is also incorporating nuclear capability onto the to be used by the United States and NATO allies as a replacement for the current aging Improved DCA readiness and the arrival of the E3 5A a fifth generation aircraft in conjunction with the ongoing gravity bomb LEP will preserve the DCA contribution to regional deterrence stability and assurance In parallei with its warhead LEP the will be equipped with a - guidance tail kit to sustain the military of existing B61 variants As is the case with the sustainment and replacement programs necessary to maintain the Triad the programs supporting the DCA mission must be completed on time If this planned Triad and DCA replacement program experiences delays or if existing systems reach obsolescence earlier than expected fielded systems will age out before replacements are available and the United States will face potentially significant gaps in its diverse and exible capabilities needed to deter assure achieve objectives if deterrence fails and hedge against future uncertainty Delays to the SSBN and SLBM replacement programs would reduce the survivability and exibility of US nuclear capabilities and challenge our ability to maintain rough parity with Russian strategic deployments even at the reduced levels set by New START Delays in the GBSD program accompanied by a rapid age out of our ICBM force would dramatically reduce the scale of attack required for an adversary to threaten much of the US deterrent forces in a first strike attack Delays in the bomber program or associated bomber weapons would reduce the ability of our strategic forces to penetrate adversary air defenses limit the diversity of our response options and compromise our ability to send the visible deterrence and assurance signals for which strategic bombers are particularly well suited 31 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Prea-Decisional Not Subject to FGIA 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1559 1660 1661 1662 1653 1664 1665 1555 1667 1668 1669 1676 1671 UNCLASSIFHEDXIFQR UFFICEAL USE QNLY PrenDecisiOnai Nat Subject ta ESTA Flexible and Secure Nuclear Capabilities An Affordable Priority What we want to do is to deter Nobody wants to have a war The only thing more expensive than deterrence is actually ghting a war and the only thing more expensive than ghting a war is ghting one and losing US Army Chief of Staff General Mark A Milley 2016 Throughout past decades Senior US officials have emphasized that the highest priority of the Department of Defense is deterring nuclear attack and therefore sustaining the nuclear capabilities necessary to deter More recently Secretary of Defense Mattie former Secretary of Defense Carter and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Joseph Dunford have all emphasized the priority of the nuclear deterrence mission and the necessity of our nuclear sustainment and replacement programs While estimates of the cost to sustain and replace U S nuclear capabilities vary based on the tiineframe considered and how they account for various elements of the program even the highest of these projections place the highpoint of the future cost at approximately 6 4 percent of the current DOD budget Maintaining and operating our current aging nuclear forces now requires between two and three percent Of the DOD budget and the replacement program to rebuild the Triad for decades of service will peak for several years at only approximately four percent beyond the existing sustainment level of spending This 6 4 percent of the current DOD budget required for the long term program represents less than one percent of today s overall federal budget As indicated by Figure 3 this level of spending compares favorably to the 13 9 percent of the DOD budget required during the last such investment period in the 19803 which at the time was almost 3 2 percent of the federal budget and the 24 9 percent of the DOD budget required in the early 1960s Figure 3 Cost of DOD Nuclear Force Replacement 32 GFFICIAL USE GNLY Pre Decisianal Nat Subject te FQEA 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 UNCLASSEFKEDHFOR GENERAL USE Pr'eu ecisional Not Subject to FQEA 962 iota 24 9% of D00 gadget 144% 9814 Terminus I 3 44% 3 2-16 of DOD Budge Q Rank-E aupiiuliznifon of Nude-or Eniarp ra Fundingr'in ladmg qui s of fanning remaining 6 54% of o Budget 89% Pedk Recapiinlizu oni 33% of 9139 Budge ni x96 of 220 Budget PERCENT OF THE DOD BUDGET FESCAL YEAR Data provided by the DOD The projected DOD costs of sustaining and replacing the nuclear capabilities needed to support U S national security strategy while substantial are moderate in historical terms and represent a small fraction of the DOD budget Given the criticality of effective U S nuclear deterrence to the assurance of allies and most importantly the safety of the American people there is no doubt that these programs are both necessary and affordable Enhancing Deterrence with Non-Strategic Nuclear Capabilities Existing elements of the nuclear force replacement program predate the dramatic deterioration of the strategic environment To meet the emerging requirements of U S strategy the United States will now pursue select supplements to the replacement program to enhance the exibility and responsiveness 0f U S nuclear forces It is a re ection of the versatility and exibility of the U S Triad that only modest supplements are now required in this much more challenging threat environment These supplements will enhance deterrence by denying potential adversaries any mistaken- confidence that limited nuclear employment can provide a useful advantage over the United States and its allies For example Russia s belief that limited nuclear first use potentially including low yield weapons can provide such an advantage is based in part on Moscow s perception that its greater number and variety of non strategic nuclear systems provide a coercive advantage in crises and at lower levels of con ict Correctng this mistaken Russian perception is a strategic imperative North Korea is illicitly developing a range of strategic and non-strategic nuclear systems to threaten the United States allies and partners It may mistakenly perceive that these systems 33 UNCLASSIFIEBHFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PreuDecisional Not Subject to FOIA 1695 1696 1697 1698 1699 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1735 UNCLASSKFIEDIIFGR QFEECEAL USE GNLY PremDeeisional n Subject to FGEA when coupled with the threat of a strategic nuclear attack against the United States would provide advantageous nuclear escalation options in crises or con ict To address these types of challenges and preserve deterrence stability the United States will enhance the exibility and range of its tailored deterrence options U S strategy does not require non strategic nuclear capabilities that quantitatively match or mimic Russia s more expansive arsenal Rather the United States will maintain a spectrum of capabilities sized and postured to meet US needs and particularly to ensure that no adversary under any circumstances can perceive an advantage through limited nuclear escalation or other strategic attack For decades the United States has deployed low yield nuclear options to strengthen deterrence and assurance Expanding exible US nuclear options now to include low yield options is important for the preservation of credible deterrence against regional aggression To be clear this is not intended to enable nor does it enable nuclear war fighting Nor will it reduce the nuclear threshold Rather expanding U S tailored response options will raise the nuclear threshold and help ensure that potential adversaries perceive no possible advantage in limited nuclear escalation making nuclear weapons employment less likely Consequently the United States will maintain and enhance as necessary the capability to forward deploy nuclear bombers and DCA around the world We are committed to upgrading DCA with the nuclear-capable aircraft We will work with NATO to best ensure and improve where needed the readiness survivability and operational effectiveness of DCA based in Europe Additionally in the near term the United States will modify a small number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low yield Option and in the longer term pursue a modern nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missile SLCM Unlike DCA a low-yield SLBM warhead and SLCM will not require or rely on host nation support to provide deterrent effect They will provide additional diversity in platforms range and survivability and a valuable hedge against future nuclear break out scenarios DOD and NNSA will develop for deployment a low yield SLBM warhead to ensure a prompt response option that is able to penetrate adversary'defenses This is a comparatively low cost and near term modification to an exiSting capability that will help counter any mistaken perception of an exploitable gap in US regional deterrence capabilities Doing so will not increase the number of deployed U S ballistic missile warheads as the low yield weapons will replace higher yield weapons currently deployed In addition to this near-term step for the longer term the United States will pursue a nuclear 'ar1ned SLCM leveraging existing technologies to help ensure its cost effectiveness SLCM will provide a needed non strategic regional presence an assured response capability and an Treaty compliant response to Russia s continuing Treaty violation If Russia returns to Treaty compliance reduces its non strategic nuclear arsenal and corrects its other destabilizing behaviors the United States may reconsider the pursuit of a SLCM Indeed U S pursuit of a SLCM may provide the necessary incentive for Russia to negotiate seriously a reduction of its non-strategic nuclear weapons just as the prior Western deployment of intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe led to the 1987 INF Treaty As then Secretary of 34 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFQR GFFICIAL USE Pie-Delusional Not Subject to 91A 1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1753 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 i755 1757 1768 1759 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 UNSHJASSIMEDIIFOR OFFECIAL USE GNLY Preu ecisional Not Subject to FGEA State George Schultz stated If the West did not deploy Pershing 11 and cruise missiles there would be no incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously for nuclear weapons reductions In the 2010 NPR the United States announced the retirement of its previous nuclear armed SLCM which for decades had contributed to deterrence and the assurance of allies particularly in Asia Given the increasing need for exible and low-yield options to strengthen deterrence and assurance we will immediately begin efforts to restore this capability by initiating a requirements study leading to an tAnalysis of Alternatives for the rapid development of a modern SLCM It will strengthen the effectiveness of the sea based nuclear deterrence force and is complementary to LRSO but cannot substitute for it because LRSO is required to sustain an effective air leg of the Triad These supplements to the planned nuclear force replacement program- a modified SLBM warhead and modern prudent options for enhancing the exibility and diversity of US nuclear capabilities to help address emerging deterrence requirements in the near term and beyond They are compliant with all treaties and agreements and together they will provide a more diverse set of characteristics greatly enhancing our ability to tailor deterrence and assurance expand the range of credible U S options for responding to nuclear or non nuclear strategic attack and enhance deterrence by signaling to potential adversaries that their concepts of coercive limited nuclear escalation offer no exploitable advantage Nuclear Command Control and Communications N C3 Modernization We have to modernize the entire architecture And so as you see the modernization plans coming in make sure number one it's the 21st century information architecture Commander United States Strategic Command General John Hyten 4 April 2017 The United States must have an NC3 system that ensures command and control of US nuclear forces at all times even under the enormous stress of a nuclear attack NC3 capabilities must assure the integrity of transmitted information and possess the resiliency and survivability necessary to reliably overcome the effects of adversary nuclear attack The NC3 architecture is essential for deterrence and enables a response if deterrence fails During peacetime and crisis the C3 system performs five crucial functions detection warning and attack characterization nuclear planning decision making conferencing receiving Presidential orders and enabling the management and direCtion of forces Today s C3 system is a legacy of the Cold War last comprehensively updated almost three decades ago It includes interconnected elements composed of warning satellites and radars communications satellites aircraft and ground stations fixed and mobile command posts and the control centers for nuclear systems 0 Warning systems include fixed terrestrial phased array warning radars the Defense Support Program DSP system and its replacement the Space Based Infrared System SB and the US Nuclear Detonation Detection System USNDS 0 Communications systems include the Military Strategic and Tactical Relay MILSTAR satellites and its replacement the Advanced Extremely High Frequency AEHF 35 OFFICIAL USE GNLY PrenDecisional w Not Subject to FOIA 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 OFFICIAL USE Preu ecisionai Not Subject to FGEA satellites a wide variety of ground- based transmission systems across the radio frequency- spectrum and Take Charge and Move Out TACAMO relay aircraft I The fixed command posts include the National Military Command Center NMCC and the US Strategic Command Global Operations Center Fixed command posts also include linkages to US forward deployed forces in USEUCOM and elsewhere Mobile command posts include the E4B National Airborne Operations Center NAOC the E6B Airborne Command Post ABNCP and ground mobile systems 0 Control centers for nuclear systems are in ICBM Launch Control Centers on and aboard bomber aircraft While once state-of-the art the NC3 system is now subject to challenges from both aging system components and new growing 21st century threats Of particular concern are expanding threats in space and cyber space adversary strategies of limited nuclear escalation and the broad diffusion within DOD of authority and responsibility for governance of the C3 system a function which by its nature must be integrated Expanding Threats Space is no longer a sanctuary and orbital space is increasingly congested competitive and contested A number of countries particularly China and Russia have developed the means to disrupt disable and destroy US assets in space Because space is no longer an uncontested domain U S NC3 space systems need to be more survivable defendable and provide resilient capabilities - J - The emergence of offensive cyber warfare capabilities has created new challenges and potential Vulnerabilities for the NC3 system Potential adversaries are expending considerable effort to design and use cyber weapons against networked systems While our NC3 system today remains assured and effective we are steps to address challenges to network defense authentication data integrity and secure assured and reliable information ow across a NC3 network Nuclear Environment Because potential adversaries are emphasizing the employment of limited nuclear options our NC3 system must be resilient in the context of adversary limited nuclear strikes The US leadership including Combatant Commanders must be able to communicate and Share information across networked command and control systems and to integrate nuclear and non nuclear military planning and operations in the context of adversary nuclear employment Modernizing the NC3 System In light of the critical need to ensure our NC3 system remains survivable and effective in crisis and con ict the United States will pursue a series of initiatives to strengthen NC3 and address 21St century needs and challenges Strengthen Protection Against Space-based Threats The United States will ensure space assets are agile and resilient thereby deterring and if necessary overcoming attempts to extend con ict into space The United States will enhance the training of operational space forces to ensure that 36 QFFECIAL USE ONLY Pre-Decisional - Not Subject to FGIA 1813 1814 1815 1815 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 UFFICEAL USE PreaDecisiunai Net Subject tn FGHA we are prepared to successfully achieve mission objectives against the range of 213t century threats Strengthen Protection Against Cyber Threats The United States will protect NC3 components against current and future cyber threats and ensure the continuing availability of U S produced information technology necessary for the NC3 system Enhance Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment The United States will develop a future architecture which willinclude modernized SBIRS satellites and integrate missile defense sensors to maximize warning time The United States will also continue to transition the DSP system to SBIRS and enhance ground based radars The upgraded SBIRS constellation will include six satellites supported by the existing DSP architecture to enhance the survivability of US satellites Additionally we will continue to sustain and upgrade the USNDS to support accurate attack 888688111611 Improve Command Posts and Communications Links The United States will upgrade and modernize critical NC3 airborne systems including the NAOC the ABNCP and the TACAMO aircraft We will also develop planning systems at all fixed and mobile sites to enhance command and control and field modernized communication transmitters and terminals across the C3 system to better ensure assured reliable and resilient communications at all levels of the nuclear force Advance Decision Support Technolo gv The United States will continue to adapt new technologies for information display and data analysis to improve support for Presidential decision making and senior leadership consultations integrate Planning and Operations The United States will improve the capability of our Cnmbatant Commands to communicate and share information across networked command and control systems in the context of adversary nuclear employment US forces will strengthen their ability to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear military operations to deter limited nuclear escalation and non nuclear strategic attacks Finally Combatant Commands will plan organize ham and exercise for this mission - Reform Governance of the Overall NC3 Svstem The United States will improve its C3 governance to ensure is properly organized to maintain a fully capable NC3 system to address current and future environments To address this challenge the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in consultation with key stakeholders will deliver to the Secretary of Defense no later than May 1 2018 a plan to reform NC3 governance to ensure its effective functioning and modernization 37 OFFICIAL USE ONLY PrenDecisienal Net Subject to FOIA 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 - 1859 1860 1861 -1862 1363 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1370 1371 1872 1873 _1374 1375 1375 1377 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 BFFICEAL USE BNLY Pr ewDecisional - Not Subject Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure s ability to achieve its vital national security missions is dependent on safe and reliable infrastructure If not appropriately addressed the age and condition of NNSA s infrasb ueture will put NNSA s missions safety of its workers the public and the environment at risk NNSA Administrator Frank Klotz 2017 An effective responsive and resilient nuclear weapons infrastructure is essential to the US capacity to adapt exibly to shiftng requirements Such an infrastructure offers tangible evidence to both allies and potential adversaries of US nuclear weapons capabilities and can help to deter assure hedge against adverse developments and discourage adversary interest in arms competition The NNSA is responsible for the Nation s nuclear Weapons infrastructure generates military requirements for the nuclear warheads to be carried on delivery platforms The NNSA oversees the assessment design development production test and research programs that respond to warhead requirements The infrastructure consists of people with the requisite skills scientists engineers production personnel and the associated experimental and industrial facilities that 0 Sustain today s nuclear stockpile and ensure its continued safety security and effectiveness - Extend the life of a select sub set of nuclear warheads and design develop and produce nuclear weapons as needed for today and into the future 0 Assess and certify annually whether the safety and reliability of the future nuclear stockpile can be assured in the absence of underground nuclear testing and as a safeguard maintain a nuclear test capability 0 Maintain the capability to design develop and produce nuclear warheads with new or different military capabilities if required in the future and 0 Provide an effective response to technical problems with a warhead or to adverse geopolitical developments that call for force augmentation In addition the scientists engineers and production personnel of the nuclear infrastructure support nuclear arms control threat reduction naval nuclear propulsion non proliferation efforts assessment of foreign nuclear weapons programs nuclear counteiterrorism and emergency response The main challenge to an effective and resilient infrastructure is the need to maintain design development manufacturing and testing capabilities during the periods of time between rebuilding cycles to ensure the enduring health of the infrastructure During the Cold War the United States carried out an intensive and balanced program on roughly a five-year cycle The last new modern warhead development program the W88 was completed by the early 19903 38 OFFICIAL USE ONLY PremDecisiorial Not Subject to FOIA 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891' 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907' 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918' 1919 1920 1921 1922 UNCLASSEFIEDHFOR OFFICIAL 11813 ONLY Prea ecisional Not Subject to FGIA We are now in the early stages of a comprehensive warhead sustainment program To provide the required strategic vision needed to inform critical warhead modernization investments the and DOE Nuclear Weapons Council approved a strategic plan This plan describes a current and future path for the nuclear warhead stockpile to meet deterrence assurance and technical hedging requirements The US must have the ability to maintain and certify a safe secure and effective nuclear arsenal with replacement programs the United States will sustain and deliver on-time the warheads needed to support both strategic and non strategic nuclear capabilities by - I Completing the LEP by Fiscal Year FY 2019 0 Completing the B61-12 LEP by 0 Completing the W88 alterations by life extension with DoD s LRSO program and completing the LEP by 0 Advancing the W78 warhead replacement one year to FY19 to support fielding on GBSD by 2030 and investigate the feasibility of fielding the nuclear explosive package in a Navy ight vehicle 0 Sustaining the 83 1 past its currently planned retirement date until a suitable replacement is identified and 0 Exploring future ballistic missile warhead requirements based-on the threats and vulnerabilities of potential adversaries including the possibility of common reentry systems between Air Force and Navy systems - Over the past several decades the US nuclear weapons infrastructure has suffered the effects of aging and underfunding Over half of infrastructure is over 40 years old and a quarter dates back to the Manhattan Project era All previous NPRs highlighted the need to maintain a modern nuclear weapons infrastructure but the United States has fallen short in sustaining a modern infrastructure that is resilient and has'the capacity torespond to unforeseen developments There is now no margin for further delay in recapitalizing the physical infrastructure needed to produce strategic materials and components for US nuclear weapons In 2008 the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy released a joint report stating While the service lives of existing warhead types are being extended through refurbishment at present the United States does not have the ability to produce new nuclear weapons While North Korea can illicitly produce nuclear warheads the United States does not have a sustained plutonium pit manufacturing capability needed to avoid stockpile age out support life extension programs and prepare for future uncertainty Plutonium pits are critical components of every nuclear warhead with nearly all current stockpile pits having been produced from 197 Today the US capability to produce plutonium pits is limited to research and deveIOpment pits unsuitable for stockpile use To avoid age related risks DOD requires NNSA to produce at least 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030 and to sustain the capacity for future LEPs and follow on programs 39 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Pres-Decisional Not Subject to 01A 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1943 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 USE GNLY Prea ecisional Not Subject to FQHA U S production of tritium a critical strategic material for nuclear weapons is now insufficient to meet the forthcoming US nuclear force 'sustainment demands or to hedge against unforeseen developments Programs are planned but not yet fully funded to eaSe these critical production shortfalls In the absence of sustained support for these programs including a marked increase in the planned production of tritium in the next few years our nuclear capabilities will inevitably atrophy and degrade below requirements The US is also unable to produce or process a number of other critical materials including lithium and enriched uranium For instance the United States largely relies on dismantling retired warheads to recover lithium to sustain and produce deployable warheads This may be inadequate to support the nuclear force replacement program and any supplements to it Past assumptions that our capability to produce nuclear weapons would not be necessary and that we could permit the required infrastructure to age into obsolescence have proven to be mistaken It is now clear that the United States must have sufficient research design development and production capacity to support the sustainment and replacement of its nuclear forces To meet these needs the United States must resolve the current significant infrastructure funding shortfalls over the next five years To remain postured to address challenges that may emerge the United States needs the exibility to hedge against future risks Consequently NNSA will explore approaches for rapid prototyping develop options for modifying warheads to increase exibility and responsiveness examine the potential for retired Warheads and components to augment the future hedge stockpile and survey past and extant warhead designs to better understand what can be certified without resuming full-scale nuclear testing An additional measure for needed exibility is to reduce the time required to design develop and initially produce a warhead from a decision to enter full scale development Along with its nuclear weapon development and production infrastructure NNSA will maintain the capability to resume underground nuclear explosive testing if called upon to do so The United States will not seek Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty but will continue to observe'a nuclear test moratorium that began in 1992 This posture was adopted with the understanding that the United States must remain ready to resume nuclear testing if necessary to meet severe technological or geopolitical challenges The nuclear weapons infrastructure depends on a highly skilled world class workforce from a broad array of disciplines including engineering physical sciences mathematics and computer science Maintaining the necessary critical skills and retaining personnel with the needed expertise requires sufficient opportunities to exercise those skills Should a technical or geopolitical development demand a new nuclear weapon it is crucial that the nuclear weapons workforce possess the skills and the knowledge needed to design develop and manufacture warheads of different design in a timely manner Yet the United States unlike potential adversaries has not executed a new nuclear weapon program for decades Ongoing work involves life extension programs for existing weapons To ensure we sustain the necessary skills and knowledge required to take new warhead designs from initial concept through development prototyping and plans for certification NNSA should assess capabilities currently being exercised by life extension programs stockpile certification 40 UNCLASSIFBEDIXFOR USE GNLY PreuDecisionai Not Subject to FGEA 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 '1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 UFFECEAL USE PreaDecisiunai Nut Subject tn F in - laboratory directed research and development and technology maturation On this basis NNSA will identify any gaps in the full range of the skills needed to design and develop nuclear weapons The Stockpile Responsiveness Program that Congress recently instituted with bipartisan support explicitly directs that the United States ensure the responsiveness and flexibility of our nuclear weapons infrastructure This is an important element of the US hedging strategy because it promises to provide more timely availability of new Capabilities if they are needed to meet changes in the security environment The United States will pursue initiatives to ensure the necessary capability capacity and responsiveness of the nuclear weapons infrastructure and the needed skills of the nuclear enterprise workforce including the following Pursue a joint DOD and DOE advanced technology development capability to ensure that efforts are appropriately integrated to meet DOD needs Provide the enduring capability and capacity to produce plutonium pits at a rate of no fewer than 80 pits per year by 2030 A delay in this would result in the need for a higher rate of pit production at higher cost - Ensure that current plans to reconstitute the US capability to produce lithium compounds are sufficient to meet military requirements Fully fund the Uranium Processing Facility and ensure availability of sufficient low- enriched uranium to meet military requirements - - Ensure the necessary reactor capacity to produce an adequate supply of tritium to meet military requirements Ensure cuntinuity in the US capability to develop and manufacture secure trusted strategic radiation hardened microelectronic systems beyond 2025 to support stockpile modernization Rapidly pursue the Stockpile Responsiveness Program established by Congress to expand opportunities for young scientists and engineers to advance warhead design development and production skills Develop an NNSA roadrnap that sizes production capacity to modernization and hedging requirements Retain confidence in nuclear gravity bombs needed to meet deterrence needs Maintain and enhance the computational experimental and testing capabilities needed to annually assess nuclear weapons Due to underfunding by previous administrations significant and sustained investments will be required over the coming decade to ensure that NNSA will be able to deliver the nuclear weapons at the needed rate to support nuclear deterrence in the 2030s and beyond 41 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Pre Decisiunal Not Subject to FOEA 2001 2002 2003 2004 '2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 i 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 EFFECHAL USE QNLY Preeraiiecisionai -- Not Subject to IX Countering Nuclear Terrorism mast prevent nuclear weapons and materials from coming into the hands of terrorists and being used against as or anywhere in the President Donald J Trump August 21 2017 Nuclear terrorism remains among the most significant threats to the security of the United States allies and partners The Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2015 emphasized Nuclear chemical and biological agents pose uniquely destructive threats They can empower a small group of actors with terrible destructive potential Thus combatting weapons of mass destruction WMD as far from our homeland as possible is a key mission for the US military U S strategy to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism encompasses a wide range of activities that comprise a defense in depth against current and emerging dangers Under this multilayered approach the United States strives to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons or Weapons us able materials technology and expertise counter terrorist efforts to acquire transfer or employ these assets and respond to nuclear incidents by locating and disabling a nuclear device or managing the consequences of a nuclear detonation Key U S efforts under this strategy include Securing nuclear weapons materials related technology and knowledge to prevent their malicious use I Enhancing cooperation with allies partners and international institutions to combat nuclear terrorism 0 Deterring state support for nuclear terrorism through advanced forensics and attribution capabilities 0 Strengthening defenses against nuclear terrorism to protect the American people and US interests at home and abroad 0 Enhancing preparedness to mitigate the effects of nuclear incidents With the cooperation of overseas partners the United States has worked for nearly three decades to keep nuclear and radiological materials out of the hands of terrorists As the number of nuclear facilities and the quantity of nuclear material worldwide continue to increase we will maintain our focus on reducing the vulnerability of these materials to theft or seizure We will also decrease the availability of sensitive equipment and technologies on the black market and thereby hinder terrorist access to them The most effective way to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism is to secure nuclear weapons and materials at their sources The United States will continue to work with allies and partners to disrupt proliferation networks and interdict transfers of nuclear materials and related technology In particular we will improve coordination with international export-control and law- enforcement agencies to bolster information sharing to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material Through collaboration with foreign partners we will maintain the constellation of radiation detection technologies that have been deployed in 60 countries around 42 OFFICIAL USE QNLY Pi em ecisional Not Subject to FOEA 2039 2040 2041 2042 2043 2044 2045 2046 2047 2048 2049 2050 2051 2052 2053 2054 2055 2056 USE GNLY Preu ecisionai a Not Subject to 01A the world to thwart the smuggling of nuclear weapons and materials by land sea and air Domestically we will sustain and build upon the roughly 57 000 radiation detectors operating at US seaports border crossings and within the American interior As part of this defense in depth the United States will sustain its specialized capabilities to search for interdict characterize and disable nuclear devices These assets are strategically pre positioned throughout the country to respond rapidly to nuclear incidents and save American lives Should an act of nuclear terrorism occur the United States also maintains advanced nuclear forensics capabilities to identify the source of the material used in a nuclear device thereby strengthening the deterrence of such an attack We will continue to improve our ability to attribute the source of a nuclear attack by establishing a nuclear materials archive to store consolidate and analyze high-value nuclear materials The United States will hold fully accountable any state terrorist group or other non state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or employ nuclear devices Although the role of US nuclear weapons in countering nuclear terrorism is limited for effective deterrence our adversaries must understand that a terrorist nuclear attack against the United States or its allies and partners would qualify as an extreme circumstance under which the United States could consider the ultimate form of retaliation 43 OFFICIAL USE QNLY PremDeeisioual Not Subject to FOIA 2057 2058 2059 2060 2061 2062 2063 2064 2065 2066 2067 2068 2069 2070 2071 2072 2073 2074 2075 2076 2077 2078 2079 2080 2081 2082 2083 2084 2035 2086 2087 2088 2089 2090 2091 2092 2093 2094 2095 USE Pra ec sionai Not Subject to FGEA X OIl pI Olifel athIl and Arms Control In a world with no overarching global authority rules are only as strong as the willingness of states to follow or enforce them Joint Chiefs of Staff 2016 Effective nuclear non proliferation and arms control measures can support U S allied and partner security by controlling the spread of nuclear materials and technology placing limits on the production stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons decreasing misperception and miscalculation and avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms competition Consequently the United States will continue its efforts to 1 minimize the number of nuclear armed states including by maintaining credible U S extended nuclear deterrence and assurance 2 deny terrorist organizations access to nuclear weapons materials and expertise 3 strictly control weapons usable material related technology and expertise and 4 seek arms control agreements that enhance security and are verifiable and enforceable Non-Proliferation and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty The NPT is the cornerstone of the nuclear non proliferation regime It provides the formal international legal framework for measures to constrain and deny proliferators and to identify contain and sanction transgressors The Treaty establishes a framework governing peaceful uses of nuclear energy allowing states to pursue civil nuclear programs under safeguards that help provide transparency and confidence that such programs will not contribute to proliferation The positive role in building consensus for non-proliferation enhances international efforts to impose costs on those who would pursue nuclear weapons outside the Treaty It also contributes to US and international efforts to mitigate threats of nuclear terrorism by helping to safeguard nuclear and radiologicai material and prevent the spread of sensitive nuciear technologies and expertise The United States remains committed to nuclear non proliferation continues to abide by its obligations under the NPT and will work to strengthen the NPT regime In addition the United States will continue to maintain a credible nuclear umbrella extended to over thirty allies and partners This is essential to meeting their need for nuclear deterrence while enabling them to forego independent nuclear Weapons capabilities Credible U S extended nuclear deterrence will continue to be a cornerstone of US non proliferation efforts Nuclear non proliferation today faces acute challenges Most significantly North Korea is pursuing a nuclear path in direct contravention of the NPT and in direct opposition to numerous UN Security Council resolutions The risk of North Korea employing nuclear weapons or attempting to sell its nuclear technology and expertise is an international problem and the international community must continue to work toward preventing this threat Beyond North Korea looms the challenge of Iran Although the JCPOA may constrain Tehran s nuclear program Iran retains the ability to produce weapons grade uranium for use in a nuclear weapon if it decides to do so This combined with Iran s ongoing missile testing is a serious concern 44 UNCLASSEFIEBIXFGR UFFECIAL USE ONLY Prealiecisional Not Subject to FOIA 2096 2097 2098 2099 2100 2101 2102 2103 _2104 2105 2105 2107 2108 2109 2110 2111 2112 2113 2114 2115 2116 2117 2118 2119 2120 2121 2122 2123 2124 2125 2126 2127 2128 2129 2130 2131 2132 2133 2134 2135 2136 USE Pre- Deeisional - Not Subject to FDEA Despite these challenges the institutions that support the NPT such as the International Atomic Energy Agency help identify violations provide evidentiary support for the imposition of multilateral sanctions and as is the case with Iran establish international monitoring and verification capabilities Perhaps most importantly strengthening these institutions and the international safeguards system supports verifiable durable progress on nonwproliferation and potentially further negotiations on nuclear reductions if the security environment permits In continuing support of nuclear non proliferation the United States will continue to pursue the political and security conditions that could enable further nuclear reductions We will work to increase transparency and predictability where appropriate to avoid potential miscalculation among nuclear weapons states and other possessor states through strategic dialogues risk reduction communications channels and sharing of best practices related to nuclear weapons safety and security To further strengthen the NPT regime the United States will support initiatives to improve capabilities to detect deter and attribute proliferation and use reduce the vulnerability of nuclear and radiological materials to theft or seizure around the world and reduce the availability of proliferation sensitive equipment and technologies through illicit transfers These activities will reduce potential terrorist access to this equipment and technology The United States will also support the efforts of multilateral supplier regimes such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group We will continue to perfect forensics capabilities for attribution purposes by establishing a nuclear materials archive to store consolidate and analyze high value nuclear materials to work in concert with the existing Nuclear Materials Information Program Further the United States remains committed to finding long term solutions to the technical challenges of verifying nuclear reductions and therefore will explore new concepts and approaches for this goal including continued support for the hiternational Partnership for Nuclear Disannament Verification The number of nuclear facilities and the quantities of nuclear materials worldwide continue to increase with a wide variance in security measures and potential vulnerabilities that Could result in terrorist acquisition of nuclear materials Consequently the United States will continue to work with allies and partners to disrupt proliferation networks interdict transfers of related materials technology and expertise prevent the employment of improvised nuclear devices attribute responsibility to perpetrators and mitigate the consequences of employment Although the United States will not seek Senate ratification of the Comprehensive NuclearTest Ban Treaty it will continue to support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Committee and through the US Atomic Energy Detection System continue its support for the related International Monitoring System and the International Data Center which detect nuclear tests and monitor seismic activity The United States will not resume nuclear explosive testing unless necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the US nuclear arsenal and calls on all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing 45 OFFICIAL USE ONLY PreuDecisional Not Subject to FOIA 2137 2138 2139 2140 2141 2142 2143 2144 2145 2146 2147 2148 2149 2150 2151 2152 2153 2154 2155 2156 2157 2158 2159 2160 2161 2162 2163 2164 2165A 2166 2167 2168 2169 2170 2171 2172 2173 2174 2175 2176 2177 BFFICTAI USE QNLY Pr en ecisional Not Subject to FQIA Finally it is important to recognize that the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty opened for signature at the UN in 2017 is fueled by wholly unrealistic expectations of the elimination of nuclear arsenals without the prerequisite transformation of the international security-environment This effort has polarized the international community and seeks to inject disarmament issues into non- proliferation fora potentially damaging the non proliferation regime This Treaty could damage US security and the security of many allies and partners who rely on US extended nuclear deterrence The terms of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty also could undermine ongoing and prospective military cooperation between the United States and signatory states cooperation that is critical to the maintenance of credible extended nuclear deterrence Arms Control Arms control can contribute to U S allied and partner security by helpingto manage strategic competition among states By codifying mutually agreed-upon nuclear postures in a verifiable and enforceable manner arms control can help establish a useful degree of cooperation and confidence among states It can foster transparency understanding and predictability in adversary relations thereby reducing the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation In addition to formal agreements regular dialogues on doctrine and forces can also contribute to mutual understanding and reduce the risk of miscalculation In a series of Cold War arms control agreements for example the United States and Soviet Union increased transparency moderated competition codified rough parity in strategic nuclear arms and closed off areas of competition The most recent 2010 New START Treaty caps accountable US and Russian strategic force levels and includes some intrusive verification measures to help monitor compliance New START is in effect through February 2021 and with mutual agreement may be extended for up to five years to 2026 The United States has already met the Treaty s central limits which go into force on February 5 2018 and will continue to implement the New START Treaty and verify Russian compliance Progress in arms control itself and-depends on the security - environment and the participation of willing partners The United States is committed to arms control efforts that advance U S allied and partner security are verifiable and enforceable and include partners that comply responsibly with their obligations Such arms control efforts can contribute to the US capability to sustain strategic stability Further progress is difficult to envision however in an environment that is characterized by nuclear armed states seeking to change borders and overturn existing norms and by significant continuing non-compliance with existing arms control obligations and commitments In this regard Russia continues to violate a series of arms control treaties and commitments the most significant being the INF Treaty In a broader context Russia is either rejecting or avoiding its obligations and commitments under numerous agreements including the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty the Budapest Memorandum the Helsinki Accords and the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives In addition Russia has violated the Open Skies Treaty and is selectively implementing the politically binding 46 SPECIAL USE ONLY PrenDecisional Not Subject to FBIA 2178 2179 2180 2181 2182 2183 2184 2185 2186 2187 2188 2189 2190 2191 2192 2193 2194 2195 2196 a 21 92 2193 2199 2200 2201 2202 2203 2204 USE ONLY Not Subject to FGIA Vienna Document to avoid transparency of its major military exercises Russia has also rebuffed U S efforts to follow ew START with another round of negotiated reductions and to pursue reductions in non strategic nuclear forces Regarding the INF Treaty the United States complies with and remains committed to preserving the Treaty However the value of the INF Treaty or any arms control treaty depends on all parties remaining in compliance For over four years the United States has pressed Russia to return to compliance and will continue to exert appropriate pressure to restore Russian compliance and preserve the INF Treaty Nevertheless Moscow must understand that the United States will not forever endure Russia s continuing non compliance The status quo in which the United States continues to comply while Russia continues deployments in violation of the Treaty is untenable Agreements that are violated cannot provide predictability undermine the prospects for future arms control and can harm U S allied and partner security Concluding further agreements with a state in violation of multiple existing agreements would indicate a lack of consequences for its non compliance and thereby undermine arms control broadly Consequently the United States will work to convince states in violation of their legal arms control obligations to return to compliance Arms control efforts must now emphasize confidence and security building measures to rebuild trust and communication The United States seeks to reestablish the conditions necessary for greater trust with Russia and improved transparency with China as it expands and modernizes its nuclear forces The United States remains Wiiling to engage in a prudent arms control agenda We are prepared to consider control opportunities that return parties to predictability and transparency and remain receptive to future arms control negotiations if conditions permit and the potential outcome improves the security of the United States and its allies and partners UNCLASSEFEEDHFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PreuDeeisional Not Subject to FOTA 47 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu