MEMORANDUM OF EAEE April 26 1967 TIME 10 30 a m 12 30 p m Chancellor Kissinger's private residence Participants US President Johnson Harry Obst Interpreter gt Press Secretary Christian LasthWe minutes FRG Chancellor Kissinger Hermann Kuesterer Interpreter 4 x Press Secretary Von Hase last twe % minutes stated that he had been thinking Chancellor Kiesinger about their earlier conversation and would like to repeat the following 1 His government was strongly interested in maintaining good relations with the US its government and the President 2 The President had been a little annoyed about some of the comments coming out of Germany recently that had contributed to a certain strain of relations He wanted to assure the President that his government would do everything possible not to cfeate any difficulties for the us He did not intend to make any statements on the matters discussed between them that would tend sw ' Copy LBJ Library -2- to involve him in any efforts by any party directed against the President or the US government The German Gover ment was aware of the big burden and heavy responsibility the Peesident has to carry and did not want to add to it In general he first would like to say how happy he was to be able to be with the President though the occasion may be a sad one The very fact of the two of them meeting for the first time was more important than any of the individual decisions they 'would have to make in the coming weeks and months He would like to emphasize that he himself his government and the majority of the two ruling parties wanted good relations with the US and trust the President and the US As a matter off xfactithey did ti not only want to continue those good relations but indeed triedx try to make them better and closer fwo days ago the President had talked to him about his concern fof goalkeeping certain subjects more in the family circle He agreed with that In the last year the Hermans had some worries It had been necessary for him to make certain public statements at certain Copy LBJ Library times but anything that he or Vice Chancellor Brandt had said had always appeared in the American news media magnified and exaggerated 1n the light of this experience he would tend fo be more cautious in the future As regards German public Opinion and he was ainaxd always following reports on this matter closely there seemed to be general conviction that permanent reconciliation between France and Germany'would have to be established On the other hand he would like to emphasize that the same peeple just as much advocate 3nd good relations and close cooperation with the United states These two sentiments were not in opposition to each other t He believed that at thistime public opinion in the FRG was more favorable to the US than in any other European country He would also like to say a word about the occasional doubts that had arisen in the ERG These doub were not so much about the President's actions but had arisen fromj h general develOpments For some US years there had been the question whether some change of policy Ji S iveesus EurOpe had taken place_ Anx thing that could be done to allay these doubts would be advantageous He did not want to discuss this matter in great detail However he'wanted to assure the President that it did not amount to a crisis of confidende Such doubts could be understood put o the fact that the cold war had abated to a bamwe certain extent and that people had not yet 95Ee 3adjusted to the new period preperly President Johnson interjected that he was familar with those doubts and agreed that some of them were due to the change in c climate'in the cold war He believed that current German public opinion presented a big probleml Once a wife started to believe that her husband might be unfaithful the situation was dangerous So far the United had States had not reduced is troop tevel in EuroPe and not given up its support and efforts in other areas di g se the serious balance of payments situation The question wasjifl oul continue such 2 a policy in the face of so many doubts During the last six months the US press each day had been full of statements about German Cgpy Libra 11 7 I- doubts lack of faith in US policy and questionigg of our commitments He could not quite understand what was really causing those doubts The US was maintaining over half a million CDOOPS in EgrOpe and spending over a billion ddlars there annually This very morning Secretary of Defense McNamara and Under Secretary Katzenbach were testifying under oath before Congressional committee The first question that would surely be put to them would be Why do we not pull out of EurOpe in the fad of the changes that have taken place The closer ties between Chancellor Kiesinger ar de Gaulle the Eur0pean statements about detente and other reasons would certainly be brought up by peOple like Senators Fulbright and Mansfield Mr McNamara would have a hard time to make them believe anything ll ag Chancellor Kiesinger stated heunderstobdXif the US were to withdraw some forces at this time it was planned to cut the number of aircraft in half The people would ask why does the United States not try simultaneously to make the Soviets agree to 7 similar cuts The US had introduced the rotational plan which Copy LBJ Library G k e phe considered to be reasonable The people would ask 'why would it not be possible for the US to try to get some ommitment from the Soviet Union which would tend to lessen the danger of wantout of the negotiations_on the Hon-Proliferation Treaty They felt if there'wmn were changes to be made there should be some reciprocity on the other side He had been told by de Gaulle in Paris on January 13-14 that he even Adenauer were too nhnninnx obedient to the tnited States He had answered de Gaulle that he was not obedient to the US Certain changes had taken place since the height of the cold 'war During that period US and German interests had been in Europe completelpridentical He realized that US policy had to follow the US interests This was legitimate He also believed that Bonn and Paris should not proceed on anything without the knowledge of Washington Both sides should reviewthere their interests are identical as well as where the areas of friction are They had neglected to do this until now Copy LBJ LibrarY -7- In the final communique in Paris he had stated that France and Germany agreed on certain matters However he had stated the disagreements for instance on NATO 'with equal clarity He had made this very clear to the public and had emphasized that the FRG fully supported an integrated NATO There was no dnzgaxx danger that the PEG would drift away from the US This he had also stated clearly in a speech in the Bundestag However P1 1 in - -v1certain peopb ma end use of his public statements on certain matters to their r he could not preventitr trv o exploit them advantage and He would like to say a few frank words also withmgard to his predecessor Ludwig Erhard He had a very high regard for Erhard's excellent as Minister of Economics However the German people thought that his foreign policy was a little naive that he failed to analyze the situations in depth and failed to recognize at times where the true interests lay The people believed that he failed when he visited the President last year This failure was one of the major reasons that the Copy LBJ Library 8- German public had lost confidence in him His party prior to that had had a constant majority in public polls This had_ dropped to 38% during the final days of the Erhard administration The Social Democratic Party at that time had received over 50% of the votes taken by the public opidg njpolls Now happily1 the Chiistian Democratis were above 50% again He was happy about this fact as otherwise the coalition might break up if the Social Democrats should receive a majority This tendency had been reaffirmed in the elections last week in Schleswig Holitein where the SPD had not received the landslide they had heped for The doubts about a changed US policy he believed started as early as the last period of the Eisenhower administrationoa He 'wanted to make clear however that there was no real distrust about the present rekmionship between the US and the Soviet Union However there were some pun people who were saying that the US had sold out to the Soviet Union and was no longer supporting the cause of German reunification Some of this might just be the resul of so many years of frustration on matters like German reunificatior Copy LBJ LibrarY The President had asked why the Chancellor thought that such doubts were already present during the Eisenhower administratic The Chancellor replied he thought this started with the Camp David meeting with Khrushchev The peeple believed that 1 0% H7 01 Eisehhower had been too trust ng and adde gem this came the former constant warnings Adenauer Some of these doubts were allayed by President Kennedy through the excellent speeches he made during his visit to Germany However later the same doubts arose again After a period of'distrust it seemed to him that during the last meeting with the dying Adenauer the latter seemed to have he reached a point of trusting that Chancellor Kissinger would follow the general direction of policy set by Adenauer The Chancellor stated he strongly believed in the necessity for close ties between Germany and France but without the romantic attitude' on this question that Adenauer had displayed He Kiesinger was convinced that it was impossible to guarantee German security and find solutions to the German problems Copy LBJ Library -10- 'without the United States Solutions to these problems could not be found by any drastic actions but only by a gradual approach and by creating an appropriate climate Most of the German people had no illusions about this matter and realized it would take a long time If the US and Germany would stand united show trust in each other and support each other's interests as far as possible those doubts should be appeased The people realized that a certain relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States was necessary in the view of the power and the heavy responsibility of these two countries Otherwise the result might may be disastrous Some people were talking a different language but they should let them talk because it did not matter as long as the leaders would consutt each other closely and make their own decisions said The President nmpahizud the Chancellor should make no mistake about the US determination to suppont German reunification and the Alliance He was aware that the Soviet Union kept making attack on the PEG However he invited the Chancellor to appoint Copy LBJ Library -11- his best research man on these matters to make a comparative chart of Soviet accusations made against Germany and those made against the US President He was convinced he would come out number one on such a comparative chart The President stated he had very strong feelings about the real nature of the Soviets just as much as Adenauer did He just did not talk so much about them an The Chancellor said it was shameful inwhathlana way the Soviet Union could permit itself to attack the FRG in foreggn capitals The only European ally that had spoken up in defense of the PEG had been President Saragat of Italy If the Soviets were to attack one of his allies like this he certainly would speak up in his defense with determination Many people did not realize the complexity of the situation the domestic antagonism against the President and the immensity of the problems he was facing in South East Asia and other parts of the world He wanted to repeat again that despite existing doubt there was no present crisis of confidence no serious situation Copy LBJ LibrarY -12- There had been a feeling that Erhard had not taken a firm enough stand on the Offset problem during his last visit in Washington He Kissinger was happy that a solution had been found for this King problem now He had been forced to take a firm stand not las - propaganda because of the threat emanating campaign of the NPD The NPD'was not only composed of national socialists but contained a great number of what the French would call i e mostly disgruntled small businessmen and a few old hard-core nationalists The NPD knew that its campaign could only succeed if the party'was able to create anti-American feelings in the Germs population Fortunately they had received less votes during the last two state elections than they had expected The elections in Schleswig Holstein were a hopeful beacon as the NPD had only been able to poll 5 6 aof the vote in this state which is tradition ally very nationalistic Gallop polls indicate that these national strength does not exceed Their propaganda plus statements by Adenauer on thelMorgentha rplan and his declaration that the US had turned its back on EurOpe and did not really see the magnitude Copy LBJ Library of the Communist threat had contributed to the doubts they were talking about He wanted to reemphasize however that these 'were not major doubts and could be ceped with On the Non Proliferation Treaty the Chancellor saluted 's the President intervention through whiCh some important pnikm s points had been clearedn up The individual points of the present text he considered acceptable but the question was if the Hi FRG could accept the Treaty out of the consideration of its relationship with the Soviet Union The FRG had alone committed itself to forego nuclear weapons in the WEU agreements and had reiterated this policy'unni repeatedly in public The FRG wanted better relations with the Soviet Union hug but was running into such statements as Koo gin's declaration in London that it would have to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty whether they iikedxix it liked to or not There was a strong group in his own party disliking the Treaty and the Bavarian branch of the party had voted against it altogether There was also some opposition in the SPD The question was what could be done to meet the desire Capy LBJ Library -14- of the US to have the Treaty and get the necessary approval in the Bundestag Many people including himself and Prime Minister Moro felt strongly that the Treaty 3 should be of a limited duration Five years had been suggested but he himself felt that such a period would be too short and he would consider ten years more acceptable During the ten years one could see what could be accomplished on disarmament and hDW'GermanFSoviet relations would develop Then one would be in a better position to talk about a possible permanent Treaty hThe idea of a limited Treaty was spreading fast It might be useful for both of them to resume discussing the NPT after the US congressional hearings and the fonth coming Bundestag debate weuld have been concluded He was not an eXpert on the liguidity QuestionI It had not been possible to get French cooperation on this matter He would have to explore it further to try and find out where the diffirultie were located On the reduction of troogs he was prepared to do all that COPY LBJ Libf fY -15- he possibly could He favoredQ B first explor Bthe matter further in joint discussions It would have to'be reViewed in the light of the needs of European security and in the light of future deVeIOpments the changes exPected in China during the next ten years The thinking of the FRG on these matters 'was not guided by egotistical motives The common good was very much on their mind The Chancellor then asked the President if he had any thoughts on a possible gisit in Washington He said he was prepared to come at any acceptable time The President might want to think about the possibility of including their principal assistants for the remainder of the talk and what to tan tell the press He would suggest tella the press that they had friendly and comprehensive discussions that they wanted to continue the close and fr endly relations that had existed between the countries in the past Copy LBJ Library -15- The President replied he had no objections mi to saying that to the press He said he was trying to put himself in the Chancellor's position and wondering how he could convey to him a picture o a -- - the problems that the Chancellor had with those that the President had without becoming mg argumentative or disagreeable He believed that the picture on German sentiment and German public opinion painted by the Chancellor was about correC' He was of the opinion that in the next few months public feeling here and public feeling in the US would somehow jell and move jointly into one direction_or into the other He was disturbed and doubtful about the state of German public Opinion at this time and still was not sure what was really causing change of government in Germany the sentiments of former Chancellor Adenauer de g le's reproaches on being too obedient or'whatever else itimay be While this was going on in Germany there was a similar type of unfaithful husbandn-wife thinking towards Germany Copy LBJ Library in the United States Peopb were saying to themselves Why should we continue to Spend over a million dollars Why should we keep on Kmaintaining our troops there Why should we not let them handle their own defense They are grown up now They have rebuilt their countries They can take care of themselves They have a better balance of payments situation Why should we stay if de Gaulle feels we should get out if the Germans dcubt us Why should we not talk to them in terms of the 20th century in terns of planes and rockets rather than in 19th century terms of ground troops If they are looking for defense protection by the French why not let them do just that The President repeated that he had congressional hearings starting this very day in which many of these sentiments would be echoed He also repeated that 13 of his own party leaders had xoted down his own suggestions on these matters in a committee He was opposing their views 100% but he did not know if he would always be able to prevail The question was what action to take in VieW'Of the sentiments in the two countries He did not want to be 1pr LBJ Library -18- the architect of the dismantling of theiAlliance However in the last months much had happened to further such a dismantling siokvm43 Aamna The European press was feeding our press And he was reading in his press ideas like LBJ did not care about EurOpe LBJ was forcing the non-proliferation treaty on them LBJ was only interested in Southeast Asia very disturbing There was a difference between your wife telling you in the secrecy of your bedroom that she thought you were unfaithful It was another matter reading it in all the papers next morning The press was saying it had beeome fashionable in Germany to be criticize independent to nrixizn the some governments believed the US to have become a second rate power the US was buddying up to the Russians Some people were doing all they could to try and divide the two countries j He wanted to be friends with Germany First of all he had no illusions about the Soviet Union not any more than the late Adenauer President Eisenhower or President Kennedy Hesalso had no illusions about the importance x necessity and desirability Cgpy LBJ Library -19 of enduring friendship and loyalty to the German people He would never want to give up this partnership He had been the first to say this when the Berlin'Wall went up was speaking up for the reunification of Germany He had made clear L u Maid shaw d ariif that would do whatever was necessary with the tr00ps stationed here He had made clear his desire to ask for concessions fromh the other Side whenever p0351ble If halve to reduce his forces to any signifkant extent he fully intended to ask the other side to make similar reductions in their troops their ABMs and to ask them also to adjust to the 20th century As far as the NPT was concerned the US was pg close to an agreement with the Soviet Union If thex'Germans really meant 'what they were saying namely that they did not want to have any nuclear arms he felt sure that a satisfactory arrangementyi for the 2 treaty could be found The US had changed the treaty at-ref WJW text 25 times just for the benefit of the FRG He still could not accept the current version The treaty was not all set and ready to be signed as he had also told Prime MinisteriMoro yesterday ol Cgpy LBJ'LibI ry 20- He did not believe the Soviet Union would accept a treaty with a time limit This seemed out of the question He was in no hurry to rush the treaty and do anything that might help the Soviet Union and hurt the Germans But at the same time he did not want to be looked uponmk as the guardian of Germany That was the Chancellor's job The Chancellor nodded approval However he would not sign a treaty directed against Germany To repeat he had changed the draft 25 times for the benefit of the FRG The US was not close to signing the treaty The latest'nlxian version also was not acceptable to the Soviet Union He was ready to cooperate with the Chancellor and Prime Minister Mar The news media constantly made it appear as if he were making a secret deal behind the barn as if he were telling the Germans to get in lin Nothing could be further from the truth The raw two sides were not close to an agreement The German people did not knothhese things The Chancellor said he had stated several times in public that the United States had been very cooperative with the FRG COPY LBJ Library -21- on the NPT The idea of limiting the treaty was mainly born out of considerations of German policy commitments towards the Soviet Union President Johnson repeated that the US did not yet have a treaty withthe Soviet Union He would have to see what progress could be made now in the negotiations He would not sign the treaty without having first consulted again with the FRG The Chancellor should not be misled by the statements of Kos yginnor by those of Mr Foster Neither of the two was WrPresident of the United States The Chancellor should make his own judgement about the President He could be sure that this President would work'with him Likewise he was looking towards Kiesinger the Chancellor of the Federal Republic and did not really much care what Mr Strauss and others might have to sag He would like to say just a few words about the two previous Chancellors Adenauer and Erhard He had had great reSpect for Adenauer and for the great accomplishments of his life Copy LBJ Library -22- However he thought that Adenauer sometimes had taken tam-41 I strong a stand vis a-Vis the Soviet Union One did not want to close a door permanently just because somebody was trying to break in We had not thought of Erhard as a softie We did not believe that he had neglected the interests of the German people He was wise to see the danger of an xi isolationist trend which was growing in momentum in the HS and he was willing to make certain concessions in an effort to head it off just as we were trying to meet German interests on the question of the growing popularity of the Erhard had left a good taste in our mouth The American peeple were not angry with Germany After 20 year of being committed all over the world they were just growing weary and wanted to go back home Chancellor Kissinger asked about the 172 planes the US intended to withdraw from Ge many The President said the figure was 144 and not 172 Copy LBJ Library -23 Chancellor Kiesgnger replied l44 planes would be one-half of the US planes stationed here The President nodded indicated his disapproval and pulled out a paper from which he determined that there were 662 planes of the US on European soil Chancellor Kiesinger replied he believed there were 288 US planes on German soil thus it would be one-half of that figure Mr Von Hase interjected withdrawing one-half of the US air force in Germany would have a strong m imp ct on the German Luftwaffe Chancellor Kissinger said he believed this would not be the time to try and make any specific suggestions on this matter He was not a military man The President asked him if he meant to say that he wanted to reserve that this decision for the future after more consultations on the expert level Chancellor Kiesinger answered yes he would They should not try to decide too many difficult problems all at once Copy LBJ Library The President summarized that there were basically four problems he was concerned with ncW3plusthe added problem of public sentiment First of all he wanted to repeat the folbwing the US as before was in favor of German reunification the US 'was determined to stand by Germany the US was prepared and ready to defend Gernany if that should become necessary The US considered Germany a trusted ally First on the NPT the US had made the adjustments wanted by Germany it was working together with German experts on this 'matter it would not sign the treaty without prior consultations at the top level -62 33 the' uestion of consultation and trust he would like to tell the Chancellor about the first meeting he had with Chancellor Erhard At that time Erhard had told him of his constant fears q Wu about the bov1et Union He had then shaken Erharcis hand and pledged to him the US would stand by his side against any aggression by the Soviet UnionH That handshake was more important Copy LBJ Library -25- than any individual assurances He had told them he would remain the friend of Germany He was ready to renew this pledge to Chancellor Kissinger The President then took the Chancellor's hand and shook it The Chancellor thanked the President for this pledge The President continued by emphasizing the importance to the US of a successful outcome of the liguidity talks He said he exPected tha fhe Chancellor would not affect our position adversely In the fourth place on the matter of tree levels the President said he expected understanding from the German side He believed the Chancellor understoodthis problem well One matter which might well be more important than any of the above'was the question of doubts Statements about feeling neglected lack of consultation hang being gjii guilty of shes complicity etc were doing much to hurt standing of the German people in the United States He reminded the Chancellor of what he had said before about the difference of saging something Cgpy LBJ Library -26- in privacy and having it all over the news media He suggested j therefore2the Chancellor put an adhesive tape on Mrg'von Hase He suggested also the ChancellOr call him directly if he should ever have any serious doubts 'What the press was writing was only helping pe0ple like Senator Mansfield It did not hurt him personally but he did not think it was good for the German people He was aware that the Soviet Union was trying to divide them%ny way they could Equally there were people in Europe trying to do the same They were both smart enough not to be influenced by this It was with this alliance between x guthe UgS$ and Germany that the survival of freedom would best be served If the Chancellor would stand by the U S as we 'were loyal to Germany nobody neither_the Soviet Union nor De Gaulle nor anybody else would be able to divide us we 5 believed that the future of Europe also depended on complete trust between Germany and the U 33 if He had never said anything unkind to De Gaulle but the Copy LBJ Library general had told him to get cum and he had left quietly without creating a scene They should not allow themselves to be swayed by the pronouncements of people like Kos zgin De Gaulle Nixon Erhard Adenauer or Robert Kennedy They were a Ey ho r the Chiefs of State and as long as they weld stand together everything would be all right f He hoped the FRG would keep its economic commitments and 4 successful Kennedy Round would be in the interest of the L up FRG as well as in the interest of the U S He trusted ghe FRG triad would try to support our interest in the liquidity 1 ts There was no agreement on the NPT yet Neither Mr Foster i5 5 not Mr Kosygin could Speak for the President He would not end the treaty without prior consultation with the Chancellor The ChancellorZ expressed his agreement with the latter suggestion He said it had been necessary for him to speak out on certain points Sometimes it was impossible to remain silent ad cz However he knew a little better now to wh-hoh extent each of his Copy LBJ Library -23- statements was being magnified by the news media in the U S He therefore agreed that it was good to exchange certain views in confidence The President agreed that it was necessary to Speak up at times One could not be a statesman without getting elected One had to have the support of the people One could not do much good without being in office he mentioned Stevenson Erhard and Goldwater Apart from the NPT theUFSf waS'working in many areas for a different relationship with the Soviet Union It had adopted a Space Treaty and was working on a Consular Treaty The Consular Treaty was not only in the interest of the Soviet Union and of the United States but in the interest of the entire free world The Soviets had plenty of peOple in the United States The interested in getting some of its people into the Soviet Union to be able to observe at close hand what was going on there Did the Chancellor follow him on this the Chancellor _nodded in surprise Copy LBJ Library -29- The President suggested that the Chancellor present his 'views on troop reduction and that they consider the question g ou cp at the highest level Both sides sheHHd-give and take until Q0 U gto a satisfactory solution'weuid be found %etails were not so important what counted was the handshake x That pledge wit would be honored beah when theusei is called The President and the Chancellor then agreed on what to say to the press after the meeting ThePresident then repeated that he was making no back- room deals with anybody that he believed there was strength in unity and disaster in division They should not let themselves be driven apart byrcolunnists or other prima donnas The Chancellor said that he was very gratified about this conversation He wanted to repeat that he would do nothing that might damage the good relations between the two countries As a matter of fact he would try to strengthen those relations 'He accepted gladly the President's suggestion to call on his advice COPY LBJ Library -30 and have joint talks and try to find solutions on any ifficulties that might come up He believed that the small worries of Germany and the uneasy feelings could be overcome He believed that public Opinion in Germany and in the Utsr wouldmove again in the direction of closer friendship The President would always find understanding here The majority of the German people were for the President because they knew that whatever happened to the U s wwould happen to the entire free world The President said he wanted to add one more thing He wondered how big the German population was -- sixty million C he Chancellor nodded aggional Those he said eat veryrwell and are dressed verxrwell but there were over three billion people in the world that were not faring so well ore of it 'i - prosperity with mJ The FRG should think about sharing some for instancejthe people of Asia and support his food program This might be worth a few squadrons to him The Chancellor assured the President of the willingness of the FRG to cooperate as much as possible He explained the Copy LBJ Library restrictions placed oh him by the bad financial situation of the Federal Government The President stated that the HESJ waswilling to give three million more tons of grab to India if the rest of the free world would match that total together He urged the Chancellor to do his utmost to support this program At this point the conversation ended having lasted a little over two hours By Harry Obst - State Department Staff Interpreter Copy LBJ Library Not 1 ix The conversation was preceded by a if teen-minute social talk with the entire Kiesinger family including Mr Kiesinger's son- in- law from Washington The atmosphere was very cordial The President during that conversation extended an invitation to Mrs Kies inger to accommy her husband to the The private conversation between the Pres idena and the Chancellor also was conducted for the most part in a very cordial manner It was noticeable that the Chancellor was feeling uneasy about the emphatic determined and simply-worded delivery of the President's thoughts He seemed unable the Chancellor to control the direction of the conversation as he norms 113 does However toward the end much of this uneasiness seemed to dissipate and it became clear that the President had made a positive impression in many reSpects on the Chancellor The Pres ident we on the other hand complete ly at ease throughout the conversation l 3 Copy 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