I DECLASSIFI ED Authority 4 Anexdcen Embassy - Bonn iJ t 1 Date July 1 1966 Moment and Related Problems Hr Foster Chaim-en US Delegation E3830 I nioter American Embassy Bonn State Secretary Cars-tone Foreign Office Ambassador Schnippenl-motter for Diment Foreign Office come T0 new Mission Geneva DISIEL Embassy London Embassy Per-1e Messy Hoecou Inn mu After an mitiel exchange of menitiee in response to State Secretary Cm-etene' query Foster said eet he was not optimistic that en agroment would be reached on non-proliferation during the present session of the lB-poner group in Geneva when we put forward questions to the Soviets as to their position we received only further questions in response At the on the morning of Jeh- 1 all five Warsaw Pact repress en'tetivee hed bitterly attacked the United States The Italians supported us but the British were confused in view of the reports out of Iendon do to H eon's stand Thin charge of the-es had made it temporarily easier for Genera Carotene ream-Iced mortally Normally the Federal Republic we on the receiving end at Geneva Hr Pastor at this point outlined the history of the lS-poxer camittee On balance he concluded the FE was probably better off out them in since the bid for membership mum obnoet certainly result to admit the GDR do well The U 5 representative elem-x tried to respond vigorously to the almost daily attacks on the Cm'otene observed at the Federal Government we grateml for this defense of relish it we mam-e Ho personally use likebdne resigned to the fact that FRG membership was all things considered not feasible at the present time DCH iHIiJloan-andmm Cleared in Draft by Hr Footer #17 I DECLASSIFIED Authority mull-7 89 - q u u I I sewer 2 The danger of continued impasse at Geneva Foster noted no 9 that the l upoxm' comittoe night be disbanded There more already mutterings to that effect On the other hard if the ccmnittee did not exist it would be necessary to im ont it As an optimist by nature he maintained the hepo that success might eventually be achieved The two best possibilities were some extension of the test ban above a threshhold and 13 non- proliferation The difficulty with the first one that a precise line could not be drum The tln'oshhold would beolIforent for granite aluminmn slat etc A treaty invol ounh 1 line might accordingly be short-lived As for nen-prolifemtion he iFoster had on June 30 told the Soviet representative Roshchin that his Govemuent Md rained the ante Last fall it had been stated that if hammers among the Western countries were not miolved there would be no barrier to egreenont Now deployment of nuclear reopens and additional consultation had been added as barriers Roshchin had responded that there had been no change in the Soviet position vhich was drafted in grmlite and that the hardware arrangement me the real barrier The question is Mr Foster said he had continued that do the Soviets really mean There have been merry con ict- ing statments recently by Gram- 0 Kosygin Toeropldn and Roshchin Carotene cemented that the critical point is obviously 0 hardcore eolu tien As Hr Foster 1413 aware the me had not abandoned its desire for such a solution ii' not in the fem of the then in some form Hr Footer noted that too have left the question open and have made it clear that our draft one designed to leave it open We had also left open the European force option Actually the present Soviet m'gmnonte would come us some trouble at Geneva particl arly the twist that since the U 5- placed such otrong mitosis on its retention of the veto we must obviously here plans to tmnsi cr the ueepons Our draft or course left open the possibility of transfer to an organ or group of states provided there was no increase in the member of entities possessing nuclear weapons Remchin was clover-er in debate than Tooropldn Hr Foster continued he was more restrained in his speeches than his predecessor who was some-mt of a ham actor However Hoehchin me also considerably more cautious and tended to consult on everything with Moscow even matters of procedure Arte - indicating that there was no objection to Mr Foster's seeing Toorapkin uhilo he use in Bonn Carotene said he had been glad to receive the new Soviet Ambassador on his first call He had attempted to discuss the recent German peace note but Teorapldn had merely cement- ed that the would have to accept the realities The German initiative Carotene vent on had been primrilv addressed to Eastern Europe though copies had been given to many other Governments Answers had been received from all of the heme Pact coxmtries with the exception of Romania which had indicated formally that it thought it better not to answer at all then to give a purely negative response Bette-rung to the nuclear sharing problem Carotene repeated that the Fm had not abandoned its desire for 1 hardware solution He recalled that men the bed visited Washington lost December he had left a on the subject with the President The President DEC LA 55 FIED w 3 Authority use 2175 Ev SECEE 3 had described the paper as helpful and it had been agreed that a copy would be sent to the British Since then there had been no progress and the subject had not really been discussed with wilson during Erhard's recent visit to the U K After Carotene had expressed interest in again visiting Geneva Mr Foster indicated that this mould be desirable it real progress were being code It seemed likely that the Committee would recess around August 25 Ambassador Schnippenkoetter noted that the Soviets were saying that they had not really received any critique of their own nonpproliferetien treaty draft hr Fbeter observed that we had asked many questions about it or the Soviets indicating our thinking Usually we got onky further questions in reply In response to Ambassador Schnippenkoetter's question as to the possi- bility of the non-aligned members' of the committee taking an initiative on disarmament Mr Foster conceded this might happen They had established two subcommittees of four members each - one On non- proliferation end one on the test ban - the former or which might produce a new draft or more probably suggestions on the two existing drafts Roechchin had indicated to him ur Fbster noted that the Soviets would be willing to censider the American draft if certain changes were made He had told Roshchin that we had certain changes in mind However this use not the time to put them forward Foster observed He might wish to tighten up the safeguards provisions in compliance with the Pastors Resolution which had been passed 99 to 0 One thing was sure there could be no agreement on the basis of the Soviet draft Mr Foster said he had made the point to the Soviets that if they continued obdurate and the non-proliferation agreement were not achieved then other countries would go nuclear with the result that the ERG about which the Soviets seemed most concerned could eventually'be under stronger compulsion to acquire such weapons itself                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu