A DECLASSIFIED gm - Authority I 61 53cm 5 a NOTES TRIP October 17 1966 3 NoncProliferation $13 KA Supplementing the instruction on handling the non-prol ration issue in the October 19 meeting of HAG the Secretary gave in e- following guidance some of it for my own information 1 Gromyko agrees that we are not discussing a situat wartime in the event of war all bets are off and treatim mahly would not restrain action that nations at war felt them- selves obliged to take 2 Gromyko also agrees that we are not trying to make the treaty cover the political decision to go to war In this conneci tion Gromyko clearly dropped any Soviet objection to instituofon s- lysing consultation of the l-icHansrs Comittee type in NATO 3 When the Secretary asked Gronyko shat arrangements the Soviets have with their allies he said he did not think that the us and the Soviets needed to discuss between themselves what arrangements they have with their own allies But a little later in the conversation Grouyko reverted to his effort to specify what the arrangement should be among the Western allies 4 The Soviets should not really be concerned about the r amber of fingers on or near the trigger as long as the U8 finger is crucial to an affirmative decision to use nuclear weapons But both the Soviets and the allies can share an interest in increasing the number of safeguards on the use of weapons and collective arrangements for decisions about their use should raise added safe- guards against their use 1 5 Gronyko draw a diagram making a distinction between three 0 kinds of proliferation and suggesting they should all he ruled out trensfar of nuclear weapons from a nuclear-weapons state to I a non-nuclear-wespons state directly a non-nuclear-weapons state through an alliance and e an alliance as such Gromyko'a point is that an alliance is something different from and more than its embers Thus NATO consists of sixteen entities -- the fifteen mber-comtries and a sixteenth entity which is all m m DECLASSJFIED Ammo W1 r Non-golgerat ion cont of them together He would like the language of a non proliferation treaty to rule out proliferation to that sixteenth entity also The Secretary argues -- and argued with Gronyho -- that the Alliance does not exist apart from its mentors and that he cannot imagine a'say of transferring nuclear weapons to an alliance that would not transfer them to the nations which are members of that alliance I said that it would be technically possible to transfer weapons to SACEUR or even to the North Atlantic Council under some agreed release procedure The important thing would be whether we relinquished control of the warheads The Secretary's point is that it is not a transfer unless we relinquish control 6 The Secretary said his Judgment is that joint ownership of nuclear warheads is out He said that he had come close to des- cribing the as dead in answering a question from Senator Jackson in the Stannis Committee His statement in this regard had been brought to the Soviets' attention Joint ownership arrangements for US-produced warheads oculd acquire a change in legislation in the Secretary's judgment we could not get such a change in the Atomic Energy legislation if it could be credibly charged that such an arrangement would stand in the way of a nonrproliferation treaty with the Soviets 7 The central principles which we want to enshrine in a non- proliferation treaty are a No transfer directly or indirectly to a weapons state b No relinquishment of control by the US over US warheads 8 The Soviets should have no real difficulty in finding a common interest with us in signing a treaty which enshrines these two self-denying provisions If they want to go beyond that and discuss the refinements of what we are not transferring nuclear weapons to it will mean that they still don t want a nonrprolifersr tian treaty enough to be willing to abandon the use of NPT negotia- tions as an instrument of their European policy SECRET 5 - DECLASSIFIED Authodtym Hon-Prolifergtion cont'd 9 The Secretary's net impression is that the Russians are increasingly concerned about proliferetion of nuclear weapons that indeed they are for the first tine concerned about possible proliferation in countries other than the Federal Republic of Germany revised I may give the Council a firm assurance that any language for non-proliferetion treaty will first be discussed with the Council before it is agreed with the Soviets This does not of course mean that we will not discuss language with the Soviets that has not previously been clan-ed with our allies We talk with them particularly through the Foster- Roshchin channel all the time NOTE New language for Article I may shortly be suggested to the Soviets It has been given informally to George rm by the Secretary It is not the Secretary' I present intention to give it to anybody else including the Germans that it is inter-Wm There is no point he feels in stirring up an argument about language when there is in his judgment no mail a chance that the Soviets will buy it SECRET                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu