- r NODIS 94 limiter 74301 2 MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION 5 Approved in_S 5 2 67 DATE April 26 1967 Time 10 45 a m to 12 30 p m Place Villa Bonn Germany Pertici ants Secretary of State Dean Rusk 'Ambassador George C WCGhee Walt Rostow Special Assistant to the President William D Krimer Interpreter PEG Foreign Minister Willie Brandt Ambassador Knappstein Theodor v Gutenberg Parliamentary State Secretary Foreign Office Conrad Ahlers Deputy Press 1 pokesman Guenther Harkort Assis1an Secretary Foreign Office Heinz weber Interpreter Poreign Office Copies to 3 3 Amembassy Bonn EUR White House ACDA Followinga exchange of pleasantries regarding excellent arrange- made by the Germans for the funeral the Secretary informed Foreign Minister Brandt that Ambassador Fosrer anc Ambassador Beer in USSR had met in Geneva yesterday and that the Soviets -ppaa 1ntly were not at this point ready to accept Article In actizion to the Non-Proliferation Treaty the ol lowing subjects repor211 in Bonn' 5 128-50 NODIS attached were - 1acussed monetary '- orn tie IMF international liquidity the Kennecy Round and the world 01 pr u i a DLCL 1 9 6 - 9 3 1 13 em-o PHESE -2- of the NPT Also there were some substantial differences on the interpretation of Articles I and II with reference to possible EurOpean unity arrangements ToiAmbassador Foster s remark that in view of these difficulties perhaps there would be no treaty Roshchin replied that that might very well be the case On the other hand the Secretary personally believed that given agreement on the central question all other questions should be capable of solution In his view the main so much - the NATO powers as other parts of the world for example if Israel were to develOp nuclear arms the Arab states would probably do likewise Also if India deveIOped its own nuclear capability Pakistan would feel forced to follow suit The Secretary thought that in our discussion with Ambassador Knappstein in Washington we had been able to meet most of the points raised by the Federal Republic so that if in fact a miracle occurred and the Russians accepted Article further progress ought to be possible Foreign Minister Brandt replied that British Prime Minister Wilson had jokingly Spoken to him yesterday of 52 amendments made by the Americans as a result of Gennan objections In fact however there were only 25 As he had indicated to the Secretary earlier his government was going to present the NPT case to the German Bundestag tomorrow and would ask the House to understand that there were a number of questions which should not be discussed His government would once again emphasize the great importance it attached to the idea of non-proliferation and to the further steps toward nuclear disarmament that would be required of the nuclear powers by the Ereamble to the NPT There was a strong feeling in Germany that it would be easier to put the NPT into a broader framework if it were limited to a period of say 5 years This would mean that all participants would be under the obligation to use this time period for the purpose of develOping disarmament measures further He hOped the Secretary knew that when the Federal Republic raised these various questions it was not doing so for the purpose of acquiring national control over nuclear weapons but rather because it was concerned over the effect of the upon the development of the Alliance and upon East-West relations The Secretary made one point about the difficulty of attaining real steps toward nuclear disarmament on the part of the nuclear We Passeavs' w COW at mu meme -3- owers arising out of the fact that Communist China and France had not signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and would not sign the NPT He was sure Foreign Minister Brandt was aware of the efforts we were making to try and engage the Soviet Union in ABM negotiations This represented a major effort on our part to prevent the nuclear arms race from rising to a higher plateau How difficult a job it was to achieve nuclear disarmament was clearly indicated as far back as 1945 by the Baruch Plan when we indicated that we thought even one nuclear power in the world was one too many Diffi- cultie are encountered in the inSpection problem and there as anorher consideration effective nuclear disamament might indeed mean that the defense budgets for conventional _rns 5 various European countries would have to be increased We dic not know if nuclear disarmament was possible but the Secretary thought that limited steps_could be worked out On the question of the duration of the Treaty he could see the point that a Treaty indefinite as to duration would be affected by any future develOpments in NATO FrOm a constitutional point of view beginning in 1969 NATO members would be permitted to withdraw from the Alliance There was no reason why a change in the status of the NATO Alliance which affected its ability to provide for the security of the remaining members could not be considered to be an Extraordinary Event under the terms of the NPT making it possible to invoke the withdrawal clause In his view there was no question that the NPT would bring about certain tensions in NATO but this situation would be far worse if indeed nuclear proliferation were permitted to occur Foreign Minister Bran said that the President had the other day mentioned the problem he faced at home in maintaining U S engagement in EurOpe In that connection Chancellor Kiesinger also had many problems It was clear that in the Bundestag there was no negative majority against the NPT but there were doubts as to the political framework in which the Treaty was to be incorporated He appreciated the c00peration of the Department of State and ACDA in trying to resolve German reservations about the NPT but thought that the question of the duration of the Treaty and also a strengthening or possible revision of the provisions for withdrawal would make it easier for Chancellor Kissinger to get broader support - POW saseff7Noprs -4- Ambassador KnappStein said that many of the reservations east the NPT in Germany had to do with the fact that the German government was being asked to tie its hands on matters which were unknown at this time For example suppose eight year from now technological development had reached a stage in which it would become possible to excavate the foundation for a 'nouse oy means of a small nuclear- charge the feeling a that Ger-many be cause of the NPT would be unable to take acvantage of such a new technological develOpment The argument that once 'he Treaty had expired in say five years everyone would immediate_y s are p1 rocucing atom bombs was ndzconvincing I view of the technological uncertainties of the future pe0ple thought thata from a certain cay on the parties to the' Treaty should nave achance to terminate their membership in it just as participants in NATO would be able to leave the Alliance The Secretary remarked that it was interesting to note how after 4 years of talking about the NPT with everyone in the UK and elsewhere heartily in fever of the idea of preventing non-proliferation by-a Treaty suddenly when prOSpects for its conclusion had become more immediate many countries were taking the position that they now needed time for reflection and consideration that this was serious business indeed Foreign Minister Brandt said semewhat the same feeling prevailed about the question of German unity Some of his korwegian friends had asked him if German unity had come any 'oser to realization if so they would have to give it some ri ions consideration before agreeing to the idea offhand posing the US did manage to reacH agreement with the Soviet Jn1ion on the quite apart from the question of duration he believed that in Geneva we would be confronted by a number of those at the negotiating table with other questions as well He understood from the Belgian Foreign Minister yesterday that - Belgium would probably reserve the right to issue a declaration to the effect that nuclear powers be required to provide assurances that they too would make efforts toward nuclear disarmament at the very least that they not add to their nuclear arsenals U U 0 r I PERU 1 sgcgEE7N0DIs PRESERVATION COPY WK Jronrs -5- _e Secretary said that he did not underestimate the as of the problems faced by other countries with In I I 9 U k reapect to the NPT For'example he was quite aware of the concert in India and Japan who were faced with Communist China as a nuclear power On the other hand if we looked down the other trail that is no agreement at all and five or ten more nuclear countries appeared on the scene that was a very prOSpect indeed He asked Mr Brandt what he thought France's position would he Foreign Minister Brandt said that he had talked about this w n some people who were very close to General de Gaulle and that it was his im ression that although France did not want to sign the Treaty de Gaulle did expect Germany to do so If however the General were asked for his advice directly he would undoubtedly advise the Federal Government not to sign 3 Foreign Minister Brandt saw the situation apart from the political problem involved it was most important that Germany not lose its links with France in EURATOM The Secretary asked him to make it quite clear in the Btndestag that as yet there was no agreement in Geneva with the Soviet Union and also to make the point that the present talks represented a major effort on the part of President Johnson to carr through extensive consultations with our allies prior to finalizing a text for the NPT The Secretary did not think that the Soviet Union's turning down Article represented its final position and he thought indeed that the difficulties in articles I and II would perhaps present more of a hurdle to vercome The Secretary pointed outdthat we could not avoid aolic statements on our interpretation of Articles I and II eoause the NPT would have to be presented at an Open Senate tearing and it would be difficult to move ahead if the Soviets isagreed with our interpretation as stated to the Senate Foreign Minister Brandt thought that perhaps the problem could be generalized and be discussed not only as a EurOpean but as a regional problem If a United States of EurOpe did come about then such a grouping would have to organize its nuclear relations with other countries and could make use of the with drawal clause This was not his argument but rather Ambassador McGhee s as he understood it from previous conversations with_him o m zoch 41 0 hurt I Mn Um cOHmmu mw nm mUa oummn wm no Mn Hw noch Um no uscowmm ode H5 nUm m mnn om anummn mwmm amamb Joan m a modmw m mH swam wwno 19m mmonmnmuw deHmm mu m n m mww Hmaonm 3005mm 03 can om 1st m m w mw noavnumnwo g n om mam 3mm Esau Baum wmeww 1 In                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu