C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 u TOP SECRET U ZENDEBAD SHAH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE FALL OF IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER MOHAMMED MOSSADEQ AUGUST 1953 Scott A Koch History Staff Central Intelligence Agency Washington DC June 1998 CLBY CLREASON DECLASON DRVFROM 2176075 l S c d XI XS LIA 3-82 MET 31-87 T SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 b 1 b 3 D C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Table of Contents Source and Classification Note iv Chapter 1 The Roots of TPAJAX 1 Iran and the United States to 1951 1 Twisting the British Lion's Tail Mohammed Mossadeq Nationalizes the Anglo-Imnian Oil Company 3 Britain Responds to The Antics of Incomprehensible Orientals 4 Mossadeq Challenges the Shah 6 Mossadeq Looks for American Support 9 Foggy Bottom's Differences with Whitehall 13 American Policy Turns Against Mossadeq 15 Mossadeq' s Successor Ayatollah Kashani or Fazlollah Zahedi 18 Eisenhower Turns to CIA 19 Chapter 2 Planning the Operation 22 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET I The First Phase Convincing the Shah 30 ----- - Final Approval 39 Chapter 3 Execution and Initial Failure 41 c ______ __ - Securing the Firmans 45 American Diplomatic Moves 49 Washington Reacts 53 Chapter 4 Victory 55 Sunday 16 August Roosevelt and the Station Regroup 55 Wednesday Afternoon 19 August Zendebad Shah 65 Chapter 5 Aftermath 71 Zahedi Consolidates His Government 71 The Tudeh Party 76 ii TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ ____ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Chapter 6 Evaluating TPAJAX 82 TPAJAX and the National Interest the Contemporaneous View 82 TPAJAX and the National Interest The Retrospective View 84 Did CIA Restore the Shah to his Throne 86 Did CIA Act Against a Legitimate Leader Enjoying Popular Support 86 Has CIA's Role Been Exaggerated 86 Was TPAJAX Responsible for Khomcini's Islamic Revolution 88 TPAJAX and the Future of American Covert Action 89 Postscript The Shadow of the Pahlavis 91 Appendix A TPAJAX Chronology 94 f 102 Appendix B ----------------------- Appendix Ct -------------------- 1 _J 105 Appendix D Biographical Sketch of Mohammed Mossadeq 107 Appendix E CIA and TPAJAX The Tension Between Analysis and Operations 113 The Office of National Estimates and TPAJAX 113 The Office of Current Intelligence and TPAJAX 116 Allen Dulles's Personal Directorate of Intelligence 118 The Consequences of Analytical Exclusion 119 Bibliography 121 iii TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U Source and Classification Note S This study is based largely on classified records of the Central Intelligence Agency Secondary sources proved invaluable in setting the historical context for TPAJAX but the details of the operation itself come from classified sources These sources are listed in the footnotes and bibliography U I have also examined relevant records from the Department of State the Department of Defense and the National Security Agency These records were not as plentiful or as helpful as I had hoped I was nonetheless able to fill in some gaps with documents from these organizations The vast majority of surviving documents on the operation itself remain with CIA but for the reasons provided below even these are not as numerou 'UlS Onc mi2ht cx Dect l S Most of the operational files on TPAJAX held in the Near East Division in the Directorate of Operations were destroyed during a routine office cleaning in 1962 According to various sources the Division needed more file space and management told branch members to clean out their files Much operational material was destroyed under the mistake ea thalhe cause Jhe_oueration was over th e documentaty_ e 9ord was of no ------------------- itnesses have confinned this unfortunate event U Copies of cables sent between Tehran Station and Washington during the operation also were among the files the Division destroyed in its attempt to gain more filing space At the time the copies were already nine years old and no one thought that they were important A record copy may have remained in the Agency's former Cable Secretariat for some time but such records too have long since disappeared in routine house cleanings An extensive search of CIA's archives has failed to uncover any surviving copies U Some transcripts of Station cables nonetheless survive because CIA had some of the cables microfilmed I have been unable to determine when In the late 1970s or iv TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET early 1980s CIA's History Staff prepared transcripts of these documents and sent them to the Department of State's Office of the Historian then researching a volume of the Foreign Relations of the United States series There is every reason to believe that these transcripts produced under the supervision of a professional historian are authentic The matters in the transcripts correspond in sequence and subject with events as we know them U The microfilm itself apparently has been destroyed in accordance with National Archives and Records Administration NARA guidelines According to NARA the microfilm had to be kept for 20 years and then could be destroyed The record of destruction had to be kept for five years at which point it too could be destroyed S CIA is not the only organization that has destroyed records relevant to TPAJAX The State Department has destroyed three quarters of the records for the relevant time period belonging to the Office of Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs GTI of State' s Bureau of Near Eastern South Asian and African Affairs These materials were in GTI files Lot 57 D 529 According to State's Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954 Vol X Iran 1951-54 the documents covered political and military matte n_d_US onomic and military assistance to Iran for the years 1946-1954 S The present stud _ It examines some of the issues currently occupying scholars Why did the United States act st ossaq J IWoull ossadeq's government have falen even if the United States had donenotliTniJ I have also exploited records of government agencies other than CIA _ _ Finally I have addressed the relationship between the operators in CIA's then-Directorate of Plans now the Directorate of Operations and the analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence a missing dimension in all published histories U Some readers may think that this study is over-classified but many of the crucial documents are still top secret after almost 50 years Since this handful of documents contains information critical to the story I have decided to use the material they contain even if it means restricting the potential readership Scott A Koch 1 June 1998 v TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOPSECREf Copyright Notice This publication contains copyrighted photogmphs that may not be reproduced or used further without explicit written permission from the copyright holder TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Chapter 1 S The Roots of TPAJAX U Iran and the United States to 1951 U During the height of the Cold War in the 1950s Washington considered the Middle East in general and Iran in particular to be among the great strategic prizes in the geopolitical and ideological struggle against the Soviet Union It was not always so For almost 175 years American policymakers ignored Iran because they had no reason to do otherwise U That changed during World War II and the immediate postwar years During the war Iran was an important route for American aid to the Soviet Army engaged in a life-or-death struggle with Hitler's Wehrmacht l Soviet troops remained in northern Iran immediately after the war encouraging pro-Communist separatist regimes in Iranian Azerbaijan and in the Kurdish region For a time it appeared to Washington that Moscow would demand the unification of Iranian Azerbaijan with Soviet Azerbaijan but this problem evaporated once Stalin understood that the United States would not permit such an aggressive move 2 U The United States would have preferred to withdraw from the Persian Gulf after the end of World War II but the postwar British retreat and retrenchment East of Suez created a vacuum that the US felt obligated to fill After London announced that it could no longer supply military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey President Harry Truman publicly declared in March 1947 that the United States would support free peoples everywhere resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside I U Eventually almost a quarter of American aid for the Soviet Union came through Iran Convoys using more northern routes lost about 20% of their cargoes to the Nazis only 8% of cargoes sent to the Persian Gulf for shipment through Iran were lost See Gerhard L Weinberg A World At Arms A Global History of World War 1 Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1994 pp 284 404 2 U See Daniel Yergin Shattered Peace The Origin of the Cold War and the National Security State Boston Houghton Mifflin Company 1977 Adam B Ulam Expansion and Coexistence Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73 2d ed New York Holt Rinehart and Winston Inc 1974 and John Lewis Gaddis The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941 947 New York Columbia University Press 1972 for a discussion of the Azeri crisis in early 1946 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 - - - - - - - - - - - - - o C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET pressures 3 For Iran the Truman Doctrine-as this pledge came to be known-meant that the United States was replacing Britain as the main geopolitical counterweight to the Russians U For the first three years after President Truman's declaration the United States paid relatively little attention to Iran even though that oil-rich country was experiencing serious economic problems widespread discontent with the government and growing agitation by the Tudeh-lran's Communist Party S In April 1950 the Director of Central Intelligence RAdm Roscoe H Hillenkoetter drew Secretary of State Dean Acheson's attention to the urgent need for additional intelligence coverage of Iran Hillenkoettcr wrote that CIA was unable to draft reliable national intelligence estimates on the country because it simply did not have enough information All the Agency could do according to the DCI was tell US policy makers that some sort of crisis does exist but CIA cannot confidently answer such specific pertinent questions as 1 how serious the situation actually is 2 how adequate are Iran's own resources for meeting its present difficulties and 3 how capable the Iranian Government is of using these resources 4 S Hillenkoetter proposed two solutions Either existing facilities could be expanded to seek information from more diverse sources or coverage might be expanded through the establishment of a consulate in the strategically important southwestern part of Iran 5 S The records do not contain Acheson's reaction to Hillenkoetter's letter but the still-classified copy in the National Archives has three handwritten notes attached to it The first is from Fisher Howe Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary of State forwarding the letter to John D Jemegan Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern South Asian and African Affairs The second is from Jernegan to C Vaughan Ferguson Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs Office of Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs The final is from Ferguson to Jernegan 6 S Howe thought Hillenkoetter's letter was largely for the record to show that CIA is fulfilling its overall responsibility for calling attention to weaknesses in intelligence coverage Jernegan lpd his oWil llD cmecified recommendntions ancLdoubllTd elhcr State_should ndODt CJA s j 1The State Department clearly did not view the paucity of i nt' elrnli g- en_c_e_o_n_tr anw it h- t li J e same urgency as CIA U Even without the most basic intelligence on Iran two elements drove American foreign policy in the post-war Persian Gulf region oil and the fear that political instability might jeopardize Western access to oil Ever since Shah Muzaffar at-Din 3 U Public Pllpers of the Presidents of the United States Harry S Truman Washington DC 1947 p 179 S Letter from Director of Central Intelligence RAdm Roscoe Hillenkoetter to Secretary of State Dean Acheson ll April 1950 Records of the State Department RG 59 Lot 57 D 529 NND959286 Iran 1946-54 box 4 National Archives and Records Administration 5 S Ibid 6 S Ibid 7 S Ibid 4 2 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 TOP SECRET granted William Knox D' Arcy an oil concession covering three-fourths of Persia as Iran was known until 1935 Iranian oil had helped fuel the British economy in peace and war s The United States was then producing enough oil for its needs but it knew that Western Europe depended on oil exports from the Middle East In January 1951 nine months after Hillenkoetter's letter to Acheson the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of National Estimates ONE wrote that the British economy would suffer if it lost Iranian oil The loss of all Middle Eastern oil ONE said would have profound and far-reaching consequences for the economies of the Western bloc 9 U Political instability in the ddle East and tbe Gulf reeiort tbre atened the contiouine sunnh of oilro the We -------------- -- 1 c Cold War the domestic politics or What later came to be called the l'fi1rd Worla had made no impact on American foreign policy decisionmaking During the Cold War Washington could not afford the luxury of indifference because doing so would spur Soviet intrigue Domestic politics almost anywhere abroad-and especially in strategically valuable areas-became important arenas for the international ideological struggle between East and West Washington was determined to win this struggle through policies promoting long-term democmtization The result American officials hoped would be stability-and victory U Twisting the British Lion's Tail Mohammed Mossodeq Nationalizes the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company U An Islamic fundamentalist assassinated Iranian Prime Minister General Ali Razmara on 7 March 1951 11 Razmara's death set in motion a series of events that were to bring American and British officials face to face with Mohammed Mossadeq one of the most mercurial maddening adroit and provocative leaders with whom they had ever dealt l2 8 U One of the reasons the British Government eventually took over 0' Arcy' s concession when he ran into financial difficulties was to ensure a secure supply of oil for the Royal Navy See Daniel Yergin The Prize the Epic Quest for Oil Money and Power New York Simon and Schuster 1991 pp 137 140-42 151 9 U NIE-14 8 January 1951 The Importance of Iranian and Middle East Oil to Western Europe Under Peacetime Conditions pp 1-2 CIA estimated that if all Middle Eastern oil were lost the non-Soviet world would have to impose an immediate and mandatory 10% cutback in consumption In that event the United States would have to implement mtioning even though runestic_nroductionJn those dllY S mtLils_Q w n_ne _eJ _ - - - - - - - - - U A member of the Fadayane Islam underg round organization assassinated Razmara 12 U See Appendix D for a biographical sketch of Mohammed Mossadeq 3 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267613 TOP SECRET S Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi-who had become Shah when his father Reza Shah abdicated in 1941-appointed Mossadeq as Prime Minister on 29 April1951 Shah's initial choice to succeed Razmam Hussein Ala had resigned after only a few weeks Severe economic and political problems awaited the Mossndeq and it was not obvious that he had the skill to solve them In a Special Estimate prepared one month after he took office CIA's Office of National Estimates ONE characterized Mossadeq as an impractical visionary and a poor administrator but in a strong political position that was unlikely to deteriorate in the foreseeable future 13 U Mossadeq's immediate concern was a struggle for control of the AngloIranian Oil Company AIOC By 1950 the British oil concession in Iran which the Shah had renewed in 1949 was a sore point in relations between the two countries In March 1951 when Mossadeq was a member of the Majlis the Iranian Parliament he submitted a bill which the Majlis quickly passed nationalizing AIOC He signed the bill into law on 1 May 1951 just three days after the Shah appointed him Prime Minister Nationalization went into effect on 2 May 1951 and was made retroactive to 20 March 1951 U AIOC's nationalization brought Mossadeq and Iran into immediate conflict with Britain The British government owned half of AIOC's stock and did not intend to let Mossadeq nationalize its assets without adequate compensation as required under international law 14 U Britain Responds to The Antics of Incomprehensible Orientals U The two countries tried to resolve the dispute but differing negotiating styles and the personalities involved hindered these efforts Many Britons found Mossadeq's seemingly impossible demands and unpredictably shifting arguments inexplicable L P Elwell-Sutton captured the mood of British policymakers at the time when he wrote Really it seemed hardly fair that dignified and correct western statesmanship should be defeated by the antics of incomprehensible orientals IS U Mossadeq found the British evil not incomprehensible He and millions of Iranians believed that for centuries Britain had manipulated their country for British ends Many Iranians seemed convinced that British intrigue was at the root of every domestic misfortune In 1951 Mossadeq told US Special Envoy W Averell Harriman You do not know how crafty they the British arc You do not know how evil they are You do not know how they sully everything they touch Harriman protested that surely the British 13 S SE-6 Current Developments in Iran 22 May 1951 14 S In March 1951 the CIA estimated that 6 to 8 percent of Ir m' s national income came from AIOC and that the AIOC contributed nearly one quarter of the Iranian Treasury's receipts Office of N tional Estimates NlE-6 IrnrU Pmti mUn tbe East-West_ConOict fDr 1ftl 21 -- ---------- -------------------------- ----- --------------------------J 15 U L P Elwell-Sutton Persian Oil A Study in Power Politics London Lawrence and Wishart Ltd 1955 p 258 4 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 ____________________________ ----' C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET were like people everywhere some bad some good Mossadeq was not persuaded You do not know them he insisted You do not know them l6 U When it seemed clear that Tehran had no intention of compensating London for AIOC's assets the British mounted a multi-pronged effort to reassert control over the company They hoped legal and economic pressure would convince Mossadeq to settle on British terms If not they were prepared to force him from office and replace him with someone open to compromise on terms favorable to the AIOC U London first asked the International Court of Justice to arbitrate the dispute Mossadeq rejected two British proposals because neither of them addressed the issue of Iran's sovereignty over its own oil The British thereafter refused to deal directly with Mossadeq They used economic weapons and then tried ostentatious military maneuvers in the Persian Gulf to try to weaken Mossadeq's negotiating position U In September 1951 Britain placed an embargo on shipments of steel sugar iron and oil-processing equipment shipments to Iran-that is on almost anything that the Iranians could exchange for dollars The AIOC laid off 20 000 oil workers at the port at Abadan and Mossadeq had to put them on the government payroll Gradually the flow of Iranian oil to the rest of the world stopped U A British airborne brigade arrived in Cyprus and a Royal Navy cruiser and four destroyers exercised near the oil facilities at Abadan The display of British force did not intimidate Mossadeq he announced that the first shot would start a world war U Britain also considered covert action options while it maneuvered diplomatically and militarily According to C M Woodhouse MI6's Chief of Station in Tehran the idea of overthrowing Mossadeq came from the Foreign Office not British intelligence Woodhouse himself thought that any move against Mossadeq had to have American support and participation London had neither until the inauguration of President Dwi2ht Eisenhower in January 1953 17 -- l - 16 U Vernon A Walters Silent Missions Garden City N Y Doubleday 1978 pp 247-48 17 CM Y loodbousC-SameJbi tuced_ London Graonda 982l J _p JJ 0- UJ ---- ------ --------------------J 5 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 ___________________ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U Mossadeq Challenges the Shah U At the same time that he was quarreling with the British Mossadeq also was struggling against the Shah He insisted that the Shah should reign and not rule To that end he worked to enhance the power of the Majlis at the Shah's expense The flash point came in July 1952 when Mossadeq resigned during a dispute over whether the Shah or the Prime Minister should appoint the war minister U During the elections for the 17th Majlis earlier in the year vote-tampering by the Iranian Royal Court had convinced Mossadeq that the government's survival depended on control of the military On 16 July he demanded the right to appoint himself minister of war The Shah refused and Mossadeq resigned 19 Mossadeq appealed directly to the public and accused the Shah of violating the Constitution U Mossadeq's resignation initially appeared to be a shrewd political move that underscored his mastery of Iranian politics and his ability to gauge and exploit public opinion The Shah appointed Ahmad Qavam Prime Minister during the Azeri crisis with the Soviet Union in 1947 to succeed Mossadeq Tn response the National Front a broad coalition fonned in 1949 organized mass demonstrations in Tehran demanding Mossadeq's return The demonstrations turned violent-69 people died and more than 750 were injured-but the Shah refused to use the police or the military to restore order Qavam lacked broad support and was unable to organize counter-demonstrations For five days the National Front controlled the streets of Tehran and other cities On 21 July l952the Shah bowed to the pressure and replaced Qavam with Mossadeq 20 U Once back in power Mossadeq struck back at the Shah and the military He transferred Reza Shah's lands back to the State appointed himself Minister of War forced the Shah's twin sister Princess Ashraf to leave the country and forbade Mohammed Reza Pahlavi from communicating directly with foreign diplomats By May 19 U M Reza Ghods Iran in tile Twentietlz Century A Political History Boulder CO Lynne Rienner Publishers 1989 p J86 Mossadeq wrote I cannot continue in office without having the responsibility for the Ministry of War and since Your Majesty did not concede to this I feel do not enjoy the full confidence of the Sovereign and therefore offer my resignation to pave the way for another government which might be able to carry out Your Majesty's wishes U Sepehr Zabih The Mossadegh Era Chicago Lake View Press 1982 p 40 20 U Ibid p 265 The National Front was a loose coalition of political parties professing liberal democratic aims and opposing foreign intervention in Iranian affairs The National Front included the leftist anti-Soviet intellectuals of the Iran Party the workers and leftist intellectuals of the Toilers' Party and the workers bazaar merchants and Islamic clergy of the Mujahedeen-ilslam Warriors of Islam Party Ayatollah AbuI Quassem Kashani later instrumental in the coup against Mossadeq was one of the leaders of the Warriors of Islam The ultr tnationalist Pan-lranist Party affiliated with the National Front but not a member included many lower class toughs The Tudeh Iranian Communist Party was not a member of the National Front but included itself among the parties opposing the government Mark J Gasiorowski The 1953 Coup d'etat in Iran International Journal of Middle East Studies 19 Aug 1987 262 6 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 ------- ---- C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 1953 according to Iranian specialist Ervand Abrahamian the shah had been stripped of all the powers he had fought for and recovered since August 1941 21 U The Prime Minister also seized the opportunity to purge the Iranian officer corps He forcibly retired many Royalist officers and cut the military budget 15% To add to the insult Mossadeq transferred 15 000 men from the military to the Gendarmerie the military's bureaucratic rival These acts fueled smoldering resentment among the dismissed officers and those few royalists escaping Mossadeq's purge 22 U Mossadeq used his popularity and ability to control the streets of Tehran to good advantage When the British appeared intransigent during the oil negotiations he simply severed diplomatic relations in October 1952 All British personnel left the country in an overland exodus at the beginning of November 1952 23 U Mossadeq's apparent political triumph rapidly turned sour The National Front began to unravel in late 1952 and early 1953 as the Prime Minister grew increasingly dictatorial By November 1952 Ayatollah Abul Quasscm Kashani a key Islamic cleric in the National Front had turned against Mossadeq and quit the Front as had Mozaffar Baqai's Toilers' Party Kashani's defection was a particularly hard blow because his group the Warriors of Islam included the bazaar merchants of Tehran and many mullahs Islamic clerics Support from these two groups historically has been critical to Iranian governments 24 U The reasons for the defections were complex Although 30 of the 79 deputies of the 17th Majlis convened in February 1952 belonged to or identified with the National Front they represented different constituencies and interests were united only in their opposition to the British In addition nationalization of the AIOC did not produce the bonanza for Iran that Mossadeq had hoped it would He began to demand more and more power from the Majlis and when the legislature granted the Prime Minister what amounted to dictatorial powers Ayatollah Kashani resigned as Majlis speaker Toilers' Party leader Mozaffar Baqai compared Mossadeq to Hitler and praised the army as a bulwark against Communism 25 U Some groups in the National Front continued to back Mossadeq The Iran Party still supponed him as did the Third Force a splinter group expelled from the Toilers' Pany 26 The Prime Minister also could still count on the backing of the Qashqai 2l U Ervand Abrahamian Iran Between Two Revolutions Princeton NJ Princeton University Press 1982 pp 272-73 22 U Ibid p 273 23 U Before leaving the country C M Woodhouse ensured that all British contacts like the Rashidian Brothers would remain active Roger Goirnn helped him Woodhouse p 116 24 U Manucher Farmnnfannaian in his memoirs describes the bazaar and the relationship of its merchants with the mullahs It the bazaar was a world unto itself impregnable to the army which could not easily enter its labyrinthine alleys The leaders of the bazaar were weighty men often tightly allied with the mollahs and they could start riots or shut down the bazaar to instant political effect Manucher Fnrmanfarmaian and Roxane Fannanfarmaian Blood and Oil Memoirs of a Persian Prince New York Random House 1997 p 36 25 U Abrahamian pp 269 277 Gasiorowski p 269 26 U Abrahamian p 277 Gasiorowski p 269 7 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267613 TOP SECRET tribes and-more ominously-the Tudeh Inm's Communist Party As support for Mossndeq narrowed the Tudeh would soon be the only group willing to take to the streets on his behalf U Ayatollah Kashani's defection and increased squabbling among the deputies effectively paralyzed the Majlis Opposition politicians-including fonner Mossadeq allies like Kashani-blocked the Prime Minister's legislation In early June 1953 fistfights broke out in the Majlis The Prime Minister won a temporary victory when Abdullah Moazemi a Mossadeq supporter succeeded Kashani as speaker in a close Majlis vote 41 to 31 on 1 July 1953 Mossadeq recognized however that the Majlis was hopelessly deadlocked and that dissolution and new elections were necessary to break the stalemate 27 U Under the Iranian constitution only the Shah could dissolve the Majlis The government could request him to do so Mossadeq knew the Shah would not agree to such a proposal so he devised a plan to achieve the same end He asked all National Front members and supporters to resign which they did and simultaneously announced the dissolution of the Majlis The Iranian people he held could ratify or reject his decision in a referendum on the theory that popular will superseded the constitution Iranian scholar Ervand Abrahamian has noted the irony in Mossadeq's rationale Mossadeq the constitutional lawyer who had meticulously quoted the fundamental laws against the shah Abrahamian wrote was now bypassing the same laws and resorting to the theory of the general wi II 28 U From 3 to 10 August 1953 Iranians voted on Mossadeq's bold and unconstitutional act The results of the rigged election were never in doubt Mossadeq purposely ex cluded rural areas from the balloting ostensibly because it would take too long to count the votes from remote areas The ballot was not secret and there were separate polling places for yes and no In the end Mossadeq claimed victory gaining over 2 043 300 of the 2 044 600 ballots cast throughout the country and 101 396 of the 101 463 ballots cast in the capitaJ 29 U The dissolution of the Majlis and the tainted referendum alienated Iranian liberals and conservatives alike Jamal Imami a pro-British member of the Majlis warned that Mossadeq was leading the country toward anarchy Ayatollah Kashani declared the referendum illegal under Islamic religious luw At his trial in late 1953 Mossadeq defended his actions on the grounds of popular sovereignty In view of the Royal Court's flagrant interference in the electoml process we had to suspend the 27 U Mark J Gasiorowski U S Foreign Policy and the S rah Building a Cliem State Ithaca NY Cornell University Press 1991 p 75 28 U Abrahamian p 274 M Reza Ghods Iran in the Twentieth Century A Political History Boulder CO Lynne Rienner Publishers 1989 p 187 29 U Zabih p 1 11 Abrahamian p 274 See also Homa Katou tian Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in ran New York I B Tuuris Co Ltd pp 187-88 In an interview appearing in the 22 August 1962 issue of Deutsche Zeitung Mossadeq admitted that he dissolved the 17th Majlis to avoid a confiden e vote that would have caused his government to fall 8 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET remainder of the Majlis elections he told the court What else was left to us but consulting the people in a most democratic method of direct plebiscite 30 U A US Embassy assessment cabled to Washington shortly after the referendum stated that the dissolution of the Majlis will graphically demonstrate truism of Mossadeq's regime that as opposition and discontent have mounted Mossadeq has moved steadily in authoritarian direction using technique of mobocracy to maintain his hold on power and to eliminate influence Shah Nonetheless the Embassy thought Mossadeqos continued appeals to the street could boomerang because he lacked any real authoritarian organization aside from anned forces ' To compensate according to the Embassy he would be forced to rely increasingly on the Tudeh thereby alienating the non-Communist followers of his Govemment 31 U Mossadeq Looks for American Support U Mossadeq hoped for US support in his struggle against the British Like many in the Third World immediately after World War IT he saw the United States as an anticolonial power His hopes were not entirely misplaced the Truman administration saw some merit in his position U Secretary of State Acheson thought that the British were overly preoccupied with their oil interests and that London did not fully understand the broader Communist threat He saw Mossadeq as a potentially important part of the solution to the problem of Soviet influence in the Middle East In Acheson's view the Iranian Prime Minister would in time become an effective bulwark against Soviet penetration into Iran To that end Washington consistently urged London to reach an equitable settlement with Tehran Acheson apparently was convinced that an agreement would strengthen the Iranian government and promote regional stability 32 U Other considerations however complicated the Truman administration's approach The United States was loath to side publicly with Iran or put excessive pressure on London Washington needed cooperation and support from BritainAmerica's closest ally-elsewhere in the world The war in Korea was not yet over and the presence of British combat troops was an important symbol of Anglo-American solidarity The North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO created in 1949 was still in its formative stages and depended upon British participation as evidence of Western unity 30 U Ghods p 188 Zabih pp 112-13 For Knshani's views on the Shari'n see Katouzian Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran p 187 31 U Department of State Cable from Tehmn to Secretary of State No 300 12 August 1953 National Archives and Records Administration Record Group 319 Entry 57 box 27 32 U Acheson criticized the unusual and persistent stupidity of the Anglo Iranian Oil company and the British Government when it came to Iran See Dean Acheson Present at tile Creation My Years in the State Department New York W W Norton Company Inc 1969 p 501 quoted in Daniel Yergin The Prize The Epic Quest for Oil Money and Power New York Simon and Schuster 1991 p 453 Richard W Cottam Iran the United States A Cold War Case Study Pittsburgh University of Pittsburgh Press 1988 p 102 9 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267B13 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET and detennination Vigorous American support for Mossadeq would have complicated American foreign policy in other parts of the world as well U President Truman had no patience with those refusing to view the AngloIranian problem in a global context When the US Ambassador to Iran Henry Grady wrote to Truman complaining that the White House was not listening to his advice the President let him know exactly where he stood Let me tell you something about the Iranian Situation from this end he wrote U we held Cabinet meetings on it-we held Security Council meetings on it and Dean Bob Lovett Charlie Sawyer Harriman and all the senior staff of the Central Intelligence discussed that awful situation with me time and again We tried to get the block headed British to have their oil company make a fair deal with Iran No they could not do that They know all about how to handle it- we didn't according to them U We had Israel Egypt Near East defense Sudan South Africa Tunisia the NATO treaties all on the fire Britain and tire Commonwealth Nations were and are absolutely essential if these things are successful Then on top of it all we have Korea and Indo-China Ir m was only one incident Of course the man on the ground in each one of these places can only see his own problem 33 C The suggestion that British forces might occupy the port city of Abadan or launch some other military action against Iran set off alanns in ONE In an April 1951 memorandum to DCI Lt Gen Walter Bedell Smith ONE chief Dr William Langer warned that the appearance of British troops in Iran might result in Soviet occupation of the northern part of the country under the tenns of the 1921 treaty of friendship between Persia and Soviet Russia 34 33 U Farhad Diba Mohammad Mossadegh A Political Biography London Croom Helm 1986 pp 131-32 citing papers of Henry Grady Emphasis added 34 C William L Langer Assistant Director National Estimates Memorandum for Director of Centml lntel liecnce Walt de ILSmilhJltuati9nJnJran 20 April 1951 _ _ _ __ L emphasis added -- ---- U In February 1921 Persia as Iran was then known and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic RFSFR the USSR did not exist until December 1922 signed a treaty of friendship Article VI gave the RSFSR the right to send troops into Persia if a third party tried to use that country as a base from which to attack Soviet Russia Russian troops would cross the border only if Persia proved incapable of removing the threat itself In an exchange of explanatory notes in December 1921 the Russians made clear that the treaty applied only to cases in which preparations have been made for a considerable anned attack upon Russia by the partisans of the regime which has been overthrown the Tsarist Government or by its supporters Leonard Shapiro ed Soviet Treaty Series A Collection of Bilateral Treaties Agreements and Conven stions Etc Concluded Between The Soviet Union and Foreign Powers vol 1 917-1928 Washington DC The Georgetown University Press 1950 pp 92-94 150- 51 10 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET S Nefther Limger nor any 0 - t e ran specJa ISlS in -crATsc an estme servlce - the Office of Special Operations OSO and the Office of Policy Coordination OPC thought the Tudeh was strong enough by itself to topple Mossadeq As long as the centml government remained able to deal with events Langer and others saw the danger of a Tudeh coup as negligible Tudeh represents a serious threat in view of the opportunities awaiting it OSO and OPC specialists agreed in January 1952 but does not yet have the intention or the ability to gain actual control of the government at this time either by force or political means 38 CIA's operators thought that the Tudeh would come to power only through chaos and impotent central authority U Although the documents in CIA's files do not indicate that Smith relayed Langer's concerns to President Truman he evidently did so because the administration subsequently let London know that the US Government disapproved of any military action against Iran At a British cabinet meeting in September 1951 the government of 1 U Strictly speaking the USSR could not have invoked Article VI if a small British force occupied Abadan in 1951 Abadan is far from the Soviet-Iranian border and the few troops the British contemplated sending could not have made a considerable anned attack upon Soviet forces Nonetheless there is no doubt that the USSR would have found some pretext to occupy northernJran had Stalin desired 38 S R L Hewitt Memorandum to Sherman Kent 8 January 1952 Conversations with OPC and OSO Specialists Concerning the Tudeh Problem History Staff Records Job 840B00443R Box 4 Folder 11 ARC 11 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Prime Minister Clement Attlee decided that it 'could not afford to break with the United States on an issue of this kind '39 A potential military crisis had passed S As of 30 July 1952 the State Department and CIA were committed to supporting Mossadeq That evening CIA representatives met at the State Department with Secretary of State Acheson Under Secretary of State David K E Bruce Charles Bohlen Henry Byroade John Jernegan and Robert Joyce all of the State Department 40 The participants decided that It is the policy of the Department of State to maintain the present government in Iran so long as this government has the authority to govern or until iUlrme ars certain that the__g_o_v_ernment will be taken over by the Communists 41 39 U H W Brands Inside the Cold War Loy Henderson and tire Rise of the American Empire 1918-196 New York Oxford University Press 1991 p 234 40 U Henry A Byroade Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern South Asian and African Affairs John D Jemegan Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern South Asian and African Affairs Charles E Bohlen Counselor of the Department of State and member of the Senior Staff National Security Council Robert P Joyce Policy Planning Stuff Department of t 'lu -' - - - - 1 12 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET -- ____j U As of November 1952 CIA's Office of National Estimates thought that Mossadeq would remain in power for the near future and that a Tudeh coup was unlikely According to an ONE estimate if the unrest plaguing Iran in 1952 continued through 1953 rising internal tensions and continued deterioration of the economy and of the budgetary position of the government might lead to a breakdown of government authority and open the way for at least a gradual assumption of control by Tudeh ONE thought Soviet intervention into Iran was unlikely unless there is a far more serious deterioration of Iranian internal stability than is foreseen in this estimate However the USSR has the capability for greatly increasing its overt and covert interference in Iran at any time to the detriment of US security interests 46 U During the last two months of 1952 both ONE and the Iran Branch of the DDP watched events in Iran and hoped things would not change radically Their hopes were soon dashed U Foggy Bottom's Differences with Whitehall U As the foregoing indicates Washington and London had fundamentally different perspectives on the events in Iran and on their consequences worldwide These differences complicated the State Department's and Foreign Office's search for a common policy At times the problems must have appeared insolvable U In January 1952 an internal memorandum in the State Department's Office of Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs identified two areas of disagreement The United States and the United Kingdom had differing views on the strength of nationalism in Iran and therefore on Mossadeq's political strength and on the global consequences of Tehran's failure to reach an oil settlement with London 47 U The State Department recognized that Iranian nationalism was a potent and growing force making an oil settlement on British terms unattainable even if Mossadeq fell In contrast the British disparaged Iranian nationalism as merely a passing stonn - '- m U Office of NationaTEstimates ''Probable Developments m Iran Through 1953 ''NIE-15 --nNovember 1952 47 U Memorandum Varying British and American Appraisals of the Iranian Situation '' 14 January 1952 Office of Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs Department of State RG 59 Records of the Department of State Records of the Office in Charge of iranian Affairs 1946-54 Lot 57 D 529 Box 40 National Archives and Records Administration 13 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813_ __ -----------' C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET It had no roots and would pass and its leaders fall as soon as it is demonstrated that their policies have brought Iran to the brink of ruin 48 U More specifically American officials feared that a British failure to compromise with Mossadeq would enable him to whip up Iran's virulent nationalism further with potentially disastrous results The West might well lose so much of its influence that it could not stop Tehran from moving the Soviet orbit Or the Iranian political situation could simply descend into chaos in which case the Soviet-backed Tudeh-Iran's best organized best financed and most effective political organizationwould be ready to fill the vacuum In the State Department's view such developments would jeopardize the security and stability of the entire Middle East would serve notice that the West could not preserve the independence of important Third World states and could deprive the West not only of Iran's oil but ultimately that of its Arab neighbors as weJ1 49 U In contrast the British regarded Iran as basically a conservative country that would not seek Soviet help nor collapse internally if London held out for the kind of oil settlement it wanted The British also feared that a bad settlement one not on their terms would severely diminish their global political and economic power already starting to decline with the post-World War ll emergence of independence movements in much of the British ernpire SO U The only suggestion for resolving these differences offered in the State Department's internal memorandum further consultation to determine the political military economic and psychological effects of the loss of Iran to the west as balanced against the political and economic effects of an agreement with the Iranians on the oil situation which might prejudice other concessions elsewhere and diminish British prestige throughout the world The memorandum concluded that unless the US and United Kingdom agreed on the importance to the West of an independent Iran there was little chance the two would be able to forge a common policy Sl U Eleven months later the National Security Council set forth basic US policy toward Iran NSC 136 1 emphasized that the United States was committed to preventing Iran from falling under communist control and that Iran's strategic position its oil and its vulnerability to Soviet political subversion or military attack made it a tempting target for Soviet expansion If the Tudeh Party seized or attempted to seize control of the Iranian government the document argued the United States should in conjunction with the British be ready to support a non-communist Iranian government militarily economically diplomatically and psychologically 52 48 U Ibid 49 U Ibid The State Department memorandum noted that American influence wus waning daily as more and more Iranians identified the United States with British interests The State Department assessed British influence as negligible 50 U Ibid St U Ibid 52 U United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954 Vol X Iran 1951-1954 Washington D C US Government Printing Office 1989 pp 529-34 14 TOP SECRET _ _ _ _ _ Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U American Policy Turns Against Mossadeq U Dwight Eisenhower did not immediately tum his attention to Iran after taking the oath of office in January 1953 His campaign pledge to end the Korean war had priority and only weeks after the inaugural festivities Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin died The new administration was faced with reevaluating Soviet-American relations Under these circumstances events in Iran receded into the foreign policy backgroundtemporarily 53 U The British had never given up hope of executing a covert action to remove Mossadeq and continued to test the American response After Mossadeq severed diplomatic relations with Britain in October 1952 the indefatigable Woodhouse met in London with Foreign Office officials including Anthony Eden to consider options available to Britain According to Woodhouse Eden said that no covert operation would succeed unless it had American support Woodhouse took his words as tantamount to permission to pursue the idea further with the Americans particularly with the CIA This he did arriving in Washington in mid-November 1952 after Dwight Eisenhower's victory 54 S Woodhouse met with State and ClA officials and argued that political conditions in Iran made that country subject to a serious Communist threat He did not stress the oil issue His reception at Truman's State Department was chilly at CIA he met with initial skepticism Walter Bedell Smith told him 'You may be able to throw out Musaddiq but you will never get your own man to stick in his place ' Frank Wisner and future DCI Allen Dulles showed increasing interest and eventually warmed to the idea of planning a covert operation to remove the Iranian Prime Minister Woodhouse writes thulD_ulles enlisted_ a_y_ounjlAcademic exQ ert on Iran to examine the situation _with us 'L__ __ S Allen Dulles became DCI in late February 1953 and promptly appnsed the President of the situation in Iran Mossadeq Dulles told the President remained the single strongest Iranian political leader With the Shah showing no inclination to marshal the armed forces for a move against Mossadeq the situation in Dulles's words was ''slowly disintegrating If a showdown developed between the Shah and Mossadeq and a real armed conflict ensued between the two opposing elements the communist Tudeh elements might come up as the victors with their relatively small but well organized group of supportersrJ nd with the assistance of_thc Soviet Embassy in Tehran disJ osing nf nlontv nf funrl l 53 U Brands p 272 54 U Woodhouse pp 116-17 _ss hi o oo ---------------------------------------------- 15 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U President Truman's and Secretary Acheson's policy of encouraging the parties to reach an equitable oil settlement had reached a dead end Neither the British nor Mossadeq appeared willing to back off from their publicly stated positions which each by this time held with something approaching religious fervor To London's relief the new US administration abandoned the search for a negotiated end to the crisis Perhaps now the British hoped Washington would finally begin to see Mossadeq as the demagogue London thoulililhe IDlund_takeJUWJ' QQri qte action _ __ I I U Also in March 1953 State Department officials and British Foreign Mimster Anthony Eden met to discuss the Iranian situation Eden found the Americans much more receptive to the British viewpoint than they had been under Truman and Acheson The collapse of the Anglo-Inmian oil negotiations had changed the Americans' attitude Washington now considered Mossadcq a source of instability and feared that his continued tenure invited a Tudeh coup C The State Department agreed with Eden that Mossadcq had to go but its reasons differed from his For Eden and his government Mossadcq's policies damaged British prestige influence and vital commercial interest For the Americans Mossadeq represented a weakened Iran and its increasing vulnerabilit to Soviet dominati m I U The United States suspected the Soviets of trying to take advantage of the deteriorating situation in Iran In the US view Soviet leaders undoubtedly saw Mossadeq's troubles as a diplomatic opening and if he wanted to try to play Moscow against Washington the Soviets would let him The Kremlin would help him The 16 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET potential benefits to the Soviets of cultivating Mossadcq were great a docile southern neighbor at a minimum and beyond that a chance to draw a strategically important country into the Soviet sphere of influence ------------------------------- _ _j S The Soviet-Iranian negotiations were front page news in The New York Times on II August 1953 Iranian Ambassador to the United States Allahyar Saleh met for 90 minutes on the 11th with John Jernegan Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern South Asian and African Affairs Jernegan learned that Imn was interested in maintaining good relations with the United States as well as the Soviet Union S Upon leaving the State Department Saleh met a group of waiting reporters wanting to know whether the meeting had anything to do with Iranian-Soviet negotiations and whether the US had reason to be concerned about such talks Saleh replied that the American Government should be pleased about the negotiations because they might resolve claims arising from Iranian expenses incurred in furthering American policy aims in World Warn U The Iranian-Soviet negotiations were never held On the day he met with Jemegan Saleh could not know that the Mossadeq government would remain in power 17 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET only eight more days President Eisenhower apparently had already made the decision to oust the Iranian Prime Minister U Mossadeq's Successor Ayatollah Kashani or Fazlollah Zahedi U At this point there was no consensus on who should replace Mossadeq US officials briefly considered backing AyatoJlah Kashani the former Mossadeq ally who had a large following and had become a strident opponent of the Prime Minister 60 S CIA Headquarters viewed the prospect of a Kashani government with alarm According to a Special Estimate published on 14 October 1952 a Kashani-led Iran would be worse for Western interests than if Mossadeq stayed in power Such a regime would be even more difficult on the oil issue and would be more resistant to Western influence The military or even Mossadeq' s followers might well overthrow Kashani The worst consequence of a Kashani government would be the progressive general deterioration of Iran possibly leading to the eventual assumption of power by the Tudch 61 U Opinion gradually settled on General Fazlollah Zahcdi as Mossadeq's successor Zahedi had served as an irregular soldier under the Shah's father Reza Shah in 1915 and subsequently rose through the ranks of the Iranian Army In 1942 the British arrested him for his activities under Nazi agent Franz Mayer and deported him to Palestine Zahedi worked for the Germans because of his anti-British views he was not generally thought to be pro-Nazi The British released him on VE Day in 1945 Zahedi retired from the army in 1949 and subsequently served in a series of mostly honorary posts He was Minister of the Interior in the early 1950s 62 S Zahedi's association with the Germans during the war was not the only blot on his record Although he was a staunch anti-Communist the CIA thought him like all 6l S Office of National Estimates Prospects for Survival of Mossadeq Regime in Iran SE-33 14 October 1952 p 3 Records of the Office of National Estimates Directorate of Intelligence ARC ---- L_ 18 TOPSECREf Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Iranians on the public scene not noted for honesty consistency reliability and strength of convictions 63 U The State Department recognized that he was not the ideal candidate but was qualified because he seemed friendly to the United States and Britain and would be acceptable to both Govemments 64 Even more importantly he was willing to take the job S Zahedi was the only opposition figure meeting two other important criteria he had consistently opposed Mossadeq and he had a significant following Other potential candidates either had a longer record of opposition or more followers but none had both Zahedi claimed to have the support of Ayatollah Kashani court officials elements of the armed forces influential merchants in the hazaar and rnostof the Imnian people This last assertion at least was dubious for aJ Iranian specialist working as a consultant for DDP's Near East and Africa Division observed It is far more likely that the man in the street continues to admire Mossadcq for his strong stand against the British and as a symbol of resurgent nationalism However this element is of no practical value to either side unless effectively organized and led 65 U Whoever succeeded Mossadeq would be able to count on US support In March 1953 an internal memorandum by the State Department's Office of Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs outlined the steps the United States was likely to take if Mossadeq fell Although American officials would limit their public pronouncements to expressions of unwillingness to interfere in the internal affairs of another country privately they would use non-US channels to assure the Shah and new prime minister that Washington was eager to help Sensitivity to Iranian concerns that the country was being turned into a foreign base would preclude ostentatious and immediate American military assistance but privately the Americans could assure Tehran that meaningful military aid trucks communication equipment and other items that also had civilian uses would be forthcoming 66 Jn U Eisenhower Turns to CIA U President Eisenhower had several options for implementing Mossadeq's removal He could use military force to invade Iran but that was impractical for obvious reasons He could keep hoping that a diplomatic solution would appear That option too was not viable diplomacy had already failed and the political situation in Imn was worsening daily Finally he could tum to CIA for a covert political operation the National Security Council had decided that covert action was a legitimate instrument of US policy 67 This alternative held the promise of attaining the result the administmtion 63 TS Ibid 64 TSl State Dtmu tment fro o a nn About Change of Government in Iran 25 June I --65 TS Ibid 66 U Measures Which the United States Government Might Take in Support of a Successor Government to Mosadeq March 1953 Department of State Office of Greek Turkish and Iranian Issues RG 59 Lot 57 D 529 Box 40 National Archives and Records Administration 67 U In NSC 10 2 19 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET wanted with a minimum of cost and attention If such an operation went sour Washington could disavow any knowledge or connection S o oneln- ClA sll22estecloLc 'llen hintedJhaLMossad hou ____ ___ _ assassinated 0 Available documentsTonot tndtcate wtio au onzed C1A to begm planmng- the operation but it almost certainly was President Eisenhower himself pisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose has written that the absence of documentation reflected the President's style U Before going into the operation Ajax had to have the approval of the President Eisenhower participated in none of the meetings that set up Ajax he received only oral reports on the plan and he did not discuss it with his Cabinet or the NSC Establishing a pattern he would hold to throughout his Presidency he kept his distance and left no documents behind that could implicate the President in any projected coup But in the privacy of the Oval Office over cocktails he was kept informed by Foster Dulles and he maintained a tight control over the activities of the ClA 69 --D9 U Stephen E Ambrose Eisenhower vol 2 Tlae President New York Simon and Schuster 1984 p 111 Ambrose repeats this paragraph verbatim in Eisenhower Soldier and President New York Simon and Schuster 1990 p 333 20 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 21 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Chapter 2 U Planning the Operation I S Responsibility for planning and executing TPAJAX fell tq the Near East and Africa Division NEA in the Directorate of Plans DDP The DDP CIA's clandestine service was less than a year old when it received the TPAJAX assignment Lt Gen Walter Bedell Smith had created the directorate in August 1952 by combining the Office of Special Operations and the Office of Policy Coordination The two had been rivals and Smith hoped their merger would prevent continued friction and duplication of effort U Kermit Kim Roosevelt grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt was the chief ofNEA Division A 1938 Harvard graduate Roosevelt had embarked on a scholarly career teaching government to undergraduates-first at Harvard and then at the California Institute of Technology He joined the Office of Strategic Services OSS during World Warn and worked for the chief of the organization's Secret Intelligence Branch in the Near East After the war he compiled the official OSS war report and then returned to the Middle East as a writer for the Saturday Evening Post 2 In 1947 he published Arabs Oil and History The Story ofthe Middle East 3 C M Woodhouse of MI5 wrote in his memoirs that Roosevelt had a natural inclination for bold and imaginative action and also a friendly sympathy with the British 4 S Roosevelt did not look like an operative Kim Philby called him the last person you'd expect to be up to his neck in dirty tricks but was an intellectual with J U The name went through several permutations before settling on Ncar East and Africa Division 2 U Burton Hersh 'l11e Old Boys The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA New York Charles Scribner's Sons 1992 p 331 G J A O'Toole Honorable Treachery A flistory of U S Intelligence Espionage and Covert Action from tile American Revolution to the CIA New York The Atlantic Monthly Press 1991 p 458 Who's Who 1964-65 3 U Kermit Roosevelt Arabs Oil and History The Story ofthe Middle East Port Washington NY Kennikat Press 1947 1969 4 C M Woodhouse Something Ventured London Granada 1982 p 120 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267613 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET specific ideas on how to counter Soviet influence in the Middle Easd l l 23 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 9 U Although ClA almost certainly would have hired him as a permanent staff employee Wilber refused and preferred to work under contract He lived in Princeton and did not wish to leave A contract enabled him to work at CIA without requiring him to move to Washington -lVlllier_mntinued hi uootract relationsbio wiliLCIA uotil the 1960 - - - - - - - - - - 24 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 25 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 26 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 27 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C 0 1 2 6 7 8 1 3 ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 28 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET L ---- U According to the military attaches it was important to recognize the difference between allegiance and control The Shah enjoyed the allegiance of almost all Iranian Army officers they had been raised to regard their monarch as a symbol of loyalty and patriotism Whether he wielded any control was more problematic His failure to assert himself against Mossadeq was causing confusion and consternation as officers risked their careers by backing him against the Prime Minister The attaches concluded that if the Shah were to give the word probably more than 99% of the officers would 27 U M 175 from USARMA- Tehran to Department of the Anny Department of the Air Force Department of the Navy Control of the Armed Forces of Iran 11 August 1953 National Archives RG 319 Entry 57 box 27 The distribution list shows that CIA received nine copies of the attaches' assessment 29 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET comply with his orders with a sense of relief and with the hope of attaining a state of stability 28 U Mossadeq through Army Chief of Staff General Riahi a Mossadeq loyalist actually controlled the Army Iranian officers considered legal-and would obey- any order of the Shah coming from the Chief of Staff The officer corps considered the Shah's silence about the Chief of Staffs actions as implied consent Failure to follow orders even under these conditions was tantamount to treason The American military attaches concluded that if the Shah opposed the Chief of Staff or if the Chief of Staff with the Shah's support opposed the Prime Minister Mossadeq's control of the Army wDuld evanota 29 U ThtLElrst ebase Convincln2Jhe Shaa _'- - - - - - - - - - - J 30 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267613 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111117 C01267813 TOP SECRET 31 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 34 U Schwarzkopf was the father of the American general of the same name who led US and Coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf war against Iraq 32 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 33 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 45 U Donald N Wilber Advent ures in the Middle East Excursions and Incursions Princeton NJ Darwin Press 1986 p 189 34 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267613 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 48 U The Shnri'a is Islamic religious law intended to guide all aspects of social activity See William 0 Beeman Patterns of Religion and Economic Development in Iran from the Qajar Eru to the Islamic Revolution of 1978 79 in Gobal Economics and Religion ed James Finn New Brunswick NJ _ utgers _T _niversit Press 1983 p 78 ------- 35 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 36 TOPSECREf Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET l l -- -J 37 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 - ------------ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET S9 U H W Brunds Inside the CaJdWar Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire Pre_ss 1991 p 282 1 21 611N fu rd Jlni v ersitv l_ 38 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 J C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 TOP SECRET l U Final Approval S On 25 June 1953 senior foreign policymaking officials met at the State Department to hear Roosevelt outline the final plan for TPAJAX President Eisenhower did not attend but other top officials did Secretary of State John Foster Dulles Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson DCI Allen Dulles Undersecretary of State and fonner DCI Walter Bedell Smith Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy Robert Bowie head of the State Department's policy planning staff and subsequent CIA Deputy Director oflntelligence in the late 1970s Henry Byroade Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East and US Ambassador to Iran Loy Henderson 61 U After Roosevelt's briefing Secretary of State Dulles polled the meeting Allen Dulles and Walter Bedell Smith were strongly in favor of proceeding the others agreed but were less enthusiastic Henderson did not like covert operations but thought the United States had no choice in this ca se 6_ 2 _ _ _ _ __ lr--------- U Nord id CIA have to notify Congress of its impending operation Allen Dulles may have informally told key Senators like Richard Russell as well as key members of the House of Representatives what the Agency was doing but CIA's files contain no record of these conversations I I 6l U Brands p 281 Eisenhower' s absence should not be read as passivity or disinterest The President knew what was going on but preferred to keep himself out of all fonnal deliberations His orders and briefings were given orally with no record kept I mber 1974 tlie Hughes-Ryan Amendment requu-ed a Prestdenhal -lmdmg ror each covert action and President Gerald Ford's Executive Order 11095 16 February 1976 required that the Executive Office notify Congress of all Presidential findings 39 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 40 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Chapter3 U Execution and Initial Failure TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267613 TOP SECRET 6 U The absence of relevant intelligence in Carroll's file is curious Foreign intelhgence assets not covert action assets collect the sorts of information Carroll needed Two possible reasons ellplain the paucity of information Either the foreign intelligence assets had not been tasked properly or as is more likely their focus up to this time had been on the Soviet Union and its activities rather than on Iranian activities The USSR invariably was the main target of the American intelligence effort and most if not all of CIA's foreign intelligence assets in Tehran _were almoslcertninlv trvjog to cnllectinfurmation on the Soviets 42 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _- C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOPSECREf 43 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U TEXT BOX The Corrupt and Impotent Iranian Army S The Iranian Anny in 1953 was understrengtlz underequipped and ill prepared to repel invasion suppress a country-wide insurrection or defeat Tudeh subversion Its 125 000 men comprised eight divisions nine independent brigades and one military police brigade According to a US Am1y Intelligence Staff Sllldy in December 1952 the Iranian officer corps was corrupt and lacked leadership ability Promotions were based on politics rather than merit The enlisted men were mostly tough peasants who uncomplainingly endured hardships and privations unthinkable to Western soldiers These traits made the enlisted ranks amenable to discipline but made instilling initiative almost impossible Tlte absence of modem weapons and shortage of ammunition made training almost nonexistent The US Anny report concluded that Iranian Amry units had no offensive capability and negligible defensive capability l3 S The General Staff positioned the divisions and brigades with an eye toward suppressing Iran's sometimes tmruly tribes rather than where they would be best able to defend the country against a Soviet invasion Accordingly most of the divisions were in the south and east rather than along the northern border with the USSR The table below lists major Iranian units and the tribal areas in which-or adjacent to which-they were deployed l4 Unit Location 1st Mountain Bri 2nd Mountain Brig 3rd Mountain Brig 1st Armored Brig 2nd Armored Brig Military Police Brig 3rd Infantry Div 4th Infantry Div 5th Infantry Div 6th Infantry Div 7th Infantry Div 8th Infantry Div 9th Infantry Div lOth Infantry Div Gurgan Ind Brig Kermanshah Ind Sanandaj Ind Brig Resht Ind Brig Tehran Tehran Tehran Tehran Tehran Tehran Tabriz Rezaieh Orumiyeh Khorramabad Shiraz Kerman Meshed Mashhad Isfahan Esfahan Ahwaz Ahvaz Gurgan Gorgan Kerrnanshah Sinneh Sanandaj Resht Rasht Tribal Area Lur Qashqai Bakhtiari Arab Turcoman Lur Kurd Shnhsavan 13 S US Army G-2 Intelligence Intelligence Staff Study Estimate of the Capabilities of the Iranian Armed Forces Including the Employment of Iranian Tribes as Auxiliaries 15 Dec 1952 Records of the Department of State RG 59 Lot 57 0529 NND 959286 Iran 1946-54 Box 4 National Archives and Records Administration 14 S Ibid 44 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U Securing the Firmans U The first phase of the operation began on 15 July J953 when Asadollah Rashidi an went to the French Riviera to meet Princess Ashraf He explained to her that Mossadeq posed a continuing danger for Iran and that she should convince her brother to dismjss bim She was unenthusiust __------ - ----- - '---- rh-e P --n n_ce_s_s aTso was convmced that Mossaoeq woulif do whateverlfe-cou to prevent her return She had already written to the Prime Minister three times saying that she wanted to come back to Iran because she could no longer afford to live in Europe When she saw with some prompting that a surreptitious visit to the Shah might improve th c i de a - - - - - - her chances of retuming _home_pennanently she began to wann tQ J L_ - U Princess Ashraf arrived in Tehran on 25 July 1953 an met witn her brotlierfour days later She was unable to convince him to sign thefirmans and left Tehran the follow_i_ng _ d a y ---- -- ------------------------------------ L- 45 TOPSECREI' Approved for Release 201711111 7 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 23 U The arrival of Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Lavrentiev in Tehran on 1 August 1953 probably heightened Washington's and Roosevelt's sense of urgency Lavrentiev had been ambassador to Czechoslovakia in 1948 and had been behind the Communist coup that deposed pro-Western Czech President Benes Lavrentiev replaced Ivan Sadchikov who left Tehran for La w in Iu v I 953 46 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET J U Manuc er annanrarm iiiin a member of tOe ranTan no6ihly was when Nassiri brought the documents to the Shah and relates in his memoirs the circumstances of this historic event One afternoon the Shah was relaxing outside with a circle of friends A butler approached and whispered into the Shah's ear and the Shah replied loudly ''Tell him to come in A man in a dark suit whom Farmanfarmaian did not recognize appeared from behind some trees and after a few words with the Shah presented him with a document The Shah asked if anyone had a pen Farmanfannaian offered his After signing the document the Shah noted that the pen would be worth much more now that he'd used it to sign the paper A fortune '' Farmanfarmaian joked Perhaps the monarch replied Perhaps it will bring us all luck as well Farmanfarmaian writes that he found out later that the messenger had been sent by Kermit Roosevelt and the document the Shah had signed appointed General Zahcdi prime minister 28 S Npssiri ret ed to_' ehran with the signed documents late on the evening of lJA r 2 _ I In his book Countercoup Roosevelt notes that nothing could be done on the _L_ _ _ 25 S Donald Wilber Operation TPAJAX draft March 1954 Directorate of Operations Records Job 80-170 I Box 3 Folder 11 p 26 ARC 26 U Nassiri later became the head of SAVAK In 1978 former Agency officer Miles Copeland met General Nassiri to discuss Ayatollah Khomeini and the deteriorating situation in Iran Copeland found Nassiri even stupider than Kim Roosevelt said he' d be The General regaled Copeland with fairly bloodthirsty details of how he could have put an end to the demonstrations within a week if only the Shah had given him free rein Miles Copeland Tile Game Player Confessions af Jhe_C_IA srriginal political operative London Aurum Press 1989 p 251 '2r U Manucher Farmanfarmaian and Roxane Farmanfarmaian Blood and Oil Memoirs ofa Persian Prince New York Random House 1997 p 292 Farmanfarmaian says that the Shah signed thefinnan on a Sunday in the second week of August This cannot be correct for the firman was not signed until 13 August The second Sunday in August was the ninth and the third Sunday was the sixteenth A State Department cable reported that the firman appointing Zahedi read View of fact situation of nation necessitates appointment of an infonned and experienced man who can grasp affairs of country readily I therefore with knowledge I have of your ability and merit appoint you with this letter Prime Minister We give into your hands duty to improve affairs of the nation and remove present crisis and raise living standard of people Gordon_H__Matti son Tcleeram to Oeoartmc o State i6 AU USl w J Thbmn No 29 47 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 13th or 14th-Thursday and Friday-because Thursday afternoon and Friday comprise the Iranian weekend Effective action would be impossible until Saturday 15 August 30 S The Shah'sfinnans changed the entire character ofTPAJAX No longer was the operation essentially a military coup with the aim of installing Zahcdi as Chief of the General Staff and then Prime Minister Now it was an exercise of the Shah's constitutional prerogative and authority Mossadeq's failure to abide by thefinnans would make his tenure as Prime Minister illegal 30 U Kermit Roosevelt Countercoup The Struggle for the Control of Iran New York ---McGraw-Hill 1979 D 171 48 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U Ame can Diulomatie MQves S ewspaper articles and statements from senior A --m-e-- nc_a_n_g_o_v-ern - ment officials hammere orne the theme that the US could not work with the Mossadeq government On 29 June 1953 President Eisenhower sent a letter to Prime Minister Mossudeq making it clear that further American foreign aid would not be available The letter appeared in the press 10 days later On 28 July Secretary of State Dulles held a press conference in which he answered a planted question about the American view of Communist activity in Iran The growing activities of the illegal Communist Party in Iran and the toleration of them by the Iranian Government Dulles said has caused our Government concern These developments make it more difficult to grant aid to Iran President Eisenhower asserted at the Governors' Conference in Seattle on 4 August that t e United States w_ould not sit b Y_and -iY atch AsiarudlUntrie d the Iron Curtain 34 1 I 33 U Ibid S Wisner's idea of the public probably was narrow Most Americans did not read The New York Times and could not have told him whether Iran was in the Middle East o ciaLDLNauacrun ----------- _____ l 49 TOP SECRET ___Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111117 C01267813 TOP SECRET Just before midnight on 15 August Col Nassiri set out with two trucks of soldiers - - to- a -r re st Mossadeq When Nassiri arrived at Mossadeq's home to deliver thefinnans and arrest the Prime Minister he found himself surrounded and arrested instead 37 S Troops loyal to Mossadeq took the other participants into custody by early morning Sunday 16 August By 0500 pro-Mossadeq troops and tanks ringed the Prime Minister's house At 0545 Radio Tehran announced that the government had foiled a coup 38 Riahi informed the commanders of all military formations of the attempted coup and ordered them to monitor morale in their units and to prevent disorder and disturbance in their areas Riahi's and Mossadeq's quick reactions effectively emasculated the military's participation in TPAJAX U The original plan for a military operation had failed abysmally Upon hearing of Nassiri's arrest the principal anti-Mossadeq figures lost their courage For example General Batmangelich who was to have captured Riahi's headquarters turned back when he saw the troops surrounding the building Batmangelich and Col Akhavi soon found themselves under arrest The Shah for his part left the summer palace in the suburbs of Tehran and flew to Baghdad via Ramsar 50 TOPSECREr Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET --------------------- 8 The Shah's flight to Baghdad was no surprise given his temperament and his --- inability to withstand any kind of psycholo alnressure The ShahJater oonraYedll Bruilida d oas nart of Lbe_ooeratioo 3- ____ ht to 391n his memoirs the Shah said However following a pre-arranged plan the Queen and I had left Tehran before learning of the revolution's success It had been decided weeks before that if Mossadegh should use force to resist his deposition we would temporarily leave the country I had decided upon this move because I believed that it would force Mossadegh and his henchmen to show their real allegiances and that thereby it would help crystallize Persian public opinion -Mobammed Reza Eahla Missian for Mv CountlYllondon Hutchinson_ Q _l 9Ull D J 51 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U Ambassador Henderson who had-left Iran to distance illiSetf trom t e operation returned to Tehran on 16 August He immediately sought and received an audience with Mossadeq The ambassador asked the Prime Minister if he believed the Shah had issued orders dismissing him and appointing Zahedi Mossadeq replied that he had never seen such documents that he would not believe them if he saw them and that in any event the Shah was powerless to dismiss him According to Mossadeq the Shah could not on his own authority demand a change in the government Notwithstanding the Iranian constitution's provision that the prime minister serves at the pleasure of the monarch Mossadeq contended that his power came from the people rather than the Shah 42 U At noon on Sunday 16 August Mossadeq issued a brief statement over Radio Tehran According to the will of the people expressed by referendum the 17th Majlis is dissolved Elections for the 18th session will be held soon Minister of Foreign Affairs Hoseyn Fatemi held 11 press conference that afternoon in which he reviewed the events of the coup and announced that the Acting Minister of Court Abut Ghassem Amini had been U H W Brands Inside the Cold War Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American 1918-1961 New York Oxford University Press 1991 pp 235 285 empjJ 52 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 _ _ __ _ __ __ __ _ _ - C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267613 TOP SECRET arrested 43 Fatemi made several violent speeches virulently attacking the Shah and ordered the monarch atute s iiL'lJIDran_tom down 44 U Washington Reacts S Nassiri's arrest and the subsequent roundup of many anti-Mossadeq principals shook official Washington A US Embassy cable to Washington on 16 August blamed the coup attempt's failure squarely on the commonly appreciated difficulty in operating when confronted by current Iranian incapacity for large scale organized effort under clandestine conditions and when confronted by unforeseen difficulties 46 S Without knowing the extent of American involvement in the move against Mossadeq CIA's Office of Current Intelligence OCI analyzed the consequences of the failed military coup 47 An OCI assessment in the Current Intelligence Bulletin on 16 August stressed Mossadeq's continued mastery of the situation According to OCI the Prime Minister could be expected to move against his enemies and proceed arbitrarily The shah's flight the involvement of the commander of the imperial guards us leader of the coup and the imperial decrees to remove Mossadeq and appoint General Zahedi prime minister OCI asserted present Mossadeq with the opportunity of reducing the Shah's position still further or attempting to eliminate the monarchy altogether 48 C On 17 August OCI published a more in-depth analysis opining that the coup's failure had broken the will of Mossadeq's opposition In the analysts' view no group appeared willing to act after Mossadeq apparently had some ringleaders under I _ 45 S TEHE 724 18 August 1953 46 S TEHE 704 16 August 1953 47 U See Appendix E for a discussion of the limited role that CIA's analytical components played before and during the operation 48 TS Office of Current Intelligence Current Intelligence Bulletin 16 August 1953 p 3 53 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267613 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET arrest and forced others into hiding Even if such a group emerged OCI was pessimistic about its chances for success 49 C OCI thought the Shah's involvement had created new dangers for the monarchy and amounted to an open invitation for Mossadeq to proceed against him If the Prime Minister did not succeed in forcing the Shah to abdicate he will manage to strip from the monarch the remaining vestiges of power Mossadeq OCI concluded may be expected to retain political control but will probably assume a more dictatorial position and indulge in more chicanery to maintain himself 50 The situation seemed irretrievable to US analysts unwitting of NEA's plans to try again CJ Assessment of the Iranian Situation 17 August 1953 Office of Current Intelligence l_ 50 C Ibid 54 TOP SECRET _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Chapter4 U Victory S The US Embassy in Tehran may have been ready to write off TPAJAX but Kermit Roosevelt was not He knew that the elements for success were still present even though the unti-Mossadeq Iranian military leadership had collapsed ignominiously at the first hint of resistance Mossadeq remained politically isolated and the military for all its inactivity was basically pro-Shah S CIA no longer viewed TPAJAX as a military coup it was now a political action designed to swing the Iranian military away from the illegal Mossadeq government and place the armed forces squarely and actively behind the Shah and the legal Zahedi government Inducing the military to move in this direction would require a rapid concentrated and effectively improvised psychological warfare campaign to publicize the notion that Mossadeq had launched a coup against the legitimate government Roosevelt wanted to control events to the extent possible but he was also prepared to react to them and take advantage of fluid situations U Sunday 16 August Roosevelt and the Station Regroup U Roosevelt knew he held at least two powerful cards in the Shah'sfim ans Although Zahedi was hiding from Mossadeq under the Iranian Constitution he was the legal Prime Minister of Iran and Mossadeq was not Roosevelt was convinced that if he could publicize and emphasize that theme Mossudeq could not retain his illegal grip on power -------------------------- --------- l U Love covered the entire crisis for Tile New York Times His reports made the front pages of the newspaper from 17-24 August 1953 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 56 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 57 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 C01267813 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 TOP SECRET 58 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 59 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U TEXT BOX A Terrible Terrible Coincidence Rome U When the Shah arrived in Rome on 18 August CIA faced a potential disaster By coincidence DC Allen Dulles was there on vacation When the Shalt checked into the Excelsior Hotel Dulles was standing next to him trying to do the same thing U John Waller remembers that he got a call from Frank Wisner between 0200 and 0300 Wisner was agitated He 's gone to Rome Wisner told Waller A terrible terrible coincidence occurred Can you guess what it is Waller could not U Well Wisner continued he went to the Excelsior Hotel to book a room with his bride and the pilot there were only three of them and he was crossing the street on his way into the hotel Guess can you tell me I don't want to say it over the phone can you imagine what may have happened Think of the worst thing you can think of that happened U Waller said He was hit by a cab and killed U No no no no Wisner responded impatiently by this time almost wild with excitement Well John maybe you don't know that Dulles had decided to extend his vacation by going to Rome Now can yotl imagine what happened U Waller answered Dulles hit him with his car and killed him U Wisner did not think it was funny They both showed up at the reception desk at the Excelsior at the very same mometzt And Dulles had to say 'After you your Majesty ' 25 U The meeting between Dulles and the Shah was completely fortuitous but fraught with embarrassment for the US Government and CIA lzad the news media learned of it They did not so the incident passed unnoticed Wisner 's reaction strongly suggests that the meeting was coincidental It was unlikely that he would have called Waller at 0200 in a panic and revealed sensitive infomlation over an open telephone line if there had been a plan for the DC to meet the Shah in Rome 26 L l U - t In writing oft is incident in GenJ eman Spy Tlie of Allen Dulles Peter Grose says that Of all the conspir 1cy theories that later swirled around the personage of Allen Dulles none has made a convincing case to accommodate this unfortunate proximity Peter Grose Gentleman Spy the Life ofAllen Dulles Boston Houghton Mifflin 1994 p 367 60 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET -------- ----------------6 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET anTaii Zu rk Umeh - - - - - U At this point mem rs o exerctse clubsF wetghiliTters wrestlers and acrobats-appeared at the head of the crowd Their involvement was almost certainly the work of the Rashidian brothers and was a brilliant stroke that showed a profound understanding of Iranian psychology U Iranians idolize acrobats and weightlifters in the same way that many Americans idolize baseball basketball or football players The sight of these men tumbling or exercising in unison with dumbbells drew a crowd in an astonishingly short time Moreover the country's most famous athlete Shahan Bi Mohk Shahan the Brainless Jaffari was in the lead and began chanting pro-Shah slogans The effect was electrifyin a 36_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SJ he infl -u-e-n-c e_ o__f the mullahs on the demonstration was clear o y men a g alvanized many of the poor of South Tehran by hammering on the themes that the Soviet-backed Communists were taking over the Shah was gone and Mossadeq was to blame The streets of Tehran which had belonged to the Tudeh 24 hours earlier now belonged to a different crowd The few Tudeh members appearing on the streets around mid-morning 19 August saw that they were hopelessly outnumbered and lost their enthusiasm for a confrontation 37 They were swept away like so much chaff U The swelling crowd headed for the offices of the pro-Mossadeq and antiAmerican newspaper Bakhtar Emruz Security forces watched passively as the crowd demolished the newspaper's office By 1000 the crowd was headed for Mossadeq's residence at 109 Kakh Palace Street which was ringed with tanks and troops loyal to the Prime Minister U The troops guarding the residence were unsure of what was happening When confronted with the large angry crowd some of the soldiers opened fire The fighting escalated as pro-Shah troops returned fire Mossadeq climbed over the wall surrounding his house and escaped L _____ 63 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET L U The size and fervor of the demonstrations were critical m encouraging J military to come down on the side of the Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi Although some members of the officer corps opposed Mossadeq Roosevelt could not be certain that their units would follow their orders in the absence of evidence that the general population would back them up The Iranian army has a long tradition of waiting to see who controls the streets before it acts S By 1130 the military evidently had concluded that Mossadeq was through Truckloads of pro-Shah soldiers sped through the streets of Tehran and many troops joined the mobs that were shoutine Zendebad Shah while waving pictures of the na h -------------------------------------------------- -- 38 S Ibid o pp 10-11 39 S Ibid p 11 40 S Ibid p 12 64 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U The broadcast in the afternoon of 19 August was confused and chaotic but there was no doubt that pro-Shah forces had captured and were controlling Radio Tehran The first indication came when the announcer said ''The people of Tehran have risen today and occupied all the government offices and 1 am able to talk to you nil through the help of the armed forces The government of Mossadeq is a government of rebellion and has fallen 41 Seven minutes later amid much confusion and shouting on the air a Col Ali Pahlavon said U Oh people of the cities be wide awake The government of Mossadeq has been defeated My dear compatriots listen I am one of the soldiers and one of the devotees of this country Oh officers a number of traitors like Hoseyn Fatemi wants to sell out the country to the foreigners U My dear compatriots today the Iranian royalists have defeated the demagogue government by which Fatemi was ruling The Iranian nation officers army and the police have taken the situation in their hands U Premier Zahedi will assume his post There is no place for anxiety Keep tranquiJ 42 U The broadcast stopped After seven minutes it continued with a woman shouting U Oh people of Iran let the Iranian nation prove that the foreigners cannot capture this country Iranians love the King Oh tribes of Iran Mossadeq is ruling over your country without your knowledge sending your country to the government of the hammer and sickle 43 U A major from the Iranian army said that he was an infantry officer retired by Mossadeq the traitor We proved to the world that the Iranian army is the protector of this country and is under the command of the Shah Much confusion followed after which Radio Tehran played the national anthem and then went off the air 44 U Wednesday Afternoon 19 August Zendebad Shah 4l U Intercept from Tehran Iranian Home Service 19 August 1953 1200 GMT Records of the Directorate of Operations Job 79-01228A Box 11 Folder 14 ARC 42 U Intercept from Tehran Iranian Home Service 19 August 1953 1207 GMT Records of the Directorate of Operations Job 79-0 1228A Box 11 Folder 14 ARC 43 U Intercept from Tehran Iranian Home Service 19 August 1953 1214 GMT Records of the Directorate of Operations Job 79-01228A Box 11 Folder 14 ARC 44 U Ibid Radio Tehran went off the air at 1222 GMT 65 TOP SECRET Approved ror Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U Zahedi began broadcasting that he was e Tegally appointed head o t c govemment 48 He also promised to Roosevelt's chagrin that he would boost living standards provide free health services to the poor and modernize agricuJture 49 J 48 U According to the State Department the Embassy monitor reported Zahedi's transmission as follows Dear Compatriots ln the name of Almighty 1 address you I have been appointed your Prime Minister by order of His Majesty Past governments have made many promises but have achieved very little Nation must know I am lawful Prime Minister on Shah's orders Principal points my program are Rule of law raising standard of living rree health services for all mechanization of agriculture road construction public security individual and social freedom cooperative societies Long live Mohamed Reza Shah Pahlevi Telegram from US Embassy Tehran to Secretary of State No 406 19 August 1953 National Archives RG 319 Entry 57 box 27 66 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET L 67 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET S The Shah at t ts pomt was stfll in Rome At first Ambassooor Henderson dtd not want the monarch back in Tehran until popular pressure for his return became overwhelming 54 Washington however thought it was a good idea for the Shah to return as soon as possible The State Department had reversed itself and now was strongly urging the Iranian ruler to make a statement thanking his people for their support and promising to return CIA Headquarters added that We feel it extremely important for Shah to return immediately since issue is still in doubt and his presence just might make all the difference 55 S State favored pressuring the Shah if he hesitated Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith wanted to remind Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of two points 1 his actions were constitutional legal and in keeping with Iranian practice and tradition and 2 had he stayed in Tehran perhaps the earlier military coup attempt would have 54 S TEHE 745 19 August 1953 55 S Dir 16330 19 August 1953 68 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET succeeded The initial failure Smith thought was in part a result of the Shah's sudden departure leaving behind only pieces of paper which are not too meaningful or forceful in Iran albe stle talone whe_njhe Y a re_the_s_ublect of controvers as to their validity 56 e arrived in the Iranian capital on Saturday 22 August to a tumultuous and emo tional welcome 57 His plane stopped in front of the ranks of the Imperial Guard drawn up to greet their sovereign and commander Kennett Love described the scene for The New York Times as the new Prime Minister met the Shah's airplane l U General Zahedi half-entered the plane and kissed the Shah's knee then backed from the door to allow the 34-year-old Emperor to descend The Shah wore the gold-braided blue gray uniform of the Air Force Commander in Chief that had been specially flown to Baghdad for his return His eyes were moist and his mouth was set in an effort to control his emotions 58 The Mossadeq em was over 59 _ 5 temuodnclusion inmessaees Ia nossihlv Romc Ba rrhdad and Iepran '' 19 August 1953 I _ Jfhe points that Smith wanted to impress upon the Shah came from the Iranian ambassador in Washington 57 S TEHE 749 20 August 1953 LlJl Al t Y rel - 'LA llaiiCL I f L1 ---------------- 69 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET S CIA estimated that the short-term prospects for Zahedi's government were good Although many Iranians will regret the downfall of Mossadeq and will thus provide a source of future opposition to the new regime most of this group will probably acquiesce at least temporarily in the change The Tudeh Party lost much of its support in the upsurge of anti-Communist pro-Shah sentiment CIA thought the Tudeh unlikely to recover its support in the near future Zahedi faced a formidable task in dealing with the disparate elements responsible for Mossadeq's downfall and he probably could not count on the Shah's strong support The Shah had never supported any of his past prime ministers coosistenllY and CIA d his would chan e _ 6o_ _ ------ 60 S Office of National Estimates The Current Outlook in Iran SE-49 26 August 1953 RecardSJlf heD ffic e _ofNationalEstimaLcs Direc torate QUnte J _ Ih rc n c c - 'Au R __ C o _ _ _ _ _ 70 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET ChapterS U Aftermath U Zahedi Consolidates His Government S The situation in Tehran was still fluid and no one knew if the Tudeh might try to instigate an armed revolt against Zahedi that could have led to civil war Neither Zahedi nor his new military Chief of Staff Gen Batmangelich wanted to take any chances Batmangelich spent the first two days of his tenure as Chief of Staff ordering selected Iranian Army units to Tehran Batmangelich may have intended to augment the security forces already in or enroute to Tehran or he may have wanted to ensure enough show troops to greet the Shah when he returned S Batmangelich ordered battalions from Isfahan Kerman Tabriz and Khorramabad to leave their garrisons for Tehran These cities are widely separated and cover the country from the northwest to the southeast The Chief of Staff may have ordered other units as well but there is no evidence supporting additional troop movements of additional units S Each battalion enroute to Iran's capital had 358 enlisted men 79 noncommissioned officers and five or six officers They left with weapons full equipment provisions for two days and one fire unit of ammunition Batmangelich was anxious that the units arrive in Tehran on time and ordered them to report their progress while en route TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U The different and widely separated home ganisons of the battalions made them unlikely co-conspirators against the new regime The chance that nny of these battalions would refuse to follow Zahedi's orders was remote U The five brigades in the Tehran ganison had not covered themselves with glory during the civil unrest ousting Mossadeq and Batmangelich and Zahedi no doubt thought it prudent to have other troops in the capital who probably would not hesitate to crush a Tudeh-led coup attempt Batmangelich clearly intended these forces for more than ceremonial purposes troops do not parade or pass in review with live ammunition S Mossadeq's fall did not mean an immediate end to the problems that had bedeviled Iran's relations with the West Almost immediately after TPAJAX Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Henry Byroade wrote a memorandum addressing two issues How will the change in government affect Iranian policies and what attitude should the US Government take toward the Zahedi government I U Byroade noted that a revolution of nationalism was sweeping Asia and that any effective leader had to base his program on nationalist aspirations or face political suicide Zahcdi therefore was not likely to reverse many of Mossadeq's policies Byroade warned that American policymakers would be unwise to assume Iran will tum a new face toward the West in the immediate future Nonetheless he argued Zahedi merited American support His fall in Byroadc's opinion would open the way to chaos and a struggle for power in which only the Tudeh organization would be likely to win 2 U Two complications affected American support for the new Iranian Prime Minister Zahedi lacked solid political support in his own right He could expect the Shah to thwart his efforts to create a strong government since the Shah distrusted any strong leader-or anyone who might emerge as a strong leader U Zahedi's options were limited He could not become a military dictator as long as the military remained loyal to the Shah nor could he seck broad-based civilian support without calling for new Majlis elections The Majlis was notorious in Byroade's words for its destructive criticism and there was no guarantee that a new Majlis would cooperate with Zahedi In short Byroade wrote there is no cause for jubilation that our problems are ended in Iran On the contrary the future can be expected to bear remarkable similarity to the recent past 3 It was a sobering antidote to the euphoria at the highest levels of CIA _ _ _ _ _j l U Memorandum from Henry A Byroade NEA to Mr Bowie SIP ''Iran 21 August 1953 RG 59 Records of the State Department Records of the Office of Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs Lot 57 D 529 Box 40 NARA 2 U Ibid 3 U Ibid 72 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 CO 1 2 67 8 3 Approved for Release 2017 1111 001267813 TOPSECRET 73 TOPSECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 4 TOP SECRET' Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 75 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U The Tudeh Party - - - LL u TPA IAXIefUhe J udeh Partv weakcnedand demaralizcd J _ _ _ _ _____ _-- S in November 1953 the intelligence community judged that the Tudeh'S disarray made it unlikely that the Party would seize power In a National Intelligence 76 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ ____ J C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267613 TOPSECREf Estimate entitled Probable Developments in Iran Through 1954 ONE wrote that the Tudeh had been seriously disrupted with many of its most active members under arrest Zahcdi moreover had purged known Tudeh sympathizers from government agencies Even so in ONE's view the Tudeh was not impotent and still remained capable of sabo ee JIDd t W orism -'-'''2_ -1 ___ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - r---- - 2l S Office of National Estimates NIE-102 Probable Developments in Iran Through 1954 16 November 1953 p 2 Records of the Office of National Estimates Directorate of Intelligence -AR- -- 77 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267613 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U Until the archives of the former Soviet Union are fully opened it will be impossible for scholars to know the exact reasons why the Tudeh did not act Perhaps Bahrami was right in suggesting that it was only because the Tudeh was unprepared but the reasons are probably more complex Stalin had been dead for only five months and the new leaders were probably reassessing his policies They almost certainly recognized the importance of Iran to the United States and to the Soviet Union but may have been unsure how much freedom of action they had In any event since the Tudeh was so closely directed from Moscow it is unlikely that the Iranian Communists decided on their own t o nothimz U Whatever ill effects or career damage Lavrenticv suffered from Mossadeq'S fall were temporary He eventually returned to his post in Tehran and stayed until May 1955 when Moscow recalled him to participate in a commission trying to resolve outstandine Soviet-Iranian bordcumd fimm cia utes U Kermit Roosevelt S The American intelligence and diplomatic communities feted Kermit Roosevelt when he returned to Washington It is no exaggeration to say that TPAJAX owed its success to him inasmuch as Headquarters and the State Department were ready to abandon the project after the initial failure on 15 August Roosevelt had quickly seen that the essence of the operation had changed into a political action Success came from 78 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET his initiative quick thinking calm analysis and ability to recognize turning points and act decisively upon them S Although CIA did not conduct an investigation or post-mortem analysis of the operation to detennine what the Agency did wrong and what it did right Roosevelt in September 1953 talked about his role in TPAJAX before a group that included President _ Eisenhuwer Secretant oLStatc Dulles the Cabinet the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others j Roosevelt kept his audience enthralled for two hours and emphasized that the operation had succeeded because it enjoyed the support of the Iranian anny and the people It also succeeded because he did not have Washington secondguessing his every move Cables from Tehran were scare during the critical days of 1619 August-for a good reason Gentlemen Roosevelt joked to general applause I made a point of not letting you know what was happening No one seemed more amused than Allen Dulles 26 S Roosevelt cautioned his audience not to draw the wrong lessons from TPAJAX Now we'll think we can walk on water everywhere he said and we've got to be careful and restrain ourselves 27 S Roosevelt had long thought that contradictions in American foreign policy would continue to make covert action necessary In 1952 he wrote that at least in the Middle East as long as American words do not match American deeds so long will our orthodox diplomacy in the area be hamstrung and our reliance upon clandestine operations increase 28 Outside the Middle East he wrote strategic considerationschiefly the fear of losing French or British support for NATO- often require or seem to require our pursuit of a policy which alienates large segments of the Islamic-Asian world Roosevelt also believed that the United States had a tendency to develop policy in terms of irrelevant traditional formulae 29 U Secretary of State Dulles did not heed Roosevelt's admonition The Secretary was already contemplating a similar operation in a country half a world away from Iran and much closer to home 30 Officials in CIA's Directorate of Plans had been working since 1952 on schemes to depose Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbcnz Like Mossadcq Arbenz was willing to tum a blind eye to Communist machinations in his country Unlike Mossadeq however Arbenz appeared to be a Communist sympathizer Even the most bitter anti-Mossadeq partisans did not claim the Iranian Prime Minister was a Communist or a sympathizer 31 I __ I 28 C Kermit Roosevelt Chief Division of Near East and Africa Directorate of Plans Memorandum General Obserutions onJh Mru lfrobten C' ntin_g J EA_Q ' 7 October 19521 ___j 29 C Ibid -----------------------l 30 U Kennit Roosevelt Countercoup The Struggle for tire Control of Iran New York ll lml Jl llO 79 TOP SECRET J _ __ __ Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET -- --------------------- U Roosevelt's knowledge of the Middle Eastg ave htm the con t ence top ay the situation in Iran by ear without much Headquarters involvement His lack of Latin American expertise would have precluded a similar approach in dealing with Guatemala Control from Headquarters would necessarily have been tighter restricting his freedom of movement 34 U There was another important distinction between Iran and Guatemala Arbenz controlled a comparatively stable Guatemalan Government Mossadcq presided over a shambles At the start of 1953 according to Iranian specialist Kuross A Samii Iran resembled an old ship swept away by a storm with no one aboard capable of dealing with 32 S See Nicholas Cullather Operation PJJSUCCESS The United States and Guatemala 19521954 Washington DC CIA History Stuff 1993 Piero Gleijeses Shattered Hope 71ze Guatemalan Revolution and the United Swtes 1944-1954 Princeton Princeton University Press 1991 Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer Bitter Fntit The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala New York Doubleday 1982 and Richard H Immerman The CIA in Guatemala The Foreign Polic jlntervention Austin University of Texas Press 1982 34 S Ibid 80 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET the attendant frenzy By August Mossadcq ''was barely holding on to the broken sails of his sinking ship Everything considered whatever might be said of the morality or the legality of American action it still should not be characterized as having overthrown a stable regime in Iran 35 What worked in Iran Roosevelt sensed probably would not work in Guatemala because the circumstances were so different S Neither CIA nor the US Government heeded Roosevelt's warnings about the seductiveness and danger of covert action and PBSUCCESS went forward successfully With the overthrow of Arbenz many in the State Department and CIA thought American action had narrowly averted a Communist government in Guatemala The relative rapidity and ease with which TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS had accomplished their objectives however deceived CIA officials They drew the erroneous lesson that the Agency could alter world events in the Third World at will and with minimal expense It would take the debacle at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 to vindicate Roosevelt but by then the man who had brought down Mossadeq had resigned from CIA 36 35 U Kuross A Samii Involvement By Invitation American Strategies of Containment in Iran University Park PA The Pennsylvania State University Press 1987 p 143 36 U Roosevelt Countercoup p 210 81 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TO SECRET Chapter6 S Evaluating TPAJAX U During the 1979-81lranian hostage crisis a reporter asked President Jimmy Carter whether he thought that it was proper for the United States to restore the Shah to the throne in 1953 against the popular will within Iran Instead of correcting the reporter's loaded question the President replied That's ancient history and I don't think it's appropriate or helpful for me to go into the propriety of something that happened 30 years ago l U Many diplomatic historians intelligence historians and political scientists do not considerTPAJAX ancient history Eighteen years after President Carter's remark the questions implicit in the reporter's query persist and continue to stir controversy S The extensive secondary literature on TPAJAX and other American covert operations in the early 1950s focuses on a single issue whether stated or implied Was the operation in the US national interest With this question as a guide this chapter evaluates the covert action as its contemporaries saw it and as we view it retrospectively S TPAJAX and the National Interest the Contemporaneous View S Official Washington thought that TPAJAX was a stunning victory for the West The operation almost certainly prevented Iran from sliding into political anarchy and becoming a target too tempting for the Tudeh and its Soviet mentors to ignore In the short term a stable Zahedi Government permitted a rapid settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute thereby restarting the flow of oil and providing a much-needed boost for the sagging Iranian economy S At the time neither Washington nor London could foresee the long-range benetits that would flow from TPAJAX The pro-Western strongly anti-Communist l U President Jimmy Carter The President's News Conference of February 13 1980 Public Papers of the Presidents oftlze United States Jimmy Carter Book -January I to May 23 1980 Washington DC United States Government Printing Office 1981 p 307 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET policy of the Zahedi Government that the United States obtained at minimal cost2 would last for 26 years Secure in the knowledge that the US would support Iran against the USSR the Shah was able to turn his attention to domestic matters He began a series of far-reaching modernization efforts including land reform and steps toward the emancipation of women U TPAJAX came at a time when the events in pre-war Europe were a fresh memory Americans had seen how Nazi subversion could destroy a country like Czechoslovakia They had seen the consequences of weakness and appeasement before Nazi and Japanese demands They had suffered the incalculable cost of failing to act when action might have stopped further aggression Many were determined never again to let the appearance of weakness and indecision encourage aggression U Neither the White House nor State Department had the slightest doubt that the Soviets coveted Iran and would do whatever they could short of war to bring that country within the Soviet orbit The Azeri crisis of 1947 showed that unless checked Stalin would continue to test the West's resolve U Stalin's death in March 1953 added a dangerous element of ambiguity to Soviet intentions Who would succeed the late dictator the breaker of nations 3 Would Soviet policy become more or less aggressive Would the Sovieto reoccupy Iranian Azerbaijan Would they encourage the Tudch to topple Mossadeq The White House the State Department and CIA struggled to find answers to these questions U Sending American troops to Iran was never a practical option for logistical and political reasons An American military occupation almost certainly would have led to war The USSR would have invoked the terms of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship Between Iran and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and occupied the northern part of the country Iran would have been divided into a Communist north and a free south Fear of partition lay behind Washington's objection to the proposed British occupation of the port city of Abadan early in the oil nationalization crisis U A covert political operation promised to attain American foreign policy and strategic in objectives Iran without the threat of war CIA gave the Eisenhower administration flexibility where diplomacy had failed and military action was not practical In addition CIA gave the US Government plausible deniability If a covert action went awry the President could deny American involvement With these considerations in mind and given the widely held Western outlook on the international J U Historian Robert Conquest's term See Robert-Conquest Stalin Breaker of Nations 'ew York Vi king Press 1991 83 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET situation in general and on Soviet intentions in particular the Eisenhower administration's decision to act in Iran was reasonable and understandable S TPAJAX and the National Interest The Retrospective View U A kind of historical hubris results from the belief that because we know far more about the consequences of past acts than contemporaneous actors could know we are more likely than they are to have a correct interpretation of events and of cause and effect We cannot know the consequences of decisions not made or actions not taken any more than contemporaries did Nevertheless time and knowledge of past events provide the historian with a perspective not available to contemporaries U Some historians argue today that TPAJAX was not in the US national interest 4 Maintaining that American policymakers in the 1950s defined national security narrowly these historians emphasize that actions intended to enhance American power ultimately have the opposite effect if they violate democratic ideals In this view intervening in domestic political processes in foreign countries inevitably undermines US national security by weakening the values on which US security rests in the long run S Specifically critics ofTPAJAX contend that it damaged American national interests for a number of reasons In their view it returned the Shah to his throne illegally The operation removed a popular legitimately elected Prime Minister from office who some now claim would have fallen eventually even without American intervention Finally American action created a reservoir of resentment among the Iranian people that helped create the conditions for Ayatollah Khomcini's Islamic Revolution in 1978-79 5 In short what appeared to be a short-term success ultimately proved to be a failure U This critique deserves careful attention its more thoughtful and articulate proponents appear to make a persuasive case The Shah did leave Tehnm to return only when he was certain Mossadeq was gone and American support for the Peacock Throne assured Mossadeq was popular among some segments of the population Some Iranians were disillusioned with the United States They had hoped that the US as the great postwar anti-colonial power would not intrigue against their country as the British and Russians had done A close examination of the facts however reveals flaws in the revisionist critique 4 See e g Wilbur Crane Eveland Ropes of Sand America's Failure in the Middle East New York W W Norton Company 1980 Burry Rubin Paved With Good Intentions The American Experience and Iran New York Odord University Press 1980 James A Bill The Eagle and the Lion The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations New Haven CT Yale University Press 1988 5 U C M Woodhouse one of the British principals in the operation deals with this point in his autobiography Something Ventured He contends that what Britain and the United States saw in 1953 was vastly different from what happened in 1979 The proper analogy he asserts is to the events in Afghanistan from 1973 to 1980 the overthrow of a weak monarchy by nationalist forces who in turn would be overtaken by indigenous Communists who in tum would call in the Soviet Army C M Woodhouse Something Ventured London Grunada 1982 p 131 84 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267B13 TOP SECRET 'PAG-E rTU'ltiOt' All'f lttnl - 85 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U Did CIA Restore the Shah to His Throne S TPAJAX did not ''restore the Shah to his throne either technically or constitutionally Although the Iranian monarch left Tehran during the operation he never abdicated Mossadeq's argument that the Shah'sfinnans were invalid was disingenuous The Iranian constitution gave the Shah the right to dismiss the Prime Minister As soon as Mossadeq refused to obey the Shah's legal order he was rebelling against constitutional authority From that point on TPAJAX became an operation to remove the usurper Mossadeq and permit Zahedi the legitimate Prime Minister to take office Unlike Mossadeq's government Zahedi's government recognized the Shah's constitutional authority S Did CIA Act Against a Legitimate Leader Enjoying Popular Support U Although there is no doubt that Mossadeq captured the imagination of segments of Iranian society with the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 his political support dwindled steadily By August 1953 he did not command mass support The Tudeh and splinters of the National Front were the only political parties willing to support him U The pro-Shah sentiments of the Tehran crowds on 19 August 1953 were genuine Although CIA had a hand in starting the demonstrations they swelled spontaneously and took on a life of their own that surprised even Kermit Roosevelt Many average Iranians seemed convinced that they had to choose between the Shah and Communism In marching against the Tudeh Iranians were supporting the Shah Iran expert Donald Wilber's plan to make this choice explicit had worked S By August 1953 Mossadeq's support was vociferous but increasingly narrow The Shah's support was latent but deep and took a crisis-like the news of Tudeh demonstrators pulling down the Shah's statues-to awaken Khorramabad residents for example wildly rejoiced at hearing of the monarch's return and threatened to destroy the homes of Tudeh leaders Security forces prevented them from doing so U Before dismissing reports like those from Khorramabad as propaganda it must be remembered that CIA was able to influence directly events only in the capitill city and there only barely Kermit Roosevelt had neither the money nor the agents to initiate the kinds of demonstrations that took place in Iran's widely separated cities U Has CIA's Role Been Exaggerated S If Mossadeq' s growing unpopularity invalidates one criticism of TPAJAX it strengthens another As indicated above some historians argue that Mossadeq's deteriorating political base made it likely he would have fallen without American intervention In this view TPAJAX was unnecessary because Irdnian domestic politics would have solved the problem itself S The American role is one of the new debates among academicians Books published before the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 tend to assign a central role to CIA 86 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET and Kennit Roosevelt 6 Post-revolutionary authors like SepehrZabih take the opposite position Zabih asserts that ascribing a large role to CIA and SIS understates the complex interaction of external and internal political forces of this era 7 U American University's Amos Perlmutter belongs to the school of thought that considers Mossadeq's fall inevitable regardless of Western actions In a foreword to Zabih's The Mos mdegh Era Roots of the Iranian Revolution Perlmutter writes that CIA's role in these climactic events was not very significant despite some of the heavily unsubstantiated claims of the old boys such as Kcnnit Roosevelt U To a large extent the return of the Shah and the downfall of Mossadegh were made possible by divisions among the political forces of the left and right the left split among nationalists Marxists and Communists and the right split among the reactionary and xenophobic clergymen and their more liberal counterparts 8 U Perlmutter is correct in saying that Imnian political divisions made the fall of Mossadeq possible but merely because something is possible does not ensure that it will happen CIA's role was significant Without Kennit Roosevelt's leadership guidance and ability to put some backbone into the key players when they wanted to quit no one would have moved against Mossadeq Iran had many political factions but few legitimate leaders-and even fewer leaders with the discipline and will necessary to take risks U A key difference between Mossadeq and his domestic opponents was his ability to control the streets Although much of the National Front had deserted the Prime Minister the Tudeh by this time Iran's only disciplined political party rallied to him when its aims and Mossadeq's coincided Tudeh demonstrations intimidated the opposition and kept the army on the sidelines Mossadeq's opponents would have been unable to overcome these disadvantages without outside help U The notion that Mossadeq would have fallen anyway ignores the realities of Iranian politics No group was able without help to contest control of the streets of Tehran with the Tudeh The opposition needed a rallying point and a psychological trigger Roosevelt provided both and gave Tehranians a choice between the Shah and the 6 S Kermit Roosevelt Countercoup The Struggle for the Control of Iran New York McGrawHill 1979 Dr Donald N Wilber one or the principal characters in TPAJAX was one of many criticizing Roosevelt's book Of its 217 pages Wilber wrote in his own memoirs about 100 are fillers reviewing recent history Concerning Operation AJAX itself the book is not meticulously correct in reporting meetings where plans were drown up or in quoting those who were there In my opinion it should have been subjected to a full editorial revision See Donald N Wilber Adventures in the Middle East Excursions and Incursions Princeton N J Darwin Press 1986 p 9 Mark Gasiorowski writes that Coulltercoup has many mistakes and omissions See Mark J Gasiorowski The 1953 Coup d'etat in Iran International Journal of Middle East Studies 19 Aug 1987 261 7 U Sepehr Zabih The Mos mdegh Era Roots of the Iranian Revolution Chicago Lake View Press 1982 p 126 8 U Amos Perlmutter forward to The Mossadeglz Era Roots of the Iranian Revolution by Sepehr Zabih Chicago Lake View Press 1982 p vii 87 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 TOP SECRET Tudeh Ordinary Iranians were willing to demonstrate their support for the monarch only when they became convinced through the pro-Shah demonstmtions in the streets that others were doing the same S The actual events ofTP AJAX suggest how a purely Inmian operation would have fared without CIA direction When Mossadeq arrested Imperial Guard commander Col Nassiri the other principals became disheartened and went into hiding Gen Batmangetich turned around when he saw troops loyal to Mossadeq surrounding the General Staff office building The operation collapsed before it started U Historians arguing that Mossadeq would have fallen anyway fail to answer a critical related question Without US intervention what would have replaced him In August 1953 Iran seemed more likely to degenerate into chaos than to experience a stable transfer of power from Mossadeq to someone else No potential prime minister was strong enough to command a majority in the Majlis or even to form a coalition government out of the factions and splinter groups comprising Iranian politics If Ayatollah Kashani whom the US had briefly considered supporting in mid- 1953 had somehow been able to succeed Mossadeq his government might have resembled Ayatollah Khomeini's regime more than Fazlollah Zahedi's S Was TPAJAX Responsible for Khomeini's Islamic Revolution U If the United States and United Kingdom had not intervened in Inm's chaotic politics in August 1953 would Ayatollah Khomeini have been able to launch his Islamic Revolution 25 years later Asking this question is like asking whether World War ll would have been fought if Germany had won World War I and Hitler had remained an obscure corporal We cannot know the consequences of events that did not happen but we can engage in infonned speculation U Revisionists contend that CIA stifled Iran's drive to democracy and strengthened the rule of the autocratic Shah thereby making Khomeini's revolution all but inevitable Despite its faults in this view Mossadeq's Government represented the popular will His government reflected a vision for Iran's future that the Shah did not share Mohammed Reza Pahlavi wanted to transform Iran into a modern Westernized state his people preferred a more traditional society U In removing Mossadeq the revisionists continue the United States and Britain effectively strangled traditional Iranian nationalism Frustrated and resentful the people rose 25 years later in rage against the Shah and the United States disparaged as the Great Satan For there can be no doubt that despite years of official American and British denials most Iranians have been convinced of the CIA's rote in Mossadeq's falt 9 9 S One of the participants in TPAJAX assured the author that many Iranians only suspected the American role in the operation subject of bazaar rumors for years The Cambridge History of rail's assessment is probably more accurate Nevertheless Iranians have never had the slightest doubt that the C I A acting on behalf or the American and British governments organized the conspirators and paid the pro-Shah mobs led by toughs from southern Tehran which together with army units were in control of the streets by nightfall on 19 August By 1982 this tenacious rumour had been fully confirmed and is now seen as incontrovertible footnote omitted Peter Avery Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville eds The Cambridge 88 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U A problem with this thesis is that Mossadeq's Iran was not moving toward democracy The Prime Minister's increasing political isolation and the fragmentation of the National Front as documented above had weakened his position and made him desperate His dictatorial grab for power from the Majlis alienated his former allies and gained him new political enemies Iran was to repeat Iran specialist Kuross Samii' s apt metaphor an old ship swept away by a storm with no one on board capable of dealing with the attendant frenzy 10 U In fact Khomeini's revolution was a reaction against secularism modernization and the Shah's misrule not a push for a return to the National Front The streets of Tehran rang with shouts of fanatical support for Khomeini rather than nostalgic calls for Mossadeq The Ayatollah was not interested in Mossadeq or the things he stood for The last thing Khomeini wanted was a secular government with multi-party participation He would have called for fundamentalist revolution against any government including a National Front or Tudeh Government that promoted modernization the emancipation of women and secularization U Edward Shirley the former CIA DO employee who journeyed through revolutionary Iran argues that the revisionist thesis also underestimates the role the clerics played in TPAJAX Without the support of Ayatollahs Kashani and Behbehani Shirley doubts the covert political action could have succeeded What the ayatollahs did in 1953 with American and British help they might have been able to do later without such help Alternatively given Mossadeq's growing political weakness and isolation from Iranian society the clerics may have defeated him and the National Front in general elections U In short according to Shirley the 1953 aborted-democracy theory is appealing but is too convenient in its diabolization of the CIA and MI6 and too Persian in its determination to make someone else responsible for failure S TPAJAX and the Future of American Covert Action S TPAJAX exerted a powetful influence on the DDP's thinking about covert action Unfortunately Allen Dulles and others in the DDP did not evaluate their experience critically and apparently drew dubious conclusions The easy success of the Iranian and Guatemalan operations seemed to herald a golden age of covert action and a sober reappraisal of the utility and flexibility of covert action as a foreign policy instrument did not occur until President John Kennedy fired Dulles after the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 11 S Dulles and his colleagues were correct in regarding covert action as an important weapon of Cold War foreign policy giving the President the means to halt or History of Iran vol 7 From Nadir Slzah to the Islamic Republic New York Cambridge University Press 1991 p 263 lO U Kuross A Samii Involvement by Invitation American Strategies of Containment in Iran University Park PA the Pennsylvania State University Press 1987 p 143 ll U See Peter Wyden Bay of Pigs the Untold Story New York Simon and Schuster 1979 89 TOP SECRET A roved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET reverse developments he deemed harmful to American interests This capability freed the US from merely reacting to Soviet moves or threats of moves and permitted American action without the threat of direct military confrontation Moreover early American covert action successes notified the Soviets that the United States was an able player in the game of high-stakes international intrigue it had only recently joined S Leading DDP figures erred in relying on covert action too heavily and resorting to it too readily As an intelligence professional Dulles must have recognized the limits and risks of covert action The success of TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS however was seductive Kermit Roosevelt's warning that covert actions like TP AJAX would succeed over the long run only with the support of the indigenous military and population fell on deaf years The operation in Guatemala seemed to show that both elements could be neutralized quite easily-the military by pammilitary operations and elements of popular opposition by psychological operations 12 S Peter Grose Dulles's biographer writes that the DCI drew a straight line from Guatemala in 1954 to the Bay of Pigs in 1961 Any doubts Dulles may have had about TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS vanished as both operations unfolded and benefited from unexpected luck Both operations may have made Dulles and the DDP overly confident that in these sorts of operations something would tum up that would lead to ultimate success They miscalculated in assuming-and expecting- that the Bay of Pigs invasion would follow the same pattem 13 S Perhaps the most important and unique result ofTPAJAX was to strengthen CIA's position within the government as an instrument of policy and solidify its been taken responsi ilitv for clande stine_ac ti Yi toJhis ooint the Agencv had lerio11 Th - e t a iill-- o - rf M os s - a i de q - - w - -a s - a- - w- - a 7t e r c sc e - rJrn-- r e - m - o - n - -s tr at m - g -c - -z -v - -a n-- c Tu n-- --e-- st 'm -e -_J operational expertise and in putting a civilian intelligence agency at the forefront of planning and executing covert operations After TPAJAX the military could not argue as it had during the Congressional hearings for the Nalional Security Act of 1947 lhat civilians did not have the background training or experience for clandestine activity l2 U Peter Grose Gentleman Spy The Life ofAllen Dulles Boston Houghton Mifflin 1994 p 384 13 U Ibid 90 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 C01267813_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Postscript U The Shadow of the Pahlavis S The political landscape of lrdn today is vastly different from what it was I n' - 1953 but the motivations of some o theJ l remain essentially the sameJ 1 S Iran continues to draw Moscow's attention for several reasons ts s tz_e_a_n __J strategic location make it a potential threat to Russian interests The Cold War may be over but that does not mean Russian and American national interests in the Middle East coincide A sense of competition in the region lingers even if its consequences are no longer potentially catastrophic TP AJAX appears to have forestalled but did not end the Russian drive for influence in Iran U The average Iranian still believes that the British and Americans are ominipotent and that if they removed Mossadeq either or both somehow put the mullahs in power Edward Shirley's Know Thine Enemy A Spy's Journey into Revolutionary Iran recounts several conversations he had with Iranians while traveling through that country One asked Shirley for help U 'Americans should help us Your secretary of state was spit upon by Khomeini He calls Iran the most evil state in the world but he does nothing Unless you want Iranians thinking that you like the mollahs you should bring them down The British put them in and America should drive them out The young Shah he is like his father a coward And the United States wastes money on him Iranians don't want to fight anymore They need a sign from America ' TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Another told Shirley it did not matter what Iranians thought It only matters what the Americans and the E11glisss think They hold the power The E11glisss have always had the cl ockets ' 2 -------- --------- --- 2 U Edward Shirley Know Thine Enemy A Spy's Journey into Revolutionary Iran New York Farrar Straus and Giroux 1997 pp 75 106 3 U See Harold Bloom The Lucifer Principle A Scientific Expedition into the Forces of History New York The Atlantic Monthly Press I 995 pp 264-70 SAV AK' s successor in the Islamic Republic of Iran is the Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Aminat-e Keshvar VAVAK known in the West as the Ministry of Intelligence and Security MOIS According to historian Carl Wegc VAV AK is noted primarily for assassinating Iranian dissidents abroad and has been doing so since the revolution in 1979 Its first victim was the Shah's nephew Shahriar Shafiq in Paris December 1979 but is most famous victim was former prime minister Shapour Bakhtiar assassinated in August 1991 Carl Anthony Wege Iranian Intelligence Organizations International Journal ofIntelligence and Counterintelligence 10 Falll997 289 Heritage Foundation Senior Policy Analyst James Phillips writes that more than a dozen Iranian dissidents have been assassinated in European cities since 1987 VA VAK even struck in the 92 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 12 06 C01267813 TOP SECRET United States murdering Iranian political activist Ali A Tabatabai founder of the Iran Freedom Foundation in his Bethesda Maryland home in July 1980 James Phillips ''The Challenge of Revolutionary Iran Heritage Foundation Committee Brief No 24 29 March 1996 I 5 U Iran Internal Security DODOD 141-28 21 May 1993 The inforllllltion in this report is classified TOP SECRET UMBRA NOFORN the title is unclassified The report already five years old states that Iran's various tribes have not been a serious threat to Tehran's rule for several years No reporting since then has warranted a qualification or change of that opinion I 93 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 12 06 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOPSECREf Appendix A S TPAJAX Chronology 8 January 1951 Office of National Estimates ONE Central Intelligence Agency publishes NIE 14 The Importance of Iranian and Middle East Oil to Western Europe Under Peacetime Conditions 7 March 1951 General Ali Razmara Iranian Prime Minister assassinated 16 March 1951 ONE publishes SE 3 The Current Crisis in Iran _j 5 April195l _j ONE publishes NIE 6 Iran's Position in the East-West Conflict 29 April 1951 Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi names Mohammed Mossadeq as prime minister of Iran 2 May 1951 Iran nationalizes the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company retroactive to 20 March 1951 22 May 1951 ONE publishes SE 6 Current Developments in Iran August 1951 Anglo-Iranian oil negotiations collapse September 1951 Britain embargoes shipments to Iran of iron steel sugar oil processing equipment and other goods that could be resold for dollars 12 January 1952 Iran orders all British consulates closed by 21 January TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267B13 TOP SECRET 4 February 1952 ONE publishes NIE 46 Probable Developments in Iran in 1952 in the Absence of an Oil Settlement 16July 1952 Mossadeq resigns as Prime Minister 21 July 1952 After five days of demonstrations and rioting by members of the National Front the Shah renames Mossadeq Prime Minister 3 L July 1952 L -- DDP Wisner reports to DCI Smith that the consensus at a meeting at the State Department on 30 July was that for the moment there was Jittle the CIA could do in Iran I lr 14 October 1952 ONE publishes SE 33 Prospects for Survival of Mossadeq Regime Iran 22 October 1952 Iran breaks off diplomatic relations with Britain 13 November 1952 ONE publishes NIE 75 Probable Developments in Iran Through 1953 20 November 1952 National Security Council issues NSC 136 1 The Present Situation in Iran 95 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET l 26 February 1953 Allen Dulles sworn in as DCI ll I - March 1953 Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith concludces that Mossadeq's tenure in office is inimical to US i nterests State Department authorizes CIA to consider opcrations that would replace Mossadeq ---1 I I ' I J 1 r I ___ _j 28 May 1953 I -- Prime Minister Mossadeq asks President Eisen hower for American financial aid -o 96 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOPSECREf 3 June 1953 Ambassador Henderson arrives in Washington for consultations 8 June 1953 Ambassador Henderson briefed on TPAJAX in Washington l 29 June 1953 President Eisenhower infonns Mossadeq that Iran will not receive further US aid until the oil nationalization issue is resolved 97 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 11 July 1953 President Eisenhower Secretary of Stute John Foster Dulles and DCI Allen Dulles approve TPAJAX - 21 July 1953 In Tehran the National Front and the Tudeh Party stage demonstrations commemorating 21 July 1952 I _ _ _ _j 23 July 1953 British Ambassador to the United States Roger MeJlor Makins presents assurances to Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith thnt UK Government would be flexible in its approach to oil question 25 July 1953 Princess Ashraf arrives in Tehran 28 July 1953 Secretary of State Dulles gives a press conference in which he says thut Recent developments in Iran especially the growing activity of the supposedly illegal Communist Party which appears to be tolerated by the Iranian government have caused us concern 29 July 1953 Princess Ashraf meets with the Shah but is unable to convince him to dismiss Mossadeq 30 July 1953 - Princess Ashraf leaves Tehran at request of Mossadeq government after having spoken to the Shah 98 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 4 August 1953 President Eisenhower states at Governors' Conference in Seattle that the US will not stand by and let Asian nations fall behind the Iron curtain 7 August 1953 Asadollah Rashidian again meets with the Shah who agrees that action should be taken on 10 or 11 August ------ l 12 August 1953 Col Nematollah Nassiri commander of thCS ha h 's_ I m-p_ erial Guard takes the fimwns by plane to Ramsar 13 August 1953 Led Late in the everng Col Nassiri returns to Tehran with the finnans I 99 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 I C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOPSECREf 15 16 August 1953 I _ _ Dunng the night of 15 16 August Col Nassiri tries to deliver the firmans to Mossadeq dismissing him but is arrested General Taghi Riahi Mossade_a's chief of staf a_has troo s at strate_gic Qoints in Tehran1 I At 0545 Radio Tehran announces an abortive coup At 0600 Mo ss adeJJ mee1s_with_cab inet to receive reports on the 16 August 1953 r ituatianl 16 August 1953 Radio Tehran broadcasts message at noon from Mossadeq According to the will of the people expressed by referendum the J7th Majlis is dissolved Elections for the 18th session will be held soon 16 August 1953 Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatemi holds a press conference at 1400 at which he makes anti-Shah statements 16 August 1953 Crowds mass in Majlis Square around 1930 to hear speeches attacking the Shah Crowds learn for the first time that the Shah had fled I-R-a-dt_ o_T_e_h_ra_n__a_t_l_0-30- c-al-ls_o_n_G_en-e-ra_l_Z_a_h-ed-i to surrender 17 August 1953 1 -- J _ _ _ 100 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 18 August 1953 Shah leaves Baghdad for Rome on a commercial flight Some morning newspapers run copies of the finnan 18 August 1953 Sporadic violence breaks out 19 August 1953 Pro-Shah groups assemble at 0900 in the Tehran bazaar Newspapers continue to print thefinnans and alleged interviews with Zahedi quoted as insisting that his government is the only legal government 19 August 1953 Pro-Shah truckloads of soldiers posted in mid-morning at key points in Tehran 19 August 1953 Gen Riahi tells Mossadeq at 1030 that he no longer controls the army 19 August 1953 Radio Tehran falls into royalist hands at 1420 ___ j 19 August 1953 Zahedi speaks over Radio Tehran at 1725 He seems to be consolidating his hold over the government 19 August 1953 Mossadeq's house is destroyed in the evening around 1900 5 December 1953 United Kingdom and Iran agree to reestablish diplomatic relations 21 December 1953 An Iranian military court in Tehran sentences Mossadeq to three years' solitary confinement for disobeying the Shah's order dismissing him and for dissolving the Majtis 101 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Appendix B TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET L _ _ _ __ 103 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 104 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267B13 TOP SECRET Appendix C TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C012678131_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 106 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET AppendixD U Biographical Sketch of Mohammed Mossadeq U Mohammed Mossadeq was born in Tehran on 16 June 1882 into a prominent political family I After working for seveml years in the Ministry of Finance he left Iran to pursue advanced studies at the University of Liege in Belgium and the University of Neuchatel in Switzerland He received a doctorate of laws LL D from Ncuchatel in 1914 Mossadeq returned to Iran in 1915 ostensibly to resume his career in the Ministry of Finance but was elected to the Third Majlis that same year He later served as Governor-General of the Province ofFars 1921 Minister of Finance 1921-22 Governor General of Azerbaijan 1922 and Minister of Justice four months in 1923 2 U In January 1924 Mossadeq took his seat in the Fifth Majlis as an elected deputy from Tehran The central issue before the Majlis was the termination of the Qajar l U Various writers give different dates of birth Barry Rubin asserts that Mossadeq was born in 1881 James A Bill uses the 1882 date Faramarz S Fatemi claims Mossadeq was born in 1879 Mossadeq's entry in the 1951 edition of Current Biography gives 1879 as his year of birth Farhad Diba's Moltammed Mossadeq A Political Biography probably comes closest to solving the mystery Diba says that the confusion stemmed from an error on Mossadeq's identity card Mossadeq registered with Precinct 3 of the Tehran police and the clerk made a mistake converting the Arabic year into the Iranian year The error made the future Prime Minister appear older than he really was The family Koran which surfaced years later records that Mossadeq was born 16 June 1882 See Barry Rubin Paved with Good Intentions n1e American Experience and Iran New York Oxford University Press 1980 p 58 James A Bill The Eagle and the Lion The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations New Haven Yale University Press 1988 p 53 Farumarz S Fatemi The U S S R in Iran The Background History of Russian and Anglo-American Conflict in Iran Its Effects on Iranian Nationalism and tile Fall of the Shah New York A S Barnes and Company 1980 p 54 Farhad Diba Mohammad Mossadegh A Political Biography London Croom Helm 1986 p 3 2 U Fatemi p 54 Bill pp 53-54 Current Biography 1951 p 444 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Dynasty and the establishment of the Pahlavi Dynasty under Reza Khan 3 Mossadeq related to the Qajar family strongly opposed Reza Khan's ascension as Shah and continued to oppose him after the Majlis voted him hereditary Shah in October 1925 Mossadeq's outspokenness brought him to the attention of the British Legation In the Legation's listing of prominent Iranians Mossadeq's entry read Poses as a jurist and talks a lot of nonsense Is nothing but a demagogue 4 U Rezn Shah did not tolerate Mossadeq's defiance for long He banished the troublesome deputy from Tehran to his native village at Ahmadabad outside of Tehran and later imprisoned him For all practical purposes Mossadeq was out of Iranian politics from 1926 to 1941 5 U World War II changed Mossadeq's fortunes The future prime minister left prison when British and Soviet troops occupied Ir m in August 1941 and Reza Shah abdicated in favor of his son Mohammed Reza Pahlavi 6 In 1944 Mossadeq Tehran again elected him to the Majlis He gained national recognition during the 1940s for strongly opposing Iranian oil concessions to foreign powers-including a concession the Soviets demanded during the Azerbaijan crisis in 1946 His opposition to the USSR's support of breakaway Azerbaijan was not as vociferous He rose in the Majlis to propose changing the constitution to transform Iran into a federation of semiautonomous states including Azerbaijan The other deputies shouted him down 7 U Mossadeq's prominence and the public's perception that he was a man of principle for having stood up to Reza Shah propelled him into a leading role in an emerging political force known as the Jablta-yi Milli or National Front 8 His work in the 16 Majlis as the chairman of the Parliamentary Oil Commission a body the Majlis established to review the options open to the government then renegotiating the United Kingdom's oil concession drew even more attention to him He began to attract a following in the streets and bazaar and was becoming a formidable political figure 9 U When an Islamic fundamentalist assassinated Prime Minister Gen Ali Razmara in March 1951 Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi replaced him with Hussein Ala Ala held office a little more than a month before resigning on 27 April The Majlis then voted to recommend that the Shah appoint Mossadeq as Prime Minister The Shah did so on 29 Aprii195I i0 3 U On 31 October 1925 the Biography 1951 p 444 Mujlis elected Reza Khan as hereditary Shah Current 4 U Wilfred Knapp 1921-1941 the Period of Riza Shah in Twentieth Century Iran ed Hossein Amirsadeghi New York Holmes Meier 1977 p 28 5 U Bill p 54 6 U Reza Shah abdicated on 16 September 1941 7 U Current Biography 1951 p 445 8 U See chapter 1 9 U Peter Avery Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville eds The Cambridge History of Iran vol 7 From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic New York Cambridge University Press 1991 p 253 IO U Current Biography 195 pp 444-45 108 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U Western statesmen did not know how to take the new Prime Minister because he neither looked nor acted like they thought heads of government should look and act Secretary of State Acheson for example described the Prime Minister as small and frail without a shred of hair on his billiard-ball head a thin face protruded into a long beak of a nose flanked by two bright shoebutton eyes Mossadeq's mannerisms were quirky to Western eyes and Acheson likened his quick nervous movements to a bird hopping on a perch ll U Mossadeq knew how to play the role of a frail old man when it suited his purposes He cried moaned and fainted when addressing the Majlis His nose ran He often conducted state business from his bed and delivered speeches in pink pajamas In naming him Man of the Year Time magazine dubbed Mossadeq an appalling caricature of a statesman 12 U Mossadeq's apparent physical frailty and almost constant illness masked an indomitable will The US Ambassador Henry F Grady warned that the Prime Minister is not to be discounted He's a man of unusual ability well educated at European universities and of great culture He is a Persian gentleman 13 S CIA did not nor underestimate Mossadeq but it also did not minimize the magnitude of the problems facing his new government In a Special Estimate prepared a month after Mossadeq became Prime Minister the Office of National Estimates characterized him as an impractical visionary and a poor administrator but added that ll U Dean Acheson Present At the Creation My Years in the State Departmelll New York W W Norton Company Inc 1969 p 503 12 U C M Woodhouse relates how Mossadeq's histrionics took in Majlis Deputy Hassan Alavi a medical doctor Musaddiq was making an impassioned speech all about the British milking his country like a wicked landlord milking a peasant's cow Alavi knew it was all nonsense but listened with tears of emotion in his eyes Suddenly Musaddiq collapsed on the floor of the Majlis apparently unconscious Alavi rushed forward pushing other Deputies aside and crying 'Let me through I'm a doctor ' He reached Musaddiq to take his pulse in an agony of dread lest the great national leader had been taken from them Then Musaddiq slowly opened one eye and winked at him Alavi laughed admiringly at the joke against himself C M Woodhouse Something Ventured London Granada 1982 pp 113-14 Vernon Walters relates a similar story with an unnamed Majlis deputy probably Alavi in Silent Missions Vernon Walters Silent Missions Garden City NY Doubleday Company lnc 1978 p 247 l3 U Henry F Grady The Real Story of Iran U S News and World Report 19 October 1951 p 14 Quoted in James A Bill The Eagle and the Lion The Tragedy ofAmerican Jranian Relations New Haven Yale University Press 1988 p 55 C M Woodhouse had a low opinion of Grady and considered the United States inadequately represented in Tehran during the oil crisis The American Grady was a business tycoon whom I had previously encountered in Greece Woodhouse wrote in his memoirs He was known at any mte to his wife as 'President Truman's trouble-shooter ' which meant that he was being rewarded for his contributions to the Democratic Party Fonunately he was soon replaced by an able career diplomat Loy Henderson and he went off to shoot trouble elsewhere C M Woodhouse Something Ventured London Gnmada 1982 p 109 109 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET he was in a very strong political position unlikely to deteriorate in the foreseeable future l4 U AfterTPAJAX Zahedi's forces found and arrested the former Prime Minister on 20 August 1953 His fate then lay in the Shah's hands The monarch discussed several options with Ambassador Henderson trial execution commutation of sentence internal exile or exile S Washington urged the Shah to avoid any action that might make Mossadeq a martyr A public trial was inadvisable for this reason CIA favored having him fade from sight by enforced residence in a small village under strong surveillance The State Depa ent oimos ed Juw hlik tti ru but mad_e no other recommenda ti on _ _ '15 -_ _ _ _ __ U Mossadcq's tna e ore a mt itary court egan on ovember 1953 and ended on 21 December The deposed Prime Minister appeared in court in u bedjacket and according to The New York Times alternately bellowed defiance threatened suicide challenged the public prosecutor to a wrestling match and resorted to histrionic weeping 17 On 11 January 1954 the court sentenced him to three years of solitary confinement starting from the date of his arrest 20 August 1953 18 He was convicted of disobeying the Shah ' sfinnans and illegally dissolving the Majlis S The Shah seemed satisfied with the sentence He told Ambassador Henderson that a longer sentence might have generated public sympathy for Mossadeq If the sentence had not included solitary confinement the Shah would not have been in a position to commute it to banishment which he intended to do and did do in 1956 Iranians generally consider simple imprisonment no worse than banishment and not worthy of commutation l9 14 S SE-6 Current Developments in Iran 22 May 1951 15 $ l jr 1 6618 2LAU JJSlJ 2S I I This description appears mVoss adeq' s obituary m he New- r or1f7Tmes 5 March 1967 18 S L P Elwell-Sutton writes that the court's decision carne on 21 December 1953 1 have used the January 1954 date because it appears in a State Department cable summarizing Mossadeq's trial and imprisonment See L P Elwell-Sutton Persian Oil A Study in Power Politics London Lawrence and Wishart Ltd 1955 p 7 U Dispatch 864 from American Embassy Tehran to Department of State ltmuo o With Qr M sadea -A Knotty Problem _ uhe Govern ent 11 April 1956 S 1 ------------------ 19 S Loy W Henderson Memorandum Summarizing Conversation Between the Shah oflran and Loy W Henderson American Ambassador on the Afternoon of December 22 1953 attachment to Dispatch 368 From American Embassy Tehnm to Department of State 28 110 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET S The Shah confided to the Ambassador that he had sent a statement to the trial judge before sentencing He told the judge that nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had served the interests of ran and that Mossadeq had had the monarch's support during his first year as Prime Minister Consequently he harbored no personal animus toward Mossadeq for what the latter had done during the rest of his tenure 20 S The monarch explained that he had sent the statement for two reasons First he wanted to make clear that he favored nationalizing the AIOC so that the nationalists did not think he had abandoned them He said he encouraged nationalism but wanted to direct it himself Second and more importantly he wanted to distance his regime from the British and dispel the impression that Iran was under London's thumb Because it appeared that the return of the British to Iran would coincide with Mossadeq's sentencing the Shah wanted to emphasize that he supported Mossadeq's attitude toward Britain during the first year of his prime ministership 2l S The Shah was pleased with the results of his intervention into Mossadeq's trial He thought that he had thrown the former Prime Minister off balance and had disarmed Mossadeq's supporters 22 U Mossadeq however was far from off balance From his confinement in the Second Armored Brigade's prison in Tehran 23 he immediately appealed to a higher military court The military appeals court affirmed the sentence on 21 April 1954 The former Prime Minister then appealed the military tribunal's decision to the Supreme Court Iran's highest civil court Under the Iranian Constitution such an appeal could occur only with the Shah's permission On 21 May the Shah agreed to let the Supreme Court review the case 24 U In January 1956 Mossadeq wrote to the Supreme Court asking for an early decision and the opportunity to be heard in person He sent another letter to the Court a month later outlining the reasons why the military court had no jurisdiction over him 25 U The Supreme Court issued its decision on 12 March 1956 Without addressing the merits of the case it ruled that the lower military court had jurisdiction to try Mossadeq The Court added that it reached its opinion under special circumstances On I April Mossadeq protested that the Supreme Court had not heard him before reaching its decision that the Court committed a crime of its own in not calling him to December 1953t I The routing slip shows that CIA re -c -e 7ive' d _sev _e_n_c_ o- pt es o Henacrson ---------- s report 20 S Ibid 21 S Ibid 22 S Ibid 23 S The American Embassy in Tehran reported that Mossadeq's confinement has been very comfortable According to Timur Bakhtiar the Military Governor of Tehran Mossadeq occupied a small cottage has his food sent in from his family if he doesn't like the best the prison has to offer and enjoys a large libr try a gramophone and a radio He can exercise in the open air whenever he wants to but he still seems allergic to exercise Ibid 24 S Ibid 25 S Ibid Ill TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET argue his own case and that the military court had no jurisdiction over him His protest an ------- S The documents do not indicate why the Shah changed his mind and decided to try Mossadeq His chronic indecision and the considerable pressure that the US had exerted against making Mossadcq a rallying point for the Shah's opponents are the most likely explanations That is not to say that the Shah's initial inclination to hold a public trial despite Washington's opposition was anathema to all the US officials involved As Roosevelt remarked in a debriefing after TPAJAX I would be more inclined to trust his the Shah's judgment and Zahedi's about it thun 1 would ours I mean they know the psychology of the situation and certainly from here Washington we can't tell it 29 U Mossadeq left the Second Armored Brigade's prison in Tehran on 4 August 1956 30 The Shah then banished the former Prime Minister to his village at Ahmadabad outside Tehran where he remained until his death from intestinal bleeding a chronic condition from which he had suffered for 42 years on 5 March 1967 31 26 cn Thiel U L P Elwell-Sutton Persian Oil A Study in Power Politics London Lawrence and Wishart Ud 1955 p 7 Faramarz S Fatcmi The U S S R in Iran The Background History of Russian and Anglo-American Conflict in Iran Its Effects on Iranian Ntllionali m and the Fall of the Shah New York A S Barnes and Company 1980 p 55 New York Times 5 March 1967 112 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Appendix E S CIA and TPAJAX The Tension Between Analysis and Operations S TPAJAX illustrates the philosophical tension inherent in planning covert operations Preparation must balance the need for fully informed decisionmaking with the need for strict operational security The former requires that those with knowledge relevant to the operation be intimately involved from the start while the latter requires that the number of people involved be kept to a minimum S An ideal operation is not at either extreme and acknowledges the inevitability of tradeoffs Covert actions might have to be planned on less- than-perfect knowledge to ensure that they remain covert and there may have to be compromises on absolute security in order to take advantage of relevant available expertise How to balance these conflicting requirements has been a recurring issue throughout the history of CIA's covert operations TPAJAX offers the intelligence historian some clues on how this tension might be resolved in some cases S TPA1AX was planned and executed with far greater concern for operational security than for u in a lhalthe planners had all relevant information There is no evidence that th Jn Kennit Roosevelt's NEA Division consulled either the Office of National Estimates ONE or the analysts in CIA's Office of Current Intelligence OCI at any stage of the operation ONE and OCI might not have provided much help because they had chronic difficulty getting intelligence reporting from DDPa problem that itself reflects poor communication between the analysts and collectors S The Office of National Estimates and TPAJAX U The Board of National Estimates BNE in ONE was responsible for producing tong-range appraisals of world events These appraisals known as National Intelligence Estimates represented the intelligence community's best thinking on a particular topic ONE did not concern itself with day-to-day events concentrating instead on trends and probable future courses of action of other nations Primarily because the Soviet Union was the focus of its attention ONE wrote few national intelligence 113 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET estimates on Iran These priorities changed when Mossadeq's Iran became a critical issue in US foreign policy S ONE did not always have the cooperation of the clandestine services when drafting an estimate In 1951 the year before DCI Walter Bedell Smith merged the Office of Policy Coordination and the Office of Special Operations into the new Directorate of Plans Dr William Langer head of BNE asked CIA' sl o seck OSO's views for an upcoming national intelligence estimate on Iran OSO management resisted request telling him 1 that OSO had too many similar requests from ONE 2 that OSO personnel were not paid to 'estimate ' but to produce facts and 3 that OSO personnel could barely keep up with their assigned duties much less help ONE do its job I OSO clearly was not interested in dialogue with analytical components for the puTP-ose of producing a superior analytical product - - - - - - - - - - - - I I 114 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 0 2 6 7 3 8 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOPSECRET 113 TOPSECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET S The Office of Current Intelligence and TPAJAX U The tension between ONE and the clandestine services was unfortunate but not potentially crippling to American policymakers during fast-breaking events ONE concentrated on larger perspectives that were not sensitive to daily crises The Office of Current Intelligence OCI on the other hand analyzed events as they happened OCI analysts could help shape policymakers' views and decisions during crises What they wrote could have an immediate impact S In the summer of 1953 OCI was responsible for keeping the Presiden t ---- infonned about daily events that mi g lt affect US foreign l o li c J y J I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____J S _j 3 OC initially conductea its analysis of the unfolailJ events in IlUn m nornnce of the developing American_role _ _ l- - -- -- ----- -- --- ---- ---- --- -- ----- -- -- te that Mossadeq had been faced with many plots in the past but had always defeated them and that there was no reason to believe that he would not do so again r U The day before DDP executed the operation someone finally called oes not remember who said that there was an imminent covert action and on ' t I s sl -- e of the house your analysts are saying there's no chance that it'll work At this poin nalysts finally received a briefing 9 U From an analytical point o __Jsays this changed the situation completely This was a major piece of infonnation that we didn't have and that if we had known it ahead of time we would have phrased things differently or maybe simply kept our mouth shut about it until it went off ''IO U The problemO dentified was unfortunately old and persistent R Jack Smith later a Deputy Director for Intelligence was the head of the current intelligence staff of the Office of Reports and Estimates in the old Central Intelligence Group In his - 8 S Interview wi u ------'j25 September 1995 tmnscript p 16 9 S Ibid p 17 10 S Ibid 116 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET book The Unknown CIA My Three Decades With the Agency Smith writes that clandestine reporting was absent from the current inteJligence publications his office produced He Iuter discovered the reason Rather than going to analysts the best clandestine reports were being hand-carried by top clandestine services people over to senior people in the White House the State Department and the Pentagon In contrast Smith's office saw mostly inconsequential scraps of infonnation about foreign personalities especiaUy the officer of local communist cells Analysts routinely were denied access to critical infonnation from clandestine sources but Smith not knowing differently thought that what he had was the best American espionage could offer 1t was not I I S AfterTPAJAXj ed to develop closer personal ties with the DDP on his own He did not expect DD to tell him what was going on all the time but he wanted to develop a relationship so that they would trust me enough that they might tell me things that otherwise wouldn't get on paper and so on And by the same token to demonstrate to them that we could help them 12 U gradually built a rapport with DDP officers that he says paid off for both sides Non s he thinks that more cooperation could have improved the intelligence product immensely When he went to the DDP in 1957 and started clawing through the files one thing that struck me was how much useful intelligence infonnation was in the operational files but had never made it out into intelligence reports because the reports officer o whr hadjust not spotted it as intelligence report materiaJ I3 s philosophical about the limited contact that he and the other analysts in his branc a with the people on the Iranian desk in the Directorate of Plans There was he says indeed a very deep gulf institutionally and policy wise and surmises that the reason lay in differences between overt and covert employees He and his fellow analysts were overt many DDP employees were covert From the DDP's perspective overt empl yees w re not sufficiently sensitive to security issues There was a measure of distrust ' c J elieves on the DDP side against these overt analysts who probably had loose tongues and if we in DDP talk too much they'll OCI analysts go blabbing around town 14 U John Walle Jnakes the same assessment of the relationship between the analysts and operators In a July 1995 interview Waller suggested two additional reasons for the unofficial separation between the two directorates First most Iranian specialists in the DDP were OSS veterans who had spent substantial amounts of time in the Middle East They had acquired their I 1 U Smith's best source of information was sensitive State Department cables While valuable CIG's and CIA's analytical over-reliance on these cables meant that the daily intelligence summary was essentially a digest of top State telegrams Intelligence reports from military and naval attaches were in Smith's words markedly inferior R Jack Smith The Unknown CIA My Three Decades With the Agency Washington Pergamon-Brassey's Inc 1989 pp 41-42 12 S Interview wi p 19 13 S Ibid p 20 14 S Ibid pp 9-10 117 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET knowledge from practical experience and thought that knowledge acquired this way was superior to the academic knowledge many Directorate of Intelligence DI analysts prized Second the DDP officers' relationships with the DI analysts were informal There was a lot of time Waller said before you sort of had a wiring diagram that put us DDP together with the DI It was all based on if you need their help go get it but you'd better know who you were talking to There's no point in talking to a man who's only read the books you've read l5 U Bureaucratic differences probably played an important part in reinforcing the separation between the DDP and the Dl DDP officers may have thought that if the DI were included in covert action planning analysts would begin to challenge DDP's preeminence in covert operations Similarly DI analysts may have feared that DDP operators would question their analytical preeminence and that close association with a covert action would raise questions about their intellectual objectivity Philosophical organizational and physical separation ensured that these kinds of issues seldom touched off bureaucratic warfare S At least in the case ofTPAJAX the relationship between the DDP and the DI contrasted sharply with the relationship between DDP and the State Department After the operation John Stutesman of State sent a letter to Roy Melbourne First Secretary of the Embassy in Tehran telling him of the close personal relationship he had developed with CIA's John Waller and Roger Goiran John Waller and Roger Goinm are men Stutesman wrote upon whose judgment we can all rely without qualification and Arthur Richards Director of the Office of Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs Department of State and I have been happy to observe that they go out of their way to maintain friendly and close relations with us asking our advice often upon subjects which their organization might not normally discuss with working levels in the Department l6 U Allen Dulles's Personal Directorate of Intelligence S The highest levels of management in CIA did nothing to discourage the estrangement of the Directorate of Plans from the Directorate of Intelligence and in fact reinforced it Allen Dulles ignored the Agency's analytical arm during TPAJAX preferring to use personal acquaintances as sources of information l7 He had numerous contacts cross the world and throughout American society from his pre-war days as an attorney and his wartime service in the OSS lS S John H Waller interview with the author 7 July 1995 p 42 16 S Letter from John H Stutesman to Roy Melbourne First Secretary US Embassy Tehran 6 November 1953 Records of the Department of State RG 59 Lot 57 D 529 NND959286 Iran 1946-54 box 4 National Archives and Records Administration 17 U Peter Grose's biography of Dulles captures this characteristic well Institutional ties never inhibited Allen from nurturing his own private networks of diverse colleagues and friends many dating back decades upon whom he would call in his regular trips to Europe for civilized exchanges among men and increasingly women of the world Peter Grose Gentleman Spy The Life of Allen Dulles Boston Houghton Mifflin 1994 p 319 118 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U Personal relationships were important to Dulles and he tended to trust the infonnation he got from people he knew On Iran much of this infonnation came from Brig Gen H Noonan Schwarzkopf and Max Thornburg an oil company executive There is no evidence that Dulles ever passed on infonnation from these sources to analysts in ONE or 0Cl l8 U Schwarzkopf had spent considerable time in Iran had trained the Iranian Gendannerie during World War ll and knew the Shah well His knowledge extended beyond Tehran because the Gendannerie operated in provinces across the country Through his work with this police force Schwarzkopf became a storehouse of knowledge about Iran and was happy to share it with Dulles l9 S Max Thornburg ran Overseas Consultants Inc a firm that advised Middle Eastern governments on oil and economic questions In 1950 he was in Iran as a fie ais about the count 's seven ear consultant to t ent adYi sinJtlrnnia mit nhmi S Thorn urg game unusua access tot en- eputy uector ans en u es and key State Department officials He maintained a steady correspondence with both CIA and State about events in the Middle East He was not shy about telling Allen what he thought should be done and consistently urged that the US had to change the psychological climate in the Middle East He also argued that the Shah was not weak but only young beaten-down and understandably skeptical about any real support coming from the United States or Britain 21 Thornburg sat in on several sessions with Dulles and drafted some papers for CIA U The Consequences of Analytical Exclusion 18 U Schwarzkopf father of the American general heading coalition forces in the Gulf war formed the New Jersey State Police in 1921 He was head of the State Police at the time it investigated the Lindbergh kidnapping in the early 1930s 19 S John H Waller interview with the author 7 July 1995 pp 41-42 2- - ---------- - r U For ackgroun on homburg s activities in Iran n mmaqami The Catalyst of Nationalization Max from 1947 to 1951 see Linda Wilfs Thornburg and the Failure of Private Sector Developmentalism in Iran 1947-1951 19 Diplomatic History Winter 1995 1-31 21 S Letter Max W Thornburg to Allen Dulles 10 February 1953 Office of the Director of Central Intelligence Records Job 80-R01731R Box 13 Folder 563 ARC 119 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET S The consequences of the analysts' exclusion from TPAJAX can be examined from two perspectives its effect on analysis itself product and process and its effect on the preparation and execution of the operation U Exclusion damaged the analytical product because it prevented analysts from basing their judgments on complete information Exclusion harmed the analytical process because it impeded the creation of a valid framework for assessing future developments S Had they been apprised of the US role in deposing Mossadcq analysts probably would have been more circumspect in concluding that because he had turned back coup attempts in the past he was likely to prevail again Knowledge that this time the United States was supporting the Prime Minister's opponents with extraordinary measures might have changed or tempered this judgment Inclusion in TPAJAX planning might have made analysts more inclined to recognize the operation's potential for success S It is less certain that the segregation of analysis from operational planning affected the conception and execution ofTPAJAX The analysis tha nd his colleagues wrote was essentially incompatible with the planned covert political action bu f onclusions did not dissuade the President the Secretary of State and the OCI from executing TPAJAX Under these circumstances one can make a strong argument convincingly that analytical exclusion had negligible consequences for TPAJAX S It is possible nevertheless that fully informed analysis might have enhanced the operation The Dl's more scholarly and detached perspective and its methodology for assessing a dynamic situation perhaps could have helped NEA clarify the assumptions upon which TPAJAX was based and how changes in those assumptions might affect the operation U The operation's initial failure provides the most conspicuous evidence that the absence of analytical expertise may have been detrimental Mossadeq arrested Col Nassiri and the military challenge melted away Headquarters wanted to call off the operation Had the planning taken into account the possibility-even the likelihood-that segments of the Iranian military would react this way DDP could have had contingency plans in effect instead of relying on Roosevelt's improvisation S Advances in collection technology have given today's analyst access to an almost bewildering array of sources inconceivable to his colleague of 44 years ago Signals intelligence imagery and information from exotic collection platforms are available to analysts but generally are unavailable to those planning covert action programs The exponential growth of information derived from these sources has made the consequences of ignoring analysis more serious today than was the case in 1953 120 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET U Bibliography Deportment of Defense Records Record Group 319 Records of the Army Staff Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 Intelligence Entry 57 box 27 National Archives and Records Administration Deportment of State Records Record Group 59 Records of the Department of State Records of the Office in Charge of Iranian Affairs 1946-1954 Lot 57 D 529 Box 40 National Archi vcs and Records Administration Record Group 59 Records of the Department of State Iran 1946-54 Lot 57 D 529 NND959286 Box 4 National Archives and Records Administration Notional Security Agency Records CBEB 18 H11-0182 ''Specialized Product 1953-Iran National Security Agency Archives CBED 37 Translations National Security Agency Archives CBEC 38 Translations National Security Agency Archives CBEC 44 Translations National Security Agency Archives CBEC 45 Translations National Security Agency Archives CBEC 46 Translations National Security Agency Archives CBEC 48 Translations National Security Agency Archives CBEC 51 Translations National Security Agency Archives 121 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267B13 TOP SECRET CBEC 52 Translations National Security Agency Archives CBEC 53 ''Translations National Security Agency Archives CBEC 54 ''Translations National Security Agency Archives Central Intelligence Agency Records Directorate Records CIA History Staff Records Job 83-00764R CIA Archives and Records Center CIA History Staff Records Job 840B00443R CIA Archives and Records Center Director of Central Intelligence Executive Registry Records Job 80BOI676R CIA Archives and Records Center Director of Central Intelligence Executive Registry Records Job 80-0165A CIA Archives and Records Center Director of Central Intelligence Executive Registry Records Job 80-RO 1731 R CIA Archives and Records Center Directorate of Intelligence Records L------------------1 122 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267B13 ------------- 1 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOPSECREf l ____________________________________________________________j Agency Histories --------------------------------------- National InteUigence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates S NIE-6 ran's Position in the East-West Conflict 5 April 1951 Records of the Office of National Estimates Directorate of Intelligence I I -------------- S NIE-14 The Importance ofIranian and Middle East Oil to Western Europe Under Peacetime Conditions 8 1anuary 1951 Records of the Office of National Estimates Directorate of Intelligence -------------------------- S NIE-46 Probable Developments in Iran in 1952 in the Absence of an Oil Selllement 4 February 1952 Records of the Office of National Estimates Directorate of I Intelligence U NIE-75 Probable Developments in Iran Through 1953 13 November 1952r ----- Records of the Office of National Estimates Directorate of Intelligence U SE-3 The Current Crisis in Iran 16 March 1951 Records of the Office of National Estimates Directorate of Intelligence S SE-6 Current Developments in Iran 22 May 1951 Records of the Office of National Estimates Directorate of Intelligence I I ------------------ S SE-33 Prospects for Survival of Mossadeq Regime in Iran 14 October 1952 Records of the Office of National Estimates Directorate of Intelligence ------- S SE-49 The Current Outlook in Iran 26 August 1953 Records of the Office of National Estimates Directorate of Intelligence I I ------- 123 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Interviews S Goiran Roger Interview by Scott A Koch 29 June 1995 Washington DC transcript of tape recording CIA History Staff Sj I Interview by Scott A Koch 1 December 1995 Washington DC transcript of tape recording CIA History Staff S Interview by Scott A Koch 25 September 1995 Winchester Virginia transcript of tape recording CIA History Staff S Waller John H Interview by Scott A Koch 7 July 1995 Washington DC transcript of tape recording CIA History Staff Books and Articles Abrahamian Ervand Iran Between Two Revolutions Princeton Princeton University Press 1982 Acheson Dean G Present at tlte Creation My Years in the State Department New York W W Norton Company Inc 1969 Ambrose Stephen E Eisenhower Vol 2 The Presidem New York Simon and Schuster 1984 _ _ _ Eisenhower Soldier and President New York Simon and Schuster 1990 Amirsadeghi Hossein ed Twentieth Century Iran New York Holmes Meier Publishers 1977 Avery Peter Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville eds Tile Cambridge History of Iran Vol 7 From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic New York Cambridge University Press 1991 Beck Lois Iran and the Qashqai Tribal Confederacy In Tile Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan ed Richard Tapper 284-313 New York St Martin's Press 1983 _ _ _ The Qashqa'i of ran New Haven Yale University Press 1986 Beeman William 0 Patterns of Religion and Economic Development in Iran from the Qajar Era to the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 In Global Economics and Religion ed James Finn 73-103 New Brunswick NJ Transaction Books 1983 124 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Bill James A The Eagle and the Lion The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations New Haven Yale University Press 1988 Brands H W Inside the Cold War Loy Henderson and the Rise ofthe American Empire 9 8-I96I New York Oxford University Press 1991 Cline RayS The CIA Under Reagan Bush Casey Washington D C Acropolis Books Ltd 1981 Copeland Miles The Game Player Confessions of the CIA's original political operative London Aurum Press 1989 Cottam Richard W Iran and tire United States A Cold War Case Study Pittsburgh University of Pittsburgh Press 1988 Diba Farhad Mohammed Mossadegh A Political Biography London Croom Helm 1986 Eden Sir Anthony Full Circle London Cassell 1960 Eisenhower Dwight D Tile White House Years Vol 1 Mandate for Change 19531956 Garden City NY Doubleday Company Inc 1963 Elm Mostafa Oil Power and Principle Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath Syracuse N Y Syracuse University Press 1992 Elwell-Sutton LP Persian Oil A Study in Power Politics London Lawrence and Wishart Ltd 1955 Eveland Wilbur Crane Ropes ofSand America's Failure in tire Middle East New York W W Norton Company 1980 Farmanfarmaian Manucher and Roxane Farmanfarmaian Blood and Oil Memoirs of a Persian Prince New York Random House 1997 Fatemi Faramarz S The U S S R in Iran The Background 1 istory of Russian and Anglo-American Conflict in Iran Its Effects on Iranian Nationalism and the Fall of the Shah New York A S Barnes and Company 1980 Garthwaite Gene R Khans and shah A documentary analy r is of the Bakhtiyari in Iran Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1983 Gasiorowski Mark J The 1953 Coup d'etat in Iran International Journal ofMiddle East Studies 19 August 1987 261-86 _ _ _ U S Foreign Policy and the Shah Buildi11g a Client State in Iran Ithaca NY Cornell University Press 1991 125 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 TOP SECRET Ghods M Reza Iran in the Twentieth Century A Political History Boulder CO Lynne Rienner Publishers 1989 Grose Peter Gentleman Spy The Life of Allen Dulles Boston Houghton Mifflin Company 1994 Heikal Mohamed The Return of the Ayatollah The Iranian Revolution from Mossadeq to Klromeni London Andre Deutsch 1981 Hunter Shireen T Iran and the World Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade Bloomington IN Indiana University Press 1990 Kammva Mehran The Political History of Modem Iran From Tribalism to Theocracy Westport CT Prneger 1992 Kaplan Robert D 17re Arabists Tire Romance of An American Elite New York The Free Press 1993 Not about Iran but useful infonnation on how the State Department specialists view the region Katouzian Homa Musaddiq and the Stmggle for Power in Iran New York I B Tauris Co Ltd 1990 Mackey Sandra The Iranians Persia Islam and the Soul of a Nation New York Dutton 1996 Oberling Pierre The Qa hqa'i Nomads of Fars The Hague Mouton 1974 Pahlavi Ashraf Princess Faces in a Mirror Memoirs From Exile Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice-Hall Inc 1980 Pahlavi Mohammed Reza Shah of Iran Mission for my Country London Hutchinson Co 1961 Ramazani Ruhollah K Iran Islam and the United States In Global Economics and Religion ed James Finn 105-117 New Brunswick NJ Transaction Books 1983 Roosevelt Kennit Countercoup The Stmggle for tile Control of Iran New York McGraw-Hill 1979 Rubin Barry Paved with Good Intentions The American Experience and Iran New York Oxford University Press 1980 Ruehsen Moyara de Moraes Operation 'AJAX' Revisited Iran 1953 Middle Eastem Studies 29 July 1993 467-86 Samii Kuross A Involvement by Invitation American Strategies of Containment in Iran University Park PA Pennsylvania State University Press 1987 126 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 C01267813 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Schulze-Holthus Berthold Daybreak in Iran A Story of the German Intelligence Service Trans Mervyn Savill London Staples Press Ltd 1954 Sharan Pannatma Government and Politics ofIran New Dehli Metropolitan Book Co 1983 Shirley Edward Know Thine Enemy A Spy's Journey into Revolutionary Iran New York Farrar Straus and Giroux 1997 Siavoshi Sussan Liberal Nationali vm in Iran The Failure ofa Movement Boulder Westview Press 1990 Waller John H Iran Where the Cold War Began Unpublished manuscript no date Wilber Donald N Iran Past and Present 7th ed Princeton N J Princeton University Press 1975 _ _ _ Adventures in the Middle East Excursions and Incursions Princeton N J Darwin Press 1986 Woodhouse Christopher Montague Something Vemured London Granada 1982 Yergin Daniel The Prize The Epic Quest for Oil Money and Power New York Simon Schuster 1991 Zabih Sepehr Tlte Mossadegh Era Roots oftlze Iranian Revolution Chicago Lake View Press 1982 Ziring Lawrence Iran Turkey and Afghanistan A Political Chronology New York Praeger 1981 Zonis Marvin Majestic Failure Tire Fall of the Shah Chicago University of Chicago Press 1991 127 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 128 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 129 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 130 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 131 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 132 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 C01267813 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __                     National Security Archive    Suite 701 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