0568 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION SUBJECT The President's Luncheon Plenary Meeting with the Heads of State and Government of Poland Hungary Slovakia and the Czech Republic PARTICIPANTS The President Warren Christopher Secretary of State Madeleine Albright U S Permanent Representative to the United Nations Mac McLarty Chief of Staff Anthony Lake Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Leon Fuerth National Security Advisor for the Vice President Adrian Basora Ambassador Czech Republic Stephen Oxman Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Daniel Fried NSC Notetaker President Lech Walesa Poland Premier Waldemar Pawlak Poland Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski Poland President Arpad Goencz Hungary Premier Peter Boross Hungary Foreign Minister Geza Hungary President Michal Kovac Slovakia Premier Vladimir Meciar Slovakia Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik Slovakia President Vaclav Havel Czech Republic Premier Vaclav Klaus Czech Republic Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec Czech Republic DATE TIME January 12 1994 12 15 - 2 00 p m AND PLACE Ambassador's Residence Prague The President opened the meeting by welcoming his guests and noting that he had enjoyed his bilateral meetings with the leaders of each country He was pleased that all the countries had expressed their support for the Partnership for Peace PFP initiative Military leaders of NATO and the U S now would get down to work with potential partner countries to make the PFP a reality and the President was ready to discuss additional details if the Visegrad leaders wished He also was ready to discuss regional or economic questions or other questions of interest He was open to discussing Bosnia though he hoped it would not dominate the meeting bog PER E O 135-26 Declassify on OADR AHVHE I NOLNHC 2 Bosnia former Yugoslavia Foreign Minister raised Bosnia noting that a stalemate currently existed with respect both to Bosnia and the entire south Slav crisis The time to put an end to the issue in a satisfactory way was two years ago this was no longer possible What then was to be done No side to the Bosnian conflict was ready to make the concessions necessary to end the war Meanwhile the process of trying to deal with the conflict was wearing on We know who is the major culprit in the war and Hungary supports sanctions against Serbia -- the only country to do so systematically Serbia knows of Hungary's role in sanctions and has means to put pressure on Hungary through partial control of Danube shipping and against the Hungarian minority in the Vojvodina Hungary would be delighted if the war would end but this is unlikely so Hungary will soldier on SQ Premier Boross picked up theme observing that sanctions had cut into Serbia's economy very deeply without however crippling its war-making potential Sanctions had their greatest effect on the pOpulation at large and on Serbia's neighbors -- such as Hungary Nevertheless sanctions and perhaps the prospect of action by the War Crimes Tribunal represented the only opportunities at present President Goencz interjected that the danger for Hungary was not so much its sanctions-related losses -- which he put at $1 3 billion -- but the prospect of massive inflows of refugees from the Vojvodina should conditions there deteriorate 89 Foreign Minister zieleniec stressed that military victory in the Balkans was impossible and in any event parties outside the conflict had not demonstrated a will to take the limited military actions that might have an effect on the conflict In the meantime Russian influence could be felt in Serbia agreed noting that through Serbia Russia could reenter Central and Eastern Europe gaining an outlet on the Adriatic through Serbia-Montenegro N1 President Walesa stressed that the time had come for decisive leadership to put an end to the conflict in Bosnia All should contribute to a solution even a military solution Poland was prepared to do its share President Kovac noted that a lack of unity had contributed to the world community s failure to find a solution to the Yugoslav conflict the priority task was to determine what settlement was achievable and then to decide upon means to achieve including military means if necessary President Meciar wondered what military solution could be achieved Three separate peoples were involved in Bosnia and the terrain was mountainous A political solution had to be determined before military means were discussed and it inevitably would involve partition But when it came time to implement a solution Slovakia too would be willing to help 64 The President stressed that the United States recognized that sanctions were burdensome especially for Hungary Nevertheless sanctions had a good deal to do with Serbia s willingness to I l I 73 3 discuss peace at all Meanwhile the Moslems were on the attack in Central Bosnia What would be the objectives of military action What would intervention lead to The possibility of a negotiated settlement made it very hard to accept options of continued warfare QGQ President Goencz again observed that Russia was deeply involved in the Balkans he wondered whether PFP could be used as a means for Russia to play a constructive role in the Yugoslav conflict The President said he would consider this last point during his talks in Moscow He then summed up the discussion the fact remained that 1991-92 was the best time to try to end the conflict in former Yugoslavia The international community failed then and the use of military power now was vastly more complex Steps such as sanctions air drops and diplomatic pressures might have an effect on the Serbs to make necessary concessions to achieve peace it was hard to imagine pressuring the Bosnian government OQ Premier Klaus added that the issue was one of the West s credibility with factions in Bosnia who wished to continue fighting The President asked Klaus whether he thought Serbia believed U S threats of military action linked to U N decisions the August 9 warnings were viable Premier Klaus answered indirectly noting that the point was not to move against any single party to the conflict but to more against all in accordance with a concept of a settlement at the end of the day- N2 PFP and Economic Issues Foreign Minister Olechowski observed that credibility was always an issue for Eastern EurOpeans contemplating Western initiatives including the PFP Still most believed economics held the key to reform s success in the region and Olechowski noted the President s call in Brussels for Western Europe to buy more exports from Central and Eastern Europe In addition to its other objectives could the PFP be an additional vehicle to allow to compete for sales of defense articles to the West In practice NATO members held the monopoly on sales to other NATO members and internal U S DOD military procurement rules kept Polish products out of the U S defense market FCJ The President said he would look into the question of procurement With respect to the larger question about PFP the President stressed that he had spoken to NATO Secretary General Woerner and SHAPE Commander General Joulwan personally about getting PFP off the ground fast 0Q President Havel took the floor and drew from the Czech prepared national statement noting that the Czech Republic was prepared to accept PFP immediately and in this context the other CEE countries represented had very similar views surely a gratifying circumstance The Czech position on PFP was derived I em 4 from Czech support for the values of Western civilization and its desire through NATO membership to defend these values 84 Premier Pawlak noted Poland s acceptance of PEP but added that it should become in the longer-term a Partnership for Development 1 The Visegrad countries had worked together to develop a free trade area and this meeting would contribute to their cooperation across the board The President s call for more open Western markets for CEE exports was an important contribution Pawlak said he hoped this would be matched by 0 8 support for Poland's and other CEE country s negotiations with the GATT and accession to OECD 0Q Picking up a theme from his earlier bilateral meeting with the President President Walesa observed that Poland would not flood the West with goods its economic cooperation would grow with the East where it was more competitive Indeed Polish cooperation with Western firms to exploit the Eastern market had great potential repeating an old refrain Walesa noted that Poland needed American generals General Motors and General Electric Poland looked to economic cooperation and not hostility with Russia Still the problem of Kaliningrad Oblast remained where the 350 000 Russian troops gave that enclave between Lithuania Poland and the Baltic Sea the highest troop concentration in the world This was a potentially dangerous situation SQ Russia Ukraine The President asked whether any had questions or comments in advance of his imminent departure for Kiev and Moscow Foreign Minister expressed agreement with Walesa s point about Russian troop concentrations in Kaliningrad Oblast Russian efforts to modify CFE restrictions were troubling as well President Walesa stressed that Russia had signed many agreements but its word was not always good one hand held a pen the other a grenade Yeltsin told the Poles in Warsaw last summer that Russia had no objection to Poland's membership in NATO he Walesa had a paper with Yeltsin's signature to prove it But Yeltsin had changed in his mind The Visegrad countries here represented Walesa continued kept their word they had a Western culture Russia did not sq President Havel again drawing from his statement noted that it was neither possible nor desirable to isolate Russia The task was to develop a relationship between NATO and Russia that would respect Russia's position There should be no Russian veto over NATO decisions nor over the decisions of sovereign nations in Central Europe Expansion of NATO would not bring an enemy closer to Russia but rather a zone of stability and democracy The President said he agreed with President Havel there was and would be no Russian veto over NATO decisions NATO was a defensive alliance that guaranteed its members borders and NATO could and would develop the right relations with Russia Si The question was also one of Russia s internal development Premier Klaus observed Russia s foreign affairs were a function AHVHE I l I 0 of its economic and democratic evolution and Russia was at a far earlier stage than CEE Foreign Minister Olechowski urged the President to remember the concerns and fears in Central and Eastern Europe Would the U S cut a deal with Russia over their heads by accepting a new sphere of influence understanding with Moscow Or would the U S work with Russia to put into effect a new security system The President rejoined that the U S would not draw a new line in Europe or contribute to such a process by giving anyone the excuse to do so Russia was not threatened by PFP though any imperialistic tendencies might be Foreign Minister Olechowski noted that if the President took such a stance in Moscow he would establish the validity of PFP The President said he would remember that point so The President asked whether it was devoting time and resources to support the independence of some of the non-Russian post Soviet states such as Ukraine responded that it certainly was and all at the table would likely agree Ukraine was essential to European security as a buffer state Yet Ukraine s economy was in shambles and this constituted a genuine danger to the country s viability Poland and Hungary knew Kiev well understood the problem and maintained excellent political relations but lacked the economic resources to help The President added that if he could conclude the agreement on nuclear weapons the U S might be able to mobilize resources to help 08 President Goencz underscored points Ukraine could be a major problem if it were neglected it might be reabsorbed by Russia or conflict could break out Kravchuk understood the danger as well The question was not whether to support Russia or Ukraine but how to support both to the benefit of all President Walesa expressed his agreement with Goencz adding that assistance to Ukraine should be rendered through CEE whose economies were not dominated by Russia as was Ukraine's The wave of democracy and reform should Spread to Russia and Ukraine from the West across CEE -- not a wave against Russia but for reform and democracy 08L President Kovac also agreed that Ukrainian independence was key to European security and that Ukraine s economy was the greatest threat to its independence If the world wanted an independent Ukraine it needed to provide more economic assistance Foreign Minister Moravcik added that support for Ukraine's economy meant support for Russian democracy because an independent viable Ukraine would thwart the agenda of the Russian imperialists 189 The President sought to sum up this portion of the discussion First recalling earlier point the President expressed U S opposition to attempts to reopen CFE through reallocations Next the President reiterated the point that CEE security was tied to America own security The U S sought an integrated Europe as large as we can make it The U S and President Clinton personally were prepared to work with CEE and AHVHB I l WW I lfJ 6 its leaders because among other things few parts of the world are as important as your four countries Finally the President expressed thanks to the CEE leaders for having met with him As the meeting broke up President Walesa joked that the countries assembled would be glad to guarantee American security if that's what a new European security required I I lO                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 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