SEEM arm - mm mm m nun-1m page cumin of 2 m A menu mm mm mm mm 1s 91m Geneva Wists Ambassador rum-w Mating Lingo ng a -- muuprmm wraith In ux-pm 9r MM Jr Cal John Kaitlin-am m mm 0mg tam ACDA 5 MW 196 MHZ-18V WES-WHWSIO mt 10311403 Sim 83 Wd r 1 Ifudo 1 mm nun an qu with m Chancellor unaw- had mun-ta om Mutt-1 my SECRET 31313 at 12-31 Inter-rah nut mun-tinny W huwmmn mtupwummummtumm mala ufaun n mfw molar mum or duplumt mullahs bilateral Wont his mum will M Ham than mzmuma stun-n Wmma 2 Wmm m uththumau-nwof n mun-Waummut maximum m1 autism au- m in bth m- amnion mum pmgm 8m af x-WhthIMMdhuWutMa manila mt mamaser titanium WEE-WW DECLASSIFIED - mum 9mm ht hlnut WM 'no to m m 1mwrm3m Winnings nmwmuaaummrm aux-Wm m Wt's 1cm Miranda-am Inn-0 8 mhrm wh wduanmm ammumtrmuth 5 hW -tmlu nun-111m WWmnothlw unwelthde mm rm sum-11mm mm 6 19mm would In kept an mtmm d 91min But it would Ilao Whammy-n arm-mam DECLASSIFIED Authorin A 7 dim by monum- Pasta A can is attach-d 8 lawman magnum-tn Attachment Questions Most Likely to be Asked on mm - mum 9mm 1 Q A indicated they would no longer seek through disrupt - March 25 1967 If seem I Questions Most Likely to be Asked NPT How can We be sure Soviets will not interpret NPT in manner contrary to US interpretations d We can never be sure but NATO members have all withstood Soviet propaganda charges before with equanimity US interpretations are based directly on treaty text and negotiating history The Soviets understand them although we can not expect them to say publicly that for example existing NATO nuclear arrangements are OK Firm in our agreement within the Alliance on these interpretations we should have no difficulty with Soviet propaganda Won't NPT hinder unification of Europe No NPT does not deal with European unification and would not prevent creation of a new federated European state U S of Europe which succeeded to the nuclear weapons of UK or France It does not give France any new status or bargaining leverage which France did not already ive as result of its geographic and economic position as well as its possession of nuclear weapons Why did US work out basis for new approach to NPT without first consulting its allies There have been repeated consultations with allies on NPT since late 1962 over last two years it became clear that not more than two of our allies wished to keep open an option for a multilateral force with nuclear weapons which oou1d be fired by majority vote Germany and possibly Italy wanted to keep this open Italians told us last year they wished to give it up to get NPT It also Became clear after extensive allied consultations that there was insufficient support to form an MLF for the foreseeable future When Soviets - existing NATO arrangements for nuclear consultations and nuclear deployments US concluded that US and its allies would all be better off with NPT and no MLF than with neither NPT nor MLF Allies were briefed on negotiations with Soviets beginning in October no one then objected and we therefore went ahead Why can't nuclear powers undertake specific disarmament steps in connection NPT if they expect others permanently to renounce nuclear weapons J In discussions in North Atlantic Oouncil j g L7 6IQI A _accept safeguards UECLASSIF I ED snonsb We have already achieved the Limited Test Ban Treaty and Outer Space Treaty which have considerable impact on nuclear powers but little as yet on anyone else If we insist on further such steps by nuclear powers we will probably hold up NPT so long that proliferation will be unstoppable preamble will however call on nuclear powers to halt the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible date We believe NPT will also improve the atmosphere for discussions on ABM's and offensive missiles now beginning in Moscow Why should non-nuclear states be made to accept safeguards when nuclear powers have no such obligation Why not leave Euratom free to apply its own safeguards without seeking to impose IAEA controls on them revent The NPT The purpose of safeguards is to manufacture of nuclear weapons Safeguards make little sense on the peaceful reactors of a country already making nuclear weapons elsea where However to reduce the element of discrimination as 4 far as possible US is prepared to support the right of non- nuclear countries to reject inspectors from nuclear countries We are also considering putting more US peaceful nuclear activities under safeguards we would appreciate knowing from our allies if they believe this would help them to Euratom will be free to continue its own safeguards system But we cannot expect other countries to accept IAEA safeguards if Euratom members insist that only they can inspect themselves Many non aligned countries have Iii-' 1 made it clear that they are prepared to accept IAEA safeguardsr but only if everyone else does too And we would not be prepared to rely on Czechs inspecting Russians We cannot therefore expect Czechs or Russians to rely on West Europeans inspecting each other How can we be sure NPT will not be used to hamper develop- ment of peaceful nuclear programs in non-nuclear weapon states Won't they lose all the spin-off benefits enjoyed by those who produce nuclear weapons Except for the requirement for IAEA safeguards and the problem of nuclear explosions which may some day be developed for peaceful purposes there'is nothing in NPT which would in any way affect peaceful nuclear programs Twenty-five countries including US have IAEA safeguards on some peaceful - nuclear facilities without any hampering of such programsgulf ii- A l'h-IEWH-hhw - nun-Luis a a h- as F tT-v a in Au vziv a - I #3 t 3 8 Q A 9 Q DECLASSIFIED Authority EL -3- U8 is modifying the safeguards article and we have added 5 preambular paragraphs to NPT to make clear that peaceful activities are to be encouraged not hampered With at assurance to other countries which will follow safeguards _h wider international cooperation on peaceful programs should - be possible The spin-off from nuclear-weapon programs some long ago and has now been widely dispersed to many countries in A the form of peaceful nuclear assistance and information Other spin-off and there is very little will also be made available to others an NPT preambular paragraph to this effect has been added In addition the US has made clear its intention to share the benefits of any nuclear explosives which may one day be develcped for peaceful purposes What assurance will non-nuclear weapon-states be given of protection against nuclear blackmail or attack Allies have the Alliance It is much better protection than will be available to other non-nuclear countries We are however prepared to negotiate an assurance of protection in the form of a UN resolution I Why can't review and withdrawal provisions be revised to make it possible for non-nuclear weapon states to hold the nuclear powers more strictly to account for implementing declarations of intention regarding nuclear disarmament $5 If these intentions are not implemented why should not the n s non-nuclear weapon states be able to withdraw without having to Justify the rigid requirements of the present withdrawal clause The present review clause permits review by all Parties after five years of whether the purposes of NPT have been achieved 6 Purposes means what appears in the preamble--which includes declarations of intention on nuclear disarmament Review in clause is therefore adequate I L If the security of a non-nucleareueapon state is Jeopardized by failure of the nuclear powers to disarm then of course it can withdraw Thus if USSR fails to come to agreement with US to cut back nuclear weapons and seriously threatens Western Europeans with those weapons then of course they can withdraw Why pursue this treaty with all the serious problems it raises when all it does is to institutionalize present practices - Aumo tym HM 'me a $11- 'y I - 4 sdhil'risk due I I NPT doea far more than institutionalize the present practice or the nuclear powers to retain their nuclear Weapons If near nuclear countries Sign up NPT will be an effective brake to proliferation in the way it is most likely to occur-- 5 by indigenous manufhoturo of nuclear weapons in India Israel f Sweden Japan etc r 3' - W'T uii tl L - m IJ ah- I i i 53cm if SECRET- LEMDIS I n                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu