a 35 DECLASSIFIED Aumoamuzii i u ioonsists of DEPARIMEM - - imp- 5 7 copies Seriesfq E Hmomumw July 11 1966 T0 The Secretary THRU SIS a FROM - U Alexis Johnson I SUBJECT Comments on the Propose Revision of the Draft Non-Proliferation Treat ACTION Mil- 0 RANDUM we now have the reactions of the Principals to the revised draft which you submitted for comments on June 23 Tab A Secretary McNamara and _the_JCS see Tab B Glenn Seaborg Tab 6 Richard Helms Tab D and Leonard Marks Tab B have all concurred in your revision on the under- standing that it would not require a change in present nuclear arrange- meats Mr Fisher has submitted a memorandum Tab F suggesting a revised formulation I have also received memoranda from Walt Stoessel Tab G Leonard Meeker Tab H and Herman Pollack Tab 1 Both Leonard Meeker and Halt Stoessel like Adrian Fisher are very much concerned about the serious difficulties which we would encounter in attempting to sustain politically an interpretation of our present arrangements as consistent with a prohibition on granting physical access to nuclear weapons 1 share this concern EUR and CIA both'pbint out that it is unlikely that the Soviet union would be willing to accept language along the lines of the draft of June 23 particularly when it became clear -and in public explanation to our Allies as well as in response to Soviet questions we would have to make it clear-- that we regarded our new formulation as permitting both existing arrangements and nuclear sharing options And as the memoranda from ACDA EUR and point out we would probably be placed in a disadvantageous tactical position in attempting to argue that present arrangements do not involve physical access Since you submitted the draft of June 23 for comment a new development has made more difficult the possibility of arguing that existing arrangements do not involve physical access On June 28 in a plenary session of the ENDC in Geneva ur Foster stated that Contrary to the Soviet implication our NATO Allies do not obtain store deploy transport aim or attach to missiles or planes any US nuclear This statement originated with a military representativ on Mr Foster's staff and although it had been cleared by an officer in the Joint Staff in Hashington it had not been dleared with others Unfortunately it is not true that our Allies I This Medal one -l national damn o it a ctt gil ll mulling cl 5 on in 9 K 33 and 794 the has - 3W I'nannc- r a k I i which in hlb ed 5 Pm 1 GROUP 1 by SSECCRFET Excluded from automatic downgrading and eases-s deolassii icetion DECLASSIFIED I SECRET 2 do not transport aim or attach to missiles or planes US nuclear weapons--they do all of these things although under our control The Joint Staff clearance for the statement had been based on the notion that until a weapon had been keyed to fire it was not a nuclear weapon but merely a very expensive chunk of iron filled with uranium This would scarcely be a politically defensible definition It is very difficult to find a simple generalized formulation for a non- proliferation undertaking which retains nuclear sharing options improves our tactical debating position and has a realistic chance of being accepted by the USSR Leonard Meeker has suggested a formulation which involves an undertaking not to transfer control of nuclear weapons through physical access or any other Fisher has sought to avoid the now contentious word control by suggesting an undertaking not to transfer nuclear weapons However both of these fermu1ations still flag the issue of physical access Hr Fisher's explicit limitation of its application to manufacture alone would in my view serve as a red flag prompting the Russians to insist that their concern with access applies to acquiring control over weapons rather than learning how to build them After having considered all the various suggested versions it is my own Opinion that the following formulation for Article 1 provides the best balance in trying to meet the three objectives noted earlier Each of the npclear-weapon states party to this treaty undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over them to any non-nuclear weapons state or any group of states and not to assist 'encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state or any group of states to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons Article 11 would be reciprocal I believe this language provides the most simple and understandable formulation while preserving all options except possibly the unlikely case of the UK divesting itself of its entire nuclear arsenal prior to its merger in a possible successor unified European state The stress on transfer of nuclear weapons deals with access to the extent that access is relevant to non-proliferation control covers cases of proliferating without physical access a finger on the button or freedom from veto in command and control councils Physical access in contrast invites attention to physical controls After looking over the Geneva conversations I conclude that the Soviet suggestion on physical access a term not in the Soviet draft treaty SECRET Authority 7 2 SECRET 3 is directed at present arrangements and that no language using that term would entirely get around this fact If some compromise formulation is possible in which the Soviets tacitly acquiesce in present arrangements it would be better to use some other formulation stressing transfer and or control rather than physical access I - If nonetheless you so desired it would be possible to add at the end of the above draft article the phrase through granting physical access to any such state or any group of states or by any other action The above formulation has not been staffed or considered by others but if it commends itself to you you may wish to staff it through the Principals Recommendation That you request to staff out with interested Agencies the above formulation with without the phrase mentioning physical access -- Approve Disapprove Attachments 1 Tab A - Memorandum for Committee of Principals I dateleune 23 1966 2 Tab - Letter from Sucretary McNamara' 3 Tab Letter from Mr Seaborg 4 Tab - Letter from Mr Helms 5 Tab - Letter from Mr Marks 6 Tab - Memorandum from Mr Fisher 7 Tab - Memorandum from Mr Stoessel 8 Tab - Memorandum from Mr Meeker 9 Tab 1 - Memorandum from Mr Pollack cc Mr Ball - Amb Thompson ACDA - Mr Fisher EUR - Hr Stoessel - Mr Meeker SIP Mr Owen 9 SECREF r - EM I I Authority 72 THE o oihlt WASHINGTON TO OF THE OF PRINCIPALS NonuProliferation Treaty Attached is a revised draft of a non proliferation treaty which is under consideration I would very much appreciate your transmitting comments as soon as possible mt Dean Rusk Attachment Non Proliferation Draft Treaty GROUP 3 Downgraded at 12 year intervals not automatically declassified par-Jr'inzrra-rl 1 - - - - WILASSIFIED I I Authority 7 2 CONFIDENTIAL Proposed Revised Articles of U S NP Treaty Article 1 Each of the nuclear-weapon states party to this treaty undertakes not to grant or in any other way to assist any non-nuclear weapon states to achieve physical access to nuclear weapons Article II Each of the non-nuclear weapon states party to tlis treaty undertakes not to manufacture or otherwise to achieve physical access to nuclear weapons Article Each of the States party to'this treaty agrees not to take any of the actions prohibited in the preceding articles directly or indirectly through third states or groups of states Article IV Any party to the treaty shall have the right to withdraw from'the treaty upon six months notice if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country Five years after the entry into force of this treaty a conference of parties shall be held in Geneva Switzerland in order to review the operation of the treaty 9 V 059 I SEC DECLAssglin 0 Q 15 IA uthorily b ACTION THE SECRETARY OF LWEFENSE WASHINGTON Honorable Dean Rusk a Secretary of State Ga Weshingten n c 20520 Dear Dean - 1511 V I have revieaed your 2L June draft of nonproliferation treaty and I concur in your proposal I understand that this fonmlation is not intended to change present nuclew sharing arrangements or to limit consultative procedures in In private discussions of this draft with our allies with the Soviet Union and with the Congress I believe this point should be made clear Ira T While I consider MFA safeguards desirable I believe we should not insist on mandatory safeguards in a nonproliferation treaty I also believe the term nuclear weapons should include all nuclear explosives since nuclear devices might be used ei uher for peaceful or military purposes i I consider the achievement of a nonproliferation treaty to be a major step in our efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons Therefore if there is anything I an do to es sist you in achievinb agrzeerren c Jl please call on me at any time Sincerelv Attachment IfDecal-5119150 non ma 5209 10 ifSECREIZ THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON n c 203m 29 JUN FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject Nonproliferation Treaty U l C Reference is made to an undated memorandum by the Secretary of State for members of the Committee of Principals subject as above which requested comments as soon as possible on an attached revised draft of the US nonproliferation treaty The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense ISA requested that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter be submitted by 29 June 2 S The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to support the national policy of the United States of preventing the spread to additional states of an independent nuclear weapons capa- bility and believe that an effectively safeguarded nonprolifera- tion agreement could assist in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons Their views on the over all subject of a non- proliferation treaty are summarized in the Annex hereto 3 S The Department of State's proposed revision to the US nonproliferation treaty is considered to be in consonance with the previously stated views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with two exceptions a There is no provision for clearly defined adequate safeguards on peaceful nuclear facilities and other peace- fu1 programs to prevent nonnuclear states from developing nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful research b Proliferation is defined in terms of physical access rather than control 1 Mm Full- Tl Ill-U I Authority SECRL u S The Soviets have stated their desire to conclude a nonproliferation treaty during the current session of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee EHDC if it would deny to Inonnuclear powers physieal to nuclear weapons is understood that the intent of the Secretary of State in circulating the preposed revi sion to the Us draft nonpro liferation treaty is to test the sinceri ty of the Soviet stated desire for a nonproliferation tre eaty 5 S The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to hold the View that clearly defined adequate safeguards as outlined in dated 12 January 1966 and in dated 15 January 1966 should be an integral part of a nonprolifera- tion treaty - 6 S Although the Soviets have indicated that neither HLF nor is acceptable but that the crux of the problem is physical access to nuclear weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany they could press for abandonment of all existing nuclear arrangements and consultative arrangements in negotiation on such a draft treaty The Joint Chiefs of Staff I have concluded that there is no current military necessity for additional nuclear weaponasharing arrangements with NATO Allies In any event negotiations and understandings associ ated with the proposed draft treaty in question must insure that present nuclear arrangements or consultative arrangements are not jeopardized 7 S Subject to providing for safeguards as indicated 1 in paragraph 5 above and insuring that current Alliance I nuclear arrangements and consultative arrangements are not jeepardized as indicated in paragraph 6 above the Joint Chiefs of Staff pose no objection to the use of the proposed revision 1 to the US draft nonproliferation treaty in exploratory dis cussions in Geneva However they request the Opportunity to comment on the final version of this draft treaty resulting from consideration within the US Government and NATO before it is tabled at the ENDC i' For the Joint Chiefs of Staff BERLE G Chamnn Jami Chiefs sf Staff - 1 ANNEX DECLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF PERTINENT JCS VIEWS ON A NONPROLIFERATION TREATY l S The United States should continue its national policy of preventing the spread to additional states of an independent 'nuclear weapons capability - an effective safeguarded nonproliferation agreement could assist in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons 2 5 Security assurances to nonnuclear powers should not be included as an integral part of a nonproliferation treaty 3 S Inclusion of a limitation on use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states in a nonproliferation treaty should Wbe opposed H all international negotiations the United States should insist on a strict definition of proliferation in terms of independent national control I 5 S Should the United States become a party to a nonproliferation treaty the following interests must be provided for continued US nuclear flexibility to include international or multilateral sharing continued current and possible future US nuclear dispersal and delivery arrangements and c clearly defined adequate safeguards 6 S No agre ment should be obtained at the risk of weakening NATO and downgrading the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent mm-qmmpoorop h 4 1H -H w t 1 a - Authority UNITED I ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WMI-IINGTON 0 6 20545 10431 JUL 1 1338 Dear Dean I We recognize that the preposed revised articles of a U S non-pro- liferation treaty are drafted with the intention of cutting through the verbiage of the previous drafts and attempting to meet directly the Do 2 1 ng imam Ie _ mien - stated Soviet over riding goal of a non-proliferation treaty which is according to their view to prevent the physical access by non nuclear weapon countries to nuclear weapons The new Articles I and II are simplified and direct We feel however that there is a need to reach an understanding within the government before any new treaty language is tabled as to what is meant by physical access we think for instance that there might well be some question as to whether our present NATO atomic stockpile program or arrangements presently being considered are consistent with a ban on our granting physical access to nuclear weapons or assisting non nuclear weapons states in achieving such access We also wonder about the con sistency of the preposed articles with potential actions we might take during an emergency or in time of war We have stated in the past our belief in the importance of including in a non-proliferation treaty a strong article on the acceptance of international safeguards by presently non-nuclear weapon states 0n the basis of the views expressed by Various government officials including those offered in Open hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy we assumed general agreement within the Administration with this position Since the beginning of the year considerable effort has been spent in convincing some of our Western allies of cur strong views on this subject and to enlist their support prior to our tabling of a revised Article In fact we are presently engaged in very active negotiations with the Canadians on this very point We are not aware of any evidence of Soviet objection to inclusion of a provision in the treaty for mandatory safeguards on presently non-nuclear weapon states Therefore while we understand that you haVe attempted in the revised Articles to focusfon the question of physical access we strongly urge that a strengthened article on safeguards such as the one we have been discussing with the Canadians be retained in the non-proliferation treaty In a effers the only method 1 5 3 is c-n'a'5 5 an - 3 r iLutajLIn LcJ p- 15 Ezifhh' t'i 35 by but - - - DECLASSIFIED a 1 I Aumo ty 72 Honorable Dean Rusk I - 2 for retaining continuing confidence on the part of all the parties to the treaty that the treaty's provisions were being observed We are sending you these comments at this time in view of the urgency you have expressed although we may have more comments after further consideration Cordially Chairman Honorable Dean husk I Secretary of State 1 DECLASSIFIED 1 '77 13 I iAuthorilY l 1112 1 51 UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY Il g j DIRECTOR CON June 29 1966 MEMORANDUM 11011 The Honorable Dean Rusk Secretary of State I have reviewed the draft of the non proliferation treaty which you recently sent to the Committee of Principles I approve of the simplified version based upon the assumption that it will not create any operating problems for ABC or 1e1ated agencies 11111 1 144 1131-3 Mark 111 o'q 1 ON FIDENT 1A sebum DECLASSIFIED 'Authority 72 series A UNITED STATES ARMS AND DISARMAMENT OFFICE OF Dl l t TON I July 8 1966 MEMORANDUM TO THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS SUBJECT Proposed Revisions of Draft Non Proliferation Treaty - Attached for your information is a copy of my memorandum to the Secretary of State concerning proposed revisions of the U1 S non-proliferation treaty draft together with a suggested alternative text In x 1 as 14% Adrian S Fisher Acting Director Attachment As stated For Addressee Use Only No GROUP 3 further distribution without Downgraded at 12 your permission of the Arms Control intervals not and Disarmament Agency automatically declass ified SECRET No 13 of 'i I 01 W1 es - mm STATES ARMS WASHINGTON ornct or I July 3 1 966 THE DIRECTOR MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE SUBJECT Proposed Revision of US Draft Non Proliferation Treaty i I agree with the premise underlying your memorandum of June 23 to the Committee of Principals on a revised draft of a nonlproliferation treaty namely that a new simplified draft is desirable It has become clear in Geneva that the impasse reached in our discussions with the Soviets will continue 50'long'as each side attempts to include in its draft treaty eXplicit language protecting a position known to be unacceptable to the other The suggested revision of Article I transmitted 6y your IJune 23 memorandum would be an apt tactical move to take advantage of the stated Soviet preoccupation with FRG access to nuclear weapons I have serious doubts however whether we can square this proposed language with the existing bi- lateral agreements within NATO and hence satisfy the require- ment that we do nothing that would upset these arrangements For example under our existing arrangements trOOps of our NATO allies actually transport U S nuclear weapons and even perform the physical work of attaching them to their own planes and missiles This procedure is safeguarded by PALS and otherwise and is used under an understanding that the U S retains custody of the weapon but it would be difficult to argue that the other nations do not have_' 'physical access to the weapons as that term is normally used Proposing a treaty which would ban physical access' 'would be an invitation to the Soviets to attempt to disrupt the present arrangements Group 3 Downgraded at 12 year intervals not automatically declassified - SECRSZ - - DECLASSIFIED r I 3 Authority 7 2 SECRET -2- that they might well find irresistible Senatorial consider ations of a treaty with this language would certainly expose these problems The only way of avoiding the danger a detailed definition of physical access to limit it to 'access involving the ability to detonate disassemble or observe internal construction -- would in effect invite a detailed discussion with the USSR of the pros and cons of our present NATO arrangement a procedure which is hardly likely to be productive I am proposing for your consideration and for that of the Committee of Principals a suggested alternative draft which is based on the concept embodied in 91 and 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 Those sections with certain exceptions prohibit the transfer of U S atomic weapons to any other country and also prohibit our giving assistance to any non- nuclear weapons country that contributes to its capability to design develop or fabricate such weapons The proposed language focuSes 0n prohibiting the transfer of U S nuclear weapons and deals with physical access only in the context of preventing any contribution to the capability of a non-nuclear weapon state to design develop or fabricate nuclear weapons I The development of the existing bilateral agreements -- within the framework of the Atomic Energy Act should make this proposal acceptable to our allies The eristing bilateral arrangements have been justified under this Act on the theory that under the custodial arrangements there has been no transfer of the weapons and that a transfer could take place only in connection with a Presidential decision to use the weapons in the face of actual or imminent hostilities In such a situation the President's power as Commander in Chief would override any statutory inhibitions It has been made quite clear in con- gressional testimony that the U S has no intention of requesting a change in this law either now or in the foreseeable future Our allies are therefore clearly on notice that custodial arrangements for U S weapons will be as strict if not stricter than those new in effect They are also aware that in connection with a decision to use weapons in the face of actual or imminent hostilities the existence of such a treaty limitation would not 0 be covs' e' rc E HfL we SECRET - 1 DECLASSIFIED Authority '7 i a I -3- Generalized language of this Sort would seem to be desirable on the premise that realistic options for future NATO or European nuclear arrangements would not be prejudiced by a draft which neither explicitly protects nor rejects them The attached draft would limit the so called European option essentially to a federated entity capable of succeeding to the nuclear assets of its constituent members Given the U K position and our own firm position against transfering control however this is in fact the only option available For their part the Soviets would have to be guided by their own estimate of the viability and likelihood of further options being implemented although it would probably be necessary in the course of future discussions with them to provide further reassurance about our plans We must Iecognizc of course that in any serious effort to negotiate a mutually acceptable agreement we must consider what our reaction might be if the Soviets insisted on injecting the concepts of' 'use control or ownership in the negotiations - I believe we should continue to oppose Soviet language regarding' 'use of nuclear weapons since this entails even greater difficulties in terms of -existing and possible future arrangements than are associated with the term physical access We should endeavor to persuade the Soviets that the question of use is relevant only in a wartime situation a situation in which this treaty would have little relevance In principle I see no reason why we could not now under- take an obligation not to transfer control of nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear state or to any group of states The limitation to national control in our existing dra ft treaty does not appear relevant to possible future nuclear arrangements of the kind we now have in mind Moreover in recent testimony before the JCAE both you and Secretary McNamara have stated SECRET - DECLASSIFIED Jr an SECRET mom END '7 2 3 73 -4- explicitly that the U S has no intention of relinquishing control over its nuclear weapons It is also pertinent to note that the U K has made clear publicly that it has no intention of transferring control over its nuclear weapons These facts are now abundantly clear to the FRG As for ownership it is our understanding that our approach to future NATO arrangements no longer includes the possibility of sharing ownership of our nuclear warheads though joint financing is not otherwise ruled out We are not aware of any disposition of the U K to transfer ownership of its warheads Accordingly we should at least in principle also be prepared to undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons into the ownership of any non-nuclear state or group of states While I believe that the above questions may well arise during the course of negotiation the attached draft would afford the basis for initiating serious negotiations with the_ Soviet Union The concept of no transfer of nuclear weapons would enable us to argue with the Soviets that it embraces what is relevant without having to add to the text contentious ideas about control and ownership - r722 Adrian S Fisher Acting Director Attachment Proposed Revised Draft NonuProliferation Treaty - - DECLASSIFIED J Authority CONFIDENTIAL Preposed Revised Articles of U S Non-Proliferation Treaty Article I Each of the nuclear weapons States party to this treaty under- takes not to transfer nuclear weapons to any non nuclear-weapons State or to any group of States or to take any action by granting physical access or otherwise that will contribute to the capability of any non nuclear-weapons State to design develop or fabricate nuclear weapons Article ll Each of the non nuclear-weapons States party to the treaty under- takes not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons either independently or together with other States Article Each of the States party to this treaty agrees not to take any of the actions prohibited in the preceding articles directly or in- directly through third States or groups of States Article IV Text of article dealing with safeguards -- still under consider ation - Attislel Any party to the treaty shall have the right to withdraw from the treaty upon six months notice if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country Five years after the entry into force of this treaty a conference of parties shall be held in Geneva Switzerland in order to review the operation of the treaty Article VI A Nuclear-weapon state means a State possessing a nuclear weapon or weapons as of date For the purpose of this Treaty a nuclear weapon includes any device capable of producing a nuclear explosion B Non-nuclear weapon State means any State which is not a nuclear-weapon State DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE LEGAL July 6 1966 MEMORANDUM FOR - AMBASSADOR JOHI FROM - Leonard C Meeker SUBJECT Preposed Revised Articles of U S Non-proliferation Treaty Two basic questions arise in considering the Secretary's proposed draft of a non-proliferation treaty whether the language is both broad enough and narrow enough to make an agreement possible without sacrificing any vital interests I Is the language of Article I prohibiting nuclear weapon states from granting or assisting non-nuclear weapons states to achieve physical access to nuclear weapons broad enough - I Proliferation other than by physical access 1 There are means other than physical access by which proliferation could occur For example were a non-nuclear weapon state given the right either unilaterally or in asso- ciation with other non-nuclear na ons to order the firing of nuclear weapons held entirely in the custody of a nuclear weapon state there would clearly be proliferation without a transfer of physical access This form of proliferation is prohibited by our present draft the new draft would therefore represent a retrogression in this regard It seems certain that the Soviets would not be prepared to leave room for such an arrangement in any non-proliferation treaty they would sign 2 This roblem might best be met by modifying Articles I and 11 so as to prohibit the transfer or acquisition of control over nuclear weapons through physical access or any other means This formulation retains the emphasis on physical access while achieving the necessary breadth As will be seen squanw the awe in the definition is also desirable I Authority qu' qj CONFIDENTIAL - 2 The problem of ownership 3 Neither the Secretary's version nor the proposed modi- fication would rule out a transfer of part or all of the bare legal title to nuclear weapons so long as no incidents of control or physical access went with it However ownership of weapons has been excluded in recent prOposals within the U S Government response to NSAM 345 and I would not think we would want to resist strongly any Soviet proposal that ownership be specifically barred by the treaty II Is the language of Article I narrow enough Present arrangements 1 Physical access may be interpreted in such a way that it does_not necessarily interfere with present allied arrangements at least as long as we do not releaSe the nuclear weapons involved That is it may be argued that physical access to unarmed nuclear weapons does not necessarily consti- tute physical access to nuclear weapons what is important from the point of view of non-proliferation is whether the sort of contact with nuclear weapons that a non-nuclear country enjoys gives it the ability to use them and this remains the problem whether the key term is control or physical access 2 The above argument is probably sound but it is also somewhat subtle and takes some explaining The initial re- aaction to use of the term physical access in this context is that it prohibits nationals of non-nuclear countries from carrying or transporting nuclear weapons even if they have electronic locks on them and even if a national of the nuclear country responsible for the weapons is always present Making physical access the key term in a non-proliferation treaty would put us more on the defensive regarding our present nuclear arrangements than would a formulation that explicitly focused on whether the ability to use nuclear weapons had been trans- ferred - The modified version proposed above prohibiting a transfer or acquisition of control through physical access or any other means would thus be desirable -- CONFIDENTIAL - 3 3 It might be thought that the Secretary's draft with or without the proposed modification would preclude a trans- fer of physical control over nuclear weapons in all situations including wartime However the better view would be that this language did not forbid a nuclear country in circumstances where full- scale hostilities had commenced or were clearly _imminent from transferring nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear ally for3 use in the common defense The purpose of a non- proliferation treaty is to reduce the chahces of a nuclear holocaust occuriing by minimizing the number of nuclear decision- making centers So long as a nuclear nation retains control over access to its nuclear weapons up to the point when it decides that they must be employed in the common defense its plans to accord access to its allies once that point had been reached would not seem to conflict with the purposes of a non- proliferation treaty 4 it is difficult to write an exception for this situ ation into the treaty and the better course may well be simply to leave it implicit The present U S draft treaty's attempt to deal with this by defining control to mean the right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear weapon state has been attac ed by the Soviets as creating much too large a loophole see Geneva 2583 2584 June 28 1966 5 A precedent of sorts for leaving a wartime exception implicit exists in the history of the Limited Test Ban Treaty Although that treaty prohibits a nuclear weapons test or any other nuclear explosion a memorandum of the Legal Advrer explained to the Senauathat the treaty did not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in time of war - 6 Should' we decide to leave the wartime exception implicit we would want to make perfectly clear at Geneva w nat we were doing lest we later be accused of having negotiated a treaty under false pretenses vuo-ona no-nnh31 911-11- O-A rnun nu1-l- n-n I'd-mend an 8 bE'CLis'sano Authority 4 - access was the key term As seen above however it would be sound if subtle to interpret physical access in terms of the ability to use nuclear weapons Again modification of the proposed language so as to focus on control through physical access or any other means would be desirable 8 The effect of the Secretary's draft as modified above would be to require a nuclear power veto in any nuclear arrange- ments A veto free EurOpean option of a certain sort would however remain open Were some of the nations of Europe to effect-political integration in such a way that all foreign and military affairs would be handled through a central institution it would be sound to consider the integrated entity to have succeeded to the nuclear status of any of its formerly national components This option is in fact much closer to what we would be prepared to see come to pass than the possibilities open under the broader wording of the present U S draft 9 The Secretary's draft might be interpreted as preclud- ing the granting to non-nuclears of the physical power to prevent the firing of nuclear weapons from their territory without their consent Under the proposed modified version in which the key term would be control but control would be undefined it might be thought that any negative control by non-nuclears over nuclear weapons would be forbidden However the better view in either case would be that the purposes of a non-proliferation treaty do not require any limits on the extent to which non- nuclear countries may prevent the firing of nuclear weapons A definition of control so as specifically to safeguard the possibility of negative control is therefore not necessary and would raise other problems LASSIFIED Authority AND q-a aqz I DEPARTMENT OF STATE urn-t INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL AFFAIRS mammum JUL 8 1955 CONFIDENTIAL IO - U Alexis Johnson THROUGH s s FROM SCI - Hermak ollack SOBJECT Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty I have'reviewed the June 23 revised draft of a non-proliferation treaty that the Secretary is now circulating to the Conmittee of Principals for comment Presumably this draft was not intended to include all necessary elements of such a treaty since there is no clause to cover safeguards I assume the Secretary meant to focus attention on the concept embodied in the new Articles I would leave any comment on these particular Articles to those more familiar with the intricacies of the problem I do wish to record however my strong belief that any non- proliferation treaty to be effective and to endure must make provision for some means of verifying that the undertakings of the parties are in fact being carried out To this end I believe a non-proliferation treaty should include a strong provision _providing for international safeguards to ensure that peaceful nuclear activities and materials are not being used counter to the undertakings of the parties Without a provision for effective international safeguards I believe it will become increasingly difficult to inepire confidence among potential nuclear states that the non-proliferation treaty is being honored by all This problem will become increasingly more acute as more and more plu- tonium is produced throughout the world through the rapid increase in nuclear-powered electrical generating plants in many countries The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has expressed itself strongly on this issue on several occasions There appears to be significant Congressional support for an effective safeguards clause in any non proliferation treaty CONFIDENTIAL i ail-o Author-it %q 3 CONFIDENTIAL 2 I am also concerned about the so called Plowshare loophole about which much has already been said The statement Mr Foster is now' authorized to make in the ENDC on peaceful nuclear explosives is of great importance in this matter I believe it is essential that the treaty clearly prescribe development of peaceful nuclear explosives by non-nuclear powers since the technology is the same as for the develoPment of weapons The addition of the phrase or other nuclear explosives to the end of Articles I and II of the June 23 draft would appear to close effectively this loophole I grant that this may make the treaty somewhat more difficult to sell but this fact in itself may indicate the importance of the Plowshare provision Ji- SCI NFSievering aam 5                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu