C01230474 West German Capabilities and Intentions Authenticated pr ACTING roved for Release 2015 11 04 00123044 3 - i 3 144 1M4Kyi fZ NIE 23-66 28 April 1966 3 5 0 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 23-66 to Produce and Depon NucIeor Weapons Submitted by DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD As indicated overleaf 28 APRIL I966 ColoneI USAF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY USIB - N9 412 A ill'd v r-v I r a aux gnaw uni- 4 i Ili' 4 51fan-fr SW l ifl' ig - 1 r' if 'li' l W a'ff'zd 4553' 5 33 v all 'u g'v -Approved for Release' 2015 11 04 301230474 i J ht whim which I 30123074 I n'u h The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart- ments oi State Defense the NSA and AEC Concurring Dr R J Smith for Deputy Director oi Central intelligence Mr George C Denney Jr for the Director of Intelligence and Research Depart- ment of State Lieutenant General Joseph F Carroll USAF Director Defense intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Marshall 5 Carter USA Director of the National Security Agency Dr Charles H Reichardt for Assistant General Manager for Administration Atomic Energy Commission Abstaining Mr William O Cregar for Asaistant Director Federal Bureau of Investigation the subiect being outside of his iurisdiction WARNING This material contains information afiecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws Title 18 USC Secs 793 and 794 the trans- mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassi cotion Approved for Release 2015 11 5 14 1' 30474 a if t rune v a r w c01230474 I proved for Releas 2015 14 00123044 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CONCLUSIONS DISCUSSION CAPABILITIES TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR DEVICES 2 A Natural Uranium Reserves 2 B Fissionable Materials 3 C Design and Fabrication 4 D The Time Required 5 DELIVERY SYSTEMS Bomber Aircraft C Tactical or Battlefiech Systems 7 D Atomic Demolition Munitions ADMSOther Possible Delivery Systems 8 Ill COSTS AND ECONOMIC BURDEN 8 IV SAFEGUABDS AND TREATY RESTRICTIONS 9 VI THE GERMAN DECISION 11 ANNEX COMPLETE LIST OF REACTOBS IN OPERATION Oli UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN WEST GERMANY 15 I Research Reactors 15 11 Power Reactors 17 Ship Propulsion Reactor 18 I - Approved for Release 2015 11 04 002304r4 301230474 - - -- - 9 provd forRelease 2015 11 04 001230474 Selected Facilities Potentially 40 30mm Useful to a West German - 40 Barnum-ms 0 K I CC Nuclear Weapons Program to pmpuhkm do 0 Nuclear research center for merchant ship NORTII Hahnoperation A Under NETHERLANDS 33 Linan A I500 C3 0 location For MRBM s GREENLAND we g 9 Juellch P 7 EAST GERMANY f BELG n 4 57 of Kohl Main AA CZECHOSLOVAKIA AObrigheim 0 Karlsruhe Schrobenhausen ANlEderalChbach Boelka GmoH FRANCE Gundremmingen St Louis Join France-German- Exp osr'vu u n mic-r SWITZERLAND 53752 4-'tx Qr I- Apprve or Release 2015 11 04 0013044 to C01230474 I - for Release 215 11 04 001230474 WEST GERMAN CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONCLUSIONS A West Germany could if it violated its agreements have a rst nuclear device in two years using domestically produced fissionable material or in one year if it used fissionable material already supplied for peaceful purposes by the US or Great Britain Para 12 B West Germany could not deploy a domestically designed missile or supersonic aircraft delivery system able to reach targets in the Western USSR until the early 19705 Paras 15-16 19 C For the next several years West Germany almost certainly will not take the political decision to begin a national nuclear weapons program Thereafter the inhibitions on such a program will probably remain strong Hon ever the future evolution of Europe appears un- certain to German leaders and they will probably try to keep open any options which might eventually enable them to produce nuclear weapons Paras 35-41 Approved for elae 05 1104 01230474 - rove for Release 2015 11 04 C01230474 DISCUSSION 1 West Germany unquestionably has the technical and economic capability to produce nuclear weapons The likelihood of a political decision to do so __is discussed in Section VI We rst examine the questions of how large a nuclear weapons program West German capabilities could support what kinds of delivery systems West Germany might want and could obtain and how quickly it could acquire both the weapons and the delivery systems i CAPABILITIES TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR DEVICES 2 West Germany has a larger nuclear research and power program than any other country not already possessing nuclear weapons The country has in operation or under construction over 20 research reactors 9 sizable power rc- actors and one ship propulsion reactor The government and industry con- vinced that nuclear power soon will become competitive with conventional power are heading every effort to make Germany a leading world supplier of reactor and nuclear power technology By the end of 1965 West Germany had spent about $1 000 million on its nuclear program which began in 1956 Current annual expenditures total about $200 million to $250 million and are rising with industry accounting for a large part of the increase Large well-equipped nuclear research centers capable of providing excellent training in nuclear and reactor physics have been established at Karlsruhe and at Juelich These -facilities plus others at various German universities would be ample to train personnel for a nuclear weapons program A Natural Uranium Reserves 3 Proven uranium reserves containing about 3 000 tons of uranium metal are located in West Germany Most of these reserves are fairly low grade ore which cannot be economically processed at the present world market price of uranium However they could be used in a weapons program in which cost was not an overriding factor Three thousand tons of uranium metal could be con- Verted into sufficient plutonium or uranium enriched in U-235 for at least several hundred ssion weapons of nominal yield 4 West Germany probably could import additional uranium ostensibly for peaceful purposes without submitting to strict safeguardsl Canada and Australia have substantial reserves of uranium but probably will continue to insist upon stringent safeguards on any exports West Germany almost certainly would encounter 'Sce Annex for a list and brief description of all West German reactors in opcratiou or under construction See also Map for selected West German nuclear facilities 2 Approved for Release 2015 11 04 001230474 1 C01230474 v proved for Release 2015 11 04 001230474 major tll lcultles in importing uranium for an openly acknowledged weapons program B Flssionable Materials 5 Plutonium West Germany could produce plutonium much more easily than uranium enriched in 11-235 as ssionable material for a weapons program We estimate that by 1970 West Germany will have reactors in operation which if Operated in a manner to maximize plutonium production could produce about We enouth to produce well over 100 weapons 3 3 6 6 West Germany need facilities for extracting the plutonium from linted fuel elements I Although West Germany has no facilities for 3 303 converting the plutonium salts which are produced in a separation plant into 3'30 6 3 Approved for Release 215111 0 001230474 '5 the plutonium metal needed for a weapons program it could build such facilities in six months There are about 300 kg of plutonium physically located in West Germany - which would not require further processing in a separation plant before being used for weapons Most of this plutonium has been supplied by the US to 1 Euratom which in turn has provided it to Germany subject to Euratom safe- guards the remainder has been provided bilaterally by either the US or Britain and comes under safeguards administered by those countries In view of the great importance which Germany attaches to the Western Alliance Wes Germany would not use this plutonium for military purposes 8 U-235 West Germany has done some research on various methods to produce uranium enriched in U-235 which is used as fuel for almost all the reactors in Germany and is also the other main fissionable material used in nuclear weapons The only method which has progressed beyond preliminary a research is the gas ultracentrifuge process Most ultraeentrifugc research has - been concentrated at Juelich 3303 8 3 bx6 I Unless much larger funds and a much higher priority are devoted to this project Germany will probably not be able to con- struct ultracentrifuge facilities of signi cant size before 1970 3 3m Beers 9 West Germany presently has about 1 400 kg of IS-supplied U-235 but only a small portion of this is sufficiently enriched to be suitable for weapons without further processing The UK has provided smaller amounts of uranium enriched in U-235 as fuel for several West German reactors As in the case of US and British plutonium all of this U-235 is under US Euratom or UK safeguards C Design and Fabrication 10 If Germany decided to use ssionablc material it had obtained from abroad or which was produced in its reactors it could design and fabricate nuclear devices fairly quickly The plutonium research facilities at Karlsruhe are among the best in the Western world Research there is devoted to the development of fast breeder reactors but German scientists are gaining experience in all phases of plutonium technology Germany also has the necessary facilities for machining plutonium Approved for Release 2015 11 04 301230474 proved fr Relase 201 1 04 00123474 Information on radiatlon cltects would be of value to the basic research and development of a weapons program 11 One of West Germany s largest aerospace and military hardware rms Boclltow Gmhil would probably participate in any national production of nuclear warheads as well as delivery systems Boclkow now is owned one-third by the Boeing Aircraft Corporation one-third by the Nerd Aviation company - of France and one-third by West German interests The Schrobenhausen plant of Boclkow near Munich isl largely funded by and works on projects for the research and development division of the defense ministry The management of the Schrobenhausen Works has an extensive knowledge of implosion techniques Sehrobenhausen is known to have many but not all of the facilities necessary to develop the conventional components of nuclear weapons and probably could obtain the others without dif culty D The Time Required 12 Ignoring safeguards and other political restrictions West Germany could probably have a first device ready for test in about one year if it used US or British plutonium or U-235 now in Germany If domestically produced pin 7 tonium were used we do not believe that a first device could be ready for testing in less than two years I 3 3mm i To produce more than a few weapons a year West Germany would need larger plutonium separation fa- cilities Construction of a larger plant could probably not be started before early 1967 a plant capable of separating enough plutonium for about 30 weapons a year would take almost three years to complete 13 West Germany is a signatory to the Partial Test Ban Treaty Furthermore there is no area in West Germany where atmospheric tests of nuclear devices could he held safely However there are sparsely populated regions where underground tests could he conducted Preparation of a site for an underground test might take longer than fabrication of the device itself but work on the site could he started concurrently with construction of the plutonium separation plant 5 a i - Appred for eleas 215 11 04 00123474 001230474 reed for Release 2015 11 04 001230474 I ll DELIVERY SYSTEMS A 14 The major emphasis in a West German national nuclear weapons program would probably be on the acquisition of a weapons system with a range of about 1 500 n m great enough to reach targets in the western USSR West German military doctrine is focused on the Soviet threat to central Europe and is aimed at preventing any prolonged war on German territory West German planners believe that the best way to prevent such a war is to make sure there is a credible threat of rapid retaliation against Soviet territory itself In this context their principal worry is that they do not share in making decisions on the use of long- range weapons systems which could attack the USSR directly 2 15 Assuming that a national nuclear weapons program were undertaken we believe that West German planners would recommend the acquisition of some I i I They could be emplaced in hard and dispersed sites or some form of land-mobile system might be employed but West Germany would probably want ultimately to deploy the majority at sea on surface ships or submarines because of the limited depth of its own territory 16 We estimate that it would take five to six years for West Germany to deploy an effective liquid fuel MBBM If a solid fuel missile were chosen in order to improve mobility development and production would take about a year Ion er and deployment on submarines would require several more years rms have bought into several Eamon aerospace cempr n1 an ese companies are participating with US industry in missile-associated programs They are obtaining access to technology which could reduce the research and development time of a future national missile program 17 West Germany would encounter substantial but not insurmountable dif - culties in establishing a test range for The only way to test such missiles to a 1 500 mm range from German territory would be to re from the North Sea coast in a northwesterly direction to an ocean impact area east of Greenland This range would pass over the very active North Sea shipping lanes however and weather in the Sea of Greenland would probably limit use of the range to summer months West Germany s only alternative would lGermany supports a strategy of forward defense along its eastern border under which any necessary means would be used to prevent the loss of even small portions of West German territory West German planners are concerned that a non-mielenr response to a Soviet incursion into Western Europe would mean the loss of part of their territory They are equally concerned that a partial escalation in tactical nuclear weapons would result in massive destruction to Germany both East and West fsma 'l Approve for Release 2015 11 0 001230474 001230474 9 oved for Release 2015 11 04 01230474 - - be to ask some other country for permission to use an existing missile range or set up a new one 18 We estimate that West Germany could develop a compatible pound fission warhead well within the five or six years needed to deploy an MRBM B Bomber Aircraft 19 A less likely possibility would be the development or acquisition of bombers which could reach targets in the western USSR The West German aircraft industry has produced under license from the US supersonic short-range air- craft such as the West Germany probably would want a bomber with a n m combat radius and a mach 2 0 supersonic dash capability which could carry a bomb 30 inches in diameter and 2 000 pounds in weight If the West Germans obtained a license to build a foreign-designed aircraft of these speci cations series production could probably begin in two or three years Native design and production of a bomber with a mach 2 0 supersonic dash capability would take about as long as an RBM system production probably could not get underway before the early 1970s West Germany could produce compatible ssion bombs several years before such an aircraft of domestic design coald be available C Tactical or Battlefield Systems 20 West Germany already owns a number of short-range nuclear delivery systems provided by the US The nuclear components for these systems are under strict US control The West Germans would not go nuclear just to produce their own warheads for these short-range systems but they might want such warheads as an adjunct to a strategic system Table II lists the delivery systems which have been provided to West Germany by the US TABLE II PRESENT NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS PROVIDED TO WEST GERMANY BY THE US Arraoxma rs Rance on wanna er wercarr Deravear sues-rm comwr moms on noun LOAD MISSILES HONEST 1mm surface-to-surface rocket 14 mm range 1 500 lb warhead SERGIMNT surface-to-surface missile 75 nan range 1 500 lb warhead Pensnmo surface-to-surface missile 400 nm range 800 lb warhead NIKE-HERCULES surface-to air missile 100 mm surface-to 1 000 lb warhead can also be used surface-to-surfacc surface range AIRCRAFT Fighter-Bomber 540 nan combat radius 2 000 lb bomb 8-Inch Howitzer 8 Han range 250 lb warhead Approved for elas 21 11 0 001230474 A - roved f0 elease 015 11 0 00120474 seesa 21 West Germany probably could if it started now produce by 1969 or 1970 a ssion weapon suitable for the F-104G fighter bomber By 1971 or 1972 it could probably produce warheads for most of the other weapons listed above and it would need still more time to produce warheads of less than 1 000 pounds D Atomic Demolition Munitions ADMs 22 I It would take Germany many years to develop such small munitions and we do not believe that the Germans would attempt to produce weapons of such limited use at any early stage of a national program - E Other Possible Delivery Systems 23 Later in this decade and in the next the West Germans Imay be interested in the French MID-620 or Pluton missiles I If West Germany acquires such weapons and should want to produce its own nuclear warheads for them it could eventually do so -the time in each case depending on the weight and yield desired for the respective warhead ill COSTS AND ECONOMEC BURDEN 24 A program to produce 30 plutonium ssion weapons per year would probably cost about $200 million up to the testing of an initial device We esti- mate that thereafter cxpenscs would run about $100 million annually including $35 to $45 million per year on the research and testing necessary for increas ingly sophisticated devices The cost of developing an MRBM system with 60 to 100 missiles and support equipment would be on the order of $1 000 million to $2 000 million for deployment in hard and dispersed sites mobile deployment on land or at sea on sill face ships Deployment on submarines would cost some $600 million to $1 000 million more depending on whether the submarines were conventionally or nuclear powered If West Germany decided to develop a bomber force of 75 to 100 aircraft instead of the cost would be about $1 000 million Operating costs of either the missiles or the bombers after deployment might total $100-$150 million annuallyApproved for Release 2015 11 0 c1230474 I 001230474 a 'r reed for e1eas 2015 1104 001230474 I I 25 West German defense expenditures now are running about $4 500 million a year or nearly five percent of the country's gross national product In order to meet present military goals a rise in the absolute level of defense spending will be necessary through the mid-1970s The country's economy will probably grow about four percent a year in this period however and defense expendi- tures without the addition of a national nuclear force could he held to five percent of GNP without difficulty Costs in the early years of an independent nuclear weapons program could even be absorbed in this figure But there- after expenses would rise rapidly and would cause either an increase in the pro- portion of GNP deVotecl to defense or sacrifices in other military programs An increase in defense expenditures to seven percent of GNP VOuld be sufficient to cover the incremental costs of building and operating a nuclear force of the size postulated without diverting funds from other military programs 26 Such a rise in defense spending would cause minor dislocations of man- power and of research and development activities in non-military sectors of the German economy which is already operating at full employment The govern- ment would also probably have to change tax rates and monetary policies or accept a degree of inflation lint there is no question that West Germany could fairly easily afford a national nuclear weapons program IV SAFEGUARDS AND TREATY RESTRICTIONS 27 All known fissionahle materials reactors ultracentrifuge facilities and other nuclear research installations in West Germany are covered by either US Euratom or British safeguards Under all three safeguard systems West Germany has specifically promised not to use these facilities and materials to develop or produce nuclear weapons Euratom inspectors are allowed to inspect all known West German nuclear installations at times of their own choosing to check all records and books and to make sample tests of materials In addi- tion US or British inspectors have the same rights regarding materials and facili- ties which are also under bilateral US or UK safeguards We believe that these safeguards are generally effective in fulfilling their limited function they are likely to detect any significant diversion of materials or equipment from the uses intended by the supplier However safeguards are concerned more with detection than prevention and like other intermrtionnl agreements could he abrogated or violated The sanctions which would be imposed on'West Ger- lioth Great Britain and France now spend about seven percent of their GNP for military purposes France with a smaller economy than that of lost Germany has cut back con- ventional forces considerably in recent years in part to prevent total defense expenditures from rising more rapidly than GNP 'Most of the larger West German reactors the plutonium research center at the ultraewntrifnge facilities at Juelieh and over half of the US-supplied fissionable material in Germaov are under l'Zurntom rather than US safeguards I We believe that Euratom safeguards are as good and are administered as cfl'eeth'cly as US safeguards I a Approed for Release 2015 11 04 001230474 3 3 6 C01230474 I pproved for elease 201 11 04 001230474 u 1 I a many for any violation would depend ultimately on the amount of political economic or military pressure which other countries Were willing to bring to bear 29 As more reactors are built and the amount of plutonium available in Germany rises the chance that West Germany could successfully divert small amounts of plutonium will also increase I lowevcr the likelihood that Germany could successfully divert larger amounts of a kilogram or more will not increase markedly Under US Euratom and British safeguards the frequency of inspections increases when there is more ssionable material available at a given facility In addition under US safeguards any facility whose inventory or production of material exceeds 60 kg per year must allow a resident inspector if the US wishes 30 In addition to safeguards there are formal treaty restrictions on West German production of both nuclear weapons and delivery systems Under the West European Union WEU Treaty of October 1954 West Germany agreed not to manufacture atomic biological and chemical weapons on West German territory Under the treaty at present West Germany also cannot manufacture on its territory guided missiles with a range of over 30 kilometers 18 75 miles submarines of over 1 000 tons displacement and surface warships of over 6 000 tons displacomcat The treaty imposes no restrictions on West German procure- ment of armaments from outside sources This treaty was part of the complex of Western postwar agreements in 1954 and 1955 which enabled West Germany to rcarm and join NATO and allowed the US Britain and France to maintain troops in Germany under NATO auspices rather than as occupying forces To the extent that future changes in NATO modify any of these arrangements West Germany could if it desired argue that other aspects of the interlocking agreements should no longer apply 31 Both safeguards and the WEU treaty are major inhibitions on any West German national nuclear weapons program We do not believe however that these inhibitions would prevent Germany from embarking on such a program - if it ever decided that vital national interests required it to do so Approved for Release 2015 11 04 C01230474 301230474 3 a 1 proved for Release 2015 11 4 001230474 VI THE GERMAN DECISION 35 We think it highly unlikely that the West German Government would t'mhark on a cnvort nuclear weapons program with any expectation of preserving secrecy wuuld almuat certainly calculate that several activities involved in nuclear weapons and delivery systems would give rise to Allied and Sovivt suspicinua at an early date that its intentions would he revvalcd Well 11 Approved for Rlease 2015 11 04 01230474 c0123o474 before it could deploy a strategic weapon system and that the penalties for being caught would be stilt This being so the German choice is essentially whether or not to throw off present restrictions and proceed in open defiance 56 We believe that West Gennany almost certainly will not do this during the next several years A German government could embark on this course only as part and parcel of a fundamental and dramatic change of the country's international orientation This change would involve the sacri ce of postwar respectability the loss of US favor and a high risk of forfeiting US protection strong Soviet hostility and possible retaliation and the alienation of all the European states In essence Germany would be playing a lone hand against the world Domestic opinion is almost universally opposed to such a course and it is difficult to believe that over the next few years any government would regard Germany's interests as well served by it 37 In the meantime however Bonn will probably want to keep open what options it can for the eventual production of nuclear weapons Non-weapons programs will continue to increase the country's nuclear resources and improve its technology The government is likely to carry on research applicable to nuclear weapons but without committing itself to a weapons program In all this West Germany will be seeking to hedge against the uncertainties of its own and Europe's future 38 In the longer run a decision to proceed on a nuclear weapons program would be the result of some major frustratiou of key German interests It is possible that during the next five years sentiment for reuni cation which appears to be rising will so change domestic politics as to incline the Germans in this direction A breaking of West European unity which left Germany isolated and facing an actively hostile France could have a similar effect Most important of all will be the German estimate of US intentions on two key points whether the US security guarantee remains valid and whether the US would in the end acquiesce in an independent German weapons program 39 We do not believe that West German sentiment in favor of a national nuclear weapons program will be significantly strengthened if Bonn fails to obtain a hardware solution to the problem of nuclear sharing in the Alliance In coming years the broader trends of European politics will have a much greater impact than any sharing arrangements on German attitudes toward nuclear weapons It national rivalries in Europe or frustrations over reuni ca- tion do encourage West Germany to seek such weapons it will not long be satisfied with arrangements which leave the final decision on use in other hands If Europe moves in other directions-- -toward an agreement with the USSR on the German problem and on European security accuptablc to the Federal Republic or toward West Eta-opean unity or both Germany will not have the desire for national weapons which the or similar proposals are meant to allay -l0 Less important factors will be the experience of present nuclear powers with such weapons and the pace of further proliferation 1 British and French Aproved for Release 201 104 01230474 C01230474 I - - proed for Release 25 11 04 C0123474 possession of nuclear weapons appears to he bringing London and Paris in- creased political benefits Bean s desires to emulate these neighbors could be stimulated The use of nuclear weapons in hostilities anywhere in the world would also encourage West Germany and other countries as well to desire nuclear weapons It countries such as India or Israel developed nuclear weapons West Germany would probably be encouraged to do likewise but only marginally if Japan another previously defeated country now bound in close alliance to the US were to develop nuclear weapons and get away with it pressures in West Germany to do likewise might mount appreciably 41 On balance we believe that even five years hence West Germany will not have committed itself to a national nuclear weapons program We base this estimate primarily on our view that major changes in the European order and in German deniestie polities will come about relatively slowly Even if the pace is quick and the changes strengthen the arguments for a national program we believe that the Germans would still want to sound out US reactions and that these would carry considerable weight in their decision Approved for Release 2015 1 04 00123047 001230474 a roved fr Rease 201511 0 0012304 a a ANNEX COMPLETE LIST OF REACTORS iN OPERATION OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN WEST GERMANY I RESEARCH REACTORS 1 The lizmetor Crosswelshcin A small Argonaut type reactor of 100 watts power Fueled with 6 4 kg of U-235 at 20 percent enrichment Went critical on 27 january 1961 US and Euratom safeguards on both fuel and reactor Reactor was linilt by the US and is used for research and materials testing I 7 2 The BER Reactor Berlin A small 50 KW homogeneous type research reactor operated by the Free and Technical Universities of Berlin Fae ch with 1 4 kg of U-235 at 20 percent enrichment Went critical on 24 july 1958 US and Euratom safeguards on hoth fuel and reactor 3 The Flt-2 Reactor Korisrnhe A tank type 12 MW thermal reactor 3 3 fueled with 5 100 kg of natural uranium Went critical on 3 jnly 1961 US safeguards on fuel and heavy water Euratom safeguards on the reactor 4 The FHF Reactor A small homogeneous type 50 KW reactor Fueled with 1 4 kg of U435 at 20 percent enrichment Went critical on 10 3 303 January 1958 US and Euratom safeguards on both fuel and modem 5 The FRO-I Reactor Gcestheeht A swimming pool type heavy water reactor of 2 MW thermal power Fueled with 5 4 kg of U-235 at 20 percent enrichment Went critical on 23 October 1958 US and Euratom safeguards on fuel reactor and heavy water Used for research in ship propulsion The FRGK2 Reactor A swimming pool type heavy water reactor of 2 MW thermal power Fueled with 3 0 kg of U-235 at 90 percent enrielnnenl Went critical on 15 March 1963 US and Euratom safeguards on the fuel reactor and the heavy water Installed in same pool as Modifications are expected to raise total combined power to 10-15 MW thermal Approvd for Relese 2015 11 04 001230474 C01230474 - - - pproved for Release 2015 11 04 001230474 7 The Ill-I Merlin Reactor Joeh eh A swimming pool type reactor of 5 MW thermal power Present fuel loading is 4 5 kg of U-235 at 80 percent enrichment Provided by the British A second fuel loading of U-235 enriched to 90 percent provided by the US is in storage Reactor went critical on 23 February 1962 Both UK and Euratom safeguards on present fuel and reactor 3303 $11 next fuel loadingl 8 The FRI-2 Dido Reactor juelieh A heavy water tank type reactor of 10 MW thermal power Fueled with 2 8 kg of U-235 at 93 percent enrich- ment Went critical on 14 November 1962 UK and Euratom safeguards on fuel and reactor US safeguards on the heavy water I 7 9 The FEM Reactor Munich A pool type reactor originally of 1 MW thermal power to he raised to 4 MW thermal power in 1966 Fueled with 4 3 kg of U-235 at 90 percent enrichment Went critical 31 October 1957 3303 I US and Euratom safeguards on lhoth fuel and reactor i 10 The FRMZ Reactor Mainz A Triga Mark type reactor of 100 KW power pulsed to 250 MW thermal Fueled with 213 kg of U-235 at 20 percent enrichment Went critical on 3 August 1965 US and Euratom safeguards on both fuel and reactor I 11 The PTB Heather Braunsehwcig A tank type reactor of 1 0 MW thermal power 12 The SAR-I Reactor Munich A small Argonaut type reactor of 1 KW power Fueled with 5 7 kg of 0-235 at 20 percent enrichment Went critical on 23 june 1959 US and Euratom safeguards on both fuel and reactor 13 The SNEAK Fast Critical Assembly Zero power Fueled with 0 3 tons of plutonium and 0 5 tons of natural uranium Will probably go critical some time in 1966 Both 3 and Euratom safeguards To he used for fast hreeder reactor research 14 The STARK Reactor A two zone Argonaut type reactor of zero power Fueled with 5 6 kg of U-235 at 20 percent enrichment in the slow zone and with 90 kg of U-235 at 20 percent enrichment in the fast zone 3 First zone went critical 11 january 1963 and second zone went critical on 24 june 1964 US and Euratmn safeguards I i6 is pproved forReIease '201 11 04 3012474 15 The Reactor Aachen 16 The SUB-100 Reactor Berlin 17 The SUB-100 Reactor Bremen 18 The ll-HX Reactor Dommtoclt 19 The sun-mo limmtm' Munich The SU 11-100 Reactor Hmnimrg 21 The SUILNX Reactor Kiel - 22 The Still-100 llcaclm' Stuttgart 23 The 11-100 Reactor Ulm These are all small homogeneous reactors of low power 0 1 watt Fueled with 700 grams of U-235 at 20 percent enrichment Most are completed but chcral are still under construction All are under both US and Euratom safe- guards All are used for minor research and teaching Built by Siemens they arc German versions of the Argonaut reactors n POWER REACTORS 1 The AKB Reactor Niederaichbach A pressure tube reactor of 400 MW thermal power and 100 MW electric power 2 The AVE Reactor Juelich A pebble bed reactor of 50 MW thermal power and 15 MW electric power I 3 The HDR Reactor Kohl Main A boiling water reactor with nuclear superheating -Ilas a power rating of 100 MW thermal and 25 MW electric Will be fueled with 260 kg of U-235 at 2 5 percent enrichment to be delivered in 1967 Will probably go critical in 1968 Both US and Euratom safeguards will be applicable 4 The KBWP Reactor Obrigheim A pressurized water reactor of 900 MW thermal power and 280 MW electric power 5 The KNK Reach Km'lsruhe An experimental power reactor rated at 60 MW thernml and 20 MW electric I Approved for Release 2015 11 04 00120474 001230474 a A red for eleae 2015 1 04 001230474 6 The KRB Reactor A boiling water reactor of 800 MW thermal and 240 electric power 7 The KWL Reactor Lingeri A boiling water reactor witl conventional suocrhcat llatccl at 520 MW thermal and 250 MW electric 8 The 71F Reactor Karla-mite - A pressurized boiling heavy water reactor of 200 MW thermal power and 50 MW electric power Fueled with 13 5 tons of natural uranium Went critical on 29 September 1965 Euratom safe- guards plus US safeguards limited to the heavy water 9 The VAK Reactor Kohl Main A boiling water reactor of 60 MW thermal power and 15 MW electric power Fueled with 127 kg of 1-235 contained in 5 56 tons of uranium dioxide enriched to 2 6 percent Went critical on 13 November 1960 Both US and Euratom safeguards on fuel and reactor Ill SHIP PROPULSION REACTOR l The FDR Reactor A reactor now being installed in the merchant ship Otto llahn at KielAproved for R i as 2 11 0 0012304 saoxo 301230474 - roved for Release 2015 11 04 001230474 Isa-s CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE I This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his iurisdiction on a need to know basis Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following oITicials within their respective departments a Director at inteliigence and Research or the Department 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