C02972610 3 '7 J DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelhgence Memorandum PROSPECTS FOR THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY FOR RELEASE 14-Aug 2008 Jamar 38 27 November 1968 No 1582 68 C02972610 - cvipt by an - WARNING This document cuntaius iufnrmutiun a defense of the United States w' 18 sections 793 and T84 transmission or - ctiug the untinnal the meaning 01' Title In US Code as atiun of its to or rc- mrizud pvrson is prohibited by law 031011 I swam rum-t amunm um C02972610 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 27 November 1968 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Prospects for the Nonproliferation Treaty Summary The Nonproliferation Treaty is still far short of receiving the number of signatures and ratifica- tions required to bring it into force For a variety of reasons the momentum required to bring about the treaty's speedy acceptance has failed to develop Some of the holdouts retain their earlier reservations that the treaty will impede their access to peace ful nuclear technology Others are dissatisfied with the security assurances provided Many coun- tries believe that so long as progress is not made toward actual reduction of nuclear arsenals the treaty aggravates the imbalance between the have and have-not countries Moreover the world situation generally- particularly the continuing uncertainties in Eastern Europe and the Middle East--is not a propitious one for disarmament Early US ratifica- tion of the NPT would give a boost to its prospects but inertia and delay have already taken their toll of support and will be hard to overcome Note This memorandum was produced solely by the Central Intelligence Agency It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research and the 0f- fice of National Estimates CO2972 610 Current Status 1 On 1 July 1968 the Nonproliferation Treaty NPT was simultaneously opened for signatures in London Washington and Moscow By 27 November 1968 some 83 countries had signed the treaty and four the UK Ireland Nigeria and Mexico had ratified it see Annex By its terms the treaty will enter into effect when 43 nations including its three nuclear weapon-possessing sponsors US UK and USSR have signed and ratified it A substantial list of countries have signed the treaty but have since adopted a wait and-see attitude before ratifying Of the three nuclear sponsors only Britain has rati- fied So far no momentum has developed to speed the ratification process and the treaty is a long way from entering into force Obstacles to the NPT 2 The nonsigners have raised a number of specific objections to the treaty's provisions These fall mainly into three groups security guar- antees against nuclear attack or threat guarantees that national programs for peaceful uses of atomic energy will not be impeded and imbalances in favor of the nuclear countries in the machinery to admin- ister the treaty Underlying these stated objections are deeper political concerns Some holdouts are unwilling to renounce a nuclear option because they regard it as a bargaining weapon against a hostile neighbor Others are disturbed because the treaty by formalizing and freezing the distinction between haves and have-note seems to discriminate against them Some particularly West Germany fear that the NPT seems to point toward a developing Soviet American partnership to which their national interests will be sacrificed Security Assurances 3 Naturally the sine qua non of the non- nuclears for yielding the nuclear option has been freedom from nuclear blackmail and a credible se- curity arrangement in case of nuclear attack The security assurance scheme of the NPT contemplates that the UN Security Council will act upon threat or use of nuclear weapons calling upon the US UK and USSR to counter the danger to world peace with -2- c02972610 force if necessary In addition each of the three sponsoring nuclear powers has declared its willing- ness to act through the Security Council to counter such aggression 4 The have-note have pointed out bitterly that these arrangements are not credible since any proposed future Council action could be thwarted by a permanent member's veto Among the demands for additional guarantees India has sought explicit undertakings that the US or Britain would use its nuclear capabilities to defend India Several na- tions have demanded international agreements or promises from the Great Powers that they will not use their veto Brazil and others have tried to convene an international conference on security as- surances apparently on the theory that one more attempt toembarrass the nuclear powers publicly can- not hurt 5 Most proposals to harden security arrange- ments have sought to eliminate the UN as the imple- menting mechanism The nuclear powers however con- tinue to see the Security Council's peacekeeping machinery as a protection against commitments and circumstances that might prove catalytic to nuclear war As a substitute for the security assurances they have requested thenon nuclears have also sought from the Great Powers either progress toward nuclear disarmament or commitments not to use nu- clear weapons Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 6 Another major concern to the non-nuclears has been the possibility that safeguards might de- prive them of access to the equipment material and technology essential to the development of their peaceful nuclear industries Germany has inter- preted the treaty as obliging nuclear countries to disclose all technology not strictly weapon-oriented including tHe technology involved in isotopic separa- tion and enrichment Several countries have requested express commitments between haves and have nots cov- ering thenon nuclears' requirements The idea of a fuel bank funded by the US UK and USSR has been pressed Many countries have complained that the safeguards requirements are unduly burdensome -3- 302972610 Arguments over Appropriate International Agencies 7 Several key threshold countries for ex- ample Italy and Japan have expressed fears that international politics could influence implementa- tion of the treaty with the nuclear countries oc- cupying an unduly strong position These countries have exerted great influence to create new inter- national bodies balanced in favor of the non-nuclear countries to administer the treaty instead of de- pending upon existing machinery which is more or less controlled by the nuclear countries Italy for example fears that the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA overbalanced with nuclear powers might be prejudiced in their favor in administering safeguards Italy has therefore fought to expand membership of the IAEA's governing body to include more non-nuclears cand particularly Italy The Italians also seek a permanent committee to carry on the work and to implement the recommendations of the non-nuclear conference an idea unpleasant to the nuclear powers Positions of Principal Non-Signatories B The following paragraphs discuss the pros- pects for signature in the major countries now hold- ing out Each of these countries will probably defer a decision until the US ratifies In most of them US ratification would generally encourage the proponents of signature but in important in- stances early US action would not decisively tip the scales The failure of a US ratification ef- fort of course would finish off the treaty West Germany 9 The key country in Europe obviously remains West Germany The decision for Bonn has been an agonizing one with strong feeling running both pro and con Under present circumstances there is no prospect for early action The Czechoslovak invasion has aggravated German suspicions of the Soviets and the continuing Soviet verbal broadsides against West Germany have further thinned the ranks of NPT supporters Upper echelons of the Christian Demo- cratic Union which seem to be close to the public mood on the matter contend that the Federal Republic -4- C02972610 should not risk entering into such an important undertaking with a nation whose readiness to break its word and to intervene in other countries was amply demonstrated in Czechoslovakia on 21 August Officials of the Social Democratic Party while still sympathetic to the treaty say that the Soviet intervention rendered any West German action on the NPT politically impossible for the time being A number of frequently heard arguments have been trotted out again Three are of particular interest in West Germany 1 there is no guarantee of unimpaired access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 2 there is no clear substantive linkage between the treaty and vertical disarmament and 3 German security is not adequately assured 10 Of special importance to Bonn has been the Soviet contention following Czechoslovakia that under Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter the USSR has the right to intervene in West German affairs if the Federal Republic engages in acts of provocation Some Germans have linked this obviously strained construction of the Charter with ratifying the NPT Naturally any s ch intervention would be of overwhelming international import which leads to the conclusion that the Soviet claim was probably an effort to regain the propaganda initiative after the Czechoslovak invasion This however does not eliminate concern over the issue among the Germans 11 West German action on the NPT is thus unlikely for the time being Disarmament specialists in Bonn have said that there certainly will be no action until next year at least very possibly not until after elections in late 1969 and maybe not even then But the NPT still has friends in Bonn chief among them Foreign Minister Brandt and the Social Democrats They see the treaty as an important adjunct to their policies of detente and as they revive talk of the latter they are likely to resume supporting the NPT Signatures by other key holdouts will be influential in West Germany Many in Bonn will be following the treaty's progress in the US Senate Ratification by the US particularly if it creates momentum toward ratification by other countries will in the end probably lead to West -5- - C02972610 German accession but Bonn will be in no hurry and will probably require further urging by the major powers Japan 12 Japanese leaders basically support the NPT but have reservations on certain points The Japanese wish to see further progress toward nu clear disarmament security guarantees of a higher order than those proffered and equal treatment under the safeguards provisions for all countries The latter point is of special importance to busi- ness leaders who seek protection from commercial espionage and fear that the relative freedom the US and the USSR have from safeguards gives them a commercial advantage 13 The government would like to have a Speci- fic bilateral guarantee of protection against nuclear attack from one or more of the NPT's nuclear spon- sors--a guarantee of more assured duration than the US-Japan Security Treaty--and Japan may not sign unless it obtains such a guarantee Chinese progress in weaponry is a matter of concern to the Japanese which together with apprehensions stirred up by Czechoslovakia has germinated some support for hold- ing open the nuclear weapon option 14 Policymakers will continue to follow closely the decisions of other major powers particularly West Germany and India before making any decision Ratification of the NPT by the US would not by it- self have an overriding impact on Japan In fact the Sato government would be loath for domestic political reasons to appear subservient to Washing ton by acting on the heels of US Senate ratification It will probably take favorable action by the US and major non-nuclear holdouts like West Germany and India to build up enough internal pressure for Japa- nese signature and ratification India and Pakistan 15 When the Security Council passed the se- curity assurances resolution as part of the NPT pack age India -a member of the Security Council at the -5- C02972610 time -abstained India has refused to sign the treaty and there is no indication that it will change its policy in the foreseeable future Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reaffirmed this decision in early November citing popular opposition as a ma- jor factor Additionally the government still takes a dim view of the security assurances arrangement in View of India's proximity to China and Indian policymakers remain dubious that the treaty will in fact retard proliferation The safeguards provi- sions are unpopular with the nuclear establishment in the country Also the government is quite pos- sibly taking a second look at the weapons option There seem to be few arguments that could enhance the chances of Indian adherence to the treaty at this time And as a prime example of the regional balance required to secure NPT ratification unless and until India becomes a party to the NPT Pakistan will not sign or ratify Italy 16 Italy is expected to sign the Nonprolifera- tion Treaty during the first few months of 1969 if the United States has ratified by then At present government preoccupation with domestic political un- certainties is a factor against immediate signature of the treaty However the most important element influencing Italian leaders to go along with popular feeling and sign will probably be the attitude of the United States as shown by its own actions on rati- fication Popular sentiment as reflected by most parliamentary delegates strongly favors the treaty Once the treaty is signed and presented to the Par- liament ratification should follow quickly Israel and the Arabs 17 The Israelis continue to resist signing the treaty and so long as conditions in the Middle East do not improve there is little likelihood of a change in their position Prime Minister Eshkol said recently that he saw no reason for Israel to rush into the pact He raised the issue of possible Soviet-Arab supervision under the safeguards provi- sions of Israel's nuclear program a spurious issue -7- CO2972610 since the IAEA's nuclear procedures will permit a state in effect to choose the nationality of the inspectors assigned it He also argued that Is- rael could ill afford to relinquish the nuclear option without ironclad security assurances since the Soviets might give nuclear weapons to the Arabs in violation of the treaty at any time In the meantime the Israelis' nuclear program proceeds apace 18 All of the Arab countries have signed the treaty Among them only the UAR has a peacetime nuclear program of any significance They have leveled verbal barrages at the Israelis and are clearly concerned that Israel's inaction on the NPT is indicative ofa nascent Israeli nuclear weapons development prOgram It is doubtful whether US ratification would have much bearing on Arab will- ingness to ratify Other Countries 19 Among other nonsigners are France Commu- nist China Indonesia and Australia France has never participated in the ENDC it has said it will not sign the treaty and there is no indication that this attitude is changing It no doubt wants Germany to adhere to the treaty however and prob ably will not prevent EURATOM's negotiating a safe- guards arrangement with the IAEA 20 Peking has regarded the NPT from the out set as an effort to perpetuate the US-Soviet nuclear monopoly and will not become a party to the treaty Indonesia and Australia are both bothered by their proximity to Communist China and have not yet made up their minds If a substantial landslide of sup port should develop for the treaty however it is quite possible that both would ultimately decide to affirm the pact 21 South Africa a producer of fissionable material is dissatisfied with the extent to which safeguards under the treaty would encroach on its industrialoperations even though South Africa as a member of IAEA has always cooperated with safe- guards requirements The South Africans never strongly in favor of the NPT have seized upon the -3- C02972610 Czechoslovak occupation as a reason for not agree ing to the treaty They have used this as an ex- cuse to keep available the privilege of beginning a nuclear weapons program should it appear necessary They would probably hold fast to this position de- spite a timely US ratification 22 In Latin America three key nations - Brazil Argentina and Chile--are closely linked as indefinite holdouts against signing the treaty Rio which has assumed a role of leadership among the three has consistently opposed the NPT on grounds that the potential restrictions impinge on Brazil's sovereign right'' to develop its own national nuclear programs It also points to the allegedly inadequate security guarantees and the absence of a binding commitment among the nuclear powers to limit their arsenals of nuclear weapons These attitudes reflect the traditional national sentiment that Brazil is destined for Great Power status and the government will probably not alter its view that the NPT is an obstacle to this national goal Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto who has formulated the Brazilian opposition is probably reflecting accurately widespread Brazilian nationalist sentiment 23 Argentina has taken an almost identical position and in fact is following the Brazilian lead With traditional ambitions for leadership in South America it apparently will not modify its policy until Brazil has done so Chile a tradi- tional rival of Argentina in turn will probably not sign the NPT until both Argentina and Brazil have become signatories Cuba is adamantly opposed to the treaty and will not sign 24 Mexico is the one major country of the hemisphere which has taken an active role in sup- port of the NPT and the only one in the area to ratify it thus far Its stance is a logical pro- jection of its leading role in the formulation and promotion of the Treaty of Tlaltelolco of 1967 which designates the southern half of the hemisphere a nuclear free zone -9- C02972 610 Soviet Position 25 The Soviet Union is clearly disturbed by the NPT's loss of momentum Moscow fears that any additional delay invites further efforts by the non-nuclear countries to create obstacles Like the US the Soviets have pushed hard in public and in private for signatures although the in- vasion of Czechoslovakia has impeded success 26 The Soviets themselves have not yet ratified the NPT Early US ratification would reduce uncertainty and would probably give pros- pects for early Soviet ratification a boost Expectations 27 The NPT has become so integrally tied to other international issues that to bring it into effect at an early date will be difficult under the best of circumstances With the pas- sage of time attrition of support could be fatal to it It is probably safe to say that the treaty's prospects depend upon accession by West Germany and at least one or two of the other prominent holdouts Unless a trend of ratification can be started by these countries the effects of the in- ertia of delay which have already rendered the treaty moribund could finish it off entirely 28 There appear to be several contingencies which could produce substantial new interest in ratifying the treaty If the French could be per- suaded to assume some of the obligations of the treaty--such as voluntary acceptance of safeguards West German receptivity would probably be enhanced If the Soviets toned down their anti-Bonn diatribes it would assist those Germans who favor the treaty Support from a number of countries would grow if Moscow should make a token acceptance of safeguards And naturally easing of major international ten sions over Vietnam and the Middle East would be helpful 29 Many countries have tied their willingness to agree to the NPT to progress in disarament yet ironically many of the same countries are ex- periencing unprecedented apprehensions that the Great -10- C02972610 Powers may get together too readily Although it is quite possible that US ratification of the treaty would give a boost to its prospects inertia and delay have already taken their toll of support and will be hard to overcome -11- C02972610 24- 26 27 28 29 31 32 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 ANNEX STATES WHICH HAVE SIGNED THE NPT 0n 1 Ju 1 6 U S Afghanistan Austria Barbados Belgium - Bolivia Botswana Bulgaria Cameroon - Canada Ceylon Chad Republic of China Colombia Congo Kinshasa - July 22 Costa Rica Cyprus Czechoslovakia Dahomey Denmark Dominican Republic Ecuador - July 9 El Salvador Ethiopia - Finland Gambia - Ghana Greece Guatemala Haiti Honduras Hungary Iceland Iran Iraq Ireland ratified Ivory Coast Jordan Kenya Republic of Korea Kuwait - Aug 15 Laos Aug 20 July 17 July 23 Sept 5 Sept 20 July 26 July 10 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 SO 51 52 53 S4 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 unless ot erwrse in icated Lebanon Lesotho - Liberia Libya July 19 Luxembourg - Aug 14 Malagasy Republic - Malaysia Maldive Islands - Mauritius Mexico - Mongolia Morocco Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Nigeria Norway Panama Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Romania San Marino Senegal Somali Republic Sweden - Aug 19 Syria Togo Trinidad Tobago Tunisia USSR UAR UK ratified Upper volta Uruguay VBnezuela Vietnam Yemen Arab Rep Sept 23 Yugoslavia - July 10 July 9 Aug 22 Sept 11 July 26 ratified Aug 20 ratified Aug 20 Nov 25 CO2972 610 Soere t                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu