DECLASSIFIED Authority 701 5 may 7' Wear cow DEC -- M - 1 Ea SYSTEMATIC refraing 13 9 NM 5 7 $930 30- a Class n to Eat-Sit with so currenee of i NARA nu a 3 23 2 2 958 25x Decem b hi M I Date 12 52 sag-esse- - fr We we we forewat No I 3 MEMORANDUM or CONVERSATION Participants The President The British Prime Minister The Secretary of State The Foreign Seer-etary The Secretary of Defense The Defense Secretary The Under Secretary of State Lord Harlech Ambassador David K E Bruce Sir Burke Trend McGeorge Bundy Sir Harold Caccia William R Tyler - Sir Solly Zuckerman Richard E Neus tadt Place The Cabinet Room December 7 1964 5 00 p 111 The principals were absent when the meeting begana The President I and the Prime Minister joined the group at 6 10 p 111 'r - In the absence of the principals Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by turning to the subject of Minutemen arid the problems of mixed manning them He said many looked across the Pacific and therefore NATO should not become involved British Defense Minister Healey observed that such a force at best would onlyr be a fraction of the U95 total capacity And Gordon Walker added that one wing of mixed-manned Minutemen could not control the remainde Mr Ball said that he did not believe the Germans had an interest in participating in a mixed-manned weapons setup in continental 0 8 They wanted something in the European area and not anything clearly in the physical control of the that was a most important factor Replying Healey said the Dutch and the Norwegians preferred to be mixed up with the U S and it was his understanding that the German Socialists wanted this too Those who insisted on having the weapons in Europe were generally looking to the ultimate release of a U S veto eases-r 4 m i an M DECLASSIFIED if atheism -2- A f Secretary McNamara said this was a difficult problem Not only was mixed-manning with greater weapons dangerous The fact was that the LS was redesigning the Minuteman and wanted to keep this fact from the USSR With mixed manning it would be difficult to keep This information was under tight control Gordon Walker granted'that the Secretary s argument on security was powerful and then turned to the subject of equality with the Germans He asserted that essentially equality was control and net in the manning arrangements The system of vetoes proposed by the British took this into account Healey then asked what the Ugsg had in mind at Nassau when it agreed to assign part of its strategic forces undervparagraph 6 and include Polaris submarines in the multilateral forceo Mr McNamara assumed that the undertakings involved a mixed-manned'seaborne force in which British and ms Polarises would be included Healey observed'that the details were not Spelled out in the communique and as he read the agreement it called for equal participation of and UK forces without reference to mixed-manning I Secretary Ball agreed that the British Go-vernrnent never agreed to join the mixed manned force but it had clearly agreed to give that concept a free wind This gave Healey the opportunity to talk about Nassau and particularly about the performance of the Tory leaders He said the Labor Govern- ment was just catching up with the Nassau record and was impressed by how much more correct Kennedy was about France than l vlacmillan In fact the UK performance was disgraceful He also thought it was unfortunate that the points of agreement at the meeting were not laid down more Specifically It was unclear to Healey how the national and mixed-manning concepts could have become so confused Mr Ball explained that the terminology was straightened out after Nassau and the terms I'multilateral and multinational were used to define the separate concepts Mru McNamara added however the presumption always was that the seaborne force would be mixed inanned DECLASSIFIED Authority mm - 1-St- Healev then asked if the British contributed their Polaris submarines and Vubombers to the forCe what would the contribution consist 0f - I Mr McNamara said it was entirely possible to think about putting in 13-475 523 and 583 although he wanted to ponder this more carefully and know more about mixu-manning bombers I Gordon Walker commented that the NATO working group had already said that the mixed manned bombers were feasible Healey then remarked that the real-aim was to produce a control system satisfactory to the non nuclear powers and bring them into the operation so that they would familiarize themselves with the nature and the pro- blems of the strategic forces Physical contact with missiles alone did not seem to produce the necessary understanding witness the example of the French It was important to get down'to the hard prov- blems of nuclear strategy before this understanding was achieved In other words the most important point of the exercise was its educational value And Healev doubted that its effectiveness was determined by the existence of mixed manned surface ships As far as he could tell the power of the atom could even be learned from Pershings Secretary McNamara disagreed and said the problem was far bigger Moreover there was a German public to be considered Continuing on this same point Healev wondered how much of the German problem was related to a misunderstanding of the U S willingness to drOp its veto He said he thought the Germans saw the mixed manned fleet as one which the German element could come to dominate There- fore they were not prepared to accept anything less promising By the same token the British felt the persistence of the U S veto was an important factor and this had to be made clear to the Germans Secretary Ball said he could not believe there was such a misunder- standing The Germans knew the veto was a fact of life And as for its relinquishrnent I he felt certain that they understood this could only be considered when and if Europe was unified under a single executive Then there clearlyr would be a new situation and all would be obliged to take a new look at the agreement - we can DECLASSIFIED Authority mm - 1-St- Healev then asked if the British contributed their Polaris submarines and Vubombers to the forCe what would the contribution consist 0f - I Mr McNamara said it was entirely possible to think about putting in 13-475 523 and 583 although he wanted to ponder this more carefully and know more about mixu-manning bombers I Gordon Walker commented that the NATO working group had already said that the mixed manned bombers were feasible Healey then remarked that the real-aim was to produce a control system satisfactory to the non nuclear powers and bring them into the operation so that they would familiarize themselves with the nature and the pro- blems of the strategic forces Physical contact with missiles alone did not seem to produce the necessary understanding witness the example of the French It was important to get down'to the hard prov- blems of nuclear strategy before this understanding was achieved In other words the most important point of the exercise was its educational value And Healev doubted that its effectiveness was determined by the existence of mixed manned surface ships As far as he could tell the power of the atom could even be learned from Pershings Secretary McNamara disagreed and said the problem was far bigger Moreover there was a German public to be considered Continuing on this same point Healev wondered how much of the German problem was related to a misunderstanding of the U S willingness to drOp its veto He said he thought the Germans saw the mixed manned fleet as one which the German element could come to dominate There- fore they were not prepared to accept anything less promising By the same token the British felt the persistence of the U S veto was an important factor and this had to be made clear to the Germans Secretary Ball said he could not believe there was such a misunder- standing The Germans knew the veto was a fact of life And as for its relinquishrnent I he felt certain that they understood this could only be considered when and if Europe was unified under a single executive Then there clearlyr would be a new situation and all would be obliged to take a new look at the agreement - we can DECLASSIFIED Authority mm - 1-St- Healev then asked if the British contributed their Polaris submarines and Vubombers to the forCe what would the contribution consist 0f - I Mr McNamara said it was entirely possible to think about putting in 13-475 523 and 583 although he wanted to ponder this more carefully and know more about mixu-manning bombers I Gordon Walker commented that the NATO working group had already said that the mixed manned bombers were feasible Healey then remarked that the real-aim was to produce a control system satisfactory to the non nuclear powers and bring them into the operation so that they would familiarize themselves with the nature and the pro- blems of the strategic forces Physical contact with missiles alone did not seem to produce the necessary understanding witness the example of the French It was important to get down'to the hard prov- blems of nuclear strategy before this understanding was achieved In other words the most important point of the exercise was its educational value And Healev doubted that its effectiveness was determined by the existence of mixed manned surface ships As far as he could tell the power of the atom could even be learned from Pershings Secretary McNamara disagreed and said the problem was far bigger Moreover there was a German public to be considered Continuing on this same point Healev wondered how much of the German problem was related to a misunderstanding of the U S willingness to drOp its veto He said he thought the Germans saw the mixed manned fleet as one which the German element could come to dominate There- fore they were not prepared to accept anything less promising By the same token the British felt the persistence of the U S veto was an important factor and this had to be made clear to the Germans Secretary Ball said he could not believe there was such a misunder- standing The Germans knew the veto was a fact of life And as for its relinquishrnent I he felt certain that they understood this could only be considered when and if Europe was unified under a single executive Then there clearlyr would be a new situation and all would be obliged to take a new look at the agreement - we can DECLASSIFIED Authore am -4 - Mr McNamara 'sa'id he had told Von HasSel quite categorically that the U S did not intend to give up the veto Others could not trigger SAG The U S could not be part of a force in which it did not have a veto Healeyinsisted this was precisely the problemu The Germans saw in the MoNarnara-Ball statements reason to believe they Inight be on their way to a EuroPean deterrent without interferenceo He therefore felt strongly that the position in this matter had to be nade-as clear to the Germans as it had already been made to the UK and the Although Mr Ball asserted the Germans understood this Healey in sisted that the European unification formula could Spell the end of non - proliferationo Nuclear weapons then would be turned over under certain circum'stances to present non- nuclear EurOpean powersn And the concept of a unified Europe Was- in itself an eduivocation The Secretary of State said he could not see the British point because in his mind he could not envisage a Europe that did not at least have 3 France andfor a Britain - The discussion-then went back to the mixed manned surface force with Healey contending that the Germans saw in this element a half-way measure to a Eur0pean force without a U0 8 vetoo When Mr Ball pointed out that Great Britain would in any event have its veto Gordon Walker insisted there was a point beyond which one nation could not hold out against the otl'lersa Greater protection was needed and this would have to be a clear U S statement of its intention to retain its veto Mr Ball said that the U S did not want to take a position which said the U98 would not give up its veto under any circumstances and thereby play right into the hands of the Gaullists And Gordon Walker replied But if you don t you raise hepes that should not have been 3 ram eds Secretary McNamara wondered which Germans the British were talking about Responsible German leaders eo g Von Hassel With whom he talked clearly understood that was not going to give up the veto and accepted this The Secretary of State added that the Germans assass- I l- -- Am 'vv-I-Iw sw pd-m- pvu A-v w Ian-wt DECLASSIFIED Amorin -5- in fact had said quite'frankly they saw the multilate '31 force as an element tying the J 50 more closely to Europa Healey said there were at leaSt two forces in Germany those who wanted closer ties with the and those who wanted to separate Europe from the U S for whatever reasons And the latter saw in the MLF potential bargaining power for themselves in'bargaining with the When Secretary McNamara denied this was a position of respOnsible Germans Gordon Walker retorted that one German who felt this way was Hallstein who saw the multilateral force as the beginning of a European force which in turn would be an important element of a politically unified Europe Mr Ball thought it would be disastrous to let the impression get around that the Anglo-Saxons were trying to prevent apolitical IEurOpea Gordon Walker said he could see the problem of wanting to hedge the Veto commitment for the political reasons stated But the fact was that it would be difficult for Britain to join the force unless the U0 30 position on the veto was clear 'Mr Ball said it'was his feeling we were really talking about words and not substanceo It was important to get the language correct and this the would try to do Healey expressed concern about the attitudes of Germans conducting the multilateral force negotiations They seemed to find it difficult to look at anything other than the original multilateral force proposals and there was some fuzziness about controlsa The danger was that if there was misunderstanding all around strains within the alliance would be increased with all that that implied Secretary McNamara described his conversation on this subject with Von Hasselg He said he told the German Defense Minister that the multilateral force would be a substitute for and not an add on to the 5 59 nuclear strength with the Germans paying for something the Americans had been financing hitherto Mereover the U S would retain its veto He also told Von Hassel the Germans had to as spme reSponsibility for selling the concept to the Germans -- that the - DECLASSIFIED Authority m X - Americans were only interested if the Europeans wanted it The Americans would not do the selling job At this point Healey asked whether the American effort'over the past'months could be described as anything less than a selling effort Mr went on to say that in reply Von Hassel told him categorically that the German Government was afraid of its own people It was concerned that if Germany did not havea role in the multilateral mixe d manned force elements within Germany would be pushing for more In addition Von Hassel expressed the Germans concern about possible 0 8 isolationism They did not want tobe left alone and felt the multilateral force would serve to tie the U S to EurOpe for a long time - Mr McNamara felt certain there was no Liane-understanding about this in VonHassel s mind - Gordon Walker observed that he did not see a great rush of the allies going forward in a tremendous force to join the multilateral force To this Mr Ball replied that very few things are done by acclamation The idea seemed good to us The Germans felt it was important The German problem is difficult and it was only prudent to consider the _matter very carefully Responding to and Gordon Walker s assertions that the British proposals in fact called for German-UK equality by bringing Germany in the nuclear club Mr Ball reiterated that equality of Germany with the other Europeans was most important This was the reason for the mixed manned proposal And redoing the concept now would be difficult Gordon Walker thought the Germans would be veryr equal if the British put in the weapons they were proposing and agreed to share control After all control rather than manning was the measure of equality At this point Secretary Rusk said he thought that over emphasis 'on the veto seemed to throw the entire concept out of kilter More than one nation w0uld make the decision and the S will be participating in the decision making process DECLASSIFIED Authority M f Gordon Walker then said he did not mind this at all if the U 5 would say it would always participate in the force Mr Ball then reminded the Britishithat the prestige of the German Government was tied to the mixed manned concept If Great Britain stood aside an unequal situation would be created No matter what the British contributed to the force the important point was that they had to participate in mixed manning Healey wondered why the U S was pushing the British and not the Germans so hard After all the UK was offering to provide one- third of the power of the force which included amixed manned element This was a higher share than was contemplated for the British in the first place - - 3 Sir Solly Zuclterman then-intervened to raise the question of participa- tion He pointed out that any one element could trigger the rest Command therefore wasrnost important If participation were sub divided there could not be command Gordon Walker pointed out that in the British view they were making a great concession by giving the Germans control over what they put into the force But Mr Ball argued that if the British fOlflO'W'Ed through on what they were suggesting they would be avoiding participa- tion in something in which everyone else joined Healey denied this again enumerating the preposed British contribution' of 4 submarines and 5 to 6 squadrOns of mixed-mannedV-bombers Not everyone need mix in the fleet and in the V-bombers Equality in effect repeating Gordon Walker's earlier point was not estab- lished by mixed-manning equality was derived from control As the President and the Prime Minister rejoined the group Mr Ball ended this phase of the discus sion by emphasizing that there was a need to give the Germans full participation and this could only be accomplished by avoiding Special participation arrangements for the British and others mar mi DECLASSIFIED Authority 5' DISTRIBUTIGN F03 TEE mm PART mm - mm WQH BATE DEMER 10th cc 8 2 rim-ma MPH-Kitchen Smith S S-dabhrtim s s-smmr emu leach non-W Emmi- Shawn- ta hi and 1 9 be returmd - WIS Masai go gt 1300 aim w - 23651 57' Lb it 90 11 6 7008 xjf ff f 3mg 333 31 ab pr we zum cy                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu