DECLASS I w- 7255 5 INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State 53 SECRET Adm OLASBA PP RUEHC RUFHOL 12532 IIBISSB Mo ZNY 55353 1967 APR 20 PM 3 57 2O19312 APR 67 35 PM AMEMBASSY BONN TO SECSTATE VASHDC PRIORITY 9PM INEO LONDON SP PARIS SC BURSSELS SAH ROME THE HAGUE BENEVA STATE BRNC 10 BT BONN 1258 3K3 USIA I NSC SLBJ NPT DURATION INR REF BONN 12462 CIA CXN NSA 1 THOOCH THE EMBASSY DOES NOT AT THIS MONENT HNOV THE OUTCONE DOD OF NAC DISCUSSION OF THE NPT HE BELIEVE THAT HE SHOULD DRAU ATTENTION TO THE POTENTIAL SERIOUSNESS OF THE OBJECTIONS NIC EXPRESSED SCHNIPPENHOETTER YESTERDAY REFTEL TO THE UNLIMITED ACDA DURATION OF OUR DRAFT TREATY MORE IMPORTANTLY VE HNOV THAT 551 THESE OBJECTIONS REPRESENT CHANOELLOR STRONG PERSON AEC VIEWS HPOUCH PROPVREIS TO DURATION OF THE TREATY CST WERE MADE BY THE CERMANS IN MARCH AND AGAIN BY SCHNIPPENKOETTER IN HASHINGTON LAST WEEK AS A DIRECT RESULT OF PERSONAL INSTRUCTION JT THEY WEREHBKER PURSUED WITH GREAT TENACITY BY THE GERMAN NEGOTIATPRS THE FONOFF TO SUBSEOHENT STRONG DISPLEASURE APPARENTLY HAD NOT CONSIDERED THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS SUFFICIENTLY GREAT TO HAHEATERHINAL DATE A MAJOR THOUGH LACKINO A DEFINITIVE CONFIRMATION PAGE 2 RUFHOL 12582 THE EMBASSY ASSUMES THAT THE CABHYET ENDORSED POSITION AT ITS YESTERDAY 2 HIESTNBER OBJECTION TO A TREATY 0F UNLIMITED DURATION RELECTS OEEP- SEATED MISBIVINCS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF SUCH A TREATY ON LONG-RANGE SECURITY INTERESTS AS HE HAS POINTED TO SEVERAL AMERICAN INTERLOCUTORS NATO -- SECRET I wmw m_s SECRET BONN 12582 4 20 67 IN THEORY AT LEAST -- COULD BE OF LIMITED DURATION ON THE OTHER HAND THE NPT AS PRESENTLY DRAFTED VOULD DEPRIVE GERMANY FOREVER OF THE ULTIMATE MEANS OF SELF-DEFENSE WHILE PROTECTIVE UMBRELLA IS PRESENTLY SUFFICIENT FOR THE NEEDS IT COULD AT SOME POINT IN TIME DISSOLVE AS AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE FORCE LEAVING GERMANY IN THE POSITION OF BEING EXPPOSED TO THE EAST AND DEPRIVED OF THE VHEREUITHAL OF A GREAT POVER THEREFORE AS THE THINKING SEEMS TO RUN -- SHOULD AVOID LICKING ITSELF IN TO A POSITLON OF PERMANENT IN- FERIORITY PARTICULARLY VIS-A-VIS ITS TRADITIONAL THROUGH AN UNLIMITED NPT THIS WOULD NOT BE FAIR TO ENSUING GERMAN GENERATIONS GERMANY DOES NOT NOV HANT OR NEED NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT THE SHAPE OF THE LONG-TERM FUTURE CANNOT BE FORESEEN 5 NOW THAT HE SEEM TO BE WILLING TO MEET THE EURATOM NATIONS ON THE 50- CALLED GUILLOTINE CLAUSE 0F 17850 THE EMBASSY FORESEES THAT OUR FUTURE CONSULTATIONS UITH THE GERMANS WILL CENTER ON THE ISSUE OF DURATION IN THE EFFORT TO OVERCOME THE GERMAN OBJECTIONS THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT HE SHOULD CENTER OUR ARGUMENTS ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS A A PROVISION LIMITING THE DURATION OF THE TREATY SUBJECT TO RENEGOTIATION VOULD BUILD IN A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT OF INSTABILITY IN THE HORLD NUCLEAR ARMS SITUATION POTENTIAL NUCLEAR-VEAPONS STATES FEARING THAT THEIR NEIGHBORS OR RIVALS WOULD GET THE JUMP ON THEM MIGHT FEEL IMPELLED TO DEVELOP THE NUCLEUS OF WEAPONS PROGRAM EVEN IF THIS DID NOT EVENTUATE A LIMITED NPT COULD GIVF RISE TO SUSPICIONS AND TENSIONS BETVEEN RIVAL STATES B A TIME-LIMIT CLAUSE UOULD ALSO UNDERCUT THE VALUE IN PROMOTING COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR POHER UNCERTAIN OF THE FUTURE USES OF NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE SOME STATES MIGHT BE INCLINED TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF THEIR COOPERATION PAGE 3 RUFHOL 12582 C NATO PROVIDES A FULLY ADEQUATE ASSURANCE OF SECURITY FOR ITS EUROPEAN MEMBERS THERE IS NO REASON TO FORESEE ANY FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE EVEN IF EFFECTIVENESS AS A MILITARY SHIELD SHOULD UANE THE US IS FULLY COMMITTED -- AND WILL REMAIN SO -- TO THE DEFENSE OF GERMANY OUR SECURITY INTEREST ARE MUTUALLY SERVED BY A CONTINUING ALLIANCE ALSO THE NPT VOULD NOT STAND SECRET DECLASSIF Authority m SECRET -3- BONN 12582 IN THE HAY OF THE CREATION OF A FEDERATED EUROPEAN MILITARY FORCE D IF CONTRARY TO ALL EXPECTATIONS PRESENT DAY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE ALTERED TO DISADVANTAGE IT HOULD HAVE EUFRY RIGHT TO INVOKE ITS UITHDRANAL RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE VI AS ITS NATIONAL WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE INVOLVED THIS RIGHT COULD ALSO BE INVOHED IN THE EVENT OF EUROPEAN UNION IF THE RIGHT OF A NEH EUROPEAN GROUPING -- UITH SUFFICIENT POWERS TO CONTROL NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- TO HAVE SUCH WEAPONS CAME IN QUESTION AS A RESULT OF THE TREATY 4 IT IS PERHAPS TOO EARLY TO CONSIDER A FALL-BACK POSITION HOWEVER SHOULD THE GERMANS PROVE TO BE OBDURATE ON THIS POINT PAGE A RHFHOL 1258 AND SHOULDIT THREATEN TO BECOME A MAJOR ISSUE IN OUR RELATIONS -- AS HELL AS AN OBSTACLE TO SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIAIONS IN GENEVA THF EMBASSY RELIEUES THAT HE MIGHT FIRST OFFER TO HATER-DOWN SOMEWHAT THF SPECIFICATIONS OF THE HITHDRANAL CLAUSE AS THE GERMANS THEMSELVES HAVE SUGGESTED THIS WOULD BE A LESS PAINFUL WAY OF THE GERMAN OBJECTIONS ALTERNATIVELY NE COULD OFFER TO INTRODHCF A TIME-LIMIT CLAUSE OF SUCH 39 OR 4 YEARS THAT IT WOULD BE DEUOID OF PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF COURSE IN DETERMINING OUR FUTURE TACTICS MUCH HILL DEFEND ON THE POSITION TO BE TAKEN BY OTHER NON-NUCLEAR POVERS 6P5 MCGHEE 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