- 11 rI DECLASSIfiED AUlhorily l I h 9'-19 16 cd-_ _- - - - - COPY ___ --------D 0 F ________ o _ COPIES il U WI 81ft IDLtUrAL p y CI 2 1'R 1L IN'li LLIU GciCC AGENCY ' nshlngton 25 D C OCf ce of tho I oput Director S Ss fll Er l Erf I D - -_ In' olllgonco 5 November 1957 Mr- M llANDUl FOil Gonoral Hobert Cutler t ir Fredricl1 III Denl born Jr hlr Gorard c Smith 1 11' Karl G Harr Jr lear admiral C D Tr10bel I believe t ' le nttached vade mocum 1s Vlell oorth your perusing arJi ponderirig Ita Buthor has boen for tho past four yeara 1n charBo of 0111' major IllBlytlcal Sov1 taBloc ShO and 1s now preparing to depart for an ' portent I lass 19nmont HiD background includes h1D tor cill trainlDEl and autho1' ahip or S rna 01' the vol uiIlos in tho oCflc ' orld ' nr II army hilltor1oB E025x1 1A lsi ROBE T AIWRY JR 'fJtclnssffitd AuJI oril 35J6 By Durotll Johnson Pate 03-01-2017 C tlFWrlJIP1 fJ I DECLASSIFIED AUlhoriIY f j Cj'-lSkl 31 Octobor 19515 ----_ _ __ The USSH Primll t' for Plann1ng I 'v 017 departing Soviet 6Jtllel't ought to b l ont tled to om I'o rthlan shot 0 - lIer o 10 mine a capsulo atrotegic approcio tlon of tho SovIet Union These are my porsonDJ views and they havo not boen coordinated w1th anyono l The USSR 1s and' is l11 ely to remaIn a p orful ne tion 8 golng ooncerll that is able to COllllnlUld gO'Ont human and natural resources 2 The USSR has many polit1cal and economic 3hortcomings aDd soviot le adero will no accomplish 011 they promiae Confllcts over the ollocatlon of lnternnl political power and over prior1tles or IIBrg1nal cho1ces e1tl' sr in economic plslUling or in toro1sn policy will occUr from t1 l e to timoD causing ul ovs or even Ilhruehchevli to topple 3 On the othO 'hand the USSR as a groat rational potlor nill not collopoa of its olm accord howover convenlent tills v ould bo for us In these circumstances chances are tho Soviet r gilC l vll11 contlnue to impress their Ol'm people and 1 oreiBn obsa ero Pith Soviot industrial and tochnological gronth 5 As a result or 1 IP'allter Jense ot security and a ne tul'al ne n ng or revolutionary eal th USSR 111 gl'adua ly evolve in tho diroction of more docent and humnne political conduct intornally and eventually toward more eivillz ed and beal'able behav or intoX llatlonally 6 Hoverthelass the Sov1et reg1l 'lO will ror a 10n8 t lm remain tundumentally host11e and compet1tlve in its doal1ngm uith tho I1clted State s Sovlet loaders ciloever they may be probcbly will ror r OBson of tato as lYell as Communist 1deology try to 1ncrease Soviet Influence OlIOI' other natioll' I1hQr lver end nhenover it cnn td thout Jsopardizing i J oun survival or substantlally reducing 1t9 OTm preotlge and powor CQ J 'I bjlJRI L c DE CLASSIFI ED K AUlho I CB'1l -27 Becnuse of the r1sk of dest t1 r lal san30 th at tirr -e 171 l' ruc on nd becl' use of a vague but SovIet loaders Ill' 1-d- b -ln on n9Vl tnble triumph for Conl2lllJ ni J JI 1 V avo no cloar war 1'1 1th the United ststes The' - o a t ttho1r orin m1litary atI'en h 1s no adequat tU 0 S a eD from us1ng 1 s olYn nucle9 r strength to ettle any stra1 egic confl1cts botl7l len the t o countries Thia g1ves o UShSR a shield for vigorous efforta to 1ncro8D6 Sov1et inl' luonco roug rad1t1onal porlerodiplomacy economic oenetratlon and political subvers10n o 8 or The Unitod States can only try to el1m1nate the Soviet comp9 tH J oll Iri et 1 t 9 To hO 6 to eliminato 1t by polit1cal l Dodling and propagands s sheer 17ish 'ul thinlcing Tho moot 1 0 Cl' ll accomolish in this Fay Ie to oncouvage favorable polit1cal evolutIonary trends 1n the USSR 10 To try to eliminato Soviot competItion by mllitary force would re ul1 1n the destruction of' most of' what ue ould be fighting to preserve Dot only 1n disputed aroa3 but quite possibly in the U S 11 Tho only altel t1ve for the United states 1s to live 1tb tho Russians 12 11' ne are g01ng to live 11th the confortably 170 aro going to have to negotiate with them 1n order to find out 1n detail what makes them tick and In order to renolve or at least dempen do o dangerous conf11cts of 1nterost 13 'f hi 13 peaceful coexistence which unhapp1ly e lot thom ' name nu tuke credit f'or Inventing tually it 10 nothing but c deacri tion of a groat-pOtier re2ationDhip bott18en t wo powora v llabls to destroy each other but div1ded by VO Bt cultural and pol1 t1cal glJ 1 l It is tho USSR 1ch is yieldlng- o abandoning its prio t ina revoltl ionary hostllityo-ln undorto klne to negotiate l'Iith the Unitod StD tea as ono groat power with another J 5 US-Sov1et negotiations ould not ach10ve mutual trust betueen Unit ed states and tho SoViet Unlon certa1nly not in the next decade 11' evor They would hOt1ever prggraas1vely 1nsu 'e ths emoval of the US-SoViot otrateg1c cOl lict from tho outrlen t m1litary e renL -SO long aD modern technology leaves mllitary poaor rougbly bQlQl'l ced--and the transfer of' 'Ghe oCl lpet1t10n tz th9 political and aconomic arena tp CQl I iI 9I'fl d tl DECLASSIFI ED Authori 'I1 '1'1'1 -16 -3 Notthb au g it is either easy or ploasant but ca U e el'a l S no o-char 1 Iinn game to play tho Unit6d Stat s should reasonably Goon taka Ule o ativ0 Ul negotiating a Xlllfln 2f 111th tho lid7o LQ ving a ide the long range9 some1 fhnt nobulous ologionl COals of ultimate Communist global triumphs the strateg lc dQmauds of the USSR at present are fa1r y limited to the roliovingl a recognition of the Soviet Union as a great poVer almost equal if not equal to the United States b negotiation of differences an the basis of the tel rito rial and strategic 9tatUG quo 111th bargains struck on a strict l1 2 rum basiso These terms are stiff but they are ualikely to get less stiffo Taking the initiative in n otiat1ng 111th the USSR at lea9t establish in 1 Iarld opInion that tho Unitsd States is no less I1lling than othOl S to settle strategiC conflicts 1 Iithout resort to 1 Iar 18 0 ould l1estern material goods technolegy and political custom are at this point in hLltory superior to 1'1 thing tho Co ists have to offer 190 20 It is only necossary for the United StataG and i t allies to mobilize their richer rssourcos ao exploi t their broader political and soclal experience to prove 3Y can build better soeioties than Ula Sovlet Communist system can States monay and a9 e ar would take It requiros that the Un1t d States maintain a booming eeono v at ho e end support a sub stant al foreign economic development program abroad It ot course elso requ 1 l'es careful strat egic plann1ng g ae ute diplomacy and closa consultctlon 1 Iith rr1endly natIons 21 This effort tIi11 eost the UnU6 the time of gifted people but not nearly so mucb o 1 o ' ' I - -'1 t ' o _ J o ' r l IIliII I f i TIl nmrt few ya3I'3g durillg Hhich a r ugh b lJ B ce of l il 1 C ry p l1 1er e tistll and S viet economic trongth is s Gill 1nf'el'ior to American strength is thG b st time there is aver 11ll aly to be fo tho United S tatas to enter vl orou ly into a negotiated truce and nollticQc oconomic compotitio'n t 1ith the USSR 2 0 23 TIle effort vould be worth hiia if it sUCCGGucd merely in depl'iving Soviot lOMers of th9il' favorite image of the United States as trigge r hal'py uarl OlI ers It 1iould inCl'3aSe American popularity in tho mutual 01 ' uncoil llittad areas It might also I eaken the bands of Commvnist lead rs in domestic planning since they have aluay relied on the capitalistic devIl to just if'y tho extraord1nnry political and economic deprivations imposed Oil their citizans Intsllectuals l I1d buraa1l Cl' Zts oeking a botter life uould certainly have greater leverage to usa in moving Soviet society t ard the normal life 24 In any cas in 11 tair CQl1fl1ct of dollar V6r9U I ruble and p l1t tcsl ao ightenment versus Comuni3t dictatorsh1p the Un1ted States ought to win hands down tIhat iz neGdad is to e cCGpt the Soviet cbellonga and vigorously proceed to tight J not lorlc1 War III n r even tho col i 1 Ia l' of t he lots Stali l1 1 st pal'ioG D but cool 111' l' of eompet tivG cocx1atGnco lsi s RAY CLnm                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu