mm W5 Authority W120 I Approved in 7 23 65 PART I 01 II hohnmt some so emcee 22 SUBJECT Hon-proliferation i 35 - 3 We Ember A hf ecpieh erienmn im The Secretary Richard Finn Deputy Director the Ronald I Spiere Deputy Director RPM Heinrich Kneppotein Ambassador of Germany Horst Bloneyer Counselor demon mmey PARTICIPANTS COPIES TO 5 ls INR White House PM ArnEmbas sy BONN '1 LONDON EUR USRO Paris - ACDA E Ambusadorm tein me thethe hedaskedto see the Secreterybecanse or his concern re looting that in Bonn about the growing v 3 debate on non- proliferation The Gilpetric Report the Robert Kennedy speech end the strong verbal approve it had received from a nmber of Senators Mr Foster's article 0Q in Fox-em Affairs and the reports from Britain that the UK was heartened about the new United States attitude on non-proliferation all contributed to the demon unease The new UK draft non-proliferation agreement had been studied in Bonn and wee unacceptable to the PM Both the Kennedy speech and the Foster article 9 appear to give very high priority to non-proliferation over other foreign policy objectives including the mimce the MLF or other new nuclear errengmte similar to this The Imowa the attitude of the State Department on this ques- tion but sees dangers of a building up of public'pmseuree in the EB which could change the present position To some degree this is what happened on the m The Becre z intersected that we must he very clear between Bonn and Washington toldustheydidnotwant itto come into being before the September elections This word cm to us from the highest authority and may not be known generally in the demon Cabinet The IMF thus has only been put on ice until after the election and there is no v 3 policy change Ambassador Kneppstein noted thet Schroeder on November 20 after his visit here had reported he was convinced fully and firmly that the 8 5 would go ahead with the MLF Then on Decaber 15 came the President's statement Le the Benton Report on MAM 322 The Secre_t_e _rx reiterated that there should be no miatmder- standing of the position whet we had done was strictly responsive to your wishes Ambassador Watt-in suggested it night be useful for him to withdrew l_the acumen-ism 05- 1254 3mm mm 3 I 1 2 YEAR 11 110T ALLY DECLASSIFIED l R L m 1 1- 3 46 DECLASSIFIED Authority W120 mw- SECRET EXDIS Ambassador Knappstein said that while he had no instructions to raise this matter with the Secretary he was interested in trying to bring Bonn to a less nervous attitude Bonn fears the theme which emerges in the Kennedy speech that the FRG is a kind of obstacle to a non-proliferation agreement Bonn feels the West would only limit itself by such an agreement since the Russians will not proliferate in any event and the Chinese are outside of the game it was not clear whether the Ambassador was speaking of a universal nonuproliferation agreement or one that would only be signed by the Western powers The Score observed that it was in the nature of nuclear weapons that those who have them do not want to give them away Ambassador Knappstein questioned whether this would be true for example as between China and Indonesia A non-proliferation agree- ment between the us and USSR would have no effect in this circumstance He then read Schroeder's press interview statement of July 3 regarding the requirements for nuclear reorganisation in NATO which he noted could be settled by the REF or a similar force and which would then allow the PEG to renounce national ownership of nuclear weapons and the relationship batty-sen non-proliferation and the problem of reunification The Seer-em noted that the relationship between non disseminae tion and reunification was a new element in Bonn's thinking and that we are not ready to accept a We bemoan the two Secretary Rusk noted that we do not intend to make the Gilpatric report public or to make it available to other governments However he wished to state that this report did not contrary to press reports urge priority for a non-prolifera- tion agreement over nuclear reorganization in the Alliance or course it was natural that Gilpatric would give high priority to non-proliferation since this was the subject he was dealing with We agree on the importance of this subject and are more concerned about the development of national nuclear programs by the twenty or so countries who have the technical capability than we are about the present nuclear powers passing control over nuclear weapons to others Secretary Rusk said that we had not accepted the Soviet view that the has anything to do with nuclear proliferation It does not involve proliferation and he is convinced that the Soviets object to the on other grounds than this The Soviets would do anything they can to stop the ELF but we are not going to con- prcmise or abandon our efforts because of Soviet objections We would like to see the 1963 Amenent we proposed to the Soviets come into being but there is little chance of this because of the Soviet attitude He recalled that the ERG had approved this agreement Maybe after the new nuclear Alliance arrangements are worked out the Soviets will accept our proposal With respect to the Foster article Ambassador Knappstein noted that the author had expressed himself very carefully Ti The Secretary noted that it was appropriate and suitable given his responsibilities for Mr Foster to urge priority for disarmament objectives There was no change in US policy however The Secretary said that he thought if by some miracle it would be possible to achieve a non-proliferation agreement we would probably be pressed very hard in the Senate on the issue of the 141 on two pounds 1 do the Europeans really want 3mm EXDIS Authority W120 EXDIS the MLF or is it adivisive element in the Alliance this is why it is important that a considerable nmber of European countries show an active and friendly inter- est in the project some Senators will be worried by the Soviets' characteri- zation of the MLF as an obstacle to better East-West relations That attitude clearly exists on the part of some Senators 0n the whole however the Senate would see this argument as a phony and agree with the position of the Executive Branch The Secretary thought however it was clearly in the Alliance's interest not to have more national nuclear forces This would break the Alliance to pieces Furthermore it was not in the interest of the Alliance for such countries as Sweden Switzerland India Brazil Israel and Emt to develop national nuclear programs Ambassador Knappstein agreed and noted that this was why a program of Joint ownership in the Alliance was significant The Secretary said that the Soviets would not get a non-proliferation agreement if they insisted on their view- point on the ME This is a position which the US cannot accept and which he personally had spent the last three years not accepting After substantial discus- sion Gromyko had finally confessed that Soviet obsections to the MLF went beyond the non-proliferation issue they object to NATO and anything which strengthens NATO Ambassador Knapgstein asked whether the non-proliferation agreement at any tprive attitude could gain ground SEORM Bush said he saw little chance of that This entire matter is very much in the hands of the President and the Execu- tive Branch He was certain there was plenty of time to get the German elections out of the way and to take a thorough look at the nuclear problem in NATO he noted we were informing the British that we did not agree with their new draft non-proliferation agreement He felt our original 1963 language was the best Ambassador Knappstein said that he was very comforted to hear this The Secrem said that the me should not be too worried about a general debate on this subject in this country so m4 at me 53 13 -L I u u 33cm EXDIS                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW 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