50 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017111117 co1za7a13 TOP SECRET U THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE FALL OF IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER MOHAMMED MOSSADEQ AUGUST 1953 Scott A Koch History Staff Central Intelligence Agency Washington DC June 1998 CL BY 2176075 CL REASON DECLAS ON XI X5 DRV FROM LIA 3-82 MET 31-87 TOQP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 001267813 um I C01269967 It mmv 11 3 1 de Mats M 40 Wand Sewn 17 MW 2000 U THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE FALL OF IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER MOHAMMED MOSSADEQ AUGUST 1953 Scott A Koch History Staff Central Intelligence Agency Washington DC June 1998 CLBY 2176075 CLmson DECLAS 0N DRV FROM 3 82 MET 31417 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 1111 601267813 C012 69 967 TOP SECRET I Table of Contents Table of Cantentx Source and Classi cation Note iv Chapter 1 The Roots of TPAJAX 1 Iran and the United States to 951 Twisting the British Lion's Tail Mohammed Mossudeq Nationalizes the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 3 Britain Responds to The Antics of lncomprehensible Orientals 4 Mossadoq Challenges the Shah 6 Mossadeq Looks for American Support 9 Foggy Bottom s Differences with Whitehall 13 Amen'can Policy Turns Against Mossadeq 1 l5 Mossadeq s Successor Ayatollah Knshani or Fazlollah Zahedi 18 Eisenhower Turns to CIA l9 Chapter 2 Planning the Operation 22 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1111 001267813 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 TOP SECRET The First Phase Convincing the Shah Final Approval 39 Chapter 3 Execution and Initial Failure 41 Securing the Firmans 45 American Diplomatic Moves 49 Washington Reacts 53 Chapter 4 Victory 55 Sunday 16 August Roosevelt and the Station Regroup 55 Wednesday Afternoon 19 August Zendebad Shah 65 Chapter 5 Aftermath 71 Zahedi Consolidates His Government 7 The Tudeh Party 76 ii TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 001267813 3D Approved for Release 2017f11 17 001267813 TOP SECRET Chapter 6 Evaluating TPAJAX 82 TPAJ AX and the National Interest the Contemporuneous View 82 TPAJAX and the National Interest The Retrospective View 84 Did CIA Restore the Shah to his Throne 86 Did CIA Act Against a Legitimate Leader Enjoying Popular 86 Has Role Been Exaggerated 86 Was TPAJ AX Responsible for Khomeini s Islamic Revolution 88 TPAJAX and the Future of American Covert Action 89 The Shadow of the Pahlavis 91 Appendix A TPAJAX Chronology 94 Appendix B 102 Appendix C 105 Appendix D Biographical Sketch of Mohammed Mossadeq 107 Appendix E CIA and TPAJAX The Tension Between Analysis and Operations 1 13 The Office of Nationai Estimates and TPAJAX The Of ce of Current Intelligence and TPAJAX Allen Dulles's Persona Directorate of Intelligence The Consequences of Analytical Exclusion Bibliography TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 113 116 118 119 121 0 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 CO1267813 TOP SECRET U Source and Classi cation Note S This study is based largely on classi ed records of the Central Intelligence Agency Secondary sources proved invaluable in setting the historical context for TPAJAX but the details of the operation itself come from classified sources These sources are listed in the footnotes and bibliography U I have also examined relevant records from the Department of State the Department of Defense and the National Security Agency These records were not as plentiful or as helpful as I had hoped was nonetheless able to ll in some gaps with documents from these organizations The vast majority of surviving documents on the operation itself remain with CIA but for the reasons provided below even these are not as numerousasonemiehtexnect Most of the operationali es on VTPAJAX held in the Near East vision in the Directorate of Operations were destroyed during a routine of ce cleaning in I962 According to various sources the Division needed more file space and management told branch members to clean out their les Much operational material was destroyed under the arm 0ch the documentary record was of no I WVitnesses have continued this unfonunate event U Copies of cables sent between Tehran Station and Washington during the operation also were among the les the Division destroyed in its attempt to gain more ling space At the time the copies were already nine years old and no one thought that they were important A record copy may have remained in the Agency's former Cable Secretariat for some time but such records too have long since disappeared in routine house cleanings An extensive search of archives has failed to uncover any surviving copies U Some transcripts of Station cables nonetheless survive because CIA had some of the cables micro lmed I have been unable to determine when In the late l970s or iv TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1 1I17 601267813 C01269967 U Source and Classi cation Note 3 U I have also examined relevant records from the Department of State the Department uchl'cnsc and the National Security Agency These records were not as plentiful or as helpful as Iliad hoped was nonetheless able infill in some gaps with documents from these The vast majority of surviving documents on the operation with CIA but for the reasons provided helow even these are not as numerous as one mipht mt 5 U Copies nl'cnhles semi jduring the operation also were among the fi es the Division destroyed in its attempt to gain more ling space At the time the copies were already nine years old and no one thought that they were impatient A record copy may have remained in the Agency s former Cable Secretariat for some time but such records too have long since disappeared in routine house cleanings An extensive search of ClA's archives- Inn railed to uncover anv surviving copie- Approved for Release 2017111117 001267813 9 9 6 TOP SECRET early 19805 History Staff prepared transcripts of these documents and sent them to the Department of State's Of ce of the Historian then researching a volume of the Foreign Relations of the United States series There is every reason to believe that these early19803 CLA's History 5133me mail of mm documents and sent me to transcripts produced under the supervision of a professional historian are authentic The the Department of State s Of ce of the Historian then researching a volume of the matters in the transcripts correspond in sequence and subject with events as we know Foreign Relations afthe United States series There is every moon to believe that these them transcripts produced under the supervision of a professional historian areauthentic The U The micro lm itself apparently has been destroyed in accordance with matters in the transcripts correspond in sequence and subject with events as we know National Archives and Records Administration NARA guidelines According to them NARA the micro lm had to be kept for 20 years and then could be destroyed The U The micro lm itself apparently has been destroyed in accordance with record of destruction had to be kept for ve years at which point it too could be National Archives and Records Administration NARA guidelines According to destroyed NARA the micro lm had to be kept for 20 years and then could be destroyed The S CIA is not the only organization that has destroyed records relevant to 0f had to be YUM It WhiCh 130th it mo could he TPAJ AX The State Department has destroyed three quarters of the records for the deem-e relevant time period belonging to the Of ce of Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs GT1 of State s Bureau of Near Eastern South Asian and African Affairs These materials were in GT1 les but 57 529 According to State's Foreign Relations of the United States J952-1954 Vol X Iran 1951-54 the documents covered political and military and military assistance to Iran for me years 1946- 9 4 S The present study fIt examines some of the issues currently occupying scholars Why did the United States act against Mossadeglg Would Mossadetfs govemmenThaveTtTIIen even Wth e United States nothing have also exploited records of government agencies other than iFinallyJ have addressed the relationship between the operators in then Directorate of Plans now the Directorate of Operations and the in the Directorate of Intelligence 1 missing dimension in all published histories U Some readers may think that this study is over-classi ed but many of the 3 crucial documents are still top secret after almost 50 years Since this handful of U some Adm may think that this study is over-classi ed but many of the documents contains information critical to the story I have decided to use the material crucial me 55 top 550 it 3111105150 WEN Sill lhi handful 01' they contain even if it means restricting the potential readership men s wn' m ' fummhun t0 91017 ht c decided to use the material they contain even if it means restricting the potential readership Scott A Koch 1 June 1998 3m 1 June 1998 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 301267813 8 2 6 7 3 Approved for Release 2017 11117 001267813 TOP SECRET C0pyright Notice This publication contains copyrighted photographs that may not be reproduced or used further without explicit written permission from the copyright holder TOP SECRET Approved tor Release 2017 11 17 001267813 C012 69967 Copyright Notice This publication coutains copyrighted photographs that may nut he reproduced or used further without explicit written pcnnission the copyright holder C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11l17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Chapter 1 S The Roots of TPAJAX U Iran and the United States to 1951 U During the height of the Cold War in the l9505 Washington considered the Middle East in general and Iran in particular to be among the great strategic prizes in the geopolitical and ideological struggle against the Soviet Union It was not always so For almost 175 years American policymakers ignored Iran because they had no reason to do otherwise U That changed during World War and the immediate postwar years During the war Iran was an important route for American aid to the Soviet Army engaged in a life or death struggle with Hitler s Wehrmacl'rt l Soviet troops remained in nonhem Iran immediately after the war encouraging pro-Communist separatist regimes in Iranian Azerbaijan and in the Kurdish region For a time it appeared to Washington that Moscow would demand the uni cation of Iranian Azerbaijan with Soviet Azerbaijan but this problem evaporated once Stalin understood that the United States would not permit such an aggressive move 2 U The United States would have preferred to withdraw from the Persian Gulf after the end of World War II but the postwar British retreat and retrenchment East of Suez created a vacuum that the US felt obligated to ll After London announced that it could no longer supply military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey President Han'y Truman publicly declared in March 1947 that the United States would support free peoples everywhere resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside l U Eventually almost a quarter of American aid for the Soviet Union came through lran Convoys using more northern routes about 20% of their cargoes to the Nazis only 8% of cargoes sent to the Persian Gulf for shipment through Iran were lost See Gerhard L Weinberg A World At Arms A Global History of World War Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1994 pp 284 404 See Daniel Yergin Shattered Peace The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State Boston Houghton Mifflin Company 1977 Adam B Ulam Expansion and Coexistence Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73 2d ed New York Holt Rinehart and Winston 1974 and John Lewis Gaddis The United States and the Origins of the Cold War I 94 I947 New York Columbia University Press 1972 for a discussion of the Azeri crisis in early 1946 TOP SECRET Approved for Rolease 2017 1 1 117 001267813 C01269967 Chapter 1 U Iran and the United State to 1951 U During the height of the Cold War in the 19505 Washington considered the Middle East in general and Iran in particular to be among the great strategic prizes in the geopolitical and ideological struggle against the Soviet Union it was not always so For almost 175 years American policymakers ignored Iran because they had no reason to do otherwise U That changed during World War Ii and the immediate postwar years During the war Ian was an important route for American aid to the SovietArmy engaged in a life-or-death struggle with Hitler s Wehmrachr Soviet hoops remained in northern Iran immediately after the war encouraging pro Communist separatist regimes in Iranian Azerbaijan and in the Kurdish region For a time it appeared to Washington that Moscow would demand the uni cation of lmnian Azerbaijan with SovietAzerbaijan but this problem evaporated once Stalin understood that the United States would not permit luclr an aggressive rnovel U The United States would have preferred to withdraw from the Persian Gulf a er the end of World War lLbut the postwar British retreat and retrenchment East of Suez created a vacuum that the US felt obligated to ll After tendon announced that it could no longer supply military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey President Harry Truman publicly declared in March 1947 that the United States would support free peoples everywhere resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside l U Evenmally almost a quarteranmuiem aid for the Soviet Union carne through nan Convoys using more run-them routes lost about 20% of their cargoes to the Nazis only 8%01 cargoes senttn the Persian Gulf for shipment ma wuc lost Sec Gerhard Weinberg A World thrust A Glam History World War Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1994 pp 284 404 2w Sea Daniel Yergin Shattered Peucc The Origins dike Cold Warand the National 5 me Boston Houghtun Mif iaC ompany 1977 Adam B Ularn Expm'arr and CowsuneuSovlct Foreign Policy 1917-73 2d ed New York Holt Rinchart and Winston Inc 1974 and John Lewis Caddis Dar UnitedStales and tire Origins d the Cold War 194 - 1947 New York Columbia University Press 1972 for a discussion ofthe Azeri crisis in early 1946 All C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 1111 601267813 TOP SECRET pressures 3 For Iran the Truman Doctrine as this pledge came to be known meant that the United States was replacing Britain as the main geopolitical counterweight to the Russians U For the rst three years after President Truman's declaration the United States paid relatively little attention to Iran even though that oil-rich country was experiencing serious economic problems widespread discontent with the government and growing agitation by the Tudeh Iran s Communist Party S In April I950 the Director of Central Intelligence RAdm Roscoe H Hillenkoetter drew Secretary of State Dean Acheson's attention to the urgent need for additional intelligence coverage of Iran Hillenkoettcr wrote that CIA was unable to draft reliable national intelligence estimates on the country because it simply did not have enough information All the Agency could do according to the DCI was tell US policy makers that some sort of crisis does exist but cannot con dently answer such speci c pertinent questions as 1 how serious the situation actually is 2 how adequate are Iran's own resources for meeting its present dif culties and 3 how capable the Iranian Government is of using these resources 4 S Hillenkoetter proposed two solutions Either existing facilities could be expanded to seek information from more diverse sources or coverage might be expanded through the establishment of a consulate in the strategically important southwestern part of Iran 5 S The records do not contain Acheson's reaction to Hillenkoetter's letter but the still-classi ed copy in the National Archives has three handwritten notes attached to it The first is from Fisher Howe Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary of State forwarding the letter to John D Jemegan Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern South Asian and African Affairs The second is from Jemegan to C Vaughan Ferguson Of cer in Charge of Iranian Affairs Of ce of Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs The nal is from Ferguson to Jernegan 6 S Howe thought Hillenkoetter s letter was largely for the record to show that CIA is ful lling its overall responsibility for calling attention to weaknesses in intelligence coverage Jemegan miners taleshoulrLadth ClA s lThe State Department clearly did not view the pa ucity of intelligence on Iran with are same urgency as CIA U Even without the most basic intelligence on Iran two elements drove American foreign policy in the post-war Persian Gulf region oil and the fear that political instability might jeopardize Western access to oil Ever since Shah Muzaffar al-Din Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Harry S Truman Washington DC l947 p 179 4 S Letter from Director of Central Intelligence RAdm Roscoe Hillenkoetter to Secretary of State Dean Acheson 1 April 1950 Records of the State Department RG 59 Lot 57 529 NND959286 Iran l946 54 box 4 National Archives and Records Administration 5 S Ibid 6 S lbid 7 S lbid 2 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 1 7 001267813 C01269967 pressures 3 For lran the Doctrine as this pledge name in he known meant thatthe Hahn States on replacing Britain a the main geopoliticalcounterwcightto the Russians II For the rst three years the ruins Statespaid relatively little attention to Iran even though that oil-rich country was economic problems widespread discontentwitll the government and growinguirarinn hv rim Irish Iran's Communist Partv 'a Even without the most basic intelligence on imam elements my American foreign policy in the post-war Persian Gulf region oil and the fear that political instability mightjeopardizem access to nil Ever since I Muraffar 51m Public Pupasrf the Pmr'derrLr dErhe llnitzd 'l'umc Harry S 'n'urmn Washington DC M'n a I'm 1 2 '7 6 8 3 Approved for Release 2017111117 001267813 TOP SECRET granted William Knox D'Arcy an oil concession covering three-fourths of Persia as Iran was known until 1935 Iranian oil had helped fuel the British economy in peace and war 8 The United States Was then producing enough oil for its needs but it knew that Western Europe depended on oil exports from the Middle East In January I95 I nine months after Hillenkoetter s letter to Acheson the Central Intelligence Agency s Of ce of National Estimates ONE wrote that the British economy would suffer if it lost Iranian oil The loss of all Middle Eastern oil ONE said would have profound and far-reaching consequences for the economies of the Western bloc 9 U Political instability in the _contiouinlsutmlv 0f 7 - Before the Cold War tE domes politics of whatliter cam efom d the Third had made no impact on American foreign policy decisionmaking During the Cold War Washington could not afford the luxury of indifference because doing so would spur Soviet intrigue Domestic politics almost anywhere abroad and especially in strategically valuable areas became important arenas for the international ideological struggle between East and West Washington was determined to win this struggle through policies promoting long term democratization The result American of cials hoped would be stability and victory U Twisting the British Lion s Tail Mohammed Mossadeq Nationalizes the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company U An Islamic fundamentalist assassinated Iranian Prime Minister General Ali Razmara on 7 March 1951 11 Razmara s death set in motion a series of events that were to bring American and British of cials face to face with Mohammed Mossadeq one of the most mercurial maddening adroit and provocative leaders with whom they had ever dealt 12 One of the reasons the British Government eventually took over D Arcy s concession when he ran into nancial dif culties was to ensure a secure supply of oil for the Royal Navy See Daniel Yergin The Prize the Epic Quest for Oil Money and Power New York Simon and Schuster 1991 Pp 137 140-42 l5 NIB-I4 8 January 951 The of Iranian and Middle East Oil to Western Europe Under Peacett me Conditions pp 1-2 CIA estimated that if all Middle Eastern oil were lost the non-Soviet world would have to impose an immediate and mandatory 10% cutback in consumption In that event the United States would have to implement rationing even though I domestiuroduetionjruttosedavs metitsowmneeds member ofthe Fadayane Islam underground organization assassinatedR azmafaf See Appendix for a biographical sketch of Mohammed Mossadeq 3 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 C01269967 granted William Knox D'Arcy an oil concession covering three-fourths of Persia on Iran was known until 1935 Iranian oil had helped fuel the economy in peace and war 8 The United States was then producing enough oil for its needs but it knew that Western Europe depended on oil exports from the Middle East in January 1951 ninc months afterI-lillenkoettcr's letter to Acheson the Central Intelligence Agency s Of ce of National Estimates ONE wrote that the British economy would suffer if it oil Thelma of all Middle Eastern oil ONE said would have profound and liar reaching consequences for the economics of the Western bloc g U Political instability in the Middle East and the Gulf region threatened the onnlinuinp mmnlu nf' all In 01 - m-rl I Before the Cold War the domestic politics of what later came to be called the Third World had made no impact on American foreign policy deeisinnmaking During tthold War Washington could not afford the luxury of indifference because doing so would spur Soviet intrigue Domestic politics almost anywhere abroad and especially in strategically valuable areas became important arenas for the intematimial ideological struggle between East and West Washington was determined to win this struggle through policies promoting leng term democratimtion The result American officials hoped would be stability and victory U Twisting the British Lion s Tail Mohammed Mossadeq Netionaiizes the Anglo Iranlan Oil Company U An Islamic fundamentalist assassinated Iranian Prime Minister General All Razmam on 7 March 1951 11 Razmam's death set in motion a series of events that were to bring American and British officials face to face with Mohammed Mossadeq one of the most mercurial maddening adroit and provocative leaders with whom they had ever dealt a U Oneof the rename the British Govmunentevenhially took over D'Arcy's concession when he minto nancial dif culties was to ensure a secure supplyof oil for the Royal Navy Daniel Yergin Thel rlze the Epic war NewYork Simon and 137 14042 151 NIB-14 8 Jammy 195 The Importance clinician and Middle East Oil to Western Europe UnderPcaccdme Conditions pp l 2 CIA estimated that if all Middle Huston oil were lost the non-Soviet world would have to impose an immediate and mandatory 10% cutback in consumption In the event the United States would have to implement rationing even though eutectic In laws met Its own rim-rt a 1 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111117 001267313 TOP SECRET S Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi who had become Shah when his father Reza Shah abdicated in l941 appointed Mossadeq as Prime Minister on 29 April 1951 Shah's initial choice to succeed Razmara Hussein Ala had resigned after only a few weeks Severe economic and political problems awaited the Mossadeq and it was not obvious that he had the skill to solve them In a Special Estimate prepared one month after he took of ce ClA's Of ce of National Estimates ONE characterized Mossadcq as an impractical visionary and a poor administrator but in a strong political position that was unlikely to deteriorate in the foreseeable future 3 U Mossadeq s immediate concern was a struggle for control of the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company AIOC By 1950 the British oil concession in Iran which the Shah had renewed in 1949 was a sore point in relations between the two countries In March 1951 when Mossadeq was a member of the Majlis the Iranian Parliament he submitted a bill which the Majlis quickly passed nationalizing AIOC He signed the bill into law on 1 May 1951 just three days after the Shah appointed him Prime Minister Nationalization went into effect on 2 May 1951 and was made retroactive to 20 March 1951 U nationalization brought Mossadeq and Iran into immediate con ict with Britain The British government owned half of stock and did not intend to let Mossadeq nationalize its assets without adequate compensation as required under international law 14 U Britain Responds to The Antics of Incomprehensible Orientals U The two countries tried to resolve the dispute but differing negotiating styles and the personalities involved hindered these efforts Many Britons found Mossadeq s seemingly impossible demands and unpredictably shifting arguments inexplicable L P ElwclI-Sutton captured the mood of British policymakers at the time when he wrote Really it seemed hardly fair that digni ed and correct western statesmanship should be defeated by the antics of incomprehensible orientals 15 U Mossadeq found the British evil not incomprehensible He and millions of Iranians believed that for centuries Britain had manipulated their country for British ends Many Iranians seemed convinced that British intrigue was at the root of every domestic misfortune In 1951 Mossadeq told US Special Envoy W Averell Harriman You do not know how crafty they the British are You do not know how evil they are You do not know how they sully everything they touch Harri man protested that surely the British Current Developments in Iran 22 May 1951 In March 1951 the CIA estimated that 6 to 8 percent of Iran's national income came from AIOC and that the AIOC contributed nearly one quarter of the Iranian Treasury's receipts Of ce of NationaLEstimates Positioajmhe East West gouging Draftl 2 Marchl il 1 1 Elwell-Sutton Persian Oil A Study in Power Politics London Lawrence and Wishart Ltd 1955 p- 258 4 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017f11 17 001267813 C01269967 U Mossadeq's immediate concur was a struggle for control of the Anglo- Iznniandl Company AIOC By l950the British oil concession in hmwhieh the 1 had renewed in i949 was a sore point in relations between the two countries In 1951 when Mossadeq was a member of the Majlis the hadearliamcnt he submitted a bill which the Majlis quickly passed nationalizing AIOC He signed the bill into law on May 1951 just three days afterthe Jappointed him Prime Minister Nationalization went into effect on 2 May 1951 and was made retroactive to 20 March 1951 U nationalization brought Mossadeq and Iran into immediate conflict with Britain The British government owned half of AIOC's stock and did not intend to let Mossadeq nationalize It assets without adequate compensation required under international law U Britain Responds to The Antics uf Orientals U The two countries bird to resolve the dispute but differing negotiating styles and the personalities involved hindered these efforts Many Britons found Mossadeq s seemingly impossible demands and unpredictably inexplicable LP Elwell-Sutton captured the mood of British policymakers at the time when hewrotc Really it madhardly fair-that digni ed and correctwestem statesmanship should be defeated by the antics of incomprehensible adrenals U Mossadeq found the British evll not incomprehensible He and millions of Iranians believed that for centuries Britain had manipulated their wearer British ends Many mime seemed convinced that British intrigue was at the root of every domestic misfortune In 1951Mossadeq told US Special Envoy W Avert- 11 Han-imam You do not know how era y they theBritish am You do not know how evil they are You do not know how they sully everything they touch Han-imam protested that surely the British 5 1 - 15m LP- Ewell-Sutton Persian CHM Study it Power Politics and mum us 1955 pt zss 4 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017111117 001267813 TOP SECRET were like people everywhere some bad some good Mossan was not persuaded You do not know them he insisted You do not know them 16 U When it seemed clear that Tehran had no intention of compensating London for assets the British mounted a multi-pronged effort to reassert control over the company They hoped legal and economic pressure would convince Mossadeq to settle on British terms If not they were prepared to force him from of ce and replace him with someone open to compromise on terms favorable to the AIOC U London first asked the International Court of Justice to arbitrate the dispute Mossadeq rejected two British proposals because neither of them addressed the issue of Iran's sovereignty over its own oil The British thereafter refused to deal directly with Mossadeq They used economic weapons and then tried ostentatious military maneuvers in the Persian Gulf to try to weaken Mossadeq s negotiating position CU In September 1951 Britain placed an embargo on shipments of steel sugar iron and oil processing equipment shipments to Iran that is on almost anything that the Iranians could exchange for dollars The ADC laid off 20 000 oil workers at the port at Abadan and Mossadeq had to put them on the government payroll Gradually the flow of Iranian oil to the rest of the world stopped U A British airborne brigade arrived in Cyprus and a Royal Navy cruiser and four destroyers exercised near the oil facilities at Abadan The display of British force did not intimidate Mossadeq he announced that the rst shot would start a world war U Britain also considered covert action options while it maneuvered diplomatically and militarily According to C M Woodhouse M16 s Chief of Station in Tehran the idea of overthrowing Mossadeq came from the Foreign Of ce not British intelligence Woodhouse himself thought that any move against Mossadeq had to have American support and participation London had neither until the inauguration of President Dwight Eisenhower in January 1953 17 Vernon A Walters Silent Missions Garden City N Y Doubleday 1973 pp 247-48 11 Ymtuse ondm mnada l982jhm 5 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 001267813 C01269967 were likepeople everywhere some had some good Mossadeq was not persuaded You do not know them he insisted You do not know threat S U When it seemed clear that Tehran had no intention of compensating London for AIOC's assets the British mounted a multi pronged effort to reassert cannot ovei the company They hoped legal and co onomic pressure would convince Mossadcq to settle on British terms If not they were prepared to force him from of ce and replace him with someone open to oompmmiac on terms favorable to the AIOC U London rst asked the Court of Justice to arbitrate the dispute Mossadeq rejected two British proposals because neither of them addressed the issue of Iran's sovereignty overits own oil The British thereafter refused to deal directly with Mossadeq They used economic weapons and then tried ostentatious military maneuvers in the Persian to try to weaken Mosaudeq s negotiating position U In September I951 Britain placed an embargo on shipments of steel sugar iron and oil processing equipment shipments to Iran that is on almost anything that the Iranians could exchange for dollars The AIOC laid off 20 000 oil workers at the port at Abadan and Mossadcq had to put them on the government payroll Gradually the ow of Iranian oil to the rest of the world stopped U A British airborne brigade arrived in Cyprus and a Royal Navy cruiser and four destroyers exercised near the oil facilities at Abadan The display of British force did not intimidate Moasadeq he announced that the rst shot would straits world war U Britain also considered covert action options while it maneuvered diplomatically and militarily According to CM Woodhouse Mld's Chief of Station in Tehran the idea of overthrowing Mossadeq came frorn the Foreign Of ce not British intelligence WoodhOuse himself thought that any move against Mossadeq had to have American support and participation London had neither until the inauguration of Presidenct Dwight Eisenhower in January 1953 17 3 16w Vemon A Waterman Missions Garden City N Y Doubleday 1978 pp 24748 7 U CM Woodhouse Something Ventured lmdon Granada 1982 pp 10- tn mommy Lav C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11117 CO1267813 TOP U Mossndeq Challenges the Shah U At the same time that he was quarreling with the British Mossadeq also was struggling against the Shah He insisted that the Shah should reign and not rule To that end he worked to enhance the power of the Majlis at the Shah's expense The ash point came in July 1952 when Mossadeq resigned during a dispute over whether the Shah or the Prime Minister should appoint the war minister U During the elections for the 17th Majlis earlier in the year vote tampering by the Iranian Royal Court had convinced Mossadeq that the govcmment's survival depended on control of the military On l6 July he demanded the right to appoint himself minister of war The Shah refused and Mossadeq resigned 19 Mossadeq appealed directly to the public and accused the Shah of violating the Constitution U Mossadeq's resignation initially appeared to be a shrewd political move that underscored his mastery of Iranian politics and his ability to gauge and exploit public opinion The Shah appointed Ahmad Qavam Prime Minister during the Azeri crisis with the Soviet Union in 1947 to succeed Mossadeq In response the National Front a broad coalition formed in 1949 organized mass demonstrations in Tehran demanding Mossadeq s return The demonstrations tumcd violent 69 peeple died and more than 750 were injured but the Shah refused to use the police or the military to restore order Qavum lacked broad support and was unable to organize counter demonstrations For ve days the National Front controlled the streets of Tehran and other cities On 21 July 1952 the Shah bowed to the pressure and replaced Qavam with Mossadeq 20 U Once back in power Mossadeq struck back at the Shah and the military He transferred Reza Shah's lands back to the State appointed himself Minister of War forced the Shah s twin sister Princess Ashraf to leave the country and forbade Mohammed Reza Pahlavi from communicating directly with foreign diplomats By May M Reza Ghods Iran in the Twentieth Century A Political History Boulder CO Lynne Rienner Publishers 1989 p 186 Mossadeq wrote I cannot continue in of ce without having the responsibility for the Ministry of War and since Your Majesty did not concede to this I feel I do not enjoy the full con dence of the Sovereign and therefore offer my resignation to pave the way for another government which might be able to carry out Your Majesty s wishes U Sepehr Zabih The Morsadegh Era Chicago Lake View Press 1982 p 40 2cl U Ibid p 265 The National Front was a loose coalition of political parties professing liberal democratic aims and opposing foreign intervention in Iranian affairs The National Front included the leftist anti-Soviet intellectuals of the Iran Party the workers and leftist intellectuals of the Toilers' Party and the workers bazaar merchants and Islamic clergy of the Mujahedeen-i Islam Warriors of Islam Party Ayatollah Abul Quassem Kashani later instrumental in the coup against Mossadeq was one of the leaders of the Warriors of Islam The ultranationalist Pan-lranist Party af liated with the National Front but not a member included many lower class toughs The Tudeh Iranian Communist Party was not a member of the National Front but included itself among the parties opposing the government Mark I GasiorOWslti The 1953 Coup d etat in Iran International Journal of Middle East Studies 19 Aug I987 262 6 TOP SECRET Appmved for Release 2017 1 7 601267813 C012 69967 U Mossadeq Challenge the I U At the same time that he was qumeling with the British Mossadoq also was struggling against the Cl- He insisted that the lshould reign and not rule To that end he worked to enhance the power of the Majlis at the expense The ash point came in July 1952 when Mossadcq resigned during a dispute over whether the Ior the Prime Minister should appoint the war minister During the elections for the 17th Majlis earlier in the year vote tampcring by the Iranian Royal Court had convinced Mossadeq that the government's survival depended on control of the military 0n l July he the right to appoint himself minister of war The lilrefused and resigned Mossndeq appealed directly to the public and accused the violating the Constitution U Mossadeq's resignation initially appeared to be a shrewd political move that tmderscored his mastery of Iranian politics and his ability to gauge and exploit public opinion The Ahmad Qavrun Prime Minister during the Azeri crisis with the Soviet Union in 1947 10 succeed Mossadcq In response the National Front a broad coalition formed in 1949 organized mass demonstrations in Tehran demanding Mossadeq's relum 'l'he demonstrations tamed violent 69 people died and more than 750 were injured but the lrefuscd to use the police or the military to restore order Qavam lacked broad support and Was unable to organize counter-demonstrations For ve days the National Front controlled the streets of Tehran and other cities On 21 July 1952 the Showed lo the pressure and replaced Qavnm with Mossadetl 20 Once back in power Mossadeq struck back at the Eland the military He transferred Rent 5 lands hack tn the State appointed himself Minister afloat forced the fa twin sister Princess Ashraf to leave the country and forbade Mohammad Reza Palilsvi from communicating directly with foreign diplomats By May l9 U Rm Ghoderan in the Twentieth Centurym Political His-tor r Boulder Rienner Publishers 1989 p 186 Momdeq wrote I cannot mntinuein of ce witlimtt having the responsibility for the Ministry ome and since Your Majesty did not mnoedetn this l feel i do not enjoy the hill con dence of the Sovereignand therefore o iar my resignation to pave the way for another government which might be ablcto carry out Your Majesty s wishes U SepehrZabrh '11 Mosradegh Era Chicago Lake View Piers 1982 p 40 20m Ibid p 265 The National Front was a loose coalition of political parties professing liberal democratic aims and opposing foreign intervention in Iranian affairs The National Front included the leftist and Soviet intellectuals of the Iran Party the workers and leftist intellectuals of the Toilets tiny and the workers bazaar merchants and Islamic clergy of the Mujahedeen-i- Islam Warriors of Islam Party Ayatollah Ahul Quassun Kashani later instrumental in the coup agalnst Mussadoq was one uflhc leaders of the Warriors of Islam The tdtranaliunalist Pan Innist Waililiated with the National Front but not a member included many lower class toughs The Truldr Iranian Communist Party was not a manber of the National Front but included itself among the parties opposing the goverm-nent Mark J Gasiorowski The 1953 Coup d etatin Irat'lntematianal Journal MWMII EartStudr'es 19 Aug 1987 261 L Approved for Release 2017111117 601267313 TOP SECRET 1953 according to Iranian specialist Ervand Abrahamian the shah had been stripped of all the powers he had fought for and recovered since August 941391 U The Prime Minister also seized the opportunity to purge the Iranian of cer corps He forcibly retired many Royalist of cers and cut the military budget 15% To add to the insult Mossadeq transferred 15 000 men from the military to the Gendarrnerie the military's bureaucratic rival These acts fueled smoldering resentment among the dismissed of cers and those few royalists escaping Mossadeq s purge 22 U Mossadeq used his popularity and ability to control the streets of Tehran to good advantage When the British appeared intransigent during the oil negotiations he simply severed diplomatic relations in October 1952 All British personnel left the country in an overland exodus at the beginning of November 1952 23 U Mossadeq s apparent political triumph rapidly turned sour The National Front began to unravel in late 1952 and early 1953 as the Prime Minister grew increasingly dictatorial By November 1952 Ayatollah Abul Quassem Kashani a key Islamic cleric in the National Front had tumed against Mossadcq and quit the Front as had Mozaffar Baqai's Toilers Party Kashani s defection was a particularly hard blow because his group the Waniors of Islam included the bazaar merchants of Tehran and many mullahs Islamic clerics Support from these two groups historically has been critical to Iranian governments 24 U The reasons for the defections were complex Although 30 of the 79 deputies of the 17th Majlis convened in February 1952 belonged to or identi ed with the National Front they represented different constituencies and interests were united only in their opposition to the British In addition nationalization of the AIOC did not produce the bonanza for Iran that Mossadeq had hoped it would He began to demand more and more power from the Majlis and when the legislature granted the Prime Minister what amounted to dictatorial powers Ayatollah Kashani resigned as Majlis speaker Toilers Party leader Mozaffar Baqai compared Mossadeq to Hitler and praised the army as a bulwark against Communism 25 U Some groups in the National Front continued to back Mossadeq The Iran Party still supported him as did the Third Force a splinter group expelled from the Toilers Party The Prime Minister also could still count on the backing of the Qashqai Ervand Abrahamian Iran Between Two Revolutions Princeton NJ Princeton University Press 1982 pp 272-73 220 Ibid p 273 23 U Before leaving the country CM Woodhouse ensured that all British contacts like the Rashidian Brothers would remain active Roger Goiran helped him Woodhouse p 16 24 U Manucher Fannanfarmaian in his memoirs describes the bazaar and the relationship of its merchants with the mullahs It the bazaar was a world unto itself impregnable to the army which coald not easily enter its labyrinthine alleys The leaders of the bazaar were weighty men often allied with the mullahs and they could start riots or shut down the bazaar to instant political effect Manucher Farmanfarmaian and Roxane Farmanfarmaian Bland and Oil Memoirs of a Persian Prince New York Random House I997 13 36 25m Abrahamian pp 269 277 Gasiorowski p 269 2l5 l l Abrahamian p 277 Gasiorowski p 269 7 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017l11 17 C01267813 C01269967 1953 according to Iranian specialist Ervand Abrahamian the ihad been stripped of all the powers he had fought for and recovered since August 1941 21 U The Prime Minister also seized the opportunity to purge the Iranian o icer corps He forcibly retired many Royalist of cers and cut the military budget 15% To add to the insult Mossadeq transferred 15 000 men item the military to the Geadarmcrie the military s bureaucratic rival These acts fueled smoldering resentment among the dismissed and those few royalists escaping Mossadeq s purge U Mossadeqused his popularity and ability to control the streets of Tehran to good advantage When the British appeared intransigent timing the oil negotiations he simply severed diplomatic relations in October 1952 All Bridsh personnel left the country in an overland exodus at the beginning of November 1952 23 U Mossadeq s apparent political triumph rapidly turned sour The National Front began to unravel in late 1952 and early 1953 an the Prime Minister grew increasingly dictatorial By November 1952 Ayatollah Abul Quassem Kashani a key Islamic cleric in the National Front had turned against Mossadeq and quit the Front had Mou ar Baqai's Toilers' Party Kashnni's defection was a particularly hard blow because his group the Warriors of Islam included the bazaar merchants of Tehran and many mullahs Islamic clerics Support from mere two groups historically has been critical to Iranian governments U The reasons for the defections were complex Although 30 of the 79 deputies of the 17th Majlis convened tn February 1952 belonged to or identi ed with the National Front they represented different constituencies and interests were united only in their opposition to the British In addition nationalization of the am did not produce the bonanza for Iran that Mossadeq had hoped it would He began to demand more and more power 'om the Majlis and when the legislature granted the Prime Minister what amounted to dictatorial powers Ayatollah Kashani resigned as Majlis speaker Toilers' Party leader Mozaffar Baqai compared Mossadeq to Hitler and praised the army as a bulwark against Communism U Some groups in the National Front continued to back Mossadeq The I131 Party still supportedhim did the Third Force a splinter group expelled from the Toilers Party 75 The Prime Minister also could still count on the baclo'ng of the Qashqai Ervand Allahandarnlrun Between mRechutIorrs Princeton N I Princeton University Press I982 pp 272 -73 12w Ibld p 273 13 U CM Woodhouseensmedthatall Britishcoatacts likcthe RashidimBm nrswouldmain active Roger Goiranhelpedhim Woodhouse p 116 24 U therelationship ofits merchants withthe mullahs It drebazaar was aworldunto itself impregnableto the army which could not easilyenter its labyrinthinealleys The leaders ofthe bmwae weighty men allicdwith the mullahs andthey could startriotn orshut down tImbanar-toinslant political e ect MaratcherF Fannmfarmaim and Roxane Farinanfarrnalan Blood and Oil Memoirs etaPcm anPrlucc New York Random House 1997 p 36 25 0 Abrahamian pp 269 277 Gasiorowrki p 269 Abrahamian p 277 Gasiorowsld p 26 Approved for Release 2017111117 001267813 TOP SECRET tribes and more ominously the Tudeh Iran's Communist Party As support for Mossadeq narrowed the Tudeh would soon be the only group willing to take to the streets on his behalf U Ayatollah Kashani's defection and increased squabbling among the deputies effectively paralyzed the Majlis Opposition politicians including former Mossadeq allies like Knshani blocked the Prime Minister s legislation In early June 1953 stfights broke out in the Majlis The Prime Minister won a temporary victory when Abdullah Moazemi a Mossadeq supporter succeeded Kashani as speaker in a close Majlis vote 41 to 31 on 1 July 1953 Mossadeq recognized however that the Majlis was hopelessly deadlocked and that dissolution and new elections were necessary to break the stalemate U Under the Iranian constitution only the Shah could dissolve the Majlis The government could request him to do so Mossadeq knew the Shah Would not agree to such a proposal so he devised a plan to achieve the same end He asked all National Front members and Supporters to resign which they did and simultaneously announced the dissolution of the Majlis The Iranian people he held could ratify or reject his decision in a referendum on the theory that popular will superseded the constitution Iranian scholar Ervand Abrahamian has noted the irony in Messadeq's rationale Mossadeq the constitutional lawyer who had meticulously quoted the fundamental laws against the shah Abrahamian wrote was now bypassing the same laws and resorting to the theory of the general will 28 U From 3 to 0 August 1953 Iranians voted on Mossadeq s bold and unconstitutional act The results of the rigged election were never in doubt Mossadeq purposely excluded rural areas from the balloting ostensibly because it would take too long to count the votes from remote areas The ballot was not secret and there were separate polling places for yes and In the end Mossadeq claimed victory gaining over 2 043 300 of the 2 044 600 ballots cast throughout the country and 101 396 of the 101 463 ballots cast in the capital 29 U The dissolution of the Majlis and the tainted referendum alienated Iranian liberals and conservatives alike Jamal Imami a pro-British member of the Majlis warned that Mossadeq was leading the country toward anarchy Ayatollah Kashani declared the referendum illegal under Islamic religious low At his trial in late 1953 Mossndeq defended his actions on the grounds of popular sovereignty In view of the Royal Court s agrant interference in the electoral process we had to suspend the Mark J Gasiorowski US Foreign Policy and the Shah Building a Client Stale Ithaca NY Cornell University Press 1991 p 75 Abrahamian p 274 M Reza Ghods Iran in the Twentieth Century A Political History Boulder CO Lynne Rienncr Publishers 1989 p 187 Zabih p l ll Abrahamian p 274 See also Home Karouzian Mumddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran New York LB Taun's Co Ltd pp l87-88 In an interview appearing in the 22 August 1962 issue of Dcutsche Zeirung Mossadeq admitted that he dissolved Willi _Mailis l igid a con dence vote that would have caused his government to fall 8 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 C01267813 301269967 tribes andu morc ominously lhe Tudeh Iran's Communist any As support for Mossadeq narrowed the Tudeh would soon be the only group willing to take to the met on his behalf U Ayatollah Kashani's defection and increased squabbling among the deputies effectively paralyzed the Majlis Opposition politicians includingformer Mossadeq allies like Kashnni-blocked the Prime Minister s legislation In early June 1953 st ghts broke out in the Majlis The Prime Minister won a temporary victory when Abdullah Mommi a Mossadeq supporter succeeded Kashani a speaker in a close Majlirr vote 41 to 31 on 1 July 1953 Mossadeq recognized however that the Majlis was hopelessly deadlocked and that dissolution and new elections were necessary to break the stalemate U Under the Iranian constitution only the lcou1d dissolve the Msjlis The government could request him to do so Mossadeq knew the l lwould not agree to such a proposal so he devised a plan to achieve the same end He asked all National Front members and supporters to resign which they did and simultaneously announced the dissolution of the Majlis The Iranian people he held could ratify or reject his decision in a referendum on the theory that popular will superseded the constitution Iranian scholar Ervand Abrahamian has noted the irony in Mossadeq s rationale Mossadeq the constitutional lawyer who had meticulously quoted the fundamental laws against the Abrahamian wrote was now bypassing the same laws and resorting to the theory of the general will U From 3 to IDAugust 1953 Iranians voted on Mossadeq s bold and unconstitutional act The results of the rigged election were never in doubt Mossadeq purposely excluded rural areas from the balloting ostensibly because it would take too long to count the votes from remote areas The ballot was not secret and there were separate polling places for yes and In the end Mossadeq claimed victory gaining over 2 043 300 of the 2 044 600 ballots cast throughout the country and 101 3960f the 101 463 ballots cast in the capital 29 U The dissolution of the Majlis and the tainted referendum alienated Iranian liberals and conservatives alike Jamal Imami a pro-British member of the Msjlis warned that Mossadeqwas leading the country toward anarchy Ayatollah Kashani declared the referendum illegal under Islamic religious law At his trial in late 1953 Mossadeq defended his actions on the grounds of popular sovereignty In view of the Royal Court's agrant interference in the electoral process we had to suspend the MarkJ Gasiorowsld U S Foreign Policyand the We ClientSrate Ithaca NY Corrie University Rm 1991 p 75 Abrahamian p 274 M Reta Ghods Iran in the Twentieth Ceuatry A Political History Boulder C0 Lynne 1989 p 187 29w Zabih 1 1 Abrahamian p 274 See also Home Katorzian Muraddiq and the Struggle far-Power in Inn New Ionic LB Tauris 8 Co Ltd pp 187-88 In an interview appearing in ureZZAugust l962issueofDeuneirz Zeltung he dimb-r Mains to amid uno ulna would have caused hle entrapment to 2 6 7 8 1 3 Approved for Release 2017111117 001267813 TOP SECRET remainder of the Majlis elections he told the court What else was left to us but consulting the people in a most democratic method of direct plebiscite 3 U A US Embassy assessment cabled to Washington shortly after the referendum stated that the dissolution of the Majlis will graphically demonstrate truism of Mossadeq s regime that as opposition and discontent have mounted Mossadeq has moved steadily in authoritarian direction using technique of mobocracy to maintain his hold on power and to eliminate in uence Shah Nonetheless the Embassy thought Mossadeq s continued appeals to the street could boomerang because he lacked any real authoritarian organization aside from armed forces To compensate according to the Embassy he would be forced to rely increasingly on the Tudeh thereby alienating the non-Communist followers of his Govemrnent 31 U Mossadeq Looks for American Support U Mossadeq hoped for US support in his struggle against the British Like many in the Third World immediately after World War he saw the United States as an anti colonial power His hopes Were not entirely misplaced Truman administration saw some merit in his position U Secretary of State Acheson thought that the British were overly preoccupied with their oil interests and that London did not fully understand the broader Communist threat He saw Mossadeq as a potentially important part of the solution to the problem of Soviet in uence in the Middle East In Acheson's view the Iranian Prime Minister would in time become an effective bulwark against Soviet penetration into Iran To that end Washington consistently urged London to reach an equitable settlement with Tehran Acheson apparently was convinced that an agreement would strengthen the Iranian government and promote regional stability 32 U Other considerations however complicated the Truman administration s approach The United States was loath to side publicly with Iran or put excessive pressure on London Washington needed cooperation and support from Britain America s closest ally elsewhere in the world The war in Korea was not yet over and the presence of British combat troops was an important symbol of Anglo American solidarity The North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO created in 1949 was still in its formative stages and depended upon British participation as evidence of Western unity Ghods p 188 Zabih pp 1 12- IS For Kashani s views on the Shari a see Katouzinn Musnddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran p 87 Department of State Cable from Tehran to Secretary of State No 300 12 August 1953 National Archives and Records Administration Record Group 319 Entry 57 box 27 Acheson criticized the unusual and persistent stupidity of the Anglo Iranian Oil company and the British Government when it came to Iran See Dean Acheson Present at the Creation My Years in the State Department New York W W Nonon Company Inc I969 p 501 quoted in Daniel Yergin The Prize The Epic Quest for Oil Money and Power New York Simon and Schuster 1991 p 453 Richard W Cottam Iran di the United States A Cold War Case Study Pittsburgh University of Pittsburgh Press 1988 p 102 9 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 201 7 1 1M 7 001267813 C01269967 remainder of the Majlis elections he told the court eratelse was le m us but consulting the people in a most democratic method of direct plebiscite 30 U A US Embassy assessment cabled to Washington shortly after the referendum stated that the dissolution of the Majlis will graphically demonstrate train of Mossadeq's regime that as opposition and discontent have mounted Mossadcq has moved steadily in authoritarian direction using technique of to maintain his hold on power and to eliminate in uence Nonetheless the Embassy thought Mossadeq s continued appeals to the street could boomerang because he lacked any real authoritarian organization aside from armed forces To compensate according to the Embassy he would be forced to rely increasingly on the 'Itrdeh thereby alienating the non-Commtmist followers of his Government U Mossndeq Looks for American Support U Mossadeq hoped for US support in his struggle against the British Like many in the Third World immediately after World War II he saw the United States as an anti- colonial power His hopes were not entirely misplaced the Truman administration saw some merit in his position U Secretary of State Acheson thought that the British Were overly preoccupied with their oil interests and that London did not fully understand the broader Communist threat He saw Mossndeq as a potentially important part of the solution to the problem of Soviet in uence in the Middle East In Acheson s view the Iranian Prime Minister would in time become an effective bulwark against Soviet penetration into that end Washington consistently urged London to reach an equitable settlement with Tehran Acheson apparently was convinced that an agreement would strengthen the Iranian government and promote regional stability U Other considerations however complicated the Truman administration s approach The Unimd States was loath to side publicly with Iran or put excessive pressure on London Washington needed cooperation and support from Britain America s closest ally-elsewhere in the world The war in Korea was not yet over and the presence of British combat troops was an important symbol of Anglo American solidarity The North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO created in 1949 was still in its formative stages and depended upon British participation as evidence of Western unity 30 0 Ghocls p 188 Zabih pp 112-13 For Kashani s views on the Stuart's sec Kstouzisn Mmeddtq and tire StrugglefarPawer in Iran p 187 quarmmtofsme Cable Secretaryorsmmo 300 12 August 195a National Archives and Records Adrninisiratioanord 57 1 27 31 0 Achesoncriticimd the tmusual andpersistent stupidityof the Anglo Iranian Oil companyand the British Governmenf'when it cameto m mmAdrmorgPresenfatm Goddamuy Yearsln rthtate Department New Yorlc W W Norton Company lnc 1969 p 501 quoted in Daniel Yergin 11 Prize MEpic Questfor and Power New York Simonand Schuster l991 p 453 Ridmdw Conant Iran cf the Cold War-arse Study University of Pittsburgh Press 1988 P 102 0 2 67 8 1 3 Approved for Release 2017l11t17 C01267813 TOP SECRET and determination Vigorous American support for Mossadeq would have complicated American foreign policy in other parts of the World as Well U President Truman had no patience with those refusing to view the Anglo- Iranian problem in a global context When the US Ambassador to Iran Henry Grady wrote to Truman complaining that the White House was not listening to his advice the President let him know exactly where he stood Let me tell you something about the Iranian Situation from this end he wrote U we held Cabinet meetings on it we held Security Council meetings on it and Dean Bob Lovett Charlie Sawyer Harriman and all the senior staff of the Central Intelligence discussed that awful situation with me time and again We tried to get the block headed British to have their oil company make a fair deal with Iran No they could not do that They know all about how to handle it we didn t according to them U We had Israel Egypt Near East defense Sudan South Africa Tunisia the NATO treaties all on the fire Britain and the Commonwealth Notions were and are absolutely essential if these things are success tl Thenhave Korea and lndo-China Iran was only one incident Of course the man on the ground in each one of these places can only see his own problem 33 C The suggestion that British forces might occupy the port city of Abadan or launch some other military action against Iran set off alarms in ONE In an April I951 memorandum to DCI Lt Gen Walter Bedell Smith ONE chief Dr William Langer warned that the appearance of British troops in Iran might result in Soviet occupation of the northem part of the country under the tenns of the 1921 treaty of friendship between Persia and Soviet Russia 34 Farhad Diba Mohammad Massadegh A Political Biography London Croorrt Helm 1986 pp 131-32 citing papers of Henry Grady Emphasis added William L Langer Assistant Director National Estimates Memorandum for Director of Situationjn lran 20 April 1951 7 emphasis added U In February 192l T ersia asTran was then known and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic the USSR did not exist until December signed a treaty of friendship Article VI gave the the right to send troops into Persia if a third party tried to use that country as a base from which to attack Soviet Russia Russian troops would cross the border only if Persia proved incapable of removing the threat itself In an exchange of explanatory notes in December I921 the Russians made clear that the treaty applied only to cases in which preparations have been made for a considerable armed attack upon Russia by the partisans of the regime which has been overthrown the Tsarist Government or by its supponers Leonard Shapiro ed Soviet Treaty Series A Collection of Bilateral Treaties Agreements and Convenstions Etc Concluded Between The Soviet Union and Foreign Powers vol 1 9174928 Washington DC The Georgetown University Press 1950 pp 92-94 150- 5 l l0 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 001267813 C01269967 and determination Vigorous American suppon for Mosaatleq Would have complicated American foreign policy in other parts of the world as well U President 'I'ntman had no patience with those refusing to View the Anglo- Iranien problem in a global centext When the US Ambassador to MHenry Grady wrote toTruman complaining that the White House was not listening to his advice the President lethim know exactly where he stood Lct inc tell you something about the Iranian Situation from this end he wrote U we held Cabinet meetings on it held Security Cotmeil meetingsonit and Dean Bub Lovett Charlie Sawyer Ilantman and all the seaiorstsii' of the Carnal Intelligence discussedthat aw tl situation withmetimeandagain We trim togetthobloekheaded British to have their oil company male 1 fair deal with Iran No they oauldnot do that They know all stun how to handle it vwe didn t accordingtn them U Wehad Israel Egypt Near East defense Sudan South Africa Tunisia the NATO treaties all anthe re Britain and die were and are absolutely essential When things are succersfut Thenhave Korea and Indo Chlna Iran was only one incident Ofoout se the man on atteofthureplam can me seehis mwoblun 330 Farhad Dlha MallonmtId Mossadegh A Political Biography I mdtm Cronin Helm r1 186 pp 131-311 ng patient of Henrv nnulu ndl'i i U lnFelmme1921 Persia u Iran was then lmovm and the Russian Soviet Eeacrated SocralistRepublicGtI- St m the USSR did not exist until 19221 signed a treaty of friendship Article VI gave the the right to send hoops into Persia if a third party tried to use that countryu a base from which to attack Soviet Russia Russian troops would cross the border only if Pattie raved incapable of removing the tlueat itself In an atohange of explanatm ynotee in Doonnber 1921 the Russians made clear that the treaty applied only to cousin whidtptepnm onshavc hem made for a omnidcrahlcarmed attackurm Russia by the partisans of the regime which has been overthrown the Turin innit-simian a by its supporters Leonani Sitapim ed Sallie Collection q'Bilaterat Treaties Agreements and Comtenstiom Etc Concluded Between The Soviet Union and Foreign Pawn-s vol 'I'he Georgetomt University Pm I950 pp 92-94 150 S1 10 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 TOP SECRET meither Langer For any cfihe 'lran specialists the Of ce of Special Operations 050 and the Of ce of Policy Coordination thought the Tudeh was strong enough by itself to topple Mossadeq As long as the central government remained able to deal with events Langer and others saw the danger of a Tudeh coop as negligible Tudeh represents a serious threat in view of the opportunities awaiting it 050 and OPC specialists agreed in January 1952 but does not yet have the intention or the ability to gain actual control of the government at this time either by force or political operators thought that the Tudeh would come to power only through chaos and impotent central authority U Although the documents in les do not indicate that Smith relayed Langer s concerns to President Truman he evidently did so because the administration subsequently let London know that the US Government disapproved of any military action against Iran At a British cabinet meeting in September 1951 the government of U Strictly speaking the USSR could not have invoked Article VI if a small British force occupied Abadan in 1951 Abadan is far from the Soviet-Iranian border and the few troops the British contemplated sending could not have made a considerable armed attack upon Soviet forces Nonetheless there is no doubt that the USSR would have found some pretext to occupy Qt-them inn had Stalin desired Hewitt Memorandum to Sherman Kenc anuany l Eonversations with and 050 Specialists Concerning the Tudeh Problem History Staff Records Job 840B00443R Box 4 Folder ll ARC 1 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1 1 17 C01267813 C01269967 3 - w Although the documents tiles do not indicate that Smith reiayed Ledger s concerns to President Truman he evidently did so because the administration subsequently let London lmow that the US chemment disappeared of term action against Iran A a British 1binet meeting in September 195 the government of CU the USSR could not have invoked if a small British force occupiedAbadanin 1951 Abadan is Soviet-Iranianbordernnd thefewtroops the British contunplated sending could not have made a considerable amad snack span Soviet forces Nonetheless there is no doubt this the USSR would have iotmd some pretext to not-than mhad madam ll Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 TOP SECRET Prime Minister Clement Attlee decided that it could not afford to break with the United States on an iSsue of this A potential military crisis had passed S As of 30 July 1952 the State Department and CIA were committed to supporting Mossadeq That evening CIA representatives met at the State Department with Secretary of State Acheson Under Secretary of State David K E Bruce Charles Bohlen Henry Byroade John Jemegan and Robert Joyce all of the State Department 40 The participants decided that It is the policy of the Department of State to maintain the present government in Iran so long as this government has the authority to govern or until immears certain that the gove unem will jaken aver _b_y_rh H W Brands Inside the Cold War Lay Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire 1918-1961 New York Oxford University Press 1991 p 234 Henry A Byroade Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 30th Asian and African Affairs John D Jemegan Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern South Asian and African Affairs Charles E Bohlen Counselor of the Department of State and member of the Senior Staff National Security Council Robert P Joyce Policy Planning Staff Department of State 12 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 C01269967 Prime Minister Clement Attlee decided that it could not afford to break with the United States on an issue of this A potential military crisis had passed 39 1 KW Brands Inside the Cold WardayHendman and theRtre q'theAmericau Empire 1918-1961 NewYork Oxford University Press 1991 p 234 HemyA BymadeAssistant SeaetaryofStateforNeerastem SouthAsisn and African Affairs John D Jemegan Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for-Near Eastern South Asian and A imn A 'aits CharlesE Bohlm Counselor of the anartment of State and member of the Senior Sta lNational Seem-it Comcil Robert P Joyce Policy Planning Staff Department of State 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017 1111 001267813 TOP SECRET U As of November I952 CIA's Of ce of National Estimates thought that Mossadeq w0uld remain in power for the near future and that a Tudch coup was unlikely According to an ONE estimate if the unrest plaguing Iran in 1952 continued through 1953 rising internal tensions and continued deterioration of the economy and of the budgetary position of the government might lead to a breakdown of government authority and open the way for at least a gradual assumption of control by Tudch ONE thought Soviet intervention into Iran was unlikely unless there is a far more scrious deterioration of Iranian internal stability than is foreseen in this estimate However the USSR has the capability for greatly increasing its overt and covert interference in Iran at any time to the detriment of US security interests 46 U During the last two months of 1952 both ONE and the Iran Branch of the DDP watched events in Iran and hoped things would not change radically Their hopes were soon dashed U Foggy Bottom s Differences with Whitehall U As the foregoing indicates Washington and London had fundamentally different perspectives on the events in Iran and on their consequences worldwide These differences complicated the State Department s and Foreign Office s search for a common policy At times the problems must have appeared insolvable U In January I952 an internal memorandum in the State Department s Of ce of Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs identified two areas of disagreement The United States and the United Kingdom had differing views on the strength of nationalism in Iran and therefore on Mossadeq's political strength and on the global consequences of Tehran s failure to reach an oil settlement with London 47 U The State Department recognized that Iranian nationalism was a potent and growing force making an oil settlement on British terms unattainable even if Mossadeq fell In contrast the British disparaged Iranian nationalism as merely a passing storm Of ce of riarionai Emirates neonate 1mm rs November 1952 Memorandum Varying British and American Appraisals of the Iranian Situation 14 January 1952 Of ce of Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs Department of State RG 59 Records of the Department of State Records of the Of ce in Charge of lranian Affairs 1946-54 Lot 57 529 Box 40 National Archives and Records Administration 13 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 301267813 C01269967 U As of November Of ce of National Estimates thought that Mossadeq would remain in power for the near future and that a Tudch coup was unlikely According to an ONE estimate if the unrest plaguing Iran in 195200ntinaed through 1953 rising internal tensions and continued deterioratiOn of the economy and of the budgetary position of the government might lead to a breakdown of government authority and open the way for at least a gradual assrunption ofcontrol byTudeh ONE thought Soviet intervention into Iran was unlikely unless there is a far more serious deterioration of Iranian intemsl stability than is foreseen in this estimate However the USSR has the capability for greatly increasing its overt and covert interference in Ian at any time to the detriment of US security interests U During the last two months of 1952 both ONE and the Iran Branch of the DDP watched events in Iran and hoped thing would not change radically Their hopes were soon dashed U Foggy Bottom s lefereuceswith Whitehall U As the foregoing indicates Washington and London had fundamentally different perspectives on the events in Iran and on their consequences worldwide These differences complicated the State Department's and Foreign Of ce s search for a common policy At times the problems must have appeared insolvable U In January i952an internal memorandum in the State Department's Of ce of Greek Turkish and Iranian A airs identi ed two areas of disagreement The United States and the United Kingdom had differing views on the strength of nationalism in Iran and therefore on Mossadeq's political strength and on the global consequences of Tehran s failure to reach an oil settlement with London U The State Department recognized that Iranian nationalism was a potent and growing force making an oil settlement on British terms unattainable even if Mossadeq fell In contrast the British disparagcd Iranian nationalism as merely a passing stonn E l 46m can ofNational Estimates Pmbable Developments in 13 Namha 1952 47 0 Memorandum Varying British and American Appmisalsofthe Iranian Situation 14 January 1mm ofGreek urlrish and Iranian Affairs Department ofStatc RG 59 Recordsofthe 1946-54 40157 529 Box 40 National Archives and Records Administration AG 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017111117 601267813 TOP SECRET It had no roots and would pass and its leaders fall as soon as it is demonstrated that their policies have brought Iran to the brink of rain 48 U More speci cally American of cials feared that a British failure to compromise with Mossadeq would enable him to whip up Iran s virulent nationalism further with potentially disastrous results The West might well lose so much of its in uence that it could not stop Tehran from moving the Soviet orbit Or the Iranian political situation could simply descend into chaos in which case the Soviet-backed Tudeh Iran s best organized best nanced and most effective political organization would be ready to ll the vacuum In the State Department s view such developments would jeopardize the security and stability of the entire Middle East would serve notice that the West could not preserve the independence of important Third World states and could deprive the West not only of Iran's oil but ultimately that of its Arab neighbors as well 49 U In contrast the British regarded Iran as basically a conservative country that would not seek Soviet help nor collapse internally if London held out for the kind of oil settlement it wanted The British also feared that a bad settlement one not on their terms would severely diminish their global political and economic power already starting to decline with the post World War II emergence of independence movements in much of the British ernpire 5 U The only suggestion for resolving these differences offered in the State Department s internal memorandum further consultation to determine the political military economic and effects of the loss of Iran to the West as balanced against the political and economic effects of an agreement with the Iranians on the oil situation which might prejudice other concessions elsewhere and diminish British prestige throughout the world The memorandum concluded that unless the US and United Kingdom agreed on the importance to the West of an independent Iran there was little chance the two would be able to forge a common policy 5l U Eleven months later the National Security Council set forth basic US policy toward Iran NSC 136 1 emphasized that the United States was committed to preventing Iran from falling under communist control and that Iran's strategic position its oil and its vulnerability to Soviet political subversion or military attack made it a tempting target for Soviet expansion If the Tudeh Party seized or attempted to seize control of the Iranian government the document argued the United States should in conjunction with the British be ready to support a non-communist Iranian government militarily economically diplomatically and Ibid Ibid The State Department memorandum noted that American in uence was waning daily as more and more Iranians identi ed the United States with British interests The State Department assessed British in uence as negligible 50 0 Ibid Ibid 52 0 United States Department of State Foreign Relations oflhe United States 1952-1954 Vol X Iran 17951-1954 Washington D C US Government Printing Of ce 1989 pp 529-34 14 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1 1 17 00126781 3 C01269967 It had no roots and would pass and its leaders fall as soon a it is demonstrated that their policies have brought Iran to the brink of win U More speci cally American of cials feared that a British failure to compromise with Mossadeq Would enable him to whip up Iran's nationalism further with potentially disastrous results The West might well lose so much of its in uence that it could not stop Tehran from moving the Soviet orbit Or the lranian political situation could simply descend into chaos in which also the Soviet backed Tudeh Iran s best organized best nanced and most effective political Organization Would be ready to ll the vacuum In the State Depart-item s view such developments would jeopardize the security and stability of the entire Middle East would monotice that the West could not pmwe the independence of important Third World states and could deprive the West not only of Iran's oil but ultimately that of its Arab neighbors as well 49 U In contrast the British regarded In an basically a that would not seek Soviet help nor collapse internally if London held out for the kind of oil settlement it wanted The British also feared that a bad settlement one not on their terms would severely diminish their global political and economic power already starting to decline with the post World War ll emergence of independence movements in much of the British empire SD U The only suggestion for resolving these differences offered in the State Department's internal memorandum further consultation to determine the political military economic and clTects of the loss of Iran to the west a balanced against the political and economic effects of an agreement with the Iranians on the oil situation which might prejudice other concessions elsewhere and diminish British prestige throughout the world The memorandum concluded thatunleas the US and United Kingdom agreed on the importance to the West of an independent was little chance the two would be able to forge a common policy 51 U Eleven months later the National Security Council set forth basic US policy toward Iran NSC emphasized that the United States was committed to preventing Iran from falling under communist control and that Iran s strategic position its oil and its vulnerability to Soviet political subversion or military attack made it a tempting target for Sovietexpansion If the Tudch Party seized or attempted to seize control of the Iranian government the document argued the United States should in conjunction with the British be ready to support a non-communist lmnian government militarily economically diplomatically and 48w Ibid Ibid The State memorandum noted that American influence was waning daily more andmorc Iranians identi edthe Unimd States with British interests The State unused British in uenceu negligible 50a lbid Slay mm United States inartment nfSt t Foreign Rda mu of the United Stains 1952-1954 Vol D C US en Printing Of ce 1989 pp 529-34 id C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 1111 601267813 TOP SECRET U American Policy Turns Against Mossadeq U Dwight Eisenhower did not immediately turn his attention to Iran after taking the oath of of ce in January 1953 His campaign pledge to end the Korean war had priority and only weeks after the inaugural festivities Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin died The new administration was faced with reevaluating Soviet-American relations Under these circumstances events in Iran receded into the foreign policy background temporarily 53 U The British had never given up hope of executing a covert action to remove Mossadeq and continued to test the American response After Mossadeq severed diplomatic relations with Britain in October 1952 the indefatigable Woodhouse met in London with Foreign Of ce of cials including Anthony Edenl to consider options available to Britain According to Woodhouse Eden said that no covert operation would succeed unless it had American support Woodhoose took his words as tantamount to permission to pursue the idea further with the Americans particularly with the This he did arriving in Washington in mid-November 1952 after Dwight Eisenhower s victory S Woodhousc met with State and CIA officials and argued that political conditions in Iran made that country subject to a serious Communist threat He did not stress the oil issue His reception at Truman s State Department was chilly at CIA he met with initial skepticism Walter Bedell Smith told him You may be able to throw out Musaddiq but you will never get your own man to stick in his place Frank Wisner and future DCI Allen Dulles showed increasing interest and eventually warmed to the idea of planning a covert operation to remove the Iranian Prime Minister Woodhouse writethaLDulles enlisted a voungacademic on Iran to wipe th_es_ituation witl_r us 1 S Allen Dulles became ml in late February and apprisecWre President of the situation in Iran Mossadcq Dulles told the President remained the single strongest Iranian political leader With the Shah showing no inclination to marshal the armed forces for a move against Mossadeq the situation in Dulles s words was slowly disintegrating If a showdown developed between the Shah and Mossadcq and a real armed con ict ensued between the two opposing elements the communist Tudeh elements might come up as the victors with their relatively small but well organized group of supporterskand with the assistance of the Soviet Embassy inll'ghran disposing of nlentv of funds Brands p 272 54 U Woodhouse pp 116-17 55 lhid n 15 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 601267813 C01269967 UMmerican Policy Turns Against Mossndeq U Dwight Eisenhower did not immediately turn his attention to Laiufter taking the oath of of ce in January 1953 His campaign pledge to end the Korean war had priority and only wcclu shot the inaugural festivities Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin died The new administration was faced with reevaluating Soviet-American relations Under these circumstances events in iron receded into the foreign policy background temporarily U The British had never given up hope of executing I covert action to remove Mossadeq and continued to test the American response After Mossadeq severed diplomatic relations with Britain in October 1952 the indefatigable Woodhousc met in London with Foreign Office of cials including Anthony to consider options available to Britain According to Woodhouse Eden said that no covert operation would succwd unless it had American support Woodhonse took his words as tantamount to permission to pursue the idea funher with the Americans particularly with the This he did arriving in Washington in mid-November 1952 after Dwight Eisenhower s victory 11 53 0 Brands p 272 54 U Wmdhompp 1 1cm U Ibid p 119 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111117 001267813 TOP SECRET U President Truman s and Secretary Acheson s policy of encouraging the parties to reach an equitable oil settlement had reached a dead end Neither the British nor Mossadeq appeared willing to back off from their publicly stated positions which each by this time held with something approaching religious fervor To London s relief the new US administration abandoned the search for a negotiated end to the crisis Perhaps now the British hoped Washington would nally begin to See Mossadeq as the demagogue London mouahthewasanitaheanptop ate action F Also in March S_tate cpartment of cials an ritish Foreign Minister Anthony Eden met to discuss the Iranian situation Eden found the Americans much more receptive to the British viewpoint than they had been under Truman and Acheson The collapse of the Anglo-Iranian oil negotiations had changed the Americans attitude Washington now considered Mossadeq a source of instability and feared that his continued tenure invited a Tudeh coup C The State Department agreed with Eden that Mossadeq had to go but its reasons differed from his For Eden and his government Mossadeq s policies damaged British prestige in uence and vital commercial interest For the Americans Mossadeq represented a weakened Iran and its increasingymerability to 9iet dominationE El The-mited States suspected the oviets oftryi ngto take advantage ofthe deteriorating situation in Iran In the US view Soviet leaders undoubtedly saw Mossadeq s troubles as a diplomatic opening and if he wanted to try to play Moscow against Washington the Soviets would let him The Kremlin would help him The 531m EonamJDl 16 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01269967 U President Truman's and SecretaryAcheson s policy of encouraging the parties to reach an equitable oil settlement had reached a dead end Neither the British nor Mossadeq appeared willing to back from their publicly stated positions which each by this time held with something approaching religious fervor To London's relief the new US administration abandoned the search for a negotiated end to the crisis Perhaps new the British hoped Washington would nally begin to see Mossadeq as the demagogue London honzht he was action I mlm r taurbepertment Wen Anthony Eden met to discuss the Iranian situation Eden found the Americans much more receptive to the British viewpoint than they had been under Truman and Acheson The collapse of the Anglo-Iranian oil negotiations had changed the Americans attitude Washington now considered Monsadeq a source of 1111211111 and feared that his 00an glhdeh coup l Windham suspectes me oovrets at trying advatit'ag eof the deteriorating situation in Iran in the US view Sovietlcaders undoubtedly saw Mossadeq's trouble-ans a diplomatic opening and if he wanted to by to play Moscow againstWashington the Soviets would lothim The Kremlin would ltolp him The T 0 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 TOP SECRET potential bene m to the Soviets of cultivating Mossadcq were great a docile southern neighbor at a minimum and beyond that a chance to draw a strategically important country into the Soviet sphere of in uence S The Soviet-Iranian negotiations were front page news in The New York Times on I I August 1953 Iranian Ambassador to the United States Allahyar Saleh met for 90 minutes on the 11th with John Jernegan Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastem South Asian and African Affairs Jemegan learned that Iran was interested in maintaining good relations with the United States as well as the Sevict Union S Upon leaving the State Department Saleh met a group of waiting reporters wanting to know whether the meeting had anything to do with Iranian-Soviet negotiations and whether the US had reason to be concerned about such talks Saleh replied that the American Government should be pleased about the negotiations because they might resolve claims arising from Iranian expenses incurred in furthering American policy aims in World War U The Iranian-Soviet negotiations were never held 0n the day he met with Jemegan Saleh could not know that the Mossadeq government would remain in power 17 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 001267813 C01269967 potential bene ts to the Soviets ofcutummg mussaacq Wcrr great a docile southem neighbor at a minimum and beyond that a chance to draw a strategically important country into the Soviet sphere of in uence E 3 w Anuunll-bOVlct nagotiations were never held On the day he met with Jemegan Saleh could not know that the govcnimcnt would remain in power Approved for Release 2017I11I17 001267813 TOP SECRET only eight more days President Eisenhower apparently had already made the decision to oust the Iranian Prime Minister U Mossadeq s Successor Ayatollah Kashani or Fazlollah Zahedi U At this point there was no consensus on who should replace Mossadeq US of cials brie y considered backing Ayatollah Kashani the former Mossadcq ally who had a large following and had become a strident opponent of the Prime Minister 60 S CIA Headquarters viewed the prospect of a Kashani government with alarm According to a Special Estimate published on October 1952 a Kashani-led Iran would be worse for Western interests than if Mossadeq stayed in power Such a regime would be even more dif cult on the oil issue and would be more resistant to Western in uence The military or even Mossadeq s followers might well overthrow Kashani The worst consequence of a Kashani government would be the progressive general deterioration of Iran possibly leading to the eventual assumption of power by the Tudeh 5' U Opinion gradually settled on General Fazlollah Zahedi as Mossadeq s successor Zahedi had served as an irregular soldier under the Shah s father Reza Shah in 1915 and subsequently rose through the ranks of the Iranian Army In 1942 the British arrested him for his activities under Nazi agent Franz Mayer and deported him to Palestine Zahedi worked for the Germans because of his anti-British views he was not generally thought to be pro-Nazi The British released him on VE Day in l945 Zahedi retired from the army in 1949 and subsequently served in a series of mestly honorary posts He was Minister of the Interior in the early 9505 62 S Zahedi s association with the Germans during the war was not the only blot on his record Although he was a staunch anti-Communist the CIA thought him like all I Of ce of National Estimates Prospects for Survivaloilvlossadeq Regime in Iran 513-153 I 14 October l952 p 3 Records of the Of ce of National Estimates Directorate of Intelligence ARC 18 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111l17 C01267813 C01269967 II only eight more days President Eisenhower apparently had already made the decision to oust the Iranian Prime Minister U Mossadcq s Successor Ayatollah Knaltanl or Fazlollah Zahedi U At this point there was no consensus on who should replace Mossadeq US of cialsbrie y considered hacking Ayatollah Kaahani the former ally who had a large follow and had_bet_ _ome of the Prime Mining 3 Opinion'g'l id illy' settled on comma successor Zahedi had served as an irregular soldier under the I father Rem in 1915 and subsequently rose through the radiant the Iranian Army In 1942M British for his activities under Hui agent Franz Mayer and deported him to Palestine for the Gerttiatts bewuxe of his tutti-British views he was not generally thought to he pro-Nazi The British released him on VE Day in 1945 Zahedi retired from the army in 1949 and subsequently served in_n series of mostly honorary posts 11 er 1'8 7 2 6 8 3 Approved for Release 2017111117 001267813 TOP SECRET Iranians on the public scene not noted for honesty consistency reliability and strength of convictions 3 U The State Department recognized that he was not the ideal candidate but was quali ed because he seemed friendly to the United States and Britain and would be acceptable to both Govemments 54 Even more importantly he was willing to take the job S Zahedi was the only opposition gure meeting two other important criteria he had consistently opposed Mossadeq and he had a signi cant following Other potential candidates either had a longer record of opposition or more followers but none had both Zahedi claimed to have the support of Ayatollah Kashani court of cials elements of the armed forces in uential merchants in the bazaar and mosLof the Iranian people This last assertion at least was dubious for at Iranian specialist working as a consultant for DDP's Near East and Africa Division observed It is far more likely that the man in the street continues to admire Mossadeq for his strong stand against the British and as a symbol of resurgent nationalism However this element is of no practical value to either side unless effectively organized and led 65 U Whoever succeeded Mossadeq would be able to count on US support In March 1953 an internal memorandum by the State Department s Of ce of Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs outlined the steps the United States was likely to take if Mossadeq fell Although American of cials would limit their public pronouncements to expressions of unwillingness to interfere in the internal affairs of another country privately they would use non-US channels to assure the Shah and new prime minister that Washington was eager to help Sensitivity to Iranian concerns that the country was being turned into a foreign base would preclude ostentatious and immediate American military assistance but privately the Americans could assure Tehran that meaningful military aid trucks communication equipment and other items that also had civilian uses would be forthcoming U Eisenhower Turns to CIA U President Eisenhower had several options for implementing Mossadeq s removal He could use military force to invade Iran but that was impractical for obvious reasons He could keep hoping that a diplomatic solution would appear That option too was not viable diplomacy had already failed and the political situation in Iran was worsening daily Finally he could turn to CIA for a covert political operation the National Security Council had decided that covert action was a legitimate instrument of US policy 67 This alternative held the promise of attaining the result the administration 6303 lbid TmiaLeDeaanmemJProaosal to Brine About Chaase oyeinmem in Ilmn 25 June l953 6503 lbid Measures Which the United States Government Might Take in Support of a Successor Government to Mosadeq March 1953 Department of State Of ce of Greek Turkish and Iranian Issues RG 59 Lot 57 529 Box 40 National Archives and Records Administration 67a In NSC 1012 19 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1 1 1 7 01 267813 C01269967 Manon the public scene not noted for honesty consistency reliability and strength of convictions 53 U The State Department recognized that he was not the ideal candidate but was quali ed because he seemed friendly to the United States and Britain and would be acceptable to both Even more importantly he was willing to take the lob U Whoever succeeded Mossadeq would be able to count on US support In March 1953 an internal memorandum by the Stone Department's Office of Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs outlined the steps the United States was likely to take if Mossadeq felL Although American offictals would limit their public pronouncements lu expressions of unwillingness to interfere in the internal affairs of mother country privately they would use non-US channels to Maine the anrl new prime minister that Washington was eager to help Sensitivity to Iranian eoncema that the country was being turned into a forcignbasc would preclude ostentatious and immediate American military assistance but privately the Americans could assure Tehran that meaningful military aid trucks cormnunication equipment and otheriteins that also had civilian item Would be forthcoming U Mower this he CIA U President Eisenhower had several options for implementing Mossadeq s removal He could use military force to invade Iran but that Was impractical for obvious reasons He could keep hoping that a diplomatic solution would appear That option too was not viable diplomacy had already failed and the political situation in Iran was worsening daily Finally he could turn to CIA for a covert political operation the National SecmityCouncil had decided that covert action was a legitimate instrument of US policy This alternative held the promise of attaining the result the administration C - 1 to the United Sm Govcnunenl mm mm in Support ofa Successor Governmentto Masada March 1953 Dcpartmentof State Of ce of Greek 'I urkish and Iranian Lam RC 59 Lot 57 529 Box 40 National Archives and Records Administration 67cc to NSC 1W2 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017I11I17 601267813 TOP SECRET wanted with a minimum of cost and attention If such an operation went sour Washington could disavow any knowledge or connection S Nannie b6 assassinated an iTaFl documents 66 15ch aumonzedt 'to g'in planning the operation but it almost certainly was President Eisenhower himself Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose has written that the absence of documentation re ected the President's style U Before going into the operatiOn Ajax had to have the approval of the President Eisenhower participated in none of the meetings that set up Ajax he received only oral reports on the plan and he did not discuss it with his Cabinet or the NSC Establishing a pattern he would hold to throughout his Presidency he kept his distance and left no documents behind that could implicate the President in any projected coup But in the privacy of the Oval Of ce over cocktails he was kept informed by Foster Dulles and he maintained a tight control over the activities of the CIA 69 7 59w Stephen E Ambrose - Eisenhower voii e Fresieienr New York mon re ne-star I984 p 11 Ambrose repeats this paragraph verbatim in Eisenhower Soldier and President New York Simon and Schuster 1990 p 333 20 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 201267813 C01269967 wanted wi t a minimum of cost and attention If such an operation went sour Washington could disavow any knowledge or connection Aveilebl documents do not indicate who authorized C11 to begin planning the operation bu it dimes certainly was President Eisenhower himself Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose has written that the absence of documentation re ected the President s style I U Before going intothe opera orgAjaxhadto have theapprovai ofthe Poseidon 1 Eisenhower participated in none of the melding that setup Max he reportsontheplar sndhe did not discussitwitiLl-us Cabinet or the NSC Establishing a pattern he would hold to throughout his Presidency he kept his distanccand le no docmentsbehind timtoouldimplieatethe President in anyprojected coup But in thepri'mcy ot'the Oval Ol cemv cocktails he was kept informedby Foster Dulles and be maintained atight control over the aetivitia of the 1 ll StephenE Ambrose Hunky-u vol 2 The mutant New York Simonand Schuster 1984 P- 111 Ambroserepeats dnisparagraph verbatim in tiuahmr Soldierandt ratdau New hd Simon and p 333 20 rm C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111117 001267813 TOP SECRET 21 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 C01269967 E Approved for Release 201711 1 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET Chapter 2 U Planning the Operation S Responsibility for planning and executing TPAJAX fell to I the Near East and Africa Divisionl the Directorate of Plans DDP The DDR- clandestine service was less than a year old when it received the TPAJAX assignment Lt Gen Walter Bedcll Smith had created the directorate in August 1952 by combining the Office of Special Operations and the Of ce of Policy Coordination The two had been rivals and Smith hoped their merger would prevent continued friction and duplication of effort U Kermit Kim Roosevelt grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt was the chief of NBA Division A 1938 Harvard graduate Roosevelt had embarked on a scholarly career teaching government to undergraduates rst at Harvard and then at the California Institute of Technology He joined the Of ce of Strategic Services 055 during World War II and worked for the chief of the organization s Secret Intelligence Branch in the Near East After the war he compiled the of cial OSS war report and then returned to the Middle East as a writer for the Saturday Evening Parr 2 In 947 he published Arabs Oil and History The Story of the Middle East 3 C M Woodhouse of M15 wrote in his memoirs that Roosevelt had a natural inclination for bold and imaginative action and also a friendly sympathy with the British 4 S Roosevelt did not look like an operative Kim Philby called him the last person you d expect to be up to his neck in dirty tricks but was an intellectual with U The name went through several permutations before settling on Near East and Africa Division Burton Hersh The Old Boys The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA New York Scribner's Sons 1992 p 331 GJ A O'Toole Honorable Treachery A History of U S Intelligence Espionage and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CM New York The Atlantic Press 1991 p 458 Who's Who 1964-65 Kermit Roosevelt Arabs Oil and History The Story ql rhe Middle East Port Washington NY Kennikat Press 1947 1969 4 CM Woodhouse Something Ventured London Granada 1982 p 120 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1 1 1 7 601267813 C01269967 Chapter 32 U Planning the Operation 3 U r Kermit Kim Roosevelt grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt was the W5 Division eeded eheawisiea A 1938 Harvard graduate Wired embarked on tst at Harvard anthmuhe alifomin of Strategic Serw'ccs mduring World War 11 Was a writer We publisheddm dllt 3 LILWOUdhouse of M5 wrote in his memoirs that Roosevelt had a mantra inclination for-bold and imaginative action and also I friendly sympathy with the British- WEE CM Woodhouse Somalu'ng Ventures Landon Gram 1982 p 120 2 6 7 8 1 3 Approved for Release 201 7 11l1 7 C01267813 TOP SECRET speci c ideas on how to counter Soviet in uence in the Middle East 23 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01257813 C01269967 C01267813 Although almost certainly would have hired him as a permanent staff employee Wilber refused and preferred to work under contract He lived in Princeton and did not wish to leave A contract enabled him to work at CIA without requiring him to move to Washington Approved for Release 2017 1111 001267813 TOP SECRET witlLCIA un LtheJQ Om 24 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 101267813 C01269967 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017l11l17 301267813 TOP SECRET 25 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 201711 1117 601267813 C01269967 Although CIA almost certainly would have hired him an I permanent staff employing Wilber refused and preferred to work under contract He lived in Princeton and did not wish in lane A contract enabled him to work at CIA without requiringhim to move In- Washington Wilber nonlinned his cont-act relationship with CIA until the 19603 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 1111 001267813 TOP SECRET 26 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11i17 001257813 C01269967 nun 21 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111 001257813 TOPSECRET Ti TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1 U17 CO1267813 C01269967 T C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111I17 C01267B13 TOP SECRET ii TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1111 001267813 C01269967 28 0 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017l11I17 001267813 TOP SECRET U According to the mWiIary attaches it was important to recognize lhe difference between allegiance and control The Shah enjoyed the allegiance of almost all Iranian Army of cers they had been raised to regard their monarch as a symbol of loyalty and patriotism Whether he wielded any control was more problematic His failure to assert himself against Mossadeq was causing confusion and consternation as of cers risked their careers by backing him against the Prime Minister The attach s concluded that if the Shah were to give the word probably more than 99% of the of cers would 27 U 175 from USARMA Tehran to Department of the Army Dapartment of the Air Force Department of the Navy Control of the Armed Forces of Iran 11 August I953 National Archives RG 319 Entry 57 box 27 The distribution list shows that CIA received nine copies of the attach s' assessment 29 TOP SECRET Approved tor Release 2017 1 1117 001267813 C012 69967 U The Americans Review the Preliminary Plan W humming to the military attaches it was important to recognize the difference between allegiance and control The icnjoyod the allegiance of almost all Iranian Army of cers they had been raised to regard their monarch an a symbol of loyalty and patriotism Whether he wielded any control was more problematic His failure to Mossadeq was causing confusion and constematinn an of cers risked their careers by backing him against the Prime Minister The attaches concluded that if the in give the word probably more than 99%of the of cers would 4 U I tram USAKMA Team to Department a- ura Anny Departrnart of the Air Force of the Navy Control of the Armed Form- of hm 1 1 August 1953 National Archives RG 319 Entry 57 box 27 The distributionlist shows that CIA received nine copies of the attach s' assessment m- - 0 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017 11117 001267813 TOP SECRET comply with his orders with a sense of relief and with the hope of attaining a state of stability U Mossadcq through Army Chief of Staff General Riahi a Mossadcq loyalist actually controlled the Army Iranian of cers considered legal and would obey any order of the Shah coming from the Chief of Staff The of cer corps considered the Shah's silence about the Chief of Staff s actions as implied consent Failure to follow orders even under these conditions was tantamount to treason The American military attaches concluded that if the Shah opposed the Chief of Staff or if the Chief of Staff with the Shah's support opposed the Prime Minister Mossadcq's control of the Army wettlcimtammzate 29 U 18w Ibid 2911111155 30 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 601267813 C01269967 comply with his orders with a sense of teiief and with the hope of attaining a state of stability Mossadeq through Army Chief of Staff General Ritual in Mossadeq icyaiist actuall'y contolled the Amy Iranian of cers considered lepL and wou'xd obey any order of the lcom mg from the Chief of Stef The of cer amps considered the is silence about the Chief of S affs actions as implied consent aims to follow orders ever under 1 168 condztions was tanamounl to treason The American military attaches concinder that if the I opposed the Chief of Su oriz' 'J'ie Chief of Su with the ET suppo opposed the Prime Ministez Mossadeq cone-oi of the would evaporate 29 13w um 29w lbid 30 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017111117 CO1267813 TOP SECRET i TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 601267813 C01269967 I U The First Phase the I Approved for Release 2017 11 17 CO1267813 TOP SECRET Schwarzkopf was the father of the American general of the same name who led US and Coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf war against Iraq 32 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267613 C01269967 3 11 Schwarzkopf ms the lather of the American general of the same name who led US and Coalition fmomin the 199qu against Iraq 32 C01267813 Approved for Release 201 7 11 17 301267813 TOP SECRET 53 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 201711 1 17 001267813 C01269967 33 C01267813 Donald N Wilber Adventures in the Middl East Exczirsions and Incursions Pri celon Approved for Release 2017I11l17 601267813 TOP SECRET NJ Darwin Press 1986 p 189 34 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1 1 17 co 267813 C01269967 C01267813 The Shari a is Islamic religious law intended to guide all aspects of social activity See William O Beemnn Patterns of Religion and Economic Development in Iran from the Qajar Em to the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 in Cabal Economics and Religion ed James Finn Approved for Release 2017 1 1l17 CO1267813 TOP SECRET New NJ Rutgers University Press1 1983i p 78 35 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 601267813 C01269967 45 1 Donald N Wilber Admmres in theMiddlc Em Excursions and Inclusion Princeton 1 1 an 1986 189 Oh Urt hc Shnd a ls Islamic religious law inlandcd to guide all squads of social activity See William 0- Beam Plum of Religion and Economic Development In frum the Qajxu- Era to Ill Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 in Cuba Ecunomim' and Religian ed James Rn New Brunswick NJ Rutgers 983 p 78 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11717 C01267813 TOP SECRET 36 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 C01269967 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111117 301267813 TOP SECRET 37 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1 1 17 601267813 C01269967 37 Approved for Release 2017111117 6012671313 TOP SECRET H W Brands Inside Ike COM War Loy Tencferson and lie R132 o h'e Xmerican Empire 1913-151 1me University D- 232 38 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 C012 69967 Brands Inside the Cold Wan-lay Henderson andthe Rise cfthe American Empire 1918-61 New York Oxford University Press 1991 p 282 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 601267813 TOP SECRET U Final Approval S On 25 June 1953 senior foreign policymaking of cials met at the State Department to hear Roosevelt outline the nal plan for TPAJAX President Eisenhower did not attend but other top of cials did Secretary of State John Foster Dulles Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson DCI Allen Dulles Undersecretary of State and former DCI Walter Bedell Smith Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy Robert Bowie head of the State Department s policy planning staff and subsequent CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence in the late 19705 Henry Byroade Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East and US Ambassador to Iran Loy Henderson 5 U After Roosevelt's brie ng Secretary of State Dulles polled the meeting Allen Dulles and Walter Bedell Smith were strongly in favor of proceeding the others agreed but were less enthusiastic Henderson did not like covert operations but thought the United States had no choice in this sgf i U Nor did CIA have to notify Congress of_its impending operation A en Dulles may have informally told key Senators like Richard Russell as well as key members of the House of Representatives what the Agency was doing but files containment at these coronation - Brands p 281 Eisenhower's absence should not be read as passivity or disinterest The President knew what was going on but preferred to keep himself out of all formal deliberations His orders and brie ngs were given orally with no record kept 621D lbidr 1974 the Hughes-Ryan Amendment required a Presraentlal for each covert action and President Gerald Ford s Executive Order 11095 16 February 1976 required that the Executive Of ce notify Congress of all Presidential ndings 39 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 001267813 C01269967 nal Approval 16 On 25 June 1953 senior foreign policymaking of cials met at the State Department to hear Roosevelt outline the nal plan for TPAJAX President Eisenhower did not attend but other top of cials did Secretary of State John Foster Dulles Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson DCI Allen Dulles Undersecretary of Statennd former DCI Walter Bedell Smith Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy Robert Bowie head of the State policy planning stu snd subsequent CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence in the late 1970s Hemy Byroade Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East and US Ambassador to Iranloy Htmdetsun 61 U Alter Roosevelt s brie ng Secretary of State Dulles polled the meeting Allen Dulles and Walter Bedell Smith were strongly in favor of proceeding the others agreed but were less enthusiastic Henderson did not like covert operations but thought the Unit more had nn r-lmin- In this onw- 62 - U Nor did CIA have to notify Congress of its impending operation Allen Dulles may have informally told key Senators like Richard Russell as well as key members of the House of Representatives what the Agency was doing but 5 les contain nn mam-d mmn-run nne in Brands p 281 Eisenhower's absenceshould not he read as passivityor disinterest The President lutew whatwas going on but preferred to keep himself out of all fennel deliberations P sorders and with nomad kart no Hw In December 1974s a Presidential nding for each eovu't action andPresident Gerald Ford s Executive Order 11095 16 February 1976 required that the Executive Eh notify Congress of all Presidential ndings 39 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 TOP SECRET 40 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 001267813 C01269967 001267813 Approved for Release 601267813 TOP SECRET Chapter 3 U Execution and Initial Failure TOP SECRET Approved or Release 2017 11 17 601267813 C01269967 Chapter3 U Execution and Initial Failure Approved for Release 2017 11 17 301267813 TOP SECRET i 5 UjThe ahsence of relevant intelligence in CarroWs We is curious Fereign intelligence assets The absence of relevant intelligence in Carroll's le is curious Foreign intelligence assets not covert action assets collect the sorts of information Carroll needed Two possible reasons not covert action assets collect the sorts of informationCan'oll needed Two possible reasons explain the paucity of information Either the foreign intelligence assets had not been tasked explainthc paucity of infomlation Either the foreign intelligence not beentasked properly or as is more likely their focus up to this time had been on the Soviet Union and its my 01 I915 more likely 1116i foul-WP t0 thistlmah dbemon le SovietUnlon nd its activities rather than on lrnnian activities The USSR invariably was the main target of the on Meetivities The USSR American intelligence effort and most if not all of foreign intelligence assets in Tehran American Imelhgence efi m't and all 1-016th mtelligenceassets In Tehran ul out Eviets m'n'y to 011 0mm 0 the 42 42 TOP SECRET I Approved for Release 201 7 11l17 301267813 5 C01267813 Approved for 2017111117 001267813 TOP SECRET 43 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1111 CD1267813 C01269967 45 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 1 1 17 001267813 TOP SECRET U TEXT BOX The Corrupt and Impotent Iranian Army S The Iranian Army in I953 was nnderstrength undereqaipped and ill prepared to repel invasion suppress a country-wide insurrection or defeat Tudeh subversion Its 125 000 men comprised eight divisions nine independent brigades and one military police brigade According to a US Army Intelligence S'ta r Study in December 1952 the Iranian o icer corps was corrupt and lacked leadership ability Promotions were based on politics rather than merit The enlisted men were mostly tough peasants who uncomplainingly endured hardships and privations unthinkable to Western soldiers These traits made the enlisted ranks amenable to discipline but made instilling initiative almost impossible The absence of modern weapons and shortage of ammunition made training almost nonexistent The US Army report concluded that Iranian Army units had no o 'ensive capability and negligible defensive capability '3 S The General Sta r positioned the divisions and brigades with an toward suppressing Iran 's sometimes unruly tribes rather than where they would be best able to defend the country against a Soviet invasion Accordingly most of the divisions were in the south and east rather than along the northern border with the USSR The table below lists major Iranian units and the tribal areas in which or adjacent to which they were deployed 4 Unit Location Tribal Area Mountain Brig Tehran 2nd Mountain Brig Tehran 3rd Mountain Brig Tehran 1st Armored Brig Tehran 2nd Armored Brig Tehran Military Police Brig Tehran 3rd Infantry Div Tabriz 4th Infantry Div Rezoieh Orumiych 5th Infantry Div Khorramabad Lur 6th Infantry Div Shiraz Qashqui 7th Infantry Div Kennett 8th Infantry Div Meshed Mashhad 9th Infantry Div Isfahan Esfahan Bakhtian 10th Infantry Div Ahwaz Ahvaz Arab Gurgan Ind Brig Gurgan Gorgon Turcoman i Ken-nanshah Ind Kermanshah Lur- Sanandai Ind Brig Sinneh Sanandai Kurd Resht Ind Brig Resht Shahsavan 3 S US Army G-2 Inteliigence Intelligence Staff Study Estimate of the Capabilities of the Iranian Armed Forces Including the Employment of Iranian Tribes as Auxiliaries 15 Dec 1952 Records of the Department of State RG 59 Lot 57 D529 NND 959286 Iran 1946-54 Box 4 National Archives and Records Administration 14 S Ibid 44 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 201 7111117 C01267813 C012 69967 Approved lorRelease 2017111117001267813 TOP SECRET U Securing the Firmans U The rst phase of the operation began on 15 July 1953 when Asadollah Rnshidi an went to the French Riviera to meet Princess Ashraf He explained to her that Mossadeq posed in continuing danger for Iran and that she should convince her brother to dismissJJinL Shewus unentbusinstie UjTheT' iicEs s also was coiiVTnceE th M6 adeq would enema Etna could to prevent her return She had already written to the Prime Minister three times saying that she wanted to come back to run because she could no longer afford to live in Europe When she saw with some prompting that a surreptitious visit to the Shah might improve her chancesof returning home hegtm to warm to th_cii5lca Tl Princess Ashrafarrived inTellran on 25 July 19 and met with her brother four days later She was unable to convince him to sign the rmans and left Tehran the following div 45 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1111 C01267B13 C01269967 U Securing U The rst phase of the operation began on 511113 1953 when Asadoilah Rashidisn went to the French Riviera to meet Princess Ashraf He explained to her that Mossedeq posed a continuing danger for Iran and that she should convince her brother to dismiss him She was unenthusinstic to me rnnocss alsowas convinced that Mossadeq would do whateverhe could to prevent herretum Shehsd already written to thePrirne Minister three times saying - that she wanted to come back to mbeeause she could no longer a 'ord in live in Europe When she saw with somepromph'ng that nemeptitionsvisitto the Imight improve her chances of mhme permanently she began to warm to the idea tu rnncess mumi'miivod ill tenrsn 01113 July 193 rm met wn'n net-brother four days later She was unable to convince him to sign the rmmr and left Tehran the following dav 4s 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017 11117 601267813 TOP SECRET The arrival of Soviet Ambassador Anntoly Lavrentiev in Tehran on I August 1953 probably heightened Washington's Roosevelt s sense of urgency anrentiev had been ambassador to Czechoslovakia in I948 and had been behind the Communist coup that deposed pro-Western Czech President Benes Lavrentiev replaced Ivan Sadchikov who left Tehran for 46 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1171 601267813 C01269967 If 13 0 The arrival of Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Iavrentiev in Tehran on I August 1953 probably heightened Washington s and Roosevelt s sense of urgency anrentievhud been nmhmadorlo Czechoslovakia in 1948 and had been behind the Communist coup that deposed pro-Western heel President Bent- 5 anren ev replaced Ivan who le Tehran for in July 1953 3 4b C01267813 Approved for Release 2017I11l17 CO1267813 TOP SECRET manual Fannanfannaian a member ofthe Iranian nobil f i aspresent when Nassiri brought the documents to the Shah and relates in his memoirs the circumstances of this historic event One aftemoon the Shah was relaxing outside with a circle of friends A butler approached and whispered into the Shah s ear and the Shah replied loudly Tell him to come in A man in a dark suit whom Fannanfarmaian did not recognize appeared from behind some trees and after a few words with the Shah presented him with a document The Shah asked if anyone had a pen Fannanfannaian offered his After signing the document the Shah noted that the pen would be worth much more now that he d used it to sign the paper fortune Farmanfarmaian joked Perhaps the monarch replied Perhaps it will bring us all luck as Well Farmanfan'naian writes that he found out later that the messenger had been sent by Kermit Roosevelt and the document the Shah had signed appointed General Zahcdi prime minister 28 S Nussiri returned to Tehran mm sinned documents tats 9n the 93mins 0 13 August iIn his book Countercoup RooseVelt notes that nothing could be done on the 25 8 Donald Wilber Operation TPAJAX draft March I954 Directorate of Operations Records Job 80-1701 Box 3 Folder 1 l p 26 ARC Nassiri later became the head of SAVAK in 1978 former Agency of cer Miles Copeland met General Nassiri to discuss Ayatollah Khomeini and the deteriorating situation in Iran Copeland found Nassiri even stupider than Kim Roosevelt said he'd be The General regalcd Copeland with fairly bloodthirsty details of how he could have put an end to the demonstrations within a week if only the Shah had given him free rein Miles Copeland The Game Player '5 original political operative London Aururn Press 1989 p 25 is U Manueher Farmanfarmaian and Roxane Farmanlarmaian Blood and Oil Memoirs ofa Persian Prince New York Random House 1997 p 292 Farmanfarmaian says that the Shah signed the rmnn on a Sunday in the second week of August This cannot be correct for the was not signed until 3 AugusL The second Sunday in August was the ninth and the third Sunday was the sixteenth 29 A State Department cable reported that the rman appointing Zahedi read View of fact situation of nation necessitates appointment of an infom'red and experienced man who can grasp affairs of country readily I therefore with knowledge I have of your ability and merit appoint you with this letter Prime Minister We give into your hands duty to improve affairs ofthe nation and remove present crisis and raise living standard of people Gordon State 16 August 1953 Tehran No _3_42 47 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1 17 601267813 C01269967 U Manucher Farmanfarmaian a member of the Iranian nobility was present when Elli brought the documents to the i_ Land relates in his memoirs the circumstances of this historic event One attemoon the Ziwas relaxing outside with a circle of friends Abutler approached and whispered into the ear and the l replied loudly Tell him to come in A man in a dark suit whom Farmanfarmaian did not recognize appeared from behind some trees and after a few words with the presented him with a document The l lasked if anyone had a pen Farmanfarmaian offered his After signing the document the noted that the pen would be worth much more now that he'd used it to sign the paper forhme joked Terhaps the monarch replied Terhaps it will bring us all luck as well Fannanfarmaian writes that he found out later that the messenger had been sent by Kermit Roosevelt and the document the had signed appointed General Zahedi prime minister Nassiri later-became theheed m1978 fom1rrAgaicy of ceerles Copeland met General Nasstri to dismiss AyatolIah IGtormini andthe deteriorating situationin Iran Copeland found Nassh'i even stupiderthan Kim Roosevelt said he d he The General regaled Copeland with details of how he wild have put ahead to the demonstrations Within a weekif only the had given him freera'n Miles Copeland 11w GamePluyer-t Mm-dauntin- apaative Imtdon Press 1989 p 251 18 U Manuchernm mnimand Roxane Fannan aunaian Blood and Oil - Mauor'rs of a Pasha Prince New York RandomHouse 1997 p 292 Mahayana the signedthe mran on a Sundayin the womtdwedc ofAugust This cannotbe correct forlhe mmn wasnot signedtmtil BAugust The secondSundayinAugustwas the ninth andthe third Sundavwas the sixteenth - 47 0 2 67 8 3 Approved for Release 2017 1 1l17 001267813 TOP SECRET 13th or l4th Thursday and Friday because Thursday afternoon and Friday comprise the Iranian weekend Effective action would be impossible until Saturday 15 August 30 S The Shah's nnans changed the entire character of TPAJAX No longer was the operation essentially a military coup with the aim of installing Zahedi as Chief of the General Staff and then Prime Minister Now it was an exercise of the Shah s constitutional prerogative and authority Mossadeq's failure to abide by the rmans would make his tenure as Prime Minister illegal Kermit Roosevelt Countercoup The the Control of Iran New York p 48 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 C01269967 ENG-D Countercaup the Conant ofIran New York Mathew-mil 1979 i 171 2 C0 1 67 8 3 Approved for Release 2017111 17 001267813 TOP SECRET U Americanninlomatis Moves S ewspaper articles and statements l rom senior American government of cials harmner'e'd' ome the theme that the US could not work with the Mossadeq government On 29 June 1953 President Eisenhower sent a letter to Prime Minister Mossadeq making it clear that further American foreign aid would not be available The letter appeared in the press 10 days later On 23 July Secretary of State Dulles held a press conference in which he answered a planted question about the American view of Communist activity in Iran The growing activities of the illegal Communist Party in Iran and the toleration of them by the Iranian Govemment Dulles said has caused our Government concern These developments make it more dif cult to grant aid to Iran President Eisenhower asserted at the Governors Conference in Seattle on 4 August that the_United States by and watch Asmumnt ei t behind the Iron Curtain 34 Ibicl S Wisner's idea of the public probably was narrow Most Americans did not read The New York Times and could not have told him whether Iran was in the Middle East 49 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017I11I17 001267813 C01269967 33 0 mid Winner s Idea uflhe public probably was narrow Most Americans did not read The New York Timeund could not have told him whether Iran was in the Middle East SouthAmorlea or North Carolina 49 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 301267813 TOP SECRET -Just before midnight on 7175 August Eol Nassiri set out with two truclrs of soldiers a rrest Mossadeq When Nassiri arrived at Mossadeq s home to deliver the nnans and arrest the Prime Minister he found himself surrounded and arrested instead S TrooPS loyal to Mossudeq took the other participants into custody by early morning Sunday 16 August By 0500 pro Mossadeq troops and tanks ringed the Prime Minister s house At 0545 Radio Tehran announced that the government had foiled a coup 38 Riahi informed the commanders of all military formations of the attempted coup and ordered them to monitor morale in their units and to prevent disorder and disturbance in their areas Riahi s and Mossadeq's quick reactions effectively emasculated the military s participation in TPAJ AX U The original plan for a military operation had failed abysmally Upon hearing of Nassiri's arrest the principal anti-Mossadeq gures lost their courage For example General Batmangelich who was to have captured Riahi s headquarters turned back when he saw the troops surrounding the building Batmangelich and Col Akhavi soon found themselves under arrest The Shah for his part left the summer palace in the suburbs of Tehran and ew to Baghdad via Ramsar 50 TOP SECRET Approved or Release 201 7 1 1117 001267813 C01269967 U The ongtnal plan foramilitary operation had failed abysmally Upon hearing of Nassiri's arrest the principal anti-Mossadeq gures lost their courage For example General Batmangelich who was to have captured Riahi's headquarters turned back when he saw the troops surrounding the building Batmangellch and Col Aklmvi soon found themselves under arrest The for his part left the summer palace in the suburbs of Tehran and ew in Baghdad via Ramsar 50 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017111 C01267813 TOP SECRET S The Shah's ight to Baghdad was no surprise given his temperament and his inability to withstand any kind of measure IheShahJater momma as nannilheooemtimwl 39In his memoirs the Shah said However following a pre-armnged plan the Queen and I had left Tehran before learning of the revolution s success It had been decided weeks before that if Mossadegh should use force to resist his deposition we would temporarily leave the country I had decided upon this move because I believed that it would force Mossadegh and his henchmen to show their real allegiances and that thereby it would help Persian public opinion Co 196 p 104 5i TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1111 601267813 C01269967 before leamingoftherevolu on's success lthadbeendecidedwedcs befote MifMossadeghshoulduse fueetoresist hlsdepositlom we would tanporarilyleavetheoum Ihaddecideduponthismove show their real allegiances and that thereby it would help Pasianpublicopinion Pahla m z r Cumyi% Hutchinson p 104 51 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001257513 TOP SECRET if Ambassador enderson Who had left iron to istance himself from the operation returned to Tehran on 16 August He immediately sought and received an audience with Mossadeq The ambassador asked the Prime Minister if he believed the Shah had issued orders dismissing him and appointing Zahedi Mossadeq replied that he had never seen such documents that he would not believe them if he saw them and that in any event the Shah was powerless to dismiss him According to Mossadeq the Shah could not on his own authority demand a change in the govemment Notwithstanding the Iranian constitution s provision that the prime minister serves at the pleasure of the monarch Mossadeq contended that his power came from the people rather than the Shah 42 U At noon on Sunday 16 August Mossadeq issued a brief statement over Radio Tehran According to the will of the people expressed by referendum the l7th Majlis is dissolved Elections for the 18th session will be held soon Minister of Foreign Affairs Hoseyn Fatemi held a press conference that afternoon in which he reviewed the events of the coup and announced that the Acting Minister of Court Abul Ghassem Amini had been H W Brands inside the lay Henderson and the Rkise a he Kmericau Empire 1918-1961 New York Oxford University Press 1991 pp 235 285 52 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1 1 17 001267813 U Ambassador Henderson who had left Iran to distance himself from the operation returned to Tehran on 16August He immediately sought and received an audience with Mossadeq The ambassador asked the Prime Minister if he believed the i had issued orders dismissing him and appointing Zahedi Mossadeq replied that he had never seen such documents that he would not believe them if he saw them and that in any event the '__ lnas powerless to dismiss him According to Mossadeq the could not on his own authority demand a change in the government Notwithstanding the Iranian constitution s provision that the prime minister serves at the pleasure of the monarch Mossadeq contended that his power came from the people rather than the 342 U At noon on Sunday l August Mossadeq issued a brief statement over Radio Tehran According to the will of the people expressed by referendum the 17th Majlis is dissolved Elections for the 18th session will be held soon Minister of Foreign Affairs Hoseyn Fatemi held a press conference that afternoon in which be reviewed the events of the coup and announced that the Acting Minister of Court Abul Ghassem Amini had been H W the Cold War-dayHeuder-mn and the is aft re American Empire 1918-1961 New York Ox deniversity Pull I991 P11 235 255 52 Approved for Release 2017111117 001267813 TOP SECRET arrested43 Fatemi made several violent speeches virulently attacking the Shah and 0 11 downs44 arr'esttul 43 Fatemi made several violent speeches virulently attacking the and ordered the monarch'l statutes In Tehran torn down U Washington Reacts S Nassiri s arrest and the subsequent roundup of many anti-Mossadeq principals shook of cial Washington A US Embassy cable to Washington on l6 August blamed the coup attempt's failure squarely on the commonly appreciated dif culty in operating when confronted by current Iranian incapacity for large scale organized effort under clandestine conditions and when confronted by unforeseen difficulties 6 S Without knowing the extent of American involvement in the move against Mossacleq CIA's Office of Current Intelligence 0C1 analyzed the consequences of the failed military coup An OCI assessment in the Current Intelligence Bulletin on 16 August stressed Mossadeq s continued mastery of the situation According to OCI the Prime Minister could be expected to move against his enemies and proceed arbitrarily The shah s ight the involvement of the commander of the imperial guards as leader of the coup and the imperial decrees to remove Mossadeq and appoint General Zahedi prime minister OCI asserted present Mossadeq with the opportunity of reducing the Shah s position still further or attempting to eliminate the monarchy altogether 48 C On 17 August OCI published a more analysis opining that the coup s failure had broken the will of Mossadeq s opposition In the view no group appeared willing to act after Mossadeq apparently had some ringleaders under 45 5 TEHE 724 8 August I953 46 5 TEI-IE 704 16 August 1953 See Appendix for a discussion of the limited role that ClA s analytical components played before and during the operation 48 TS Of ce of Current Intelligence Current Intelligence Bulletin 16 August 1953TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1 1 17 C01267513 Approved or Release 2017 11 17 601267813 TOP SECRET arrest and forced others into hiding Even if such a group emerged 0C1 was pessimistic about its chances for success 49 C 0C1 thought the Shah's involvement had created new dangers for the monarchy and amounted to an open invitation for Mossadeq to proceed against him If the Prime Minister did not succeed in forcing the Shah to abdicate he will manage to strip from the monarch the remaining vestiges of pOWer Mossadeq 0C1 concluded may be expected to retain political control but will probably assume a more dictatorial position and indulge in more chicanery to maintain himself 50 The situation seemed irretrievable to US unwitting of plans to try again Assessment of th_e lranian Situz nn 17 August 1953 Of ce Intelligence Ibid 54 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 001267813 C01269967 7 2 7 3 6 8 Approved for Release 2017711117 601267813 TOP SECRET Chapter 4 U Victory S The US Embassy in Tehran may have been ready to write off TPAJAX but Kermit Roosevelt was not He knew that the elements for success were still present even though the anti-Mossadeq Iranian military leadership had collapsed i gnominiously at the rst hint of resistance Mossadeq remained politically isolated and the military for all its inactivity was basically pro-Shah S CIA no longer viewed TPAJ AX as a military coup it was now a political action designed to swing the Iranian military away from the illegal Mossadeq government and place the armed forces squarely and actively behind the Shah and the legal Zahedi government Inducing the military to move in this direction would require a rapid concentrated and effectively improvised warfare campaign to publicize the notion that Mossadeq had launched a coup against the legitimate government Roosevelt wanted to control events to the extent possible but he was also prepared to react to them and take advantage of uid situations U Sunday 16 August Roosevelt and the Station Regroup U Roosevelt knew he held at least two powerful cards in the Shuh's mmns Although Zahedi was hiding from Mossadeq under the Iranian Constitution he was the legal Prime Minister of Iran and Mossadeq was not Roosevelt was convinced that if he could publicize and emphasize that theme Mossudeq could not retain his illegal grip on powerior mg i Love covered the entire crisis for The New York Times His reports made the front pages of the newspaper from 17-24 August 1953 TOP SECRET Approved or Release 2017 1 1117 001267813 C01269967 Chapter 4 U Victory 3 U Sunday 16 August Roosevelt and the Station Regroup U Roosevelt knew he held at least two powerful cards in the D s rmons Although Zahedi was hiding from Mossadeq under the Iranian Constitution he was the legal Prime Minister of than and Mossadeq was not Roosevelt was convinced that if he could publicize and emphasize that theme Mossadeq could not retain his illegal grip on power for long I 1 0 Love covered the entire crisis for TheNew York limes His rqiurlsmade the ront page of the newspaper 'om 17-24 August 1953 l C01267813 Approved for Release 201 7 1 1 17 001267813 TOP SECRET 56 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 C01269967 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 1111 001267813 TOPSECRET 37 TOPSECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 C01269967 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 1 1I17 001267813 TOPSECRET 58 TOPSECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 301267813 C01269967 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 TOP SECRET 59 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01257813 C01269967 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017 11l17 001267813 TOP SECRET U TEXT BOX Terrible Terrible Coincidence in Rome U When the Shah arrived in Rome on 18 August CIA faced a potential disaster By coincidence Allen Dulles was there on vacation When the Shah checked into the Excelsior Hotel Dulles was standing next to him trying to do the some thing U John Waller remembers that he got a call from Frank Wisner between 0200 and 0300 Wisner was agitated He s gone to Rome Wisner told Waller terrible terrible coincidence occurred Can you guess what it is Waller could not U Well Wisner continued he went to the Excelsior Hotel to book a room with his bride and the pilot there were only three of them and he was crossing the street on his way into the hotel Guess can you tell me i don't want to say it over the phone can you imagine what may have happened Think of the worst thing you can think of that happened U Waller said He was hit by a cab and killed U No no no no Wisner responded impatiently by this time almost wild with excitement Well John maybe you don t know that Dulles had decided to extend his vacation by going to Rome Now can you imagine what happened U Waller answered Dulles hit him with his car and killed him U Wisner did not think it was funny They both showed up at the reception desk at the Excelsior at the very same moment And Dulles had to say After you your Majesty 25 U The meeting between Dulles and the Shah was completely fortuitous but fraught with embarrassment for the US Govemment and CIA had the news media learned of it They did not so the incident passed unnoticed Wisner's reaction strongly suggests that the meeting was coincidental It was unlikely that he would have called Waller at 0200 in a panic and revealed sensitive infomtation over an open telephone line if there had been a plan for the DCI to meet the Shah in Rome 25 1 In writing ofthis incident in Gentleman Spy The life of Allen Dulles Peter Gross says that Of all the conspiracy theories that later swirled around the personage of Allen Dulles none has made a convincing case to accommodate this unfortunate proximity Peter Grose Gentleman Spy the Life of Allen Dulles Boston Houghton Mif in 994 p 367 60 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017711117 001267813 C01269967 U TEXT BOX Terrible Terrible Coincidence in Rome U When the arrived inRome on I8 August CIAfaced a potential disaster By coincidence DCI Allen Dulles was there on vacation When the checked into Excelsior Hotel Dulles was standing next to him trying to do the same thing U John Waller remembers that he got a callfrom Frank Wlsner between 0200 and 0300 Wisnerwas agitated He s gone to Rome Wiener told Waller terrible terrible coincidence occurred Can you guess what it is Waller Could not U Well Wisnercontinued he went to the Excelsior Hotel to book a room with his bride and thepilot there were only three i them and he was crossing the street on his way into the hotel Guess can you tell me I don 't mat tosay it over the phone can you imagine what may have happened Think of the worst thing you can think of that happene U Wallersaid Hewas hit by a cab and killed U No no no no Wisner responded impatiently by this time almost wild with excitement WellJohn maybe you don t know that Dulles had decided to extend his location by going to Rome Now can you imagine what happened U Walleranswered Dulleshit him with his car and killed him U Wlsnerdid not think it wasfunny They both showed up at the reception task at the Excelsior at the very same moment And Dulles had to say 'After you your Mateo- '25 U The meeting between Dulles and the i 3 was completebtfortuitous but 'mught with embarrassmenfor the US Government and CIA had the news media learned If it They did not so the incidentpassed unnoticed Wisner s reaction strongly suggests hat the meeting was coincidental It was unlikely that he would have called Wallerat 7200 in a pan lo and revealed sensitive in eration over an open telephone line i there Ed been a plan for the to meet the in Rome 3 250 1 In writing of this incident in Gentleman Spy The life dAllen Dulles Peter Grose says tint the conspiracy theories that later swirled around theperlonageofAlleu Dulles none has made a convincing can to ammodate this unfortunate proximity Peter Grose Gentleman Spy theLt ofAllen Dulles Boston Houghton Mimiu 1994 p 367 60 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 TOP SECRET 6 1 TOP SECRET Approved for Retease 2017111117 C0126781 3 C01269967 61 1 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017 1111 001267813 TOPSECRET 5f TOPSECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 CD1267813 C012 69967 62 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11117 001267813 TOP SECRET U At this point members of Iranian Zriirrkhaneii exercise wrestlers and combats appeared at the head of the crowd Their involvement was almost certainly the work of the Rashidian brothers and was a brilliant stroke that showed a profound understanding of Iranian U Iranians idolize acrobats and weightlifters in the same way that many Americans idolize baseball basketball or football players The sight of these men tumbling or exercising in unison with dumbbells drew a crowd in an astonishingly short time Moreover the country s most famous athlete Shaban Bi Mohk Shaban the Brainless Jaffari was in the lead and began chanting pro-Shah slogans The effect was electrifyina 36 51 the influence of the mullahs on the demonstration was clear Holy enhad galvanized many of the poor of South Tehran by hammering on the themes that the Soviet-backed Communists were taking over the Shah was gone and Mossadeq was to blame The streets of Tehran which had belonged to the Tudeh 24 hours earlier now belonged to a different crowd The few Tudeh members appearing on the streets around mid moming 19 August saw that they were hopelessly outnumbered and lost their enthusiasm for a confrontation They were swept away like so much chaff U The swelling crowd headed for the offices of the pro-Mossadeq and anti- Amerioan newspaper Baklrrar Emruz Security forces watched passively as the crowd demolished the newspaper s of ce By 1000 the crowd was headed for Mossadeq s residence at 109 Kakh Palace Street which was ringed with tanks and troops loyal to the Prime Minister U The troops guarding the residence were unsure of what was happening When confronted with the large angry crowd some of the soldiers opened re The ghting escalated as pro-Shah troops retumed re Mossadeq climbed over the wall surrounding his hog 3 1M escaped 63 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 17 001267813 C01269967 U At this paint members of Iranian Zuhrkhaneh exercise wrestlers and acrobats ppemed at the head of the crowd Their involvement was almost work of the Rashidian brothers and was a brilliant stroke that showed a profound understanding of Iranian U In nidolize acrobats and weightli ers in the same way that many Americans idolim baseball basketball or football players The sight of these men tumbling or exercising in artisan with dumbbells drew a crowd in El astonishingly short time Moreover the country s most famous athlete Shaban Bi Mohlt Shahan the Brainless Ja ari was in the lead and began chanting pro-Shah slogans The e ect was - 36 U The swelling crowd beam for the of ces of the pro Mossadeq and anti- American newspaper Bakhtar Emma Security forces watched passively as the crowd demolished the newspaper s of ce By 1000 the crowd was headed for Mossadeq s residence at 109 Kakh Palace which was ringed with tanks and troops loyal to the Prime Minister U The troops guarding the residence were unsure of what was happening When confronted with the large anarycrowd some of the soldiers opened re The ghting escalated as pro-Shah troops returned re Mossadeq climbed over the wall surrounding his house and restrained E 63 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017111117 001267813 TOP SECRET U The size and fervor of the demonstra ons were criticiin encouraging the I military to come down on the side of the Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi Although some members of the of cer corps opposed Mossadcq Roosevelt could not be certain that their units would follow their orders in the absence of evidence that the general population would back them up The Iranian army has a long tradition of waiting to see who controls the streets before it acts S By 1130 the military evidently had concluded that Mossadeq was through Truckloads of pro-S hah soldiers sped through the streets of Tehran and many troops joined the mobs that were shouting Zendcbad Shah while waving pictures of the monarch 38 5 lbid pp 10-1 1 39 8 lbid p ll 40 3 lbid p 12 64 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017l11 17 201267813 C01269967 U The size and fervor of the demonstrations were critical in encouraging the military to come down on the side of the Sand Prime Minister Zahedi Although some members of the of cer corps opposed Mossadeq Roosevelt could not be certain that their units would follow their orders in the absence of evidence that the general population would back them up The Iranian army has a long tradition of waiting to see who controls the streets before it acts 33 3 Ibid pp to 39 5 Jill p 11 40 8 we 51 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017I11l17 601267813 TOP SECRET U The broadcast in the afternoon of 19 August was confused and chaotic but there was no doubt that pro-Shah forces had captured and were controlling Radio Tehran The first indication came when the announcer said Tl-re people of Tehran have risen today and occupied all the government of ces and I am able to talk to you all through the help of the armed forces The government of Mossadeq is a government of rebellion and has fallen 41 Seven minutes later amid much confusion and shouting on the air 8 Col Ali Pahlavon said U Oh people of the cities be wide awake The government of Mossadeq has been defeated My dear compatriots listenl I am one of the soldiers and one of the devotees of this country 0h of cers a number of traitors like Hoscyn Fatemi wants to sell out the country to the foreigners U My dear compatriots today the Iranian royalists have defeated the demagogue government by which Fatemi was ruling The Iranian nation of cers army and the police have taken the situation in their hands U Premier Zahedi will assume his post There is no place for anxiety Keep tranquil 42 U The broadcast stopped After seven minutes it continued with a woman shouting U on people of Iran let the Iranian nation prove that the foreigners cannot capture this Iranians love the King 0h tribes of Iran Mossadeq is ruling over your country without your knowledge sending your country to the government of the hammer and sickle 43 U A major from the Iranian army said that he was an infantry of cer retired by Mossadcq the traitor We proved to the world that the Iranian army is the protector of this country and is under the command of the Shah Much confusion followed after which Radio Tehran played the national anthem and then went off the air 44 U Wednesday Afternoon 19 August Zendebad Shah I 4 Intercept from Tehran Iranian Home Service 9 August 1953 200 GMT Records of the Directorate of Operations I ob 79-01228A Box 11 Folder 14 ARC Intercept from Tehran Iranian Home Service 19 August 953 1207 GMT Records of the Directorate of Operations Job 79-01228A Box I 1 Folder I4 ARC Intercept from Tehran Iranian Home Service 19 August 1953 1214 GMT Records of the Directorate of Operations ob 79-01228A Box 11 Folder ARC 44w lbid Radio Tehran went off the air at 222 GMT 65 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 201267513 C01269967 U The broadcast in the a cmoon of 19 August was confused and chaotic but there was no doubt that pro-Shah forces had captured and Were controlling Radio Tehran The rst indication came when the announcer said The people of Tehran have risen today and occupied all the government of ces and I am able to la'lkto you all through the help of the armed forces The government of Mossadeq is a government of rebellion and has fallen Seven minutes later amid much confusion and shouting on the air a Col Ali Pshlavon said U Oh people ofthe cities wide awake 'I'hegovemmentof My dearoompahiotsdistenl I moneof the soldiers undone of the dcvotccsof this county 0ho ioers a sell the foreigners IDMydesrcompatriots todaythe Iranianroyalistshavc The Iranian nation of cers army and the police have taken the nitration in theirhands assumchispost Thereisnoplacefor amticty U stopped Alter seven minutes itcontinued with a woman shouting U foreigners cmrnot capture this Iranians love the King 0h tribes of IraLMossadeqts ruling over your country without your howlitalge sending your the government of the hammer and sickle U A major from the Iranian army said that he was an infantry of cer retired by Mossadeq the traitor We proved to the world that the Iranian army is the protector of this country and is under the command of the Much confusion followed alter which Radio Tehran played the national anthem and then went off the air 4 In Intercept Iranian Horne Service 19 August 1953 1200 GMT Records of the Dnectotated'Operstions Job 79mm Box ll Foldcr 42oz Intercept from Tehran Iranian Home Service 19 August 1953 1201 GMT Records ofthe Directorate of Operations Job worms Box 11 Folder MARC 43_ 11 Intercept 'omTehran IranianI-Iune Service 19 August 1953 1214 GMT Records ofthe Ducctmate of Operations Job MIMA Box II Folder 44 1 Ibid RndioTehran watt 05' the air at 1222 GMT 65 C01269967 0 2 67 8 1 3 Approved for Release 2017l11l17 001267813 TOP SECRET U Zahe egan broadcasting mat he was the legally appointed head of the U Zahcdi began broadcasting that he was the legally appointed head of the govemment 48 He also promised to Roosevelt's chagrin that he would boost living govemmenL He also promised to Roosevelt s chagrin that he would boost living standards provide free health services to the poor and modernize agriculture 49 standards provide free health services to the poor and modernize agriculture 9 48 U According to the State Department the Embassy monitor reponed failedFe transmission 48 U AWE to the State W s Embasy monitorteported M'sh'msmission as follows Dear compatriots Compatnots In the name of Almighty 1 address you In the name addressyou I have been appointed your Prime Minister by order of His Majesty Ihavebeen appomwd mm Past governments have made many promises but have achieved very little Past n'me er on 'a ers pom 5 serviceifor my program are Rule of law nusmg standard of free health servrces for all mechanization of agriculture'road consu'uction public security individual all mechanization of agriculture road construction public security individual and social freedom cooperative docie w and social freedom cooperative societies Long in Mohamed Rem _ Pahlcvi Long live Mohamed Reza Shah Pahlcvi- Telegram anS EmbassyTehranto Secretaryof State No 406 19 August 1953 National Telegram from US Embassy Tehran to Secretary of State No 406 19 August 1953 National Archives RG 319 Entry 51 box 27 Archives RG 319 Entry 57 box 27 66 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1111 601267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11117 001267813 TOP SECRET 61 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111 001267813 C01269967 57 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 801267813 TOP SECRET 33 We air at t is point was still in'liome Fit rst Rm a s sa dor HendErso de' not want the monarch back in Tehran until popular pressure or his return became overwhelming 54 Washington however thought it was a good idea for the Shah to return as soon as possible The State Department had reversed itself and now was strongly urging the Iranian ruler to make a statement thanking his people for their support and promising to return CIA Headquarters added that We feel it extremely important for Shah to return immediately since issue is still in doubt and his presencejust might make all the difference 55 S State favored pressuring the Shah if he hesitated Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith wanted to remind Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of two points 1 his actions were constitutional legal and in keeping with Iranian practice and tradition and 2 had he stayed in Tehran perhaps the earlier military coup attempt would have TEHE 745 19 August 1953 55 5 Dir 16330 I9 August 1953 68 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1 1117 301267813 C012 69967 $8 C01269967 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017111117 001267813 TOP SECRET succeeded The initial failure Smith thought was in part a result of the Shah s sudden departure leaving behind only pieces of paper which are not too meaningful or forceful in Intuit besueLalone ullemheLare the subiept of controversy as to their l 'tyj m he arrived in the Iranian capital on Saturday 22 August to a tumultuous and emotional welcome-57 His plane stopped in front of the ranks of the Imperial Guard drawn up to greet their sovereign and commander Kennett Love described the scene for The New York Times as the new Prime Minister met the Shah s airplane U General Zahedi half-entered the plane and kissed the Shah's knee then backed from the door to allow the 34-year-old Emperor to descend The Shah lmlel m m me 13mm the D's mi'l'he mlzl wore the gold-braided blue gray uniform of the Air Force Commander in Chief the gold-Emidedghteow 6 mdfo te wm I Chi that had been specially own to Baghdad for his return His eyes were moist and inthad been specially 0 51 sz I I xhis rl 0mm eyes laws and his mouth was set in an effort to control his emotions 58 his mouth was setin an effort to 0011110le emotions 53 The Mossadeq era was over 59 The Mossadeq era was over 59 Tehran 19 August 1953 7 The points that Smith wanted to impress upon the Shah came from the Iranian ambassador in Washington 57 3 TEHE 749 20 August 1953 Tim-e L053 b 69 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 001267813 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017 1 1l17 001267813 TOP SECRET S CIA estimated that the short term prospects for Zahedi's government were good Although many Iranians will regret the downfall of Mossadeq and will thus provide a source of future opposition to the new regime most of this group will probably acquiesce at least temporarily in the change The Tudeh Party lost much of its support in the upsurge of anti-Communist pro-Shah sentiment CIA thought the Tudeh unlikely to recover its support in the near future Znhedi faced a formidable task in dealing with the disparate elements responsible for Mossadeq's downfall and he probably could not count on the Shah s strong support The Shah had never supported any of his past pn mc ministersconsistentlLand CIA dithQleliexetl w minim-60 l 50 8 Of ce of National Estimates The Current Outlook in Iran SE49 26 August 1953 70 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 CO1 267813 C01269967 TD C01269967 Approved for Release 2017i11t17 601267813 TOP SECRET Chapter 5 Chapter 5 U Aftermath U Aftermath U Zahedi Consolidates His Government S The situation in Tehran was still uid and no one knew if the Tudeh might try to instigate an armed revolt against Zahedi that could have led to civil war Neither Zahedi nor his new military Chief of Staff Gen Batmangelich wanted to take any chances Batmangelich spent the rst two days of his tenure as Chief of Staff ordering selected Iranian Army units to Tehran Batmangelich may have intended to augment the security forces already in or enroute to Tehran or he may have wanted to ensure enough show troops to greet the Shah when he returned S Batman gelich ordered battalions from Isfahan Kennan Tabriz and Khorramabad to leave their garrisons for Tehran These cities are widely separated and cover the country from the northwest to the southeast The Chief of Staff may have ordered other units as well but there is no evidence supporting additional troop movements of additional units 5 Each battaliOn enroute to Iran s capital had 358 enlisted men 79 non- commissioned of cers and ve or six of cers They left with weapons full equipment provisions for two days and one fire unit of ammunition Batmangelich was anxious that the units arrive in Tehran on time and ordered them to report their progress while enroute TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01257B13 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 1 1117 cat 267813 TOP SECRET U The different and widely separated home garrisons of the battalions made them unlikely co-conspirators against the new regime The chance that any of these battalions would refuse to follow Zahedi s orders was remote U The ve brigades in the Tehran gan'ison had not covered themselves with glory during the civil unrest ousting Mossadeq and Batmangelich and Zahedi no doubt thought it pmdent to have other troops in the capital who probably would not hesitate to crush a Tudeh led coup attempt Batmungelich clearly intended these forces for more than ceremonial purposes troops do not parade or pass in review with live ammunition S Mossadeq s fall did not mean an immediate end to the problems that had bedeviled Iran s relations with the West Almost immediately after TPAJAX Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Henry Byroade wrote a memorandum addressing two issues How will the change in government affect Iranian policies and what attitude should the US Government lake toward the Zahedi government l U Byroade noted that a revolution of nationalism was sweeping Asia and that any effective leader had to base his program on nationalist aspirations or face political suicide Zahedi therefore was not likely to reverse many of Mossadeq's policies Byroade warned that American policymakers would be unwise to assume Iran will turn a new face toward the West in the immediate future Nonetheless he argued Zahedi merited American support His fall in Byroadc s opinion would open the way to chaos and a struggle for power in which only the Tudeh organization would be likely to win 2 U Two complications affected American support for the new Iranian Prime Minister Zahedi lacked solid political support in his own right He could expect the Shah to thwart his efforts to create a strong government since the Shah distrusted any strong leader or anyone who might emerge as a strong leader U Zahcdi s options were limited He could not become a military dictator as long as the military remained loyal to the Shah nor could he seek broad based civilian support without calling for new Majlis elections The Majlis was notorious in Byroade s words for its destructive criticism and there was no guarantee that a new Majlis would cooperate with Zahcdi In short Byroade wrote there is no cause for jubilation that our problems are ended in Iran On the contrary the future can be expected to bear remarkable similarity to the recent past 3 It Was a sobering antidote to the euphoria at the highest levels of CIA l U Memorandum from Henry Byroade NEA to Mr Bowie SIP Iran 21 August 1953 RG 59 Records of the State Department Records of the Of ce of Greek Turkish and Iranian Affairs Lot 57 529 Box 40 NARA 2w lbid Ibid 72 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 C01267813 C01269967 U The different and widely separated home garrisons of the battalions made then unlikely coconspirators against the new regime The chance that any of these battalions would re ise to follow Zahedi's orders was remote U The ve brigades in the Tehran garrison had not covered themselves with glory during the civil unrest ousting Mossadeq and Batmangelich and Zahedi no doubt thought it prudent to have other troops in the capital who probably would not hesitate to crush a Tndeh-led coup attempt Bamnngelich clearly intended these forces for more than ceremonial purposes troops do not parade or pass in review with live ammunition - any to base hisprogram on nationalist aspirations or face political suicide Zahedi therefore was not likely to reverse many of Mossadeq s policies Byroade warned that American policymakers would be unwise to assume I'm will turn a new face toward the West in the immediate future Nonetheless he argued Zahedi merited American support His fall in Byroade s opinion would open the way to chaos and a struggle for power in which only the Tudeh organim on would be likely to win - U Two complications American support for the new mumPrime Minister Zahedi lacked solid political support in his own right He could expect the I Jto thwart his efforts to create a strong government oineothe fjdistrusted any strong leader r anyone who might emerge as a strong leader CU Zahedi's options were limibd He could not become a military dictator as long as the military remained loyal to the nor could he seek broad-based civilian support without for new Majlis elections The Majlis was notorious in Byroade's words for its dcsu'uctive criticism and there was no guarantee that anew Majlis would cooperate Mili'tZahedi In short Byroade wrote there is no cause forjubilalion that our problems are coded in Inn On the contrary the future canbe expected to bar remarkable similarity to the recent past 3 It was a sobering antidote to the euphoria at the highest levels of CIA l U Manonodum from Henry to Mr Bowie SIP 21 August 1953 RG 59 Records of the Slate Departmult Records of the n ofGreek Turkish and hail 51 1 529 30140 m Ibid 3 0 Ibid 72 C01267813 Approved for Release 001267813 TOP SECRET 73 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01269967 73 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 1111 001267813 TOP SECRET 74 TOP Approved for Release 2017 1 1117 C01267813 C01269967 74 C012678l3 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 301267813 TOP SECRET 75 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267B13 C01269967 y-ux-uw-u v Wham-4 I I m 0 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017l11l17 001267813 TOP SECRET U The Tudeh Party 131 1 qu leMeludehfmv S In NovemBer 1953 he Tmteiligence communityjudged that thTuaeh s disarray made it unlikely that the Party would seize power In a National Intelligence 76 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1111 C01267813 C01269967 l iui mid 76 - 7 8 2 6 1 3 Approved for Release 2017111117 001267813 TOP SECRET Estimate entitled Probable Deveiopmems in Iran Through 1954 ONE wrote that the Tudeh had been seriously disrupted with many of its most active members under arrest Zahcdi moreover had purged known Tudeh sympathizers from government agencies Even so in view the Tudeh was not impotent and still remained capable of sabouzee and terrorism 21 Of ce of National Estimates NEE-102 Probable Developments in Iran Through 1954 16 November 1953 p 2 Records of the Office of National Estimates Directorate of Intelligence ARC 77 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017111117 301267813 C01269967 E Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 TOP SECRET U Until the archives ofthe former Soviet Union are fully opened it will be tmpOSSIble for scholars to know the exact reasons why the Tudeh did not act Perhaps U Until the archives ofthe former Soviet Union arefully opened itwill be Bahrami was right in suggesting that it was only because the Tudeh was unprepared but impossible for scholars to know the exact reasons Why the 'I udeh did not act Perhaps the reasons are probably more complex Stalin had been dead for only ve months and Bahrami was rightin it was only because the Tudehnaa pm but the new leaders were probably reassessing his policies They almost certainly recognized the reasons are probably more complex 5mm bum dead for only ve months and the importance of Iran to the United States and to the Soviet Union but may have been the new leaders were probably Whit policies They almost certainly recognized unsure how much freedom of action they had In any event since the Tudeh was so the importance of Iran to the United States and to the Soviet Union but may have been closely directed from Moscow it is unlikely that the Iranian Communists decided on their unsure how much freedom of action they had In any event since the Tudch wasso own thOJtOlhit tE closely directed from Moscow it is unlikely that the Iranian Communists decided on their own to do nothing C U Whatever ill effects or career damage Lavrenticv suffered from Mossadeq s fall were temporary He eventually returned to his post in Tehran and stayed until May 1955 when MOSCOW recalled him to participate in a commission trying to resolve outstanding SoyieL Iranianbordcnand financiaLdEDLBS 3 U Whatever ill effects or career damage Lamntiev suffered from Mossadeq s fall were temporary He eventually tetra-nod to his post in Tehran and stayed until May l955 when Moscow recalled him to participate in a commission trying to resolve outstandin Snviet-Tranian border and nancial dismm-s 4 i U Kermit Roosevelt S The American intelligence and diplomatic communities feted Kermit Roosevelt when he retumed to Washington It is no exaggeration to say that TPAJAX owed its success to him inasmuch as Headquarters and the State Department were ready to abandon the project after the initial failure on 15 August Roosevelt had quickly seen that the essence of the operation had changed into a political action Success came from 7s 73 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1 1I17 001267813 7 0 2 6 8 3 Approved for Release 2017 1111 001267813 TOP SECRET his initiative quick thinking calm analysis and ability to recognize turning points and act decisively upon them S Although CIA did not conduct an investigation or post-monem analysis of the operation to determine what the Agency did wrong and what it did right Roosevelt in September 1953 talked about his role in TPAJAX before a group that included President Eisenhomencretarv of StatrLDulles the Cabinet the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others Roosevelt kept his audience enthralled for two hours and emphasized that the operation had succeeded because it enjoyed the support of the Iranian army and the people It also succeeded because he did not have Washington second- guessing his every move Cables from Tehran were scare during the critical days of 16- 19 August for a good reason Gentlemen Roosevelt joked to general applause made a point of not letting you know what was happening No one seemed more amused than Allen Dulles 26 S Roosevelt cautioned his audience not to draw the wrong lessons from TPAJ AX Now we ll think we can walk on water everywhere he said and we ve got to be careful and restrain ourselves S Roosevelt had long thought that contradictions in American foreign policy would continue to make covert action necessary In 1952 he wrote that at least in the Middle East as long as American words do not match American deeds so long will our orthodox diplomacy in the area be hamstrung and our reliance upon clandestine operations increase 28 Outside the Middle East he wrote strategic considerations chiefly the fear of losing French or British support for NATO often require or seem to require our pursuit of a policy which alienates large segments of the lslamic-Asian world Roosevelt also believed that the United States had a tendency to develop policy in terms of irrelevant traditional formulae 29 U Secretary of State Dulles did not heed Roosevelt s admonition The Secretary was already contemplating a similar operation in a country half a world away from Iran and much closer to borne 3o Of cials in Directorate of Plans had been working since 1952 on schemes to depose Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Like Mossadcq Arbenz was willing to turn a blind to Communist machinations in his country Unlike Mossadeq however Arbenz appeared to be a Communist sympathizer Even the most bitter anti-Mossadeq partisans did not claim the Iranian Prime Minister was a Communist or a sympathizer 31 28 0 Kermit Roosevelt Chief Division of Near East and Africa Directorate of Plans Memorandum Problems Confronting NEA DJLsiont 7 October 195 lbid Kermit Roosevelt Countercoup The Struggle for the Control oflran New York 79 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01269967 II sec-um u malf- Uunw um nut ecu Roosevelt s admonition The Secretary was already contemplating a similar operation in a country half a world away from Iran and much closer to home Of cials in CIA's Directorate of Plans had been working since 19520n schemes to deposc Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Like Mossadeq Arbenz was willing to turn a blind to Communist machinations in his country Unlike Mossadeq however Arbenz appeared to be a Communist sympathizer Even the most bitter snti-Mossadeq partisans did not claim the kanlanPrime Minister was a Communist or a '1 Wu maul Roosevelt Counter-coup msa-nglefor the Conn-o afIrau New Yoda MoGraw-Hil 1979 P- 210 79 C01269967 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 1111 601267813 TOP SECRET 3 U Roosevelt s knowledge of the Middle East gave him the con dence to play the situation in Iran by car without much Headqimrtm's involvement His lack of Latin TI Roosevelt' 5 knowledge ofthef liddle East gave him We con dence to play the situation in Iran by car without much Headquarters involvement His lack of Latin American expertise would have preclumd a similar approach in dealing with GuatemalaAmerican expertise would have precluded a smile approach In dealing Guatemala gingeipg Headquarters would necessanly have been tighter restricting his freedom of Control from Hea wouldn 'Iy havcbeen tighter restricting his freedom of U There was another important distinction between ran and Guatemala mowing was another im 113m distinction between remand Guatemala Arbenz controlled a comparatively stable Guatemalan Government Mossadoq presided over a controlled 3 com aretivel stablePG uatemalnn Gov ent Messed sided a shambles At the start of 1953 according to Iranian specialist Kuross A Samii Iran 1 es aecording to mmilsmp'ml alistKuroEXreSmnii Iran resembled an old ship swept away by a storm with no one aboard capable of dealing with resembled an old ship swept awayby a storm with no one aboard capable of dealing with 32 S See Nicholas Cullather Operation PBSUCCESS The United States mid Guatemala 1 9 5- 1954 Washington DC CIA History Staff 1993 Piero Gleijeses Shattered Hope The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States 1944-1954 Princeton Princeton University Press l991 Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer Bitter Fruit The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala New York Doubleday and Richard H lmmen nan The CIA in Guatemala ag Foreign Policy oflmervenrirmLAustin University of Texas Press 1982 3 - Ibid 80 30 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1111 601267813 C01269967 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 TOP SECRET the attendant frenzy By August Mossadcq was barely holding on to the broken sails of his sinking ship Everything considered whatever might be said of the morality or the glz E By A'Tgust 3qu bias but 3 1 $1136 legality of American action it still should not be characterized as having overthrown a $5 90115 tever sat o mo ty stable regime in Iran 35 What worked in Iran Roosevelt sensed probably would not legality Of American raglan It still should not be charactenzed havrng ov uldwn a work in Guatemala because the circumstances were so different stable regtme Iran What worked Roosevelt probably wo no S Neither CIA nor the US Government heeded Roosevelt s warnings about the work 111 Guatemala because the were so dl mnt seductiveness and danger of covert action and PBSUCCESS went forward successfully With the overthrow of Athena many in the State Department and CIA thought American action had narrowly averted a Communist government in Guatemala The relative rapidity and ease with which TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS had acc0mplished their objectives however deceived CIA of cials They drew the erroneous lesson that the Agency could alter world events in the Third World at will and with minimal expense It would take the debacle at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 to vindicate Roosevelt but by then the man who had brought down Mossadeq had resigned from CIA 36 3 35CU Km A Sarnll Imiwmart Invitation American Strategies 4 Containment in Iran 35 1 Kuross A Samii Involvement By Invitation American Strategies of Containment in Iran UniversityPu-k PA University PMS 1937 P- 143- University Park PA The State University Press 1987 p 143 36 0 Mt Countercoupm 210- Roosevelt Countercorrp p 210 Ill 81 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 301269967 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017 1111 001267813 TO SECRET Chapter 6 Chapter 6 S Evaluating TPAJAX U During the 1979-81 Iranian hostage crisis a reponcr asked President Jimmy U During the 1979-81 Iranian hostage crisis areporter asked President Jimmy Caner whether he thought that it was proper for the United States to restore the Shah to Carter whether he thonght that it was proper for the United States to restore the to the throne in 1953 against the popular will within Iran Instead of correcting the the throne in 1953 against the popular Will within Ital Instead ofeorrectmg the reporter's loaded question the President replied That's ancient history and I don t think reporter's 195de queshon the Presnden replied That s ancient history and I don't think it s appropriate or helpful for me to go into the propriety of something that happened 30 appropnate 0 helpful for Inc 0 3 into the 0f that happened 30 years 9 807 years 830 U Many diplomatic historians intelligence historians and political scientists do P Many dlplofa historians 139111839 311 fem-19 s 10 not consider TPAJ AX ancient history Eighteen years after President Carter's remark 1 1 All glue mme- $3 3391' President Carter 8 remark the questions implicit in the reporter s query persist and continue to stir controversy questions up at 5 reporter 5 query continue t shroontroversy S The extensive secondary literature on TPAJAX and other American covert operations in the early 19505 focuses on a single issue whether stated or implied Was the operation in the US national interest With this question as a guide this chapter evaluates the covert action as its contemporaries saw it and as we View it retrospectively S TPAJAX and the National Interest the Contemporaneous View S Of cial Washington thought that TPAJAX was a stunning victory for the West The operation almost certainly prevented Iran from sliding into political anarchy and becoming a target too tempting for the Tudeh and its Soviet mentors to ignore In the short term a stable Zahedi Govemment permitted a rapid settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute thereby restarting the ow of oil and providing a much needed boost for the sagging Iranian economy 3 S At the time neither Washington nor London could foresee the Ion g range bene ts that would flow from TPAJAX The pro-Westem strongly anti-Communist PresidentJimmy Carter The President s News ConfereneeofFebnlary 13 1980Jublic i U President Jimmy Carter The President's News Conference of February 1980 Public my toner Papers afthe Presidents ofthe United States Jimmy Carter Book l January to May 23 980 Washington DC United States Government Printing Office l98l p 307 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 TOP SECRET policy of the Zahedi Government that the United States obtained at minimal cost2 would last for 26 years Secure in the knowledge that the US Would support Iran against the USSR the Shah was able to turn his attention to domestic matters He began a series of far-reaching modernization efforts including land reform and steps toward the emancipation of women U TPAJAX came at a time when the events in pre-war Europe were a fresh memory Americans had seen how Nazi subversion could destroy a country like Czechoslovakia They had seen the consequences of weakness and appeasement before Nazi and Japanese demands They had suffered the incalculable cost of failing to act when action might have stopped further aggression Many were determined never again to let the appearance of weakness and indecision encourage aggression U Neither the White House nor State Department had the slightest doubt that the Soviets coveted Iran and would do whatever they could short of war to bring that country within the Soviet orbit The Azeri crisis of 1947 showed that unless checked Stalin would continue to test the West's resolve U Stalin s death in March l953 added a dangerous element of ambiguity to Soviet intentions Who would succeed the late dictator the breaker of nations 3 Would Soviet policy become more or less aggressive Would the Soviets reoccupy Iranian Azerbaijan Would they encourage the Tudch to topple Mossadeq The White House the State Department and CIA struggled to nd answers to these questions U Sending American troops to Iran was never a practical option for logistical and political reasons An American military occupation almost certainly would have led to war The USSR would have invoked the terms of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship Between Iran and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and occupied the northem part of the country Iran would have been divided into a Communist north and a free south Fear of partition lay behind Washington s objection to the proposed British occupation of the port city of Abadan early in the oil nationalization crisis U A covert political operation promised to attain American foreign policy and strategic in objectives Iran without the threat of war CIA gave the Eisenhower administration exibility where diplomacy had failed and military action was not practical In addition CIA gave the US Government plausible deniabllity If a covert action went awry the President could deny American involvement With these considerations in mind and given the widely held Western outlook on the international 3 6 Historian Robert Conquest's term See Robert Conquest Slime Tracker amelions New York Viking Press l99l 83 TOP SECRET Approved or Release 2017l11l17 C01267813 C01269967 policy of the Zahedi Government that the United States obtained at minimal cost2 would last for 26 years Secure in the knowledge that the US would support Iran against the USSR the mares able to his attention to domestic matters He began a series of far-reaching modernization efforts including land reform and steps toward the emancipation of women U came at a time when the events in pro-war Europe were a fresh memory Americans had seen how that subversion could destroy a country like Czechoslovakia They had seen the consequences of weakness and appeasement before Nazi and Japanese demands Theyhad suffered the incalculable cost of failing to act when action might have stopped further aggression Many were determined never again to let the appearance of weakness and indecision encourage aggression U Neither the White House nor State Department had the slightest doubt that the Soviets coveted Iran and would do whatever they could short of war to bring that country within the Soviet orbit The Azcri crisis of 1947 showed that unless checked Stalin would continue to test the West s resolve U Stalin's death in March 1953 added a dangerous element of ambiguity to Soviet intentions Who would succeed the late dictator the breaker of nations 3 Would Soviet policy become more or less aggressive Would the Soviets rcoccupy Iranian Azerbaijan Would they encourage the Tudeh to topple Mossadeq The White House the State Department and CIA struggled to nd answers to these questions U Sending American troops to Iran was never a practical option for logistical and political reasons An American military occupation almost certainly would have led to war The USSR would have invoked the terms of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship Between Itarrmd the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and occupied the northem part of the country Iran would have been divided into a Communist north and a free south Fear of partition lay behind Washington's objection to the proposed British occupation of the port city of Abadan early in the oil nationalization crisis U A covert political operation promised to attain American foreign policy and strategic in obj actives Iran without the threat of war CIA gave the Eisenhower administration exibility where diplomacy had failed and military action can not practical In addition CIA gave the US Government plausible deniability lfa covert action went awry the President could deny American involvement With these considerations in mind and given the widely held Western outlook on the international 3 to tits-tum tween Conquest's term See Robert Conquest Stalin Breaker of Nations New York VikingPress 1991 83 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 1111 001267813 TOP SECRET situation in general and on Soviet intentions in particular the Eisenhower administration s decision to act in Iran was reasonable and understandable S TPAJAX and the National Interest The Retrospective View U A kind of historical hubris results from the belief that because we know far more about the consequences of past acts than contemporaneous actors could know we are more likely than they are to have a correct interpretation of events and of cause and effect We cannot know the consequences of decisions not made or actions not taken any more than contemporaries did Nevertheless time and knowledge of past events provide the historian with a perspective not available to contemporaries U Some historians argue today that was not in the US national interest 4 Maintaining that American policymakers in the 19505 defined national security narrowly these historians emphasize that actions intended to enhance American power ultimately have the opposite effect if they violate democratic ideals In this view intervening in domestic political processes in foreign countries inevitably undermines US national security by weakening the values on which US security rests in the long run S Speci cally critics of TPAJAX contend that it damaged American national interests for a number of reasons In their View it returned the Shah to his throne illegally The operation removed a popular legitimately elected Prime Minister from of ce who some new claim would have fallen eventually even without American intervention Finally American action created a reservoir of resentment among the Iranian people that helped create the conditions for Ayatollah Khomeini s Islamic Revolution in 1978-79 5 In short what appeared to be a shon tenn success ultimately proved to be a failure U This critique deserves careful attention its more thoughtful and articulate proponents appear to make a persuasive case The Shah did leave Tehran to return only when he was certain Mossadeq was gone and American support for the Peacock Throne assured Massadeq was popular among some segments of the population Some Iranians were disillusioned with the United States They had hoped that the US as the great postwar anti-colonial power would not intrigue against their ecuntry as the British and Russians had done A close examination of the facts however reveals flaws in the revisionist critique 4 See Wilbur Crane Eveland Roper of Sand America '3 Failure in the Middle East New York W W Norton Company 1980 Barry Rubin Paved With Good Intentions The American Experience and Iran New York Oxford University Press 980 James A Bill The Eagle and the Lion The Tragedy ofAmerictm-Imnian Relations New Haven CT Yale University Press I988 CM Woodhouse one of the British principals in the operation deals with this point in his autobiography Something Ventured He contends that what Britain and the United States saw in 1953 was different from what happened in 1979 The proper analogy he asserts is to the events in Afghanistan from I973 to 1980 the overthrow of a weak monarchy by nationalist forces who in turn would be overtaken by indigenous Communists who in turn would call in the Soviet Army CM Woodhouse Something Venturcd London Granada I982 p I31 84 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01269967 situation in general and on Soviet intentions in particular the Eisenhower administration's decision to act in Iran was reasonable and understandable U A kind of historical hubris results from the toner mat because we know for more about the consequences of past acts than contemporaneous actors could know we are more likely than they are to have a correct interpretation of events and of cause and effect We cannot know the consequ-ces of decisions not made or actions not taken any more than contemporaries did Nevertheless time and knowledge of past events provide the historian with a perspective not available to contemporaries U Some historians argue today that TPAJAX was not in the US national muesli Maintaining that American policymakers in the 19505 de ned national security narrowly these historians emphasize that actions intended to enhance American power ultimately have the opposite effect if they violate democratic ideals In this view intervening in domestic political processes in foreign countries inevitably undermines US national security by weakening the values on which US security rests in the long run I mane deserves careful attention its more thoughtful and articulate proponents appear to make a persuasive case The Edit leave Tehran to return only when he was certain Mossadeq was gone and American support for the Peacock Throne assured Mossadeq was popular among some segments of the population Some Iranians were disillusioned with the United States They had hoped that the US as the great postwar anti-colonial power would not intrigue against their country as the British and Russians had done A close examination of the facts however reveals aws in the revisionist critique 4 See Willi 0mm Eveland Ropes lysine - America s Failure in name East New York W W Norton Company Rubin Paved With Grandmas The American Experience and Iran NewYork Oxford University Press 1980 James A Bill The Eagle and firearm The Tragedyq'Amerieau-Iranian Relations New Haven CT Yale University Press 1988 5 0 C N Woodhouse one of the British principals in the operation deals with this point in his Something marred He contends tin what Britain and the Unimd Statessaw in 1953 wasvastly di 'erent omwhathappenedin 1979 Theproper snalogy he asserts is tothc events tnAfghantsinn from 1973 to 1980 the overdnowofa nationalist forces whoin indigenousCommrmists who inthe Soviet Army CM Woodhouse 9ch Vermont London Granada 1982 p 131 B4 2 6 7 8 1 3 Approved for Release 2017111I17 C01267613 TOPSECRET T Aee 1n en zw 7 cElam lg 85 TOPSECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 C01269967 w u C01269967 C01267813 Approved for Release 201711 1117 601267813 TOP SECRET U Did CIA Restore the Shah to His Throne S TPAJ AX did not restore the Shah to his throne either technically or constitutionally Although the Iranian monarch left Tehran during the operation he never abdicated Mossadeq s argument that the Shah's rmans were invalid was disingenuous The Iranian constitution gave the Shah the right to dismiss the Prime Minister As soon as Mossadeq refused to obey the Shah s legal order he was rebelling against constitutional authority From that point on TPAJ AX became an operation to remove the usurper Mossadeq and permit Zahedi the legitimate Prime Minister to take of ce Unlike Mossadeq s government Zahedi's government recognized the Shah s constitutional authority S Did CIA Act Against a Legitimate Leader Enjoying Popular Support U Although there is no doubt that Mossadeq captured the imagination of segments of Iranian society with the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in U Although there is no doubt that Mossadeq esp magma-53 of 1951 his political support dwindled steadily By August 1953 he did not command mass segments ofIraniansoeiety with the nationalization ofthe Anglo Iranian 11 Company in support The Tudeh and splinters of the National Front were the only political parties 1951 his political support dwindled steadily By August 1953 he did not command mass willing to support him support The Tudeh and splinters of the National Front were the only political parties U The pro-Shah sentiments of the Tehran crowds on 9 August 1953 were willing to supporthim genuine Although CIA had a hand in starting the demonstrations they swelled U The pro-Shah sentiments ofthe Tehran crowds on 19Ath 1953 were spontaneously and took on a life of their own that surprised even Kermit Roosevelt genuine Although Gilbert a'hand in starting the demonstrations they swelled Many average Iranians seemed convinced that they had to choose between the Shah and spontaneously and took on a life of their own that surprised even Kermit Roosevelt Communism In marching against the Tudeh Iranians were supporting the Shah Iran Many average Iranians seemed convinced that they had to choose between the Cloud expert Donald Wilber's plan to make this choice explicit had worked Communism In marching against the Tudeh Iranians were supporting the 1 Iran S By August 1953 Mossadeq s support was vociferous but increasingly narrow expert mm mm 5 make this h0i0 explicit had worked The Shah s support was latent but deep and took a crisis like the news of Tudeh demonstrators pulling down the Shah's statues to awaken Khorramabad residents for example wildly rejoiced at hearing of the monarch's return and threatened to destroy the homes of Tudeh leaders Security forces prevented them from doing 50 - Before dismissin re orts like those from Khorramabad as ro a nude it I U must be remembered that CIA was able to influence directly events only in the capital El city and there only barely Kermit Reesevelt had neither the money nor the agents to bzrmemem at 1 16 to 11 31 '01 events only lathe 632 an ereo ybarey Kernu oseve nei er emoneynor eagen 1m rate demons rations hot too place in Iran 5 wrdely separated initiate the kinds of 1 ans one that kplace in I s widely arated cities U Has ClA s Role Been Exaggerated S If Mossadeq s growing unpopularity invalidates one criticism of TPAJAX it strengthens another As indicated above some historians argue that Mossadeq s deteriorating political base made it likely he would have fallen without American intervention In this view TPAJAX was unnecessary because Iranian domestic politics would have solved the problem itself S The American role is one of the new debates among academicians Books published before the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 tend to assign a central role to CIA 86 86 TOP SECRET Approved tor Release 2017 1 17 301267813 0 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017 111'17 301267813 TOP SECRET and Kermit Roosevelt Post-revolutionary authors like Sepehr Zabih take the opposite position Zabih asserts that ascribing a large role to CIA and SIS understates the complex interaction of external and internal political forces of this era U American University's Amos Perlmutter belongs to the school of thought that considers Mossadeq s fall inevitable regardless of Western actions In a foreword to Zabih's The Mosradegh Era Roots of the Iranian Revolution Perlmurter writes that ClA s role in these climactic events was not very signi cant despite some of the heavily unsubstantiated claims of the old boys such as Kermit Roosevelt U To a large extent the relum of the Shah and the downfall of Mossadegh were made possible by divisions among the political forces of the left and right the left split among nationalists Marxists and Communists and the right split among the reactionary and xenophobic clergymen and their more liberal counterparts 8 U Perlmutter is correct in saying that Iranian political divisions made the fall of Mossadeq possible but merely because something is possible does not ensure that it will happen ClA's role was signi cant Without Kermit Roosevelt's leadership guidance and ability to put some backbone into the key players when they wanted to quit no one would have moved against Mossadeq Iran had many political factions but few legitimate leaders and even fewer leaders with the discipline and will necessary to take risks U A key difference between Mossadeq and his domestic opponents was his ability to control the streets Although much of the National Front had deserted the Prime Minister the Tudeh by this time Iran s only disciplined political party rallied to him when its aims and Mossadeq s coincided Tudeh demonstrations intimidated the opposition and kept the army on the sidelines Mossadeq s opponents would have been unable to overcome these disadvantages without outside help U The notion that Mossadeq would have fallen anyway ignores the realities of Iranian politics No group was able without help to contest control of the streets of Tehran with the Tudch The opposition needed a rallying point and a trigger Roosevelt provided both and gave Tehranians a choice between the Shah and the Kermit Roosevelt Countercoup The the Control of Iran New York McGraw Hill I979 Dr Donald N Wilber one ofthe principal characters in TPAJAX was one of many criticizing Roosevelt s book Of its 217 pages Wilber wrote in his own memoirs about 100 are llers reviewing recent history Concerning Operation AJAX itself the book is not meticulously correct in reporting meetings where plans were drawn up or in quoting those who were there In my opinion it should have been subjected to a full editorial revision See Donald N Wilber Adventures in the Middle East Excursions and lncursions Princeton NJ Darwin Press 1986 p 9 Mark GnsiorOWSki writes that Countercaup has many mistakes and omissions See Mark J Gasiorowski The I953 Coup d'etat in Iran International Journal of Middle East Studies 19 Aug 1987 261 Sepehr Zabih The Mossadegh Era Roots of the Iranian Revolution Chicago Lake View Press l98 2 p 26 Amos Perlmutter forward to The Morradeglr Era Roots of the Iranian Revolution by Sepehr Zabih Chicago Lake View Press 1982 p vii 87 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 1 1 7 001257813 C01269967 U American University's Amos Perlmutter belongs to the school of thought that considers Mossadcq s fall inevitable regardless of Western actions In a foreword to Zablh s TheMossadeglt Ere Roots Iranian Revolution Perlmutter writes that role in these climactic events was not very signi cant despite some of the heavily unsubstantiated claims of the old boys such an Kermit Roosevelt U Toalnrge extengtheremm ofthe were made possible by divisions among the political forces of the left outright the left splitamong nationalists Mnnists and Commtmists and the right split among the reactionary and xenophobic dogma and their more liberal counterparts a U Perlmutter is correct in saying that Iranian political divisions made the fall of Mossadeq possible but merely because something is possible does not ensure that it will happen role was signi cant Without Kermit Roosevelt s leadership guidance and ability to put some backbone into the key players when they wanted to quit no one would have moved against Mossadeq Iran had many political factions but few legitimate leaders and even fewer leaders with the discipline and will necessary to take r'sks U A key difference between Mossadeq and his domestic opponents was his ability to control the streets Although much of the National Front had deserted the Prime Minister the Tudch by this time Iran's only disciplined political party rallied to him when its aims andMossadeq's coincided Tudch demonstrations intimidated the opposition and kept the army on the sidelines Mossadeq's opponents would have been unable to overcome there disadvantages without outside help U The notion that Mossadeq would have fallen anyway ignores the realities of Iranian politics No group was able without help to contest control of the streets of Tehran with the Tudeh The opposition needed a rallying point and a trigger Rama-w nmvided both and gave Tehranians a choice between the and the 7 7 0 Sepeerabih TheMossndegh Era - Raats d re Iranian Revolution Chicago Lake View Prune 1982 p 126 Amos Pedmulter forwardto TheMassadeglr Em Roots of the Iranian Revolution by Chlcago Lake View Press 982 P vii a1 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017111 301267813 TOP SECRET Tudeh Ordinary Iranians were willing to demonstrate their support for the monarch only when they became convinced through the pro-Shah demonstrations in the streets that others were doing the same S The actual events of TPAJAX suggest how a purely Iranian operation would have fared without CIA direction When Mossadeq arrested Imperial Guard commander Col Nassiri the other principals became disheartened and went into hiding Gen Batmangelich turned around when he saw troops loyal to Mossadeq surrounding the General Staff office building The operation collapsed before it started U Historians arguing that Mossadeq would have fallen anyway fail to answer a critical related question Without US intervention what would have replaced him In August 1953 Iran seemed more likely to degenerate into chaos than to experience a stable transfer of power from Mossadeq to someone else No potential prime minister was strong enough to command a majority in the Majlis or even to form a coalition government out of the factions and splinter groups comprising Iranian politics If Ayatollah Kashani whom the US had brie y considered supporting in mid I953 had somehow been able to succeed Mossadeq his government might have resembled Ayatollah Khomeini's regime more than Fazlollah Zahedi's S Was TPAJAX Responsible for Khomeini s Islamic Revolution U If the United States and United Kingdom had not intervened in Iran's chaotic politics in August l953 would Ayatollah Khomeini have been able to launch his Islamic Revolution 25 years later Asking this question is like asking whether World War II would have been fought if Germany had won World WarI and Hitler had remained an obscure corporal We cannot know the consequences of events that did not happen but we can engage in informed speculation U Revisionists contend that CIA sti ed Iran s drive to democracy and strengthened the rule of the autocratic Shah thereby making Khomeini s revolution all but inevitable Despite its faults in this View Mossadeq s Government represented the popular will His government re ected a vision for Iran s future that the Shah did not share Mohammad Reza Pahlavi wanted to transform Iran into a modern Westemized state his people preferred a more traditional society U In removing Mossadeq the revisionists continue the United States and Britain effectively strangled traditional Iranian nationalism Frustrated and resentful the people rose 25 years later in rage against the Shah and the United States disparagcd as the Great Satan For there can be no doubt that despite years of of cial American and British denials most Iranians have been convinced of the role in Mossadeq s fall 9 9 S One of the participants in TPAJAX assured the author that many Iranians only suspected the American role in the operation subject of bazaar rumors for years The Cambridge History of Iran s assessment is prehably more accurate Nevertheless Iranians haVe never had the slightest doubt that the C I A acting on behalf of the American and British governments organized the conspirators and paid the pro-Shah mobs led by toughs from southern Tehran which together with army units were in control of the streets by nightfall on l9 August By I982 this tenacious rumour had been fully con rmed and is now seen as incontrovertible footnote omitted Peter Avery Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville eds The Cambridge 88 TOP SECRET Approved or Release C01267813 C01269967 'Ihideh Ordinary Iranians were willing to demonstrate their support for the monarch only when they became convinced through the pro-Shah demonstrations in the streets that had- eu-M flair the cum - 3 U Historians arguing that Mossadeq would have fallen anyway fail to answer a critical related question Without US intervention what would have replaced him In August 1953 Iran seemed more likely to degenerate into chaos than to experience a stable transfer of power from Mossadeq to someone else No potential prime minister was strong enough to command a majority in the Majlis or even to form a coalition government out of the factions and splinter groups comprising Iranian politics If Ayatollah Kashani whom the US had brie y considered supporting in mid 1953 had somehow been able to succeed Mossadeq his government might have resembled Ayatollah Khomeini's regime more than Fazlollah Zahedi's U If the United States and United Kingdom had not intervened in Iran s chaotic politics in August I953 would Ayatollah Khomeini have been able to launch his Islamic Revolution 25 years later Asking this question is like asking whether World War would have been fought if Germany had won World War Iand Hitler had remained an obscure corporal We cannot know the consequences of events that did not happen but we can engage in informed emulation U Revisionism contend that am sti ed Iran s drive to democracy and strengthened the rule of the autocratic thereby making Khomeini s revolution all but inevitable Despite its faults in this view Mossadeq s Government represented the popular will His government re ected a vision for Iran's iture that the did not share Mohammad Reta Pahlavi wanted to transform Iran into amodem Westernized state his people preferred a more traditional society U In removing Mossadeq the revisionists continue the United States and Britain effectively strangled traditional Iranian nationalism Frustrated and resenttiil the people rose 25 years later in rage against the and the United States disparagetl as the Great Satan For there can be no doubt that despite years of of cial American and British denials most Iranians have been convinced of the CIA's role in Mossadeq's fall 9 I 2 67 8 3 Approved for Release 2017 1111 001267813 TOP SECRET U A problem with this thesis is that Mossadeq s Iran was not moving toward democracy The Prime Minister s increasing political isolation and the fragmentation of the National From as documented above had weakened his position and made him desperate His dictatorial grab for power from the Majlis alienated his former allies and gained him new political enemies Iran was to repeat Iran specialist Kuross Samii s apt metaphor an old ship swept away by a storm with no one on board capable of dealing with the attendant frenzy 1 U In fact Khomeini s revolution was a reaction against secularism modernization and the Shah s misrule not a push for a return to the National Front The streets ofTehran rang with shouts of fanatical support for Khomeini rather than nostalgic calls for Mossadeq The Ayatollah was not interested in Mossadeq or the things he stood for The last thing Khomeini wanted was a secular government with multi-party participation He would have called for fundamentalist revolution against any government including a National Front or Tudeh Government that promoted modernization the emancipation of women and secularization U Edward Shirley the former CIA D0 employee who journeyed through revolutionary Iran argues that the revisionist thesis also underestimates the role the clerics played in TPAJ AX Without the support of Ayatollahs Kashani and Behbehani Shirley doubts the covert political action could have succeeded What the ayatollahs did in 1953 with American and British help they might have been able to do later without such help Alternatively given Mossadeq's growing political weakness and isolation from Iranian society the clerics may have defeated him and the National Front in general elections U ln short according to Shirley the 1953 aborted-democracy theory is appealing but is too convenient in its diabolization of the CIA and MI and too Persian in its determination to make someone else responsible for failure S TPAJAX and the Future of American Covert Action S TPAJ AX exerted a powerful influence on the thinking about covert action Unfortunately Allen Dulles and others in the DDP did not evaluate their experience critically and apparently drew dubious conclusions The easy success of the Iranian and Guatemalan operations seemed to herald a golden age of covert action and a sober reappraisal of the utility and flexibility of covert action as a foreign policy instrument did not occur until President John Kennedy red Dulles after the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 S Dulles and his colleagues were correct in regarding covert action as an important weapon of Cold War foreign policy giving the President the means to halt or History of Iran vol 7 From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic New York Cambridge University Press 1991 p 263 Kuross A Samii Involvement by Invitation American Strategies of Containment in Iran University Park PA the State University Press 1987 p I43 ll U See Peter Wyden Bay of Figs the Untold Story New York Simon and Schuster 1979 89 TOP SECRET Approved tor Release 2017 11 17 001267813 C01269967 U A problem with this thesis is that Mosaadeq's Iran was not moving toward democracy The Prime Minister s increasing political isolation and the fragmentation of the National Front as documented above had weakened his position and made him desperate His dictatorial grab for power from the Majlis alienated his former allies and gained him new political enemies Irat was to repeat Iran specialist Kuross Samii's apt metaphor an old ship swept away by a storm with no one on board capable of dealing with the attendant nenzy 1 U In fact Khomeini's revolution was a reaction against secularism modernization and the misruIe not a push for a return to the National Front The streets of Tehran rang with shouts of fanatical support for Khomeini rather than nostalgic calls for Mossadeq The Ayatollah was not interested in Mossadeq or the things he stood for Thelart thing Khomeini wanted was a secular government with multi-party participation He would have called for fundamentalist revolution against any government including a National Front 01' Tudeh Government that promoted modernization the emancipation of women and secularization U Edward Shirley the former can DO employee who journeyed through revolutionary nan argues that the revisionist thesis also underestimates the role the clerics played in Without the support of Ayatollah Knshani and Behbehani Shirley doubts the covert political action could have succeeded What the ayatollahs did in 1953 with American and British help they might have been able to do later without such help Alternatively given Mossadeq's growing political weakness and isolation from Iranian society the clerics may have defeated him and the National Front in general elections U In short according to Shirley the 1953 aborted-democracy theory is appealing but is too convenient in its diaboliza on of the CIA and M16 and too Persian in its determination to make someone else responsible for failure I Histarycf Iran voL 7 meNadlr lm the Islamic Republic New York Cambridge UnivasityPnesa 1991 p 263 10 1 Kim A Samii Invahancnt by Invitation American Strategies Containment in Iran University Park PA the State University Press 1981 p 143 I int See Peter Wyden Bay cf Pigs the UntaldStory New York Simon and Schuster 1979 89 C01269967 Approved for Release 2017111717 001267813 TOP SECRET reverse developments he deemed harmful to American interests This capability freed the E US from merely reacting to Soviet moves or threats of moves and permitted American action without the threat of direct military confrontation Moreover early American covert action successes noti ed the Soviets that the United States was an able player in the game of high stakes international intrigue it had only recently joined S Leading DDP gures erred in relying on covert action too heavily and resorting to it too readily As an intelligence professional Dulles must have recognized the limits and risks of covert action The success of TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS however was seductive Kermit Roosevelt s warning that covert actions like TPAJAX would succeed over the long run only with the support of the indigenous military and population fell on deaf years The operation in Guatemala seemed to show that both elements could be neutralized quite easily the military by paramilitary operations and elements of popular opposition by operations J2 S Peter Grosc Dulles's biographer writes that the DCI drew a straight line from Guatemala in 1954 to the Bay of Pigs in 1961 Any doubts Dulles may have had about TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS vanished as both operations unfolded and benefited from unexpected luck Both operations may have made Dulles and the DDP overly con dent that in these sorts of operations something would turn up that would lead to ultimate success They miscalculated in assuming and expecting that the Bay of Pigs invasion would follow the same pattcm S Perhaps the most important and unique result of TPAIAX was to strengthen position within the government as an instrument of policy and solidify its rcsponsi Up to been taken sedodsl The fall of Mossadeq was a watershed in demonstrating civilian clandestine operat'onal expertise and in putting a civilian intelligence agency at the forefront of planning and errecutin covert operations After TPAJAX the military could not argue as it had during the Congressional hearings for the National Security Act of 1947 that civilians did not have the background training or experience for clandestine activity l2 U Peter GTOSE Gentleman Spy The Life ofAlIen Dulles Houghton Mif in 9941 1me GTOSC ch mum Spy HeLIfe rfA ell DRUGS Boston Houghton Ml lln 1994 p 384 13w Ibid 13 0 90 90 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11117 C01267B13 C01269967 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 001267813 TOP SECRET U The Shadow of the Pahlavis U The Shadow of the Pahlavis S The political landscape of Iran today is vastly different from what it was in 1953 but the Myations of theplayers remain essentially the same 8 Tran continues to draw Moseow's attention For several reasons Its size and strategic location make it a potential threat to Russian interests The Cold War may be ever but that does not mean Russian and American national interests in the Middle East coincide A sense of competition in the region lingers even if its consequences are no longer potentially catastrophic PAJAX appears to have forestallcd but did not end the Russian drive for in uence in Iran 3 U The average Iranian still believes that the British and Americans are U The average still believe that the British and Americans are ominipotent and that if they removed Mossadeq either or both somehow put the mullahs ominipotent and that ifthey removed Mossadeq either or both somehow put the mullahs in power Edward Shirley s Know Thine Enemy A Spy s Joumey into Revolutionary in power Edward Shirley s Know ThineEuenly A Spy's Journey into Revolutionary Iran recounts several conversations he had with Iranians while traveling through that Iran recounts several conversations he had with Iranians while traveling through that country One asked Shirley for help country One asked Shirley forhelp U Arnerieuns should help us Your secretary of state was spit upon by U Amerieansshould helpus Your secretaryofstatewas spituponby Khomeini He calls Iran the most evil state in the world but he does nothing - Khomeini He callsInm mmgyi state in the world but he does m iing Unless you want lranians thinking that you like the mollahs you should bring thinly wantlranimis iit dng that you like the mollahs you shouldbring them down The British put them in and America should drive them out The than down TheBritish put them in mdAmerica should drivethem out The young Shah he is like his father a coward And the United States wastes money young tithe is likehis father acoward And the United States waste money on him Iranians don t want to ght anymore They need a sign from America onhim Iranians don twant to ght anymore Theyneed a sign om America TOP SECRET Approved for Release 201 7111 17 001267813 C01267813 Approved for Release 2017 11 17 601267813 TOP SECRET Another told Shirley it did not matter what Iranians thought It only matters what the Americans and the think They hold the power The have always had the clever 2 2 U Edward Shirley Know Thine Enemy A Spy s Journey into Revolutionary Iran New York Farrar Straus and Giroux 1997 pp 75 106 3 U See Harold Bloom The Lucifer Principle A Scienti c Expedition into the Forces of History New York The Atlantic Press 1995 pp 264-70 successor in the Islamic Republic of Iran is the Vezarat-e Ettela at va Aminat-e Keshvar VAVAK known in the West as the Ministry of Intelligence and Security MOIS According to historian Carl Wegc VAVAK is noted primarily for nssassinuting Iranian dissidents abroad and has been doing so since the revolution in 1979 Its rst victim was the Shah s nephew Shahriar Sha q in Paris December 1979 but is most famous victim was former prime minister Shapour Bakhtiar assassinated in August 1991 Carl Anthony Wege Iranian Intelligence Organizations International Journal of Intelligence and Counterinlelligence to Fall l997 289 Heritage Foundation Senior Policy Analyst James Phillips writes that more than a dozen Iranian dissidents have been assassinated in European cities since 1987 VAVAK even struck in the 92 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 11 17 C01267813 C01269967 Another told Shirley it did not matter what Iranians thought It only matters what the Americans and the think They hold the power The Engines have always had the clergy in their pockets 2 2 U Edward Shirley Know MeEnanyrA Spy'sJoumq into Revolutionary Iran New York Farrar Straus and Giroux 1997 pp 75 106 3 U See Harold Bloom eLuc 'erPrincipMA Sdaityic Expedition into theFarces d Elston New York The Atlantic Press 1995 pp 264-70 SAVAK's successor in the 151mm Republic of his the Vemrat eEtteln nt va Arninate lmown in the Westasthe AccordingtohistorianCaerege noted pnmmily for abroad andhas been doingso Since the revolution in 1979 Its rstvictirn was the nqihew ShahriarSha q in Paris December 1979 but is most famous vic mvm fonnerprime ministerShapour Bakhtiar assassinated in August 1991 Carl AnthonyWege ImnianIntelligence Organizations International Journal ofIntelligence and 10 Fall 1997 289 Heritage Foundation SeniorPolicy Analyst James Phillips write that more Item adonen Iranian dissidentshave been assassinated in European cities since 1987 VAVAK even struck in the C01269967 2 6 7 8 3 Approved for Release 2017 12 06 201267813 TOP SECRET I L United Slates murdering Iranian political activist Ali A Tabatabai founder of the lran Freedom United 3mm Iranianpoli eal activist Ali A Tabatabai Md of m 11mm Foundation in his Bethesda Maryland home in July 1980 James Phillips The Challenge of meda omin his Bethesda in July 1930' Jam Phillips 'The ma _Rev_olutionmy lgng jjeritage Foundation Committee Brief No 24 29 March 1996 Heritage Foundation nmmittne Brief No 24 29 March 996 5 U Iran Inlemal Security DODOD 41-23 21 May 1993 The information in this report is U Internal Security wuul tat-Lu 1 1 may 199 1 the ttuumutuun In ufts report is classi ed TOP SECRET UMBRA the title is unclassi ed The report already ve classi ed'mP SECRETUMBRA non-03min title isunclassi edf tctepmt already ve years old states that Iran s various tribes have not been a serious threat to Tehran's rule for yearsold stawslhat Iran's havenotbeen aseriousti'l eatto'l'eluan's rule for several years No reporting since then has warranted a quali cation or change of that opinion several yeala No reporting since then has warranted a quali cationor change of tat opiman 93 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2017 12 06 C01267813                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu