R esearch Paper Research Division - NATO Defense College Rome - No 121 - November 2015 Russia's Renewed Military Thinking Non-Linear Warfare and Reflexive Control by Can Kasapoglu1 Introduction A Renewed Russian Military Thinking The Research Division RD of the NATO Defense College provides NATO's senior leaders with sound and timely analyses and recommendations on current issues of particular concern for the Alliance Papers produced by the Research Division convey NATO's positions to the wider audience of the international strategic community and contribute to strengthening the Transatlantic Link The RD's civil and military researchers come from a variety of disciplines and interests covering a broad spectrum of security-related issues They conduct research on topics which are of interest to the political and military decision-making bodies of the Alliance and its member states The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the NATO Defense College Printed copies of this paper can be obtained by contacting Mary Di Martino at m dimartino@ndc nato int Research Paper ISSN 2076 - 0949 Res Div NATO Def Coll Print ISSN 2076 - 0957 Res Div NATO Def Coll Online Research Division Jeffrey A Larsen PhD Division Head NATO Defense College Via Giorgio Pelosi 1 00143 Rome - Italy website www ndc nato int Follow us on Twitter and Facebook at https twitter com NDC_Research at https facebook com NDC_Research Printed and bound by DeBooks Italia V le G Mazzini 41 00195 Rome Italy www debooks us Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission provided that a standard source credit line is included The Research Division would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints Please direct all enquiries to m dimartino@ndc nato int Since the Russo - Georgian War in 2008 the Russian Armed Forces' new way of warfighting has been drawing attention Especially following the Crimean campaign which ended up with the illegal annexation of the peninsula in March 2014 and given Moscow's ongoing open and covert military activities in Eastern Ukraine and recently in Syria many experts started to focus their assessments on what they call Russia's hybrid or nonlinear warfare On the other hand there are also some voices in the Western strategic community advancing the analysis that Moscow's understanding of non-linear warfare is simply an attempt to catch up conceptually to the realities of modern war with which the United States has been grappling for over a decade in Iraq Afghanistan and elsewhere 2 Indeed the Russian and the Western understandings of hybrid warfare differ to a great extent Without a doubt one of the most explanatory conceptualizations on hybrid warfare was offered by Frank Hoffman in his 2007 work He defined hybrid warfare as a fusion of war forms that blurs regular and irregular warfare Hoffman underlined that hybrid warfare would incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities irregular tactics and formations terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion and criminal disorder 3 Therefore referring to this conceptualization it would be fair to say that from a Western standpoint the key word for defining hybrid wars would be 'multi-modality ' In parallel NATO preferred to use the expression of wide range of overt and covert military paramilitary and civilian measures 1 Dr Can Kasapoglu is an NDC Eisenhower Fellow in the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome He also serves as an analyst on defense issues for the Istanbul-based think-tank the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies EDAM His career includes posts as visiting researcher at the BESA Center in Israel and the FRS in France Dr Kasapoglu earned his Ph D from the Strategic Research Institute at the Turkish War College and his M Sc degree from the Defense Sciences Institute at the Turkish Military Academy The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the NATO Defense College 2 M Kofman and M Rojansky A Closer Look at Russia's Hybrid War Kennan Cable Wilson Center no 7 2015 3 F Hoffman Conflict in the 21st Century The Rise of Hybrid Wars Potomac Institute for Policy Studies Virginia 2007 pp 7-8 1 Research Paper No 121 - November 2015 depth in order to cut the adversary's communications destroy its logistics deep-deployed assets and command mechanisms Furthermore Soviet military planners in the 1980s based their tank operations on Tukachevsky's understanding and generated Operational Maneuver Groups that were small enough to conduct deep maneuvers in rear areas of the enemy but at the same time large and powerful enough some 500 tanks to bring enough fighting power 6 employed in a highly integrated design when defining hybrid threats in 2014 Wales Summit declaration 4 On the other hand in his report Russian expert Andrew Korybko defines hybrid warfare or indirect warfare as he frequently preferred using being a Western effort in general that aims to destabilize Russia's neighborhood through colored revolutions fifth column-driven regime changes subversive use of social media and internet and a Lead From Behind policy 5 In his work Korybko places Russia in a defensive even victimized position suffering from destabilizing and subversive hybrid warfare aggressions Of course one could label Korybko being politically biased and such a claim could well have a fair point Still such a label would not help us to get a good grip on the Russian understanding of hybrid warfare Korybko's negative stance on hybrid warfare might be emanating from the Western innovation of the concept and or Russia's geopolitical uneasiness with the West's influence on the geography that Moscow prefers to call 'the neighborhood ' Yet being biased or not Korybko's conceptualization is still defensive and we are looking for an analytical framework to explain Russia's understanding of offensive non-linear or hybrid warfare In fact as this paper explains in detail the aforementioned deep penetration theory could be considered as the very determining basis for the contemporary reorganization of the Russian Armed Forces' elite units and even for the establishment of a Russian Rapid Reaction Force that would be centered on the airborne troops VDV However still there could be unaddressed gaps when depicting Tukachevsky's deep penetration theory as an explanatory framework for the Russian understanding of contemporary offensive non-linear warfare Above all what Tukachevsky underscored was to be a military manner of conduct within a declared conventional warfare situation Yet Moscow seized Crimea in 2014 through 'deep penetration' of its military intelligence and information warfare assets but without open armed conflict or inter-state conventional war Within the aforementioned context this study argues that while the key word for depicting the Western understanding of hybrid warfare remains 'multimodality ' the key word for the Russians' offensive nonlinear warfare paradigm would be 'penetration ' In fact a 2005 RAND Corporation report penned by Sean Edwards might be 'accidentally' guiding us to the roots of contemporary Russian offensive non-linear warfare paradigm Although Edwards' work intended to focus on operational art tactical approach and maneuver aspects of non-linear warfare he touched upon the Soviet Deep Operation Theory which was advanced by Marshal Mikhail Tukachevsky In brief Tukachevsky considered tanks as an integral part of a combined arms team and thereby the Soviet marshal argued that along with other traditional duties Soviet tanks were to be used for breaking-out into the operational At this point another Soviet-legacy theory that this paper will explain in detail 'reflexive control ' comes into the picture In brief 'reflexive control' refers to the systematic methods of shaping the adversary's perceptions thereby decisions and latently forcing him to act voluntarily in a way that would be favorable to Russia's strategic interests In sum it could be argued that Moscow's non-linear warfare understanding reflects a 'new ' or 'renewed ' Russian military thinking not a strategy or concept It is a 'renewed' thinking as it combines the Soviet-legacy Deep Operation Theory and Reflexive Control Theory in order to create a 'disguised blitzkrieg impact ' In doing so Moscow uses a core group of elite troops along with NATO 2014 Wales Summit Declaration http www nato int cps en natohq official_texts_112964 htm accessed 2 October 2015 4 For an explanatory work on the Russian understanding of 'hybrid warfare' see A Korybko Hybrid Wars The Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime Change Peoples' Friendship University of Russia Moscow 2015 5 S J A Edwards Swarming and the Future of Warfare RAND Corporation Santa Monica 2005 pp 56-59 6 2 No 121 - November 2015 Research Paper means of a concealed character including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special operations forces 9 a wide-array of non-military means while concealing its true geopolitical intentions and surreptitiously influencing its competitors' decision-making algorithms As the Gerasimov doctrine underscores the contemporary Russian military thinking shifts away from traditional military methods in which military action follows strategic deployment and declaration of war large ground units conduct frontal clashes under strict hierarchy and manpower fire power remain the main determinants of war Instead the new Russian military thought focuses on non-contact clashes between highly maneuverable units within undeclared wars peace-time military action use of armed civilians and management of troops in a unified informational sphere 10 Non-Linear Warfare and the 'Gerasimov Doctrine' The Russians' conduct of hybrid warfighting breaks ground in operational art and the military strategic thought as it strongly stresses the efficiency of intelligence and strategic forecasting efforts The new Russian military thinking underlines undeclared wars and nonlinear conduct of warfighting In a February 2013 article for the Russian 'Military Industrial Kurier' on contemporary Russian military thought General Valery Gerasimov the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation's Armed Forces frankly argued that there is a blurring divide between 'war and peace' in the 21st century threat landscape Wars are no longer declared and having begun proceed according to an unfamiliar template 7 According to the top Russian general The renewed Russian military thinking poses risks and threats to the North Atlantic Alliance's defense and security in several ways Firstly although Moscow's official rhetoric voices some legal and grounds for its recent aggressions and interventions Russian geopolitical calculus is the very basis for the conduct of non-linear warfare In this respect it would be noteworthy to remind that the Liberation of Crimea medal which decorates some participants of the Russian campaign in the peninsula is dated February 20 - March 18 Clearly 'the medal' does not start the campaign on February 22 2014 when President Yanukovich fled Kiev 11 Thus the new military thinking by all means depends on a cold blooded realpolitik approach and 'necessary expansionism ' Secondly it paralyzes the target state's main functions by all means necessary to implement 'deep penetration ' In this regard the Ukrainian intelligence apparatus and probably high political echelons too was so systematically penetrated by several Russian intelligence agencies GRU FSB and SVR that although the Ukrainian General Staff warned Kiev about unusual Russian activity in Crimea a perfectly thriving state can in a matter of months and even days be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict become a victim of foreign intervention and sink into a web of chaos humanitarian catastrophe and civil war 8 Even more importantly General Gerasimov argued that the role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown and in many cases they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political economic informational humanitarian and other non-military measures -applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population All this is supplemented by military 7 For English translation see http www huffingtonpost com robert-coalson valery-gerasimov-putin-ukraine_b_5748480 html For the original Russian text see http vpk-news ru sites default files pdf VPK_08_476 pdf accessed 28 September 2015 8 For English translation see http www huffingtonpost com robert-coalson valery-gerasimov-putin-ukraine_b_5748480 html For the original Russian text see http vpk-news ru sites default files pdf VPK_08_476 pdf accessed 28 September 2015 Ibid 9 J Berzins Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine Implications for Latvian Defense Forces National Defence Academy of Latvia Center for Security and Strategic Research 2014 p 4 10 11 R N Mcdermott Brothers Disunited Russia's Use of Military Power in Ukraine The Foreign Military Studies Office Kansas 2015 p 9 3 Research Paper No 121 - November 2015 arms effort that tanks fulfill vital duties with infantry supported by engineers and under accompanying artillery with direct fire roles 15 In fact this reorganization effort namely organizing combined arms units below regiment or brigade level is not new to the Russian military thinking It is reported that artillery was attached in 77% of motorized rifle battalion exercises and 73% of tank battalion exercises Attachments ran from a battery to several battalions with a full artillery battalion being the most common 80% Artillery was in support of 18% of motorized rifle battalion exercises and 13% of tank battalion exercises Engineer elements usually a platoon were attached in 62% of motorized rifle battalion exercises and 57% of tank battalion exercises 16 in January 2014 this was completely ignored 12 Thirdly deployment of nuclear warhead delivery-capable highprecision Iskander-M missiles and S-400 long range advanced air and missile defense systems in Kaliningrad sends a strong politico-military signal to the West 13 Last but not least current Russian Military Doctrine 2014 itself openly categorizes NATO as one of the main external military dangers 14 Although Russia overall tends to adopt a new military thinking which has indoctrinated several echelons of the Russian Armed Forces with the new strategic thought finding a viable compromise among Moscow's politicalmilitary elite for attaining adequate force generation and military modernization as well as conducting the strategic operational and tactical requirements of the new doctrinal approach would not be an easy task Clearly in Clausewitzian words in doing so Russia has to promote a massive 'fog of war' and ambiguous 'center of gravity' for its adversaries while ensuring minimum 'friction factor' in its hybrid warfare campaigns Such military thinking necessitates a highly centralized politico-military structure in Moscow while requiring decentralized freedom of movement permanent readiness and combined arms warfighting capabilities at least at battalion level for elite formations Contemporary Russian military modernization is based on three main criteria modern weapons readiness and manpower Although the exact Russian depiction of 'modern weapons' remains ambiguous readiness and manpower stand for briefly the ability to rapidly move from permanent basing positions especially for force protection and a significant increase in combat capabilities and level of training of Russian military units 17 However none of these main criteria would be solely adequate for assertive campaigns from the Western perspective i e the annexation of Crimea the 2008 invasion of Georgia and breaking of its territorial unity permanently and the challenging military buildup in Syria at a time when US-led coalition is flying combat missions over Syrian skies Therefore the Russians would be in need of a 'strategic disguise' and some form of semi-covert 'political warfare' for their complex hybrid warfare strategy Although many could think that the incumbent Russian elite have invented a new method for fulfilling all these tasks in fact they found what they needed deep in the Soviet theoretical studies i e 'reflexive control ' It would be accurate to claim that catastrophic results of the first Russo-Chechen War 1994-1996 paved the ground for a comprehensive evolution of the Russian combined arms concepts As Moscow was faced with a new fragmented battlefield of unconventional warfare with a high surprise factor and light but continuing casualties the Russian military thinking began to attach utmost importance to combined arms units mostly battalions that can sustain fighting for extended periods of time Within this military context Russian defense planners no longer perceive unconventional warfare solely as a light infantry mission but a true combined Ibid pp 8-10 12 For a comprehensive assessment on Russian deployments see S Forrs et al The Development of Russian Military Policy and Finland Finland National Defense University Series 2 Research Report no 49 Helsinki 2013 13 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2014 14 L W Grau Restructuring the Tactical Russian Army for Unconventional Warfare Red Diamond Forth Levenworth vol 5 no 2 2014 pp 4-8 15 16 Ibid p 7 K Giles and A Monaghan Russian Military Modernization-Goal in Sight The Letort Papers SSI 2014 pp 2-3 17 4 No 121 - November 2015 Research Paper warfighting Within this theoretical context a 'reflex' is tantamount to generating certain model behavioral in the system that is exposed to 'reflexive control' activity 20 Therefore the 'control' activity itself is to signal necessary reasons and motives to the 'target system' to make a significant impact on its decision-making process and perceptions Within the aforementioned 'control' efforts 'reflex' should be understood as a set of interrelated and specific procedures which aim to imitate the adversary's reasoning and possible behavior in order to drag him into an unfavorable decision for himself 21 The Element of 'Reflexive Control' in Russian Hybrid Warfare Conduct Berzins argues that Russia's military strategy depends on three interrelated levels of doctrinal unilateralism a strong adherence to legalism and a systematic denial of use of open military force 18 Within this context doctrinal unilateralism refers to the idea that legitimacy could be derived from using force successfully while adherence to legalism refers to Moscow's effort to base its actions on some legal grounds and finally the denial of use of open military force can be better understood given the Russian diplomatic rhetoric in Crimea 19 Based on the early Soviet concept of maskirovka studies on 'reflexive control' evolved through several decades i e scientific research the early 1960s to late 1970s practical orientation late 1970s to early 1990s psychological-pedagogical processes early to mid1990s and the psycho-social processes the late 1990s onward 22 The insidious merit of 'reflexive control' is the fact that the theory and related concepts have been designed to be executed at strategic operational and tactical levels Furthermore the conduct of 'reflexive control' incorporates an advanced toolkit that utilizes means of hard power disinformation and manipulation tools of influencing the adversary's decision-making algorithms and altering the adversary's response time simultaneously 23 Although Berzins' aforementioned points have valid grounds in depicting the Russian campaign's main pillars there could be another explanation for this manner of conduct other than simply military strategy While the Russians have been following the aforementioned interrelated strategy two questions need to be addressed What kind of measures prevented the West from decisively reacting to Moscow's territorial gain by threat and use of force How did these same measures prevent the Kiev leadership from developing a swift and accurate understanding of the possible trajectory of the conflict and Kremlin's actual intentions In fact Russian information warfare and psychological operations in Ukraine are by no means entirely new or unique Notably the current Russian efforts to conceal its hybrid warfare campaign root back to the Sovietlegacy theory and the concept of 'reflexive control ' Without having a good understanding of 'reflexive control' operations one cannot fully grasp Moscow's modus operandi 'Reflexive control' gives a fairly competitive edge to Russia and constitutes a vital component of its hybrid warfare strategy The theoretical approach and related concepts go well beyond psychological warfare information warfare and information operations in terms of direct and indirect effects on the battleground at strategic operational and tactical levels Firstly the primary 'input' of 'reflexive control' mechanism is carefully-tailored information that would drag the enemy towards a pre-determined decision i e the intended output voluntarily Therefore the theory and A concept more of military art than military science effective 'reflexive control' over the adversary would render possible exerting utmost influence over his battle plans his assessment of the situation and the way of J Berzins Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine Implications for Latvian Defense Forces National Defence Academy of Latvia Center for Security and Strategic Research 2014 p 3 18 19 Ibid T Thomas Russia's Reflexive Control Theory and the Military Journal of Slavic Military Studies no 7 2004 237-256 20 21 Ibid 22 Ibid Ibid 23 5 Research Paper No 121 - November 2015 fully considered within the context of either the law of belligerent occupation or -by no means- peaceful relations under contemporary international norms due to flow of Russian arms and military assistance to the separatists As a result the Russian Federation has managed to be recognized as one of the signatories of the Minsk accords instead of a warring party which does not hold Moscow primarily responsible for the settlement At the tactical angle in Crimea the systematic Russian 'reflexive control' campaign has proven efficient by providing a critical cover of deception for Russian forces for executing deployments and maneuvers to take control of key facilities and positions 26 as well as penetrating deeply to paralyze a possible Ukrainian response At the operational level the Russian military buildup along the border areas during the 'stealthy invasion' of Crimea did not only serve by pinning down Ukrainian military formations but also by confusing the Kiev leadership and the West about the true scope and limits of the Russian intentions in Ukraine related concepts have enjoyed mathematical and scientific components as well as psycho-cultural and historical elements Secondly the Soviet roots of the theory well reflect a special focus on control and psychological elements of a totalitarian authority 24 Thirdly and most importantly being a Soviet theory and concept makes 'reflexive control' a product of Marxist-Leninist paradigm According to this paradigm cognition results from the reflection of the material world in human mind which determines social consciousness Man's intelligence and cognitive processes are dependent on his sensory awareness of the outside world which in turn determines the content and the dimensions of his consciousness 25 In the light of the brief theoretical discussion above it is argued that the current Russian approach to 'reflexive control' and maskirovka aims to manipulate Moscow's competitors' 'sensory awareness of the outside world ' and thereby their consciousness about Russia's aggressions through disinformation on the cognition that derives from 'the material world ' 'The material world' here could refer to the ongoing invasion in Georgia since 2008 or the fact that Moscow launched a war of conquest in Crimea Besides 'the material world' could well be tantamount to snap exercises conducted by the Russian Armed Force at NATO's eastern doorstep In other words the contemporary Russian hybrid warfare conduct aims to create a 'hallucinating fog of war' and consistent deception that aims not to paralyze the West's intelligence and anticipatory capabilities but to 'alter' Western analytical end-results and perceptions of Russia's strategic intentions The Right Force Generation for 'Reflexive Control'-Driven Hybrid Warfare Without a doubt the uniquely advanced way of fighting hybrid wars depicted above would demand an extraordinary force generation and doctrinal order of battle for Kremlin to reach its politico-military goals Therefore it would not be accurate to underscore the setbacks of regular branches and principal units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in training and technological gaps e g precision-guided munitions in order to judge Moscow's ability to run its hybrid warfare campaigns As a matter of fact since the very outset of the current conflict Ukraine has been serving as a 'laboratory' that can be observed to determine the characteristics of the Russian 'reflexive control' concepts At the strategic level the Russians managed to confuse the West about their deployed troop numbers and true political-military goals in Ukraine for a long time Furthermore Moscow managed to keep a stance in Ukraine that cannot be As indicated by Berzins especially the Crimea campaign reflects the maturation of the Russian operations in the light of new military guidelines with 2020 reference The campaign's success can be measured by the fact that in just three weeks and without a shot being 24 For a comprehensive study published during the last years of Cold War see D Chotikul The Soviety Theory of Reflexive Control in Historical and Psychocultural Perspective A Preliminary Study Naval Postgraduate School Monterey-California 1986 Ibid p 43 25 M Snegovaya Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine ISW Washington D C 2015 pp 15-17 26 6 No 121 - November 2015 Research Paper District spearheaded the Russian operations in Ukraine particularly in Crimea 30 The transition from Soviet to contemporary Russian military thinking witnessed the transformation of VDV from a principal deepinterdiction force into an elite infantry with counterguerilla missions due to the situation in Chechnya at that time Since the last VDV unit spetsnaz units of the 45th Separate Reconnaissance Regiment left Chechnya 31 VDV had to wait for approximately two years for adapting to its new role as the military spearhead of Russia's 'reflexive control'-driven hybrid warfare efforts fired the morale of the Ukrainian military was broken and all of their 190 bases had surrendered Instead of relying on a mass deployment of tanks and artillery the Crimean campaign deployed less than 10 000 assault troops -mostly naval infantry already stationed in Crimea backed by a few battalions of airborne troops and Spetsnaz commandos- against 16 000 Ukrainian military personnel In addition the heaviest vehicle used was the wheeled BTR-80 armored personnel carrier 27 Under the aforementioned circumstances a limited number of elite forces 'reflexive control' efforts by several agencies of the Russian state apparatus speed intentional ambiguity and clandestineness within deep penetration operations remain the major assets and critical abilities that Moscow requires to run its hybrid warfare agenda At the beginning of the incumbent Shoygu-Gerasimov military leadership the understanding of speed in ground forces depended on a terrain-based approach that led to the initial categorization of Russian brigades as light medium and heavy by which wheeled armor coupled with a good network of roads was expected to be used in interventions possibly in Moscow's Western neighbors' territories 28 However Russian defense planners recently faced standardization problems in the aforementioned categorization of brigades thus they have had to subdivide the light brigades into 'motorrifle ' 'mountain ' and 'air-mobile' formations More importantly most of the brigades which were initially planned to be light i e the 11th 56th and the 83rd army air-assault brigades were reassigned to the Airborne Forces VDV - Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska 29 VDV a 35 000 elite force is commanded by a battlehardened notoriously powerful 'maverick' under President Putin's political cover Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov a high-profile figure who was twice designated a Hero of the Russian Federation Following a series of reorganization efforts for about two decades and thanks to General Shamanov's strong lobby among top political-military echelons in Moscow VDV's doctrinal order of battle cannot be compared with typical Western airborne units It is organized in four divisions the 7th the 76th the 98th and the 106th of which only the 98th and the 106th divisions have kept their airborne role namely air-drop into zones of action The 7th which was restructured as a 'Mountain Air-Assault Division and the 76th divisions have only one parachute-trained battalion yet they enjoy increased organic fire-power capabilities with extra self-propelled artillery assets Apart from its four robust divisions VDV force structure includes a separate airborne brigade that resembles its Western equivalents the 31st Brigade and its own spetsnaz force the 45th Separate Reconnaissance Regiment 32 At this point the importance of the VDV units within the Russian doctrinal order of battle in conducting recent hybrid warfare efforts should be underlined It is reported that these elite 'blue berets ' along with other special-operations units from the Southern Military Military assessments by Russian experts indicate that following the 2006 reforms in VDV as well as the lessons-learned from the 2008 Russo - Georgian War the Airborne Troops have been subject to a significant modernization process In terms of firepower and ability J Berzins Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine Implications for Latvian Defense Forces National Defence Academy of Latvia Center for Security and Strategic Research 2014 p 4 27 K Giles and A Monaghan Russian Military Modernization-Goal in Sight The Letort Papers SSI 2014 p 18 28 29 IISS Military Balance 2015 Routledge 2015 p 160 30 Ibid p 170 31 R Thornton Organizational Change in the Russian Airborne Forces The Lessons of the Georgian Conflict SSI Carlisle Barracks - Pennsylvania 2011 p 5 32 Ibid pp 8-10 7 Research Paper No 121 - November 2015 of taking on armor as well as fortifications in close quarters VDV units were granted widespread arsenal of single-use RPG-18 RPG-22 and RPG-26 anti-tank weapons while reusable RPG-7 anti-tank rockets were assigned to specialist machine gun and RPG squads of the companies 33 In addition the length of the combat training was increased from six months to one year and the training program now includes battalion-level tactical firing exercises rather than company level in order to enable VDV units to fight in large formations 34 The aforementioned picture is where General Shamanov had become involved General Shamanov who joined the Russian Armed Forces in 1978 and had his first VDV post as artillery platoon of the 76th Division served as the Chief of Staff of another VDV division the 7th during the first Russo - Chechen War in 1994 Coming from the ranks of VDV with some other high command posts Shamanov gained his notorious fame during the 1999 - 2000 Second Russo - Chechen War by indiscriminate use of force and accusations of extreme brutality So much so that General Shamanov's methods were not even approved by the top echelons of the Russian Armed Forces and he was forced to retire in the year 2000 Nevertheless being President Putin's protege General Shamanov was assigned to top political roles such as governor of Ulyanosk oblast in 2000 assistant to the then PM Mikhail Fradkov in 2004 and assistant to Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov in 2006 Finally he ended up in the armed forces once more as the Director of Combat Training upon a Presidential edict in 2007 which was an extraordinary case for Russian and Soviet military traditions 37 This was his official post when he was assigned to the command of VDV units in Abkhazia Apparently due to his success in 2008 he was appointed as the commander of VDV in 2009 and since then the general has kept his post 38 Due to his military success albeit some with unethical methods and thanks to his political connections General Shamanov managed to keep VDV being a reserve force of the President of the Russian Federation privileged and immune to many cutbacks of the Russian defense reforms The 2008 Russo - Georgian War marked a turning point for VDV and its top figure General Vladimir Shamanov Despite all the problems with communications reconnaissance and the lack of adequate equipment that VDV - as well as other Russian forces in Georgia- suffered from the 'blue berets' showed a good performance in 2008 In this respect two battalions from the 76th Division deployed some 2 000 km away from their base in Pskov to Beslan-North Ossetia in 24 hours and they moved into area of operations and positioned in the vanguard of the campaign even before the 58th Army's elements that were actually based in Chechnya and North Ossetia More importantly the spetsnaz from the VDV's 45th Reconnaissance Regiment were so swift to move into the hot zone that they were involved in the defense of Tskhinvali to confront Georgian elements 35 In the Abkhazian sector about eight VDV battalions were deployed within the five days of hostilities and four battalions from the 7th Division actively engaged in combat More importantly unlike the situation in South Ossetia there was minimum number of Russian ground troops' in support of the operating VDV units and the military transport priorities were given to the South Ossetia front As a result the story for the blue berets in Abkhazia was nowhere being as 'satisfactory' as it was for their 'brothers in arms' in South Ossetia 36 Unlike the VDV Russian Special Operations Forces SOF have been much more affected by domestic power politics among Moscow's political elite and Kremlin circles Firstly established to counter the tactical nuclear weapons threat during the Cold War after more than five decades Russian SOF structure was first 33 A Lavrov Reform of the Airborne Troops in Russia's New Army M Barabanov ed Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies Moscow 2011 pp 33-35 34 Ibid pp 34-35 35 R Thornton Organizational Change in the Russian Airborne Forces The Lessons of the Georgian Conflict SSI Carlisle Barracks - Pennsylvania 2011 p 25 36 Ibid pp 25-26 For a detailed biography see R Finch One Face of the Modern Russian Army General Vladimir Shamanov The Journal of Slavic Military Studies no 24 pp 396-427 2011 37 38 Ibid 8 No 121 - November 2015 Research Paper percent Considering a rough total of some 14 000 current Russian spetsnaz estimated 12 000 GRU 1 500 Special Ops Command some 700 VDV which refers to 1 9 percent of the Russian Armed Forces' manpower the mentioned 5-7 percent would probably remain an unrealistic ideal 45 Moreover distinct from many world armies today Russia uses conscript soldiers in SOF units so much so that in 2011 the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade was manned by only %30 contract soldiers 46 Therefore a much larger SOF force may not naturally translate into more military efficiency for the Russians drastically altered by the Serdukyov reforms in 2008 and subsequently by the establishment of the Special Operations Command in 2013 39 Intelligence failures during the 2008 Georgia War put the military Main Intelligence Directorate's GRU spetsnaz forces under the radar as did the traditional rivalry between the Federal Security Service FSB and GRU in the Russian Federation 40 Last but not least some open-source intelligence reports even suggest a GRU-FSB confrontation in Ukraine a rivalry based on Vladislav Surkov's41 influence on Kremlin's Ukraine policies 42 On the other hand General Shamanov of the VDV puts forward an interesting -albeit menacing for NATO- idea that could find the way-forward for the Russian reflexive control- driven hybrid warfare force generation In his RIA Novosti interview General Shamanov proposed a fifth mobile strategic command in addition to four static strategic commands in order to unify special forces and airborne troops under a single command which would be responsible for confronting threats and challenges both inside and outside of the country 47 Yet despite the underperformance in 2008 Georgia Ukraine is now seen as a test-field for the reorganization of the new SOF structure and the Special Operations Command KSO According to Jane's Intelligence Review Russian spetsnaz now embraces a vital role for nonlinear warfare especially in terms of political warfare and behind-enemy lines penetration for long-term reconnaissance and surveillance Furthermore Russian spetsnaz's footprint in Eastern Ukraine suggests that this elite force is assigned to training and coordination missions with proxy forces 43 In this respect some Russian weapon systems such as Pantsir-S1 surface-toair missile and T-72B3 main battle tanks a new variant that entered service in the Russian Ground Forces in 2013 have been spotted in Eastern Ukraine 44 Notably General Shamanov's comments were followed by Moscow's decision to establish a 70 000-strong Rapid Reaction Force that would be based on VDV as backbone 48 This force would possibly have an automated command control C2 system i e Andromeda which VDV has been working on in recent years in order to increase its combat mobility Within this context VDV being the planned backbone of Russian Rapid Reaction Forces is to be augmented by tank battalions for higher fire-power and %80 of its units are planned to be manned by professional soldiers 49 Although some Russian military experts suggested that special operations forces should member some 5-7 percent of the armed forces total for Russia the current global trends in most states range between 1-3 39 40 T Bukkvoll Military Innovation under Authoritarian Government-the Case of Russian Special Operations Forces Journal of Strategic Studies no 5 2015 pp 602-625 Ibid Vladislav Surkov is the former deputy PM of the Russian Federation and now serves as personal advisor to President Putin on South Ossetia Abkhazia and Ukraine He was accused of arranging sniper teams during the Ukrainian Euromaidan 41 42 Stratfor Reviving Kremlinology 2015 p 15 43 Jane's Intelligence Review 2014 pp 5-7 44 R N Mcdermott Brothers Disunited Russia's Use of Military Power in Ukraine The Foreign Military Studies Office Kansas 2015 p 29 T Bukkvoll Military Innovation under Authoritarian Government-the Case of Russian Special Operations Forces Journal of Strategic Studies no 5 2015 pp 602-625 45 46 Ibid 47 http in rbth com economics 2013 04 29 special_operations_force_to_power_russian_army_24329 accessed 1 October 2015 Jamestown Foundation http www jamestown org single cHash 40bf42c159bd77b6f78ee1d37fd073c1 tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D 7 tx_ttnews%5Btt_ news%5D 44010# Vg1MVk3AK70 accessed 1 October 2015 48 49 Ibid 9 Research Paper No 121 - November 2015 snap exercises to disguise military buildups and its actual political intentions Therefore in addition to an enhanced elite force Russia would always be in need of a large army regardless of developments in rapid reaction force generation Yet mobilizing such a large force at short notice necessitates centralized political-military control Last but not least referring to General Shamanov TASS Russian News Agency reported in 2014 that the new Rapid Reaction Force could be supported by army aviation brigades 50 These developments suggest that the Rapid Reaction Force may well transform into the '5th mobile Strategic Command' or 'a new military district without a permanent area of responsibility' depending on Kremlin's geopolitical ambitions and calculus Military Buildups and Snap Exercises as a Strategic Tool of the New Russian Military Thinking The 2012 - 2013 period witnessed additional important changes in the Russian defense apparatus President Putin began to work with his new Chief of Staff General Valery Gerasimov and his new Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu In parallel the military reforms which were tailored by the previous Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdukyov were replaced by the 2013 Defense Plan Moreover new legislation adopted in late 2012 changed the top command structure of the armed forces and since then General Gerasimov has been subordinated to President Putin as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Last but not least the new General Staff position was reinforced by drastic new functions such as control over local authorities outside the Ministry of Defense in order to execute territorial defense 52 These organizational changes have brought along a highly centralized politico-military decision-making mechanism that enabled massive snap exercises and effective cooperation between military and non-military bodies of the Russian state apparatus Although the Russian 'reflexive control'-driven hybrid warfare efforts are run by a core group of elite forces proxies as 'armed civilians ' trained and coordinated by Russian special forces along with other 'non-military measures ' still massive military buildups remain important to the Russian strategy From a military standpoint lessons-learned from the 2008 RussoGeorgian War demonstrate that Russia could overcome its setbacks in tactical engagements by strategic surprise factor through a swift buildup as well as fast and direct operational art 51 Moreover the Ukraine case shows that as a tool of 'reflexive control ' Moscow uses massive In order to avoid possible escalation and conflict with Russia Kiev had intentionally avoided formidable deployments and military buildups along border areas In this regard Timothy Thomas underlines that only a handful of Ukraine's 38 or so military formations were originally located east of the Dnieper River 53 On the other hand such a doctrinal order of battle and its geostrategic reflections were cunningly exploited by Moscow during the annexation of Crimea During Moscow's Crimean campaign the Russian military buildup in the vicinity of Chernihiv - Luhansk in eastern Ukraine put significant pressure on Ukrainian Such a rapid reaction force would probably constitute Moscow's main asset to run 'reflexive control'-driven hybrid warfare efforts Given General Shamanov's political power and 'special relations' with President Putin placing VDV at the core of the new rapid reaction forces would not be a solely military decision but also a political one Furthermore the FSB elite who are reported to be in rivalry with GRU would not oppose GRU-spetsnaz's possible absorption within VDV's doctrinal order of battle Yet should the new rapid reaction force's status remain the same with VDV which comes into the picture as President's reserve force then the Kremlinology calculus in Moscow would have to be re-assessed 50 TASS http tass ru en russia 743211 accessed 1 October 2015 For a comprehensive assessment on the Russian Armed Forces' performance in Georgia 2008 see A Cohen and R E Hamilton The Russian Military and the Georgian War Lessons and Implications SSI Pennsylvania 2011 51 52 K Giles and A Monaghan Russian Military Modernization-Goal in Sight The Letort Papers SSI 2014 p 1 53 T Thomas Russia's Military Strategy in Ukraine Indirect Asymmetric-and Putin-led Journal of Slavic Military Studies no 28 2015 pp 445-461 10 No 121 - November 2015 Research Paper for using the threat of force in international disputes troop dispositions and thereby forced Kiev to shift military formations from west to east instead of the Crimean peninsula and surrounding regions 54 Besides although the Ukrainian Armed Forces were strong on the paper due to low defense budget around 2 4 billion USD in 2013 and poor maintenance more than half of its main battle tanks were in storage during the Crimean campaign 55 This manner of conduct complicates determination of the necessary force-to-force ratio when defending against Russian aggression Clearly the Russian way of hybrid warfare depends on swift and massive deployments along border areas as well as elite units' deep penetrations and subversive activities in parallel with proxy elements' irregular warfare efforts on the ground Such an operational art brings along the problem of taking both conventional force-to-force ratios and required troop density for low intensity conflicts including adequate force-to-population levels to fight insurgencies As mentioned earlier the highly centralized decisionmaking structure of the Russian doctrinal order of battle enables snap exercises to disguise menacing military buildups along border areas In this respect Russian snap exercises conducted between February 26 and March 7 2014 played a key role by deterring and diverting attention of the Kiev government and prevented the Ukrainian leadership from focusing on the troublesome contingency in Crimea 56 Although the Russians did not launch a massive conventional incursion into Ukraine the menacing military buildup shaded by a snap exercise deterred the Kiev government from taking decisive actions against Moscow's little green men and local proxies 57 Russian sources reported that between February 26 and March 3 2014 some 150 000 troops from the Western and Central Military Districts including all three armynavy-air force branches supported by more than 200 air force assets up to 90 fixed-wing and 120 rotary-wing aircrafts 880 tanks 80 warships and 1 200 piece of other military equipment conducted massive drills to test combat readiness of these forces 58 Indeed one of the major aims of the Russian massive snap exercises is to test combat readiness of the armed forces Yet they also serve as a politico-military tool to send signals to NATO as well as to the countries of the 'near abroad ' as defined by the contemporary Russian geopolitical paradigm 59 Furthermore a series of snap exercises have become the Putin administration's justification tool Conclusion and Recommendations NATO is not facing a new Russian military strategy but a new military thinking that brings about shifts at strategic operational and tactical levels along with doctrinal order of battle and military strategic culture Therefore the right panacea would not be centered on the question of 'how to confront the Russian hybrid warfare challenge ' rather the question of 'how to best understand the Russian hybrid warfare challenge ' Without a doubt the Russian challenge posed to the North Atlantic Alliance's strategic interests of collective defense and cooperative security is a serious and imminent one Within this context what is at stake is Russian hybrid warfare challenge is neither a perfect revolution in military affairs RMA as some tend to exaggerate nor just conduct of a decades -if not centuries- old way of warfighting now cunningly discovered by the Russian military machine's little green men Rather the contemporary Russian warfighting concept managed to put a new face on hybrid warfare by incorporating non-military measures into the battlefield 54 I Sutyagin and M Clarke Ukraine Military Dispositions Military Ticks Up while the Clock Ticks Down RUSI https www rusi org downloads assets UKRANIANMILITARYDISPOSITIONS_RUSIBRIEFING pdf accessed 27 September 2015 55 IISS Military Balance 2014 Routledge London 2014 pp 194-195 56 A Racz Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine Breaking the Enemy's Ability to Resist FIIA Report 43 pp 74-75 57 Ibid p 88 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation http function mil ru news_page country more htm id 11905664@egNews accessed 28 September 2015 58 59 T Frear et al Preparing for the Worst Are Russian and NATO Military Exercises Making War in Europe more Likely Policy Brief European Leadership Network August 2015 p 4 11 Research Paper No 121 - November 2015 in intensive ratios effectively conducting a good refinement of the Soviet legacy 'reflexive control' concepts to disguise Kremlin's campaigns abroad and also by linking strategic operational and tactical levels of a campaign efficiently within the context of full spectrum operations proxy war special operations and subversive activities This strategic perspective is supported by a new force posture renewed doctrinal order of battle and robust combined arms capabilities for elite units at permanent readiness levels In sum what NATO is facing could well be depicted as a maskirovka-driven hybrid blitzkrieg Such a conceptualization should not confuse the North Atlantic Alliance strategic community about the Russian Armed Forces' military capabilities as regular conscripts with inadequate training and poor equipment cannot counterbalance a highlytrained well-disciplined conventional force using precision strike assets and conducting technology-driven networkcentric operations In other words as the character of warfare shifts towards more traditional and conventional the Russians could face serious shortcomings emanating from lack of trained personnel in large numbers and of modern equipment On the other hand Russian defense modernization and its hybrid warfare aspect remains menacing as such a manner of conduct poses dire challenges not only to Western military capabilities but also its strategic culture operational art and military thought The overall picture serves Russian interests by enhancing the fog of war from the perspective of the North Atlantic Alliance thereby making it harder to utilize traditional intelligence analysis and strategic forecasting procedures to understand Moscow's moves Through a Clausewitzian lens by effectively conducting 'reflexive control' theory and related concepts Moscow made it extremely hard for the West to predict any Russian campaign's center of gravity Another aspect of the Russian hybrid warfare campaign is the fact that it is supported by an authoritarian but stable political authority As seen in every segment of warfare military capabilities can only be proven effective when they are supported by strong and determined political will Thus it would be fair to say that Moscow's current Siloviki elite have done well on their part to stand behind the Russian Armed Forces ' or its little green men's operations abroad Russian military trends with regard to establishing and equipping Rapid Reaction Forces should be monitored and 12 assessed carefully In fact as being hinted by General Vladimir Shamanov by his 'fifth strategic command' expression the Rapid Reaction Forces are believed to be the main arm of the Russian hybrid warfare approach in the 2020s Clearly as VDV cannot be explained by the Western militaries' parameters for airborne troops Moscow's Rapid Reaction Forces would probably show little resemblance with the concept of rapid reaction forces' that would resonate among the North Atlantic Alliance strategic community The conclusion is that NATO needs new intelligence analysis and strategic forecasting capabilities for getting a grip on the new Russian challenge This should be followed by adequate military strategies concepts and of course hard power capacity First and foremost the North Atlantic Alliance strategic community should recognize the Russian 'reflexive control' campaign that could bring about a menacing 'analytical paralysis' when assessing Moscow's true intentions and manner of conduct in its future hybrid warfare efforts This 'analytical paralysis' may well include 'buying' the lessrisky options that the Russian elite offer in order to pursue a policy which might be seen 'carefully-calculated and risk-aversive ' but unintentionally paving the ground for more gains for Moscow through use or threat of force In order to confront the aforementioned challenges this study recommends the North Atlantic Alliance to promote necessary institutions and concepts to develop a thorough understanding of hybrid warfare and the Russian interpretation of it in the form of 'reflexive control-driven nonlinear warfare ' In this regard a new Center of Excellence particularly focusing on hybrid warfare and related works within Allied Command Transformation is recommended This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu